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ABSTRACT
1960-1975 is a period of particular significance in Turkish-American relations.
The tone and contents of President L.B. Johnson's letter to Prime Minister Ismet
Iiinü on Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus dispute in June 1964 forced the
Turks to make a fundamental reappraisal of their relationship with the United
States. This thesis examines the nature of the developing relationship between
Turkey arid the United States throughout the whole period and sets it within both
a theoretical and a historical context. Seeing it as a valuable case study of a small
power - superpower alliance, it traces it from a time of almost automatic Turkish
support for the United States to one of greater independence and flexibility and
improved relations with the Soviet bloc and Third World.
After an introductory chapter, Chapter II sets out the theoretical explana-
tions offered by alliance, patron-client, dependency and influence theories. Chap-
ter III examines the foreign policy-making structures and determinants in both
the USA and Turkey. Chapter IV constitutes a detailed analysis of military rela-
tions between the two countries with special emphasis on Turkish efforts to have
a more independent policy and on the evaluation of the alliance by both sides.
Chapter V explains Turkey's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis of October
1962 and the U.S. bargaining with the USSR over the Jupiter missiles belonging
to Turkey. In Chapters VI and VII events of the Cyprus question in 1960-75 are
examined from the point of their impact on U.S.-Turkish relations. Chapter VIII
gives a detailed account of the U.S.-Turkish controversy over the alleged contri-
hution of Turkish opium to the U.S. drug abuse problem. In the final chapter,
the conclusion is reached that the U.S.-Turkish relationship in 1960-1975 was not
simply a patron-client relationship but presented a more complicated case.
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PREFACE
The year 1964, in which Turkey received the famous Johnson letter, is rightly
considered by many scholars as a turning point in Turkish foreign policy. Until
that thne foreign policy discussion among Turkish politicians and public opinion
was very rare, if not absent totally, and was far from criticising the official line.
In spite of strong disagreements over other matters, Turkish political parties and
groups had formed an undeclared consensus on the state's foreign policy decisions
and actions, seeing this attitude as a national duty. The new constitution in 1960
prepared the ground for public discussions by providing all political groups with
means to voice their ideas. But one had to wait until 1964 to see widespread
criticism of foreign policy.
Starting in the last ten days of December 1963, Greek Cypriot atrocities
against the Turkish Cypriots attracted the close attention of Turkish people and
led them to pressurise their government to intervene in Cyprus militarily. The
failure of the Turkish government to intervene in Cyprus apparently because
of U.S. pressures, including the Johnson letter with its serious threats, caused
widespread criticisms and demonstrations against the United States in Turkey.
Subsequently, in the second half of the 1960s, all aspects of U.S.-Turkish rela-
tions and Turkish foreign policy became the main subjects of public discussion,
overshadowing disputes over internal matters. Turkey's alliance with NATO and
its military relations with the USA were particularly questioned by leftist circles
and the press and some went so far to suggest withdrawal from NATO. In this
atmosphere Turkish rulers, too, felt the need to make some changes in foreign
policy by improving relations with the Eastern bloc and the Third World and
being more careful in dealings with the United States. As a part of their new
xv
approach, they took some actions in the military field, which could displease the
Americans.
The importance of these developments, which are still frequently cited by
Turkish politicians and scholars, for Turkey's foreign policy inspired me to study
them in detail. I particularly wanted to analyse views of different political groups
including ruling elites on Turkey's relations with the United States to see the effect
of public discussions on Turkey's official foreign policy line and to question the
real character of changes in Turkish foreign policy. In the meantime, to study
U.S.-Turkish relations in this period from the point of small-big state relationships
in the light of theoretical considerations emerged as an attractive option. This
necessitated the inclusion of Turkey's involvement in the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis in the research in order to see the state of the U.S.-Turkish alliance prior
to the uneasy 1964-1975 period. The subject did not attract public discussion
at that time and has not been studied by Turkish scholars but it was at least as
important as the Cyprus question and the Johnson letter for Turkey's security
and its relations with the USA. I thought it would be an important contribution
to the understanding of Turkish foreign policy and U.S.-Turkish relations to study
all aspects of this event in the light of recent revelations.
The cooperation in the military field still constitutes the basis of the U.S.-
Turkish relationship. I wanted to study it in a wider perspective by giving the rea-
sons for its establishment and continuity, noting what it was like in the 1950s and
mentioning recent developments to complete the picture. Apart from analysing
the events of the U.S.-Turkish military alliance in 1960-75, including important
actions of the Turkish government to gain more initiative in this area and the
U.S. arms embargo against Turkey in 1975, I also aimed to give the evaluation of
the alliance by both sides by analysing the NATO discussion in Turkish politics
in the 1960s, giving figures on military and economic transactions and explaining
Turkey's strategic importance for the USA.
The Cyprus question was of course the factor that had the most important
impact on relations between Turkey and the United States in the period under
review. In spite of the existence of many studies on various aspects of the issue,
it would be a new contribution to comprehend the implications of the Cyprus
xvi
problem for the U.S.-Turkish alliance. However, to do this within the limits of
two chapters posed a problem. The original study of this matter was itself of the
length of a whole thesis. To conform to the length limitations of a thesis, the
treatment of this subject therefore had to concentrate on the Cyprus policies of
the United States and Turkey and the effect of these policies on their relationship.
The opium issue in the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s is generally
considered a side issue in the Turkish-American relationship. The only aspects
which are normally mentioned on the subject are the U.S. dislike for the Demirel
government because of its failure to ban opium cultivation, the prohibition of
opium by the Erim government as an act to please the Americans and the re-
sumption of opium production by the Ecevit government as act of independence.
However, in the course of the study, I realised that the issue was very complicated,
had many aspects concerning internal and foreign policies and public opinions of
both states and became a serious matter at certain times even threatening the
alliance between the two countries. I aimed to give a detailed analysis of the
matter from the point of view of both sides, which had not been done before.
I should also note that I studied all events of the 1960-75 U.S.-Turkish re-
lationsliip to see how far Turkey was influenced by the United States and how
far the United States was able to affect Turkish actions on these incidents. A
seminar which I prepared for this purpose proved useful in the detailed study of
these subjects.
At the beginning of the research my aim was to visit both the USA and
Turkey to collect primary material and to have interviews with U.S. and Turkish
officials who were involved in the events studied by the thesis. Unfortunately,
the visit to the USA could not be realised because of financial problems. Never-
theless, available primary U.S. sources were obtained through the Inter-Library
Loan service. The visit to Turkey was fruitful in collecting primary sources but
was not as successful as I would have wished in talking with Turkish statesmen.
However, I did manage to have interviews with two former Turkish foreign min-
isters, one former MP and diplomat and two prominent Turkish academics and
columnists. Attempts to talk to other Turkish statesmen failed because of their
busy schedules, or unwillingness and unresponsiveness. The Turkish Presidency
xvii
and the Turkish Foreign Ministry were kind in suggesting and supplying sources,
which are unfortunately secondary. One sorrowful event which was also a loss for
the research was the sickness and later death of I. Sabri çalayaiigil, who served
as foreign minister between 1965 and 1971 and in 1975. I also tried to obtain
views of former U.S. and Turkish statesmen by sending interview letters to them.
Failure to contact some of them and lack of response from others was frustrating.
Apart from these difficulties I made the maximum use of available primary
sources to produce a solid thesis. I hope my research will cast light on future
studies on the subject made with the benefit of additional primary sources when
they are declassified.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Significance of the Study
When the United States and Turkey established alliance relations immediately
after the Second World War, foreign policies of both countries were experiencing
a radical change. As the most powerful state in the world, the United States
had decided to give up its traditional isolationist policy and to undertake global
responsibilities. The main aim of U.S. policy after that moment was to confront
and contain the Soviet Union and its bloc. The alliance with Turkey was a part of
this new U.S. approach. By aligning with the USA, Turkey, too, abandoned her
traditional neutralist policy, which had prevented her from establishing alliances,
especially with big powers. Her main concern was to be a part of the Western
world. In 1994, in the aftermath of the cold-war period, the alliance between the
United States and Turkey still constitutes an important aspect of their foreign
policies. This alliance is significant in today's world politics because it influences
events in important regions such as the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean,
the Balkans, and Central Asia, including Russia and former Soviet republics.
This study attempts to explain the basis of this important relationship and the
factors affecting it. In order to gain a thorough understanding of the relationship
between Turkey and the United States today it is necessary to know why the two
countries chose to establish their alliance and to continue it in spite of internal and
international changes that adversely affected their relationship. The relationship
is studied within the context of Turkey's westernization policy, its need for foreign
aid to develop its economy and for military assistance to ensure its security, its sen-
sitivity to foreign influences and interventions, its insistence on its national causes,
its importance for U.S. global and regional interests and strategies, the character of
the international regime, and alliance perceptions and special internal conditions
of both states. Foreign policy-making structure and factors and determinants of
foreign policies in both the United States and Turkey are also examined.
1
The period of our study (1960-1975) holds a particular importance. After
experiencing a perfect honeymoon period in the 1950s, the durability, strength
and cohesion of the U.S.-Turkish alliance were tested by severe problems between
1960 and 1975. Looking at these problems will provide insights into the current
relationslup.
In 1960 the Turkish Republic experienced its first military coup and saw a
radical change in its political system. Encouraged by military officers removing a
rightist government and by the more pluralist and pro-freedom constitution of 1960,
leftist groups launched an all-out campaign to increase their influence in domestic
politics and to this end from 1964 they attacked Turkey's relations with the USA
and NATO. The bargaining over Turkey's Jupiter missiles by the United States
with the Soviet Union during the Cuban crisis of October 1962 occurred without
public criticism and damage to the U.S.-Turkish relationship largely because of
public ignorance of the incident. However, when the U.S. response to the Cyprus
question, which emerged in December 1963 as a serious matter, was perceived by
Turkish rulers and people as anti-Turkish, the domestic politics of Turkey after that
time were dominated by criticism of the United States and Turkey's contacts with
the Americans. Military relations were particularly targeted to the extent that
the Turkish government had to force the U.S. administration to review bilateral
agreements signed since 1947 and that Turkey had to take some actions in the
military field that would not please the Americans. Such developments can be seen
in relations between two states at any time. Studying these past experiences will
help academics and politicians assess current problems in perspective and enable
them to suggest solutions with a clearer awareness of the likely consequences.
In the 1960s the most important accusation made by Turkish leftists and be-
lieved by niany others was that U.S.-Turkish contacts acquired the character of a
patron-client relationship. It was widely propagated that Turkey was dependent
on the USA in almost every field and was under the heavy influence of the United
States in its decisions and actions. Similar claims can be heard frequently in big-
small state relations. For instance, in today's Turkey Islamists have voiced almost
the same kinds of opinion. Our study questions whether or not leftists' claims
in the 1960s reflected the truth and hopes to give clues for the understanding of
current and future events.
2
In this context, one important thing which the thesis tries to explain is the
characteristics and different aspects of a big-small state relationship. Turkish-
American relations in the 1960-1975 period present a good case to analyse how an
alliance between a relatively small state and a superpower works. The transactions
between the USA and Turkey and the features of both states appear to reflect many
aspects of the patron-client relationship. The Turkish position during the Cuban
missile crisis; U.S. president Johnson's letter to the Turkish prime minister, which
included heavy threats to force Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus; considerable
U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey; the equipping of the Turkish army with
U.S. weapons; U.S. pressures on Turkey to force her to ban opium production;
and the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey, aiming to change its Cyprus policy
can all lead one to the conclusion that as a small state Turkey fell victim to U.S.
influence in this period. However, one can easily show evidence for the opposite
claim: Turkey's improving relations with Eastern bloc and Third World countries;
Turkish support for the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict; some Turkish actions in
the military arena such as not allowing U-2 flights from Turkish territory, reviewing
bilateral agreements with the USA, not allowing the use of U.S. bases for non-
NATO purposes, and changing the duty status formula applied to U.S. personnel
in Turkey; not banning opium production and later resuming it after it was banned
by a non-party government; and Turkish intervention in Cyprus all point in the
other direction.
By studying individual examples in this context, the thesis tries to provide
answers to the following important questions:
(a) In a small-big state relationship which side gets more benefits?
(h) To what extent can a big state influence and change foreign policies, deci-
sions and actions of its small ally and force her to act in a certain way?
(c) To what extent can a big state influence national causes and internal policies
of its small ally?
(d) How does a big state get iiivolved in matters concerning its small ally and
how do it react when actions of this ally seem to damage its global and national
interests? To what extent can a big state punish its small ally in these cases?
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(e) What are the difficulties faced by a small state in its relations with its
bigger ally? For instance, how can its survival be put under threat because of its
alliance relations with a big partner and how can its interests be bargained by its
big ally with other powers?
(f) How does a small state act when it faces threats and pressures from its big
ally?
(g) To what extent does heavy dependence on a big power restrict the freedom
of decision and action of a small state?
(h) How could a small state be influenced or threatened by a big power if it
did not have alliance relations with this state?
(i) How does a small state's determination on one national issue make her
reject influences and threats of its big ally?
(j) How do public consensus and pressures in one issue affect the attitude of
the small state's rulers in their dealings with a big power in this issue?
(k) What is the effect upon the views, decisions and actions of tie rulers of a
small state who are proud of its independence when they suspect it is being treated
as a satellite?
(1) How does a small state's regime affect its relations with its big ally?
(in) How and why does a small state follow the lead of its big ally in interna-
tional events even without thinking its own interests?
(n) What are the alternatives for a small state when it is cornered or deserted
by its big ally? For example, can it opt for neutrality or change sides?
(o) To what extent can a smnalj state have a flexible foreign policy and improve
its relations with enemy and other powers while having alliance relations with a
big power at the same time?
(p) To what extent can a small state take a major action in spite of opposition
from its big ally?
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(q) How does the overall international climate (bipolarity, multipolarity, tense
confrontation, detente, etc.) affect relations between a small and big state?
(r) What factors restrict decisions and actions of both sides of a big-small state
relationship? For example, how do mutual interests and the need each felt for the
other affect one side's decision to influence the other or reject the influence of the
other?
In addition to the answers to these questions, analysis of changes in Turkey's
foreign policy in the period of our study will contribute to an understanding of
Turkish foreign policy past, present and future, and will also give clues that will
help an assessment of the characteristics and prospects of small states' foreign
policies in general. In the 1965-1975 period, it appeared that Turkish rulers tried
to pursue a more independent foreign policy, remaining outside the influence of the
United States and the NATO alliance. A study of the reasons for these efforts and
the extent of their success will contribute to the current knowledge of the subject.
The thesis will also show how important internal conditions of a state are in
determining its foreign policy decisions and its relations with other states. In the
context of our study the following examples can be cited:
(a) The role of Turkish leftists and the press in opening foreign policy discussion
in Turkey for the first time and in forcing rulers to reconsider foreign policy.
(b) The effect of Turkish public opinion on Turkey's Cyprus policy and its
dealings with the USA on this issue.
(c) The role of electoral concerns in the Turkish government's rejection of the
U.S. demand to prohibit opium cultivation.
(d) The effect of public opinion on Turkish rulers' efforts to make changes in
military relations with the United States.
(e) The impact of Turkey's traditional westernisation policy on its relations
with the USA.
(f) The extent to which having a military regime influenced Turkey's recep-
tiveiiess to U.S. demands.
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(g) The effect of the U.S. Congress and the power competition between the
Congress and the administration on U.S. policies toward the Cyprus question,
Turkey's opium production and U.S.-Turkish military relations.
(h) The impact of Greek-Americait lobby groups in the United States on the
Johnson letter and the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey.
(i) The role of the U.S. public's preoccupation with the drug abuse problem in
getting the U.S. government to put pressure on Turkey to prohibit opium produc-
tion.
The thesis provides a uniquely comprehensive analysis of U.S.-Turkish rela-
tions between 1960 and 1975. Turkey's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis of
October 1962 is studied in the light of most recent revelations in great detail. The
fact that Turkey's survival was put under great threat during the crisis because
of her alliance relations with the United States and that U.S. rulers bargained the
missiles belonging to Turkey without informing her cannot be forgotten by Turk-
ish authorities as a serious lesson which will guide their future dealings with the
Americans.
Military contacts are still the basis of the U.S.-Turkish relationship and the
conditioning and amount of U.S. military assistance to Turkey continue to be a
problem between the two countries. The signing of a general military co-operation
agreement arises as a serious matter in relations at regular intervals. This thesis
examines different aspects of U.S.-Turkish military contacts and by also noting
both the previous and more recent developments it clarifies the nature of today's
U.S.-Turkish alliance. Its exposition of the ideas of defenders and critics of Turkey's
alliance with the USA and NATO in the 1960s is of relevance to the current
evaluation of this alliance.
The Cyprus problem, too, is a continuing problem of both Turkish foreign poi-
icy and U.S.-Turkish reltions. It is still a national cause for Turkey considerably
influenced by public opipion and the United States still tries to find ways to affect
Turkey's Cyprus policies. Looking at the roots of the problem and analysing U.S.
and Turkish attitudes and interactions on the matter in a historical perspective
will certainly help an understanding of the present situation, its future prospects
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and its impact on the U.S.-Turkish alliance. Any proposed solutions to the prob-
lem need to be made in the light of this knowledge. U.S. President Johnson's letter
in 1964 is a good example of a diplomatic mistake which alienated the recipient
state considerably and caused changes in its foreign policy. It is still frequently
cited by Turkish politicians and scholars in the course of discussing foreign policy
and Turkish-American relations. The U.S. arms embargo against Turkey in 1975,
which was aimed at forcing Turkish rulers to make concessions in Cyprus, is also
fresh iii Turkish minds, reminding them how the United States can try to pun -
ish their country and how the U.S. Congress can affect relations between the two
states.
The opium question was short-lived and ceased to be a problem after 1974.
However, its implications are still alive. It demonstrates how internal public pres-
sures caii lead the U.S. administration to pressurise its close ally and how easily
Turkey can attract the antagonism of American people and Congress. It also shows
how open pressures on Turkey, forcing her to act in a certain way, can provoke a
severe response.
1.2 Purpose of the Study
The aims of the study are implicit in the preceding section. The chief aim is
to examine the characteristics of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in the 1960-1975 period
and show whether Turkey was a satellite of the United States and whether U.S.-
Turkish relations fitted the pattern of a small-big or a patron-client relationship.
It examines individual examples in this context.
Secondly, the study analyses events of the U.S.-Turkish relations in the 1960-
1975 period in order to reflect their true character and reveal unknown aspects.
It aims to give comprehensive knowledge of these events with their causes and
consequences and their impact upon the U.S.-Turkisli alliance.
Another intention is to explain changes in the direction of Turkish foreign
policy. It explores the character of these changes, why they occurred, and ques-
tions how successful they were. To this end, the study analyses the ideas of anti-
American critics and the attempts of the Turkish government to implement a more
independent policy staying outside U.S. influence.
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The study seeks to explain factors affecting U.S.-Turkish relations and reasons
for the continuity of the U.S.-Turkish alliance. To achieve this it includes a dis-
cussion of determinants and formal policy-making structure of foreign policies in
Turkey and the USA.
A further important objective of this research is to discover the true reasons,
motives and aims behind U.S. attitudes toward Turkey in different incidents. In
other words, to examine whether U.S. rulers had biased opinions about Turkey
while pressuring her or whether their attitude was more or less objective. Similarly,
an attempt is made to find out true intention of Turkish rulers in their apparently
anti-American actions related to changes in Turkish foreign policy.
1.3 Scope and Focus of the Study
The thesis covers all political and military contacts between the United States
and Turkey in the 1960-1975 period. It also mentions events before 1960 and
after 1975 to explain the roots of problems and subsequent developments. The
economic aspect is briefly touched upon when it is thought to be useful in under-
standing relations, though the fact that the two nations' trading patterns reveal
their economies to be more complementary than competitive means that economic
factors were less important than military and political considerations in shaping
their relationship.1
Between 1960 and 1975 Turkey generally exported agricultural products and imported manufac-
tured industrial materials. Turkey's major exports included cotton, tobacco, hazelnuts, raisins,
minerals (incliidiiig chromium), textiles, food beverages and industrial products, while her major
immiports were iion-cicctric machulery. iron and steel products, means of transport (including motor
vcliieles). crude oil and petroleum products, electrical machinery, rubber and plastics products,
agriculture-based processed products, cereal (including wheat) and textiles. On the other hand,
time United States was one of tile leading powers in the export of manufactured goods though
manufactures also occupied the most important place in her imports. Major U.S. exports were
niaclunery. automobiles and parts, aircraft and parts, iron and steel products, chemicals, electrical,
(-oflstiUCtiofl aiid agricultural mitachinery, fuels, wheat, etc. The USA imported mainly machinery,
transport equipment, petroleum products. forest products. iron and steel products, chemicals, cof-
fee. etc. Trade relations between the USA and Turkey in the 1960-75 period fit these trade patterns
and denionstrate that tile US-Turkish trade was colnplenlentary rather than competitive. While
Turkey exported to the USA mainly agricultural products (tobacco. fruits, vegetables, nuts, some
raw minerals and metals, animal products, textile and cereals), U.S. exports to Turkey included
niainly manufactured goods (non-electric and electrical machinery, road vehicles and other tramis-
port equipment. wheat, chemicals. petroleum and products, metal manufactures, iron and steel,
textiles amid rubber products). Although in this period both Turkey and the USA exported wheat
and textiles. Turkey's exports of these products were not large enough to pose any problems to
tijeim relationship. For more detailed information on Turkish-US trade see Appendix I.
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In Chapter II, which discusses the relevant theories, arguments on the patron-
client relationship, dependency and influence are mostly related to actual issues
in Turkish-American relations between 1960 and 1975. The arguments in this
chal)ter determine the treatment of topics dealt with in detail in later chapters.
The theoretical framework established in this chapter can be used in the analysis
of present relationships as well as the relationship during the period of our study.
Similarly, the consideration in Chapter III of factors influencing foreijn policies
of Turkey and the USA assists understanding of the current as well as the 1960-1975
situation.
In the discussion of U.S.-Turkish military relations a detailed picture is given
of the relationship from its establishment up to the 1980s and where necessary to
complete the picture brief reference is made to the current situation. The general
basis of the relationship and the factors that influence it are also considered.
Turkey's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis is studied in great detail to
reach correct conclusions. Daily and even hourly developments are given where
necessary, though to keep the account within bounds summaries are provided of
certain stages, and to present a clear picture the history from 1959 to 1963 of
the Jupiter missiles, which caused Turkey's involvement in the crisis, is explained
briefly.
The Cyprus issue, which placed enormous strains on the alliance, is covered
in chapters VI and VII. Incidents of the Cyprus problem in the 1960-1975 period
which have direct iniplications for the U.S.-Turkish relationship are summarised
and more attention is directed to the Cyprus policies of the two countries and the
impact of the matter on dealings between them and their foreign policies.
The chapter on the opium problem provides a brief background from the be-
ginning of the century, describes developments between 1969 and 1974 in great
detail and summarises its aftermath until the 1980s in order to present the matter
in perspective. The need to give both sides' opinions objectively determined the
length of this chapter.
The focus of the study is of course the examination of ideas mentioned in
the theoretical chapter and their application to the events in the U.S.-Turkish
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relationship in the concerned period. The examination of alleged U.S. influences
rrk€ in these events can be given as the main focus of the thesis.
1.4 Methodology
As a first step to begin the study, I reviewed the literature, acquired a detailed
knowledge of historical events which are related to the study directly or indirectly,
and became familiar with important personalities who were involved in the con-
cerned events and with foreign policy-making processes both in the United States
and Turkey. In these early stages of the research, I also gained familiarity with the
theoretical considerations. In this way, the information that should be sought dur-
ing the fieldwork and the sources that should be obtained for the research became
clear. In order to find the answer to the main question of the study, that is whether
Turkey was a satellite of the United States, Turkish newspapers, magazines and
parliamentary records were searched and some Turkish statesmen were interviewed
during the fieldwork. Subsequently a seminar study, titled Was Turkey a Tool of
the U.S. Policy, was prepared in the light of the data which the fieldwork provided
and this paper became the guide of the research in its later stages. Other sources,
including the American ones, were obtained and used during the detailed study of
each chapter's subjects. In this stage, the problems were reconsidered and the rel-
evance or otherwise of the theories to what had actually happened was examined.
Finally, conclusions were drawn and the aspects that deserve future study when
documents become available were noted.
Since the period of our study covers very recent events many of the relevant
documents, particularly the official records, are still classified by both sides and
consequently not available for inspection. Nevertheless, every effort has been made
to consult all primary sources that are available, to gain further insights by inter-
views and correspondence with influential people who were personally involved in
the events concerned and to supplement this with recourse to extensive secondary
sources and the considered views of scholars and commentators who have reflected
at length upon various aspects of this subject.
First of all, almost all published and declassified primary documents concern-
ing U.S.-Turkish relations in the 1960-1975 period were used during the course of
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the research. These primary sources include public statements of governments, for-
eign ministries and other interested ministries; agreements between Turkey and the
United States; joint communiques announced at the end of official talks between
the two states; statements of officials of both sides; memoirs of statesmen; par-
liarnentary discussions in Turkey and congressional hearings in the United States;
bulletins of foreign ministries; interviews with former Turkish foreign ministers,
etc.
The author's interviews with former Turkish foreign ministers Osman Olcay
and U. Haluk Bayülken, former Turkish MP and diplomat Kamran Inan, Turk-
ish academic Seyfi Ta.han and retired Turkish academic and columnist Fahir Ar-
maolu were helpful in clarifying some events of Turkish-American relations and
understanding characteristics of Turkish foreign policy.
In order to get the whole picture of the Turkish side on U.S.-Turkish relations
the author spent great amount of time going through all issues of major Turkish
newspapers and magazines and records of Turkish parliamentary discussions in
the period of 1960-1975. The Durham University Library and the Turkish Grand
National Assembly Library provided means for this effort. Duygu Sezer's book,
Kamuoyu ye Dz Politika, too, was useful in pointing to other articles in numerous
Turkish newspapers. Newspapers and magazines had the additional merit of giv-
ing the general atmosphere of Turkish domestic politics at that time and providing
official statements and news of U.S.-Turkish contacts. Articles by Turkish states-
men, academics, politicians and columnists in these papers reflected the opinion
of the Turkish government, opposition and public. Records of parliamentary dis-
cussion undoubtedly provide a good contemporary evaluation by the government
and opposition of the U.S.-Turkish alliance and its associated events.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry's bulletin, the semi-official Turkish magazine,
Foreign Policy, and official books on the visits of Turkish Presidents and Prime
Minister to the USA and on the opium question provided for the thesis official doc-
uments, records of events, and statements and articles by Turkish officials. The
book by Nihat Erim, who was the Turkish representative in the Geneva talks of
July-August 1964, provided a first-hand account of Cyprus events. Series of articles
and hooks by Metin Toker, the son-in-law of Turkish prime minister Ismet Inönü,
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too, were useful in conveying information on different topics, including the Cuban
missile crisis and the Cyprus question. Haluk Ulman, who joined the Geneva con-
ferences in July and August 1974 as a member of the Turkish delegation, gave the
account of these conferences from the Turkish point of view. Books and articles
by other Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials including Turkish Cypriot leader
Rauf Denktash supplied official documents and the viewpoint of the Turkish side
on the Cyprus question. The author made a detailed use of books of Turkish
political leaders and party and government programs in preparing the section on
foreign policy-making structure of Turkey. M. Tamkoc's book, the Warrior Diplo-
mats, and the thesis of J.E. Sowerwine, too, were helpful in this subject. Turkish
Prime Minister Demirel's long press conference in February 1970 greatly assisted
the study of U.S.-Turkish bilateral military agreements. The author also bene-
fited from books by retired Turkish admiral Sezai Orkunt and Senator Haydar
Tunçkanat as these included opinions of Turkish military officers and official doc-
uments of U.S.-Turkish military relations. The Turkish Finance Ministry's book
was used in preparing the tables of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey.
On the American side, hearings in the U.S. Congress provided a detailed ac-
count of views of U.S. congressmen and officials on the opium question, U.S.-
Turkish military relations, the arms embargo and the Cyprus problem. Reports
prepared by the Library of Congress servicemen for committees of the U.S. Congress
clarified the U.S. position amid gave detailed information in various subjects includ-
ing U.S. bases and facilities in Turkey, Turkey's strategic importance for the USA,
the Cyprus question, and the arms embargo. Memoirs by some U.S. statesmen sup-
plied first-hand accounts of some events: Truman's memoirs on the Truman doc-
trine, George Ball's memoirs on the Cuban missile crisis and on the Cyprus ques-
tiomi in 1964, Henry Kissinger's memoirs on the Cyprus crisis in 1974 and Jimmy
Carter's memoirs on the foreign policy-making structure of the United States. The
memoirs of Robert Kennedy, U.S. Attorney-General in 1962 and brother of Pres-
ident Kennedy, were used in the chapter studying the Cuban missile crisis and
due attention was paid to time memoirs attributed to Soviet Premier Khrushchev.
Books and articles by former U.S. ambassadors, James W. Spain, George McGhee
and Monteagle Stearns, too, contributed to the study. Documents provided by
U.S. and British sources before 1960 were used in the explanation of military re-
lations in the 1950s. The author also made the use of U.S. public laws concerning
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Turkish-American relations. Figures of assistance to Turkey were obtained from
the book published by the U.S. Agency for International Development. On the
Cuban missile crisis, the author benefited from books of former U.S. officials who
were actively involved in the crisis as close aides of the President and saw the
classified documents. Some declassified documents, White House Tapes, were also
obtained by the author. U.S. official Harvey R. Weliman's article was particularly
useful in presenting the U.S. government's position on the opium question. Books
and articles of former U.S. officials and U.S. experts on Turkey such as George Har-
ris, Ferenc A. Vali, Dankwart A. Rustow, Richard C. Campany, etc., too, helped
the author in analysing U.S.-Turkish relations.
Some third-party sources were also used for our research. Middle East Record
provided summaries of events and voting patterns in the United Nations. Keesing 's
Contemporary Archives were helpful in tracking down international incidents con-
cerning U.S.-Turkish relations. International Organisation was used for the record
of U.N. discussions on the Cyprus question. The Journal of Defense and Diplo-
macy, Jane's books on weapons and SIPRI's book supplied figures for Turkey's
military equipment supplied by the United States. The correspondence between
the Turkish and Soviet premiers, Khrushchev and Gürsel, and between U.S. Presi-
dent Johnson and Turkish P.M. Inönü were obtained from Middle Eastern Affairs
and Middle East Journal. Memoirs of Greek statesmen, Andreas Papandreou aiid
Dimitri S. Bitsios, cast useful light on the Cyprus question from the point of U.S.-
Turkish relations. The author also benefited from the thesis of M. Allan Turner
on the opium problem between the USA and Turkey. Finally, he also consulted
numerous secondary sources.
1.5 Outline of the Study
Chapter II examines the U.S.-Turkish alliance in the light of alliance theories by
pointing to reasons for the establishment and continuity of this alliance and factors
affecting its general situation and its cohesion. U.S. and Turkish perceptions of
their alliance are also considered in this section. By using theoretical studies on
these subjects the chapter then questions whether U.S.-Turkish contacts gained
the character of a patron-client relationship and whether Turkey was dependent
on the USA in different areas. Finally, the chapter examines the U.S. influence on
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Turkey and mentions some minor events of U.S.-Turkish relations between 1960
and 1975 in this context.
Chapter III provides the framework and background of subjects examined in
the following chapters by explaining determinants, factors and policy-making struc-
ture of U.S. and Turkish foreign policies in the light of historical incidents.
Chapter IV analyses all events and problems of U.S.-Turkish military relations
from the establishment of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in 1947 to the lifting of the
arms embargo in 1978 and mentions some important developments after 1978. It
explains how and why this alliance was formed and then developed in the 1950s.
After shortly mentioning developments of the Turkish junta period, the chapter
examines the importance of the Johnson letter in 1964 for the U.S.-Turkish mil-
itary alliance. Then, the Turkish government's initiatives to make some changes
in military relations with the USA, influenced by widespread public criticism, are
considered at length. Views of Turkish critics who defended and those who crit-
icised Turkey's alliance with the USA and NATO are analysed in the following
section and then military relations of the 1970s including the arms embargo are
briefly described. Finally, the chapter gives figures on military and economic assis-
tance and military equipment which Turkey received from the USA and analyses
Turkey's strategic importance for Washington, including U.S. bases and facilities
011 its territory and its position vis-a-vis the Middle East.
Chapter V constitutes a detailed examination of Turkey's involvement in the
Cuban missile crisis because of the U.S.-supplied Jupiter missiles on her territory.
First, it exJ)laiflS why aI1d how the Jupiters were stationed in Turkey over a long
period of time and became the subject of U.S. attempts to remove them. Then, it
mentions the role of these missiles in the Soviet move to deploy nuclear missiles to
Cuba. After giving a detailed account of discussions among U.S. officials during
the crisis on the possibility of trading the Jupiters with Soviet missiles in Cuba
and citing the Soviet proposal on this, the chapter describes how Turkey came to a
be a first target of a nuclear war whose outbreak became highly possible. Then, it
explains how the United States made a secret deal with the Soviets on the Jupiters
to cud the crisis. In the final section, the chapter gives Turkey's attitude during
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the crisis and analyses implications of the Cuban crisis and the removal of the
Jupiters for Turkey.
Chapter VI, which describes developments of the Cyprus question between
1960 and 1965, starts with explaining how the USA was involved in the matter and
worked to station NATO soldiers on Cyprus. In this context, it gives the account
of George Ball's visit to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and U.S. pressures on Turkey
to prevent its intervention in Cyprus. After mentioning the U.S. attitude during
the U.N. Security Council discussions on the Cyprus question in March 1964, the
Chapter explains how President Johnson tried to prevent a Turkish intervention
in Cyprus by sending his famous letter to the Turkish prime minister in June 1964
and later tried to mediate between Greece and Turkey on the matter by talking
to the Turkish and Greek prime ministers in Washington. The following sections
provide information on the Geneva talks between Turkish and Greek delegation in
July-August 1964, mediated by Johnson's special envoy Acheson, the August 1964
Cyprus crisis and U.S. and Turkish policies and interests on the Cyprus question.
Chapter VII focuses on the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July and Au-
gust 1974 from the point of U.S.-Turkish relations and the subsequent U.S. arms
embargo against Turkey. It starts with explaining the U.S. role in Greek-Turkish
secret talks on the Cyprus question between 1965 and 1974 and in ending the
November 1967 Cyprus crisis and then mentions Cyprus policies of the USA and
Turkey in the 1967-1974 period. Subsequently, the chapter analyses the Cyprus
coup and the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus by focusing on U.S. role in
and U.S. attitude toward these events. U.S. reactions to Turkish actions during
this critical period are particularly emphasised in this context. Finally, the chapter
analyses the arms embargo imposed by the U.S. Congress on Turkey in detail with
its causes, consequences and implications.
Chapter VIII is a detailed account of U.S.-Turkish controversy over the opium
production of Turkey mainly between 1969 and 1974. Firstly, it summarises the
history of the problem until 1969 and then explains views of U.S. officials on
Turkey's opium production and their efforts and pressures on Turkish rulers to
achieve the prohibition of opium cultivation in Turkey. After describing Turkish
rulers' views on the problem, their efforts to prevent illegal opium production and
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trafficking and the reasons of their failure to ban it completely, the chapter analyses
the Turkish opium ban in 1971 with its reasons and implementation. Finally,
the chapter examines the U.S.-Turkish controversy surrounding the resumption of
Turkish poppy production in 1974 by mentioning the views of Turkish authorities
and the reaction of the U.S. administration and Congress and summarises the
aftermath of the problem.
The final chapter of the thesis contains a general evaluation of U.S.-Turkish
relations between 1960 and 1975 and a summary of the findings of the research
including validity of the theories mentioned in Chapter II, explains its own contri-
bution to scholarly understanding of the subjects and points to aspects that would
repay further study.
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Chapter II
THEORETICAL STUDY OF U.S.-TURKISH
RELATIONS
The aim of this chapter is to examine theoretical explanations of Turkish-
American relations between 1960 and 1975. It first gives the reasons for the es-
tablishment of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, which came to the existence with the
Truman doctrine in 1947 and was formalised with Turkey's entry into NATO in
1952. Secondly, the chapter illuminates factors affecting the alliance in general and
its cohesion specifically, and tlieii gives the U.S. and Turkish perceptions of their
alliance. Thirdly, it tries to answer the three questions which constitute the core
of the thesis itself: 1- Was the U.S.-Turkish relationship an example of patron-
client relationship? 2- Was Turkey heavily dependent on the USA? 3- Was Turkey
influenced by the USA in its decisions and actions? Finally, the chapter studies
the examples of U.S. influence on Turkey (U.S. influence on the Thrkish economy,
U.S. intervention in Turkish internal politics, Turkish recognition of China, and
the appointment of Komer as U.S. ambassador to Turkey), leaving the analysis of
other examples to the other chapters (Turkish dependence on the USA militarily,
implications of the Cuban missile crisis for U.S. influence on Turkish security, U.S.
influence on Turkey's Cyprus and opium policies).
2.1 Reasons for Alliance Formation
Turkey decided to establish an alliance with the United States for three main
reasons: to protect its security, to obtain military and economic aid and to strengthen
its Western-style state structure. The reasoii which made U.S. rulers enter into
alliance relations with Turkey was Turkey's strategic importance for U.S. interests
in the Middle East and for its global policy of containing the Soviet Union.
2.1.1 Security
In the opinion of many scholars a common external threat to the security of
countries is the primary source of alliances. Two states, A and B, form a military
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alliance since they have a similar perception of a common threat and they want to
deter that threat by combining their military resources in the event of an external
military aggression. In a more particular case, if power A fears that power C
harbours aggressive designs against her and if she feels herself weaker than power
C, she seeks an alliance with a more powerful state B who will help her maintaiii her
security and strengthen her power. Weaker members of the international system
who confront a major security threat often rely on the guarantee of a powerful
alliance and external aid of a powerful allied state because they cannot obtain
security by use of their own capabilities. 2 By making an alliance with a lesser
state, a strong power aims to prevent its adversary from gaining resources of the
lesser state3 and advancing its influence towards strategic places.
The main factor which brought the United States and Turkey together within
an alliance was the Soviet threat to the security of Turkey. The Russians have
always been a potential threat and enemy for the Turks since the rivalry and fight-
ing began between the empires of the Ottomans and the Russians. The traditional
Russian desire to reach warm waters through the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits
and the possibility of Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia have constituted a night-
mare for the Turks for centuries. 4 In the post-war period, when the Soviet Union
abolished the Treaty of Friendship of 1925 between the two countries, wanted the
revision of the Montreaux Convention of 1936 on the Turkish Straits to the ad-
vantage of the Black Sea countries and made some territorial demands in eastern
Anatolia, Turkey immediately began to seek the military and diplomatic support
of the United States and became willing to pay any price to secure its involvement
in the Western alliance which emerged as a counter force against the Soviet Union.5
Although the immediate Russian military threat seemed to have disappeared after
October 1947 and the new leadership of the Soviet Union launched some peace
2 H.L. Ilotlisteiji. Alliances and Small Powers, New York: Columbia University Press. 1968.
pp.24. 25. 29. 49. 50. 118, G. Liska, Alliances and the Third World. Baltimore: The John
Hopkins Press. 1968, pp.26, 27, M. Haudel, Weak States in the International System.
London: Frank Cass. 1981. p.121, R. Rothstcin, "On the Problems of Being Sinai!
and Poor" in W.C. Olson et a1.(ds.), The Theory and Practice of International
Relations. Eiiglcwood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice Hall. 1983, p.36.
OR. Hoisti. P.T. Hoppinan and J.D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International
Alliances. Ncw York: Wiley and sons Inc.. 1973, p.97.
The aiitliors interview with former Turkish foreign minister U. Haluk Bayiliken.
K.H. Kaipat(ed.), Twrkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, pp.1-2.
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initiatives towards Turkey after 1953, Turkish policy-makers continued to see the
Soviet Union as the major potential threat to Turkey and therefore insisted on
preserving close ties with NATO and the United States.6
In the post-World War II period, American rulers came to see Turkey as an
important part of their global policy of containing Soviet expansion and decided
to extend military and economic aid to her to block "the Soviet aggression." They
believed that without strong U.S. support Turkey might be transferred by the
Soviet Union to a springboard for political and military expansion into the Near
and Middle East where the United States had important interests.7
One important problem for weak states is the ambiguity of outside support in
the event of facing an external aggression. History shows that outside support for
weak states does not come or arrives late or is given only in expectation of future
benefits. 8 Lesser powers also fear that great powers may reach an agreement at
their expense.° In the 1960s there was a great deal of discussion among Turkish
politicial1S regarding the genuineness of the U.S. and NATO guarantee for Turkish
security. 10 Turks also suspected that U.S.-Soviet agreements on some issues would
increase the Soviet threat to Turkey.'1
2.1.2 Assistance Need
Economic amid military needs force a lesser power to seek an alliance with a
greater power. 12 To strengthen their developing economy and to fulfil their plans
of economic construction and development, lesser powers need economic aid from
developed countries and in many cases to secure economic aid of these powers they
join military alliances established by them. A state that lacks sufficient capacity
to build her own sophisticated weaponry and defence system necessary to deter
external threats may choose to join in an alliance to get weapons easily.
6 M. Göiiliibol, "NATO, USA and Turkey" in ibid., pp.47, 49.
G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972. p.21.
8 lloth.steiii. 1968. op.cit.. p.24.
9 Hrindei. op.cit.. p.i79.
10 Sec the section on the NATO discussion in Turkish politics in Chapter IV.
11 See the section o detente in Chapter IV.
12 Hoisti et al.. op. cit., p.13, George Liska, Nations in Alliance, Baltimore: Joint Hopkins Press,
1968. p.14.
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Turkey's need for military and economic assistance and America's response to
it played an important part in the Turkish-American alliance. Although Turkey did
not join the Second World War until the last minute and did not suffer war damage,
her economy in the post-war period was very weak. After the Democrat Party came
to power, promising more wealth for the people by pursuing an economic policy
giving more weight to the private sector, Turkey's economic aid needs increased
considerably. The new government had based its ambitious economic plans and
projects on the availability of vast foreign economic aid and investment.' 3 During
the war Turkey's military expenditures were very high because she had kept her
troops deployed throughout the war. In the post-war period Turkey's security
worries derived from the Soviet pressure impelled her to keep her army at its
existing size and to modernise it. Turks' desire to join NATO and the Western
world and their exaggeration of the Soviet t1reat were corsderth ti'a.te. j
their desire for economic and military aid from the United States. In the 1947-1974
period the United States was the main source of Turkey's military and economic
aid'4 but U.S. aid fell short of meeting Turkish expectations and this cast a shadow
on relations.
2.1.3 Strategic Reasons
When a lesser state needs an alliance with a great power, she often prefers
a geographically remoter one.' 5 However, an alliance with a distant great power
could prove less reliable because it might be more difficult to agree on a common
response to local conflicts and distance might mean a less certain military corn-
ntitment in case of attack; the weak state might be overwhelmed in the interval
between an attack and the arrival of aid.'° To overcome these disadvantages the
weak state sometimes urges the great power to station troops and maintain bases
on its territory and thus tries to obtain automatic intervention of the great power.'7
A lesser state's closeness to a threatening great power and her geographic location
13 L. Taiisky. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries, A Comparative Study
of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R., New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967, pp.39,
46.
14 Se the tables of U.S. aid to Turkey and military equipment of the Turkish army in Chapter IV.
15 Olsoi, et al.(eds.). op. cit., p.22O, Hoisti et al., op. cit., p.l3.
16 ftotlistcin, 1968. op.cit., p.118, Handel, op.cit., p.128.
' Handel. op.cit.. p.126.
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and strategic importance also affect the decision of that state in making an alliance
with a different great power. If a smaller state is very close to a great power and it
is in the way of natural expansion of that power, she seeks the alliance of a more
powerful state to balance the regional great power.' 8 The important strategic lo-
cation of a small power vis-a-vis the powerful enemy state is an important reason
for a great power to extend her alliance to that small state.
Turkey had a very long frontier with the Soviet Union, the leader of the War-
saw Pact, and she was within the zone of Soviet natural influence and expansion.
Turkey, therefore, felt it necessary to continue its alliance with the United States
not because the USA was remote from Turkey but because it was the only coun-
try that could balance the Soviet Union's power. 19 Thus, the remoteness of the
United States to Turkey had no major influence on the decision of the Turks to
choose the USA as an ally. Turks were happy with the presence of U.S. troops and
facilities in their territories, thinking that it would secure automatic U.S. help in
the event of an aggression. When the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on
Turkey in February 1975, the Turkish government did not stop the U.S. bases from
functioning immediately because it believed that their presence was to Turkey's
advantage. Turkish rulers always claimed that because of her strategic importance
to major great powers Turkey could not afford to stay outside the Western al-
liance. 2° Turkey's geographical location was an important factor in the minds of
US decision-makers: Turkey adjoined the Soviet Union and also the Middle East
region; it constituted a natural barrier between the two regions; its straits and
relatively large army and base facilities on its territory were valuable assets for the
West; so it was particularly important to keep Turkey in the Western camp.21
2.1.4 Ideology
Many scholars consider a common or similar ideology of secondary importance
in making an alliance after security needs. 22 Ideology plays relatively less part in
18 Rotlistein. 1968. op.cit., p.121.
19 Göiilübol in Karpat(ed.), op. cit., p.47.
20 President Cevdet Sunay's speech in the White House in 1967, Amerika 'da Onbir ClAn,
Ankara: Yarm Yayinlari, 1967, p.26.
21 See the section on Turkey's strategic importance in Chapter IV.
22 Olson et al.(eds.), op. cit., p.220. Hoisti et al., op. cit., p.30.
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making or breaking an alliance. However, alliances established by powers who have
identical or similar ideological and cultural values are more durable and effective.
They bring about more co-operation and fewer problems. 23 States are likely to
prefer making alliances with partners with whom they share common institutions,
social and political values.24
Turkish leadership has always claimed that Turkey is a democratic and secu-
lar country sharing common values with the Western world. 25 The Turks clearly
assigned more importance to the ideological dimension and expected their alliance
with the USA and NATO would help them maintain better relations with the
West and pursue westernization policies at home whereas American rulers were
more interested in U.S. national interests. 26 In the aftermath of World War II,
ruling elites in Turkey held almost the same views as the American administration
with regard to political and economic systems and shared their political and ideo-
logical perceptions. In general, however, Turkish and American nations differed in
many aspects such as culture, religion and democratic experience. 27 Nevertheless,
although ideological differences caused some resentment against the United States
among the Turkish nation, this did not affect the general direction of Turkish-
American relations.
2.1.5 Internal Reasons
States also enter into alliances in order to ensure domestic stability 28 and to
cover failures in domestic politics. Obtaining political, economic and military sup-
port of a powerful and internationally respected alliance strengthens the govern-
ment's position vis-a-vis its potential and actual enemies and increases its prestige
in the eyes of the people. One motive of a small state in aligning with a great
power might be to achieve an increase in its status internally and internationally
23 Hoisti c't a!.. op. cit., pp.54. 265, 268, Liska, Nations in Alliance, op. cit., p.90.
24 Hoisti et al., op. cit., p.12.
25 President Sunny's speech in the White House, Amerika 'da Onbir Gun, op.cit., p.18.
26 See the section on U.S. and Turkish perceptions of the alliance in this chapter.
27	 the words of former U.S. ambassador to Greece, M. Stearns. "we shared [with Turkey] a security
thirat more than we shared political values, economic interests, or a common historical experience."
M. Stearns. Entangled Allies, U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus,
New York: Council oii Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p.21.
28 Liska. Alliances, op.cit., p.28.
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by enjoying the great power's reputation. 29 Sometimes for a weak state to find a
patron is to find a scapegoat that can be blamed for domestic failures.30
Turkish rulers saw their alliance with the West as an insurance of Turkey's po-
litical and democratic process and as a proof of Turkey's greatness as a "civilised"
Western country. Economic and military aid of the West were one of their main
sources of strength. When they faced economic and political crises at home Turk-
ish ruling elites looked at the West as their saviour, expecting aid and statements
supporting their regime. Economic failures and foreign policy failures, especially
on the Cyprus question, were attributed to the West's negative attitude. Allegedly
in June 1964 Prime Minister Inönü sought U.S. disapproval for Turkish interven-
tion in Cyprus in order to save his government's prestige by blaming the USA for
non-intervention.3'
2.1.6 Neutrality Option
Generally sniall states are advised not to enter into an alliance with a more
powerful state because of possible grave dangers. Machiavelli wrote: "a prince
ought never to make common cause with one more powerful than himself, unless
necessity forces him to it." Egyptian leader Nasser rephrased the idea as follows:
"an alliance between a big and small power is an alliance between the wolf and the
sheep, and it is bound to end with the wolf devouring the sheep." 32 However, to
pursue neutrality and non-alignment a small state must meet certain criteria: it
"must not be so potentially powerful as to threaten to shift the balance if incor-
porated by one side; the citizens of the small state must be willing to withdraw
from world affairs... [;] the small state must be strategically irrelevant and politi-
cally nonprovocative" ;33 and it must not be under the threat of a great power.34
Turkish politicians did not see non-alignment as a viable alternative because of the
Soviet threat, Turkey's strategic importance and shortage of national resources.
29 Ibid.. p.29. Handel, op.cit., p.148.
3,) Haiidcl. op.cit., p.148.
31 See the section oii the Jolm8on letter in Chapter VI.
32 llothsteiii. 1968. op.cit., p.117.
33 Ibid.. p.32.
Ibid., p.247. Handel, op.cit., p.121.
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2.2 Factors Affecting Alliances
2.2.1 Costs-Benefits
An alliance relationship brings some costs and probleips as well as benefits.
States have to consider advantages and disadvantages of making an alliance with
a state or a group of states before deciding to join it and subsequently they should
from time to time reconsider their positions within this alliance in the light of
receiit developments. Haas defines an alliance as "a relationship in which a formal
agreement specifies the rights and obligations of the members of alliance." 35 States
aim to maximise their rights and to minimise their obligations when they join an
alliance or at least they try to balance rights and obligations. If a state feels that
the balance of costs and benefits within the alliance favours the other side, it seeks
means to keep the balance or as the last resort it leaves the alliance.
The US-Turkish alliance was criticised by some Turkish politicians and scholars
since they saw it as a one-sided alliance. The major Turkish opposition party and
leftist radicals claimed that the USA benefited from the alliance much more than
Turkey did. At the end of the 1960s, even leaders of the governmental party were
affected by this opinion. Public discussion on the costs and dangers of Turkey's
alliance with the USA forced Turkish leaders to reconsider it and to take some
initiatives to change the state of relations between the two countries.36
Some costs and dangers of an alliance, which were also mentioned by the
Turkish critics of Turkey's alliance witl1 the USA and NATO, are as follows: 37
 The
alliance may expose the state to the retaliation of a neighbouring or remote great
power by provoking her. 38
 The small state, as the weakest link in the alliance,
may become the preliminary target of an enemy attack. 3° It may face new and
unexpected threats by small allies of the enemy power4° and may become involved
E.B. Haas. Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. p.13.
° See the sect ion on Turkish efforts to gain more independence in its military relations with the USA
in Chapter IV.
37 For views of the Turks in this regard see the section on the NATO discussion in Turkish politics
in Chapter IV.
8 fiotlistein, op.cit., pp.44, 48.
Ibid., pJ).Gl-62, 120-121. 123.
Liska. Alliances. op.cit., p.28.
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in the coiiflicts of the great power, for which it is unprepared, or which it might
disapprove. 41 If there are bases of a great power on its territory, the small state
might find itself on the target list of another power. 42 The alliance might weaken
the state's integrity by forcing it to dissipate its strength 43 and bring for it high
defence budgets, increased costs of communications, and bigger military bureau-
cracy. 44 Finally, the alliance also might cause the state some loss of independence,
status, prestige and influence.45
The reasons for alliance formation, which were mentioned above, constitute
benefits of the alliance. Additionally, the alliance might help a state influence
policies of its allies iii a favourable direction and prevent allies from following ad-
venturist policies. 46
 A multilateral alliance seems to offer more benefits: it provides
more deterrence and defence, a precise commitment, political and material support
of more states, more bargaining, more compromise and thus more opportunity for
the small state to advance its own views. The possibility that the alliance will
beconk. a tool of one great power is diminished. It may cost less in terms of exter-
nal pressure and domestic discontent. 47 Although Turkey's military arrangements
were mainly with the United States, Turkish rulers emphasised the multilateral
character of NATO and made comparisons with the position of other members
while defending Turkey's alliance with NATO. They argued that being a member
of NATO provided the opportunity to influence U.S. policies and decreased the
possibility of a U.S. armed action or intervention against Turkey.48
2.2.2 Goals of Members
Goals and interests of states in making an alliance affect their relations with
their allies. Some scholars regard parallel interests, not necessarily common or
41 Handel. op.cit.. p.129. Rothsteiu, op.cit.. p.44.
42 Handel. op.cit.. p.l29.
' Rot hstcin. op.cit.. p.44.
' EN. Botsa.s. "the U.S. Cyprus Turkey Greece Tetragon...", Jonrnal of
Political and Ii1ilitary Sociology. vol.16, No.2, Fall 1988, p.252.
n Rothstein. op.cit., pp.47, 259.
ii.. 1)1)49-50.
ibid.. pp.124-126, 260.
48 Tue author's interview with former Turkish foreign innusters U. Haluk Bayülken and Osman Olcay,
who drew attention to U.S. actions against certain other nations at various times.
25
identical ones, as one of the foundations of an alliance. 49 States with considerably
different expectations from an alliance are less likely to be compatible alliance
partners. 5° If the members of an alliance have limited clear and unambiguous
purposes, their alliance becomes more durable and stable.5'
Although at the start the United States and Turkey had a common interest,
to block the expansion of Soviet influence, each tended to use the alliance for
its own interests. The Turks believed that they were helping American national
interests and therefore they had the right to expect from the Americans support for
Turkish national interests even when those interests were outside the US-Turkish
alliaiice. 52 The Turkish leadership considered the American actions, particularly
in the Cyprus question, primarily in terms of Turkey's own interests, ignoring
the American interests such as keeping good relations with Greece. On the other
hand, the United States seemed not to accept that Turkey could have national
interests outside the NATO alliance which were not compatible with the U.S.
global strategy 53 and that she could have another enemy apart from the Soviet
Union.
2.2.3 Strength and Size of Members
In an alliance between a small state and a big power, differences are more
likely to arise. 54 If the strength and size of two powers are markedly uiiequal,
these powers usually face many problems in their alliance since their perception of
world events and their purposes in the international arena are very different. 55 The
weaker state naturally fears that its physical, political and cultural identity will
he violated by its more powerful ally. 56 It is always suspicious that its big ally will
use various means to increase its influence over it or that the larger state will try
Olson et al., The Theory and..., op. cit., pp.220, 221, Rothstein, op.cit., p.56.
° Holst.i et al.. op. Cit. p.23.
Il)id.. pp.57. 263.
52 R.C. Caiiipany. Turkey and the United States, New York: Praeger, 1986. pp.80, 82.
St'ariis. op.cit.. p.16.
In the theoretical analysis of relationships between powers, 'size' is often used as a synonym for
strength. strong powers being described as 'big' and weak ones as 'small'.
H.A. Kissinger. The Troubled Partnership, New York: McGraw Hill, 1965, p.226. Rothstehi,
Alliances and Small Powers, op.cit., p.57.
Li.ska. Nations in Alliance, op.cit., p.13.
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to intervene in its internal affairs and to penetrate its domestic politics. There is
a general belief that big powers use alliance partnership to increase their influence
on the members of the alliance since its allies are linked to the alliance in so many
ways. 57 When the big power helps its smaller ally with a considerable amount of
economic and military aid, the suspicion is always there that the smaller country
becomes the client or satellite of the big power. 58 Some scholars, however, argue
that in an alliance the bigger power does not necessarily gain all the advantages,
but sometimes the lesser power has more influence on the bigger one in fulfilling
its desires. 5 ° The stronger state may feel itself obliged to transfer wealth or other
resources to the weaker and to prevent the weaker from collapse to maintain its
prestige in the eyes of the enemy camp.6°
The United States and Turkey are unequal powers in strength and size. The
USA is the most powerful state in the world, whereas Turkey is a developing coun-
try which needs external aid for its security and economy. At the same time, the
Turks are very proud of their history, identity and potential capacity. They claim
equal status with developed powers, including NATO members, and refuse to ac-
cept any foreign domination in their country. 61
 Foreign influence and interference
are always an important concern for the Turks, since they do not forget the memo-
ries of the old capitulations and Western influence on the Ottoman Empire. In the
1960s the propaganda of the Turkish leftist radicals portrayed Turkey as a puppet
of the Uiiited States and put this view across repeatedly to Turkish public opinion,
particularly when the USA seemed to take a negative action in the Cyprus dispute.
As a fact, Turkish ability to influence the USA for its own interests stayed very
weak, while the USA had a relatively free hand to affect Turkey in regional and
international events.
Canipany. op. cit.. p.7. Olson ot al.. op.cit.. pp.28. 222. Raymond Arms, "The Quest for a
Philosophy of Foreign Affairs" in S. Hoffivann(ed.). Contemporary Theory in
International Relations. Eiiglewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc. 1960. p.87. Rothstein.
op.cit.. PP.l2l124.
58 Harris. Troubled Alliance. op.cit., p.204.
° Ibid.. P205 Campaiiy. op. cit.. p.6. S. Hoffmann. "The Diplomatic-Strategic Chess-
board" in Olson et al.(eds.), op. cit., pp.32-33. Handel, op.cit., pp.129, 131.
°° Rotlistein. op.cit.. p.12O.
61 Canspauy. op. cit., p.81.
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It should also be noted that alliances are affected by domestic political struc-
ture and events of member countries. Domestic support for the alliance strengthens
it considerably. The U.S.-Turkish alliance came under the influence of domestic
political situations in both countries, especially on the Cyprus and opium ques-
tions.
2.3 Cohesion of Alliance
Partners of an alliance try to maintain the cohesion of the alliance as long as
they benefit from it. The cohesion of the alliance is strengthened by the continu-
ing external common threat and it is weakened by the reduction of the common
threat.° 2 Consultation, compromise and strong commitment are important factors
in keeping cohesion of an alliance. In the case of an uncertain commitment, the
great power might assume that the small has agreed to do whatever is in the in-
terest of the strong whereas the small power's domestic politics may be consumed
by a heated debate over the nature of its commitment to the great power, the
latter's intention to help and the possibility of withdrawing the commitment.°3
Extensive consultations between two allies are likely to increase their solidarity
and cohesion. 64 Big powers tend to wish to be consulted by their smaller allies if
any important internal, regional or international events seem to have importance
for the alliance.65
The cohesion of the Turkish-American alliance partly depended on the seri-
ousness of the Soviet threat to Turkey and the Western camp. When the Soviet
threat seemed reduced, Turkey and the USA pursued more independent policies
outside their alliance. Lack of consultation between the two allies caused some
problems. The Turkish authorities complained that the USA did not inform them
about some American activities related to the American bases in Turkey, they also
resented the unilateral withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The
United States criticised the Turkish leadership for their intention of landing in
Cyprus without the knowledge of the USA.
62 Ibid.. pp.5-6. Holsti (1 ad., op. cit., pp.17. 88.
63 Rot1istin. op.cit.. p.119.
64 Campaiiy. op. cit.. p.5. Holsti et al., op. cit., p.16.
65 Liska. Nationc. op.cit.. p.74.
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Alliance cohesion also depends on the character of the international system. It
declines as tension, conflict and potential threat are reduced in the international
arena.°6 In a bipolar system, "the greater the inter-alliance conflict, the greater
the intra-alliance cohesion; conversely, the greater the inter-alliance detente, the
less the intra-alliance cohesion." 67 In the period of detente, smaller powers within
alliances feel more free to improve their relations with states from the enemy
camp. 68 Moreover, if the polarity of the international system is very tight, the
cohesion of alliances in the two camps is stronger. When the polarity is reduced,
cohesion decreases. 6° As long as more great powers emerge in the international
arena, cohesion is reduced in favour of smaller powers.
The United States and Turkey had more cordial and close relations in the
1950s, when the East-West conflict was more tense. In the second half of the 1960s
and at the beginning of the 1970s when detente was a more dominant tendency
in the international system, Turkey felt that she could improve her relations with
the Eastern bloc and Third World countries despite her alliance with the USA
and NATO. The emergence of China and France as dissidents in the main power
blocs emboldened Turkish authorities to pursue a more independent policy. At
the same time, Turkey's importance seemed diminished in the eyes of Americans
in the detente period, and the American administration became less anxious to
continue aid to Turkey.
The Turkish-American alliance between 1959 and 1975 is a typical example of
the bipolar world alliances. In the cold war period in which the world was divided
into two enemy camps, the state of the relationship between the superpowers af-
fected the condition of the US-Turkish alliance. The model of the position of a
smaller state within one of the ideological camps and management of intra-bloc
problems by its super power is relevant. It is, however, necessary to look at the spe-
cial internal and international conditions of the two countries such as geographical
location, historical heritage, cultural and political identity, foreign policy making
process, traditional state policy, effect of public opinion, etc.
66 Holsti et al.. op. cit., p.58.
67 Ibid.. p.92.
68 Ibid.. p.97.
°° Ibid.. p.93.
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2.4 U.s. and Turkish Perceptions of Their Alliance
2.4.1 Turkish Perception
The Turks viewed their alliance with the United States in the light of their
long-pursued efforts of Westernization, attributing a great importance to it in the
way of becoming an integral part of the Western world. In their opinion, Turkey
had to continue its alliance with America because this policy not only helped to
fulfil her national interests, hut more importantly it represented a relationship be-
tween two states which shared the same ideology and moral principles. 70 In his
visit to Washington in June 1964 immediately after receiving President Johnson's
disappointing letter, Turkish P.M. Inönü said that "we, the Turks, believe that
friendship between states relies not on temporary interests but on common moral
principles." 7 ' Turkish President Cevdet Sunay expressed his belief that close friend-
ship and alliance between Turkey and the USA was a consequence of their shared
moral principles and aims such as the love of freedom and democracy. 72 As an
example of how far ideological thinking affected the minds of Turkish politicians,
the speech of Turkish MP Gökhan Evliyaolu may be cited. In an atmosphere of
great public criticism directed toward the Western states because of their attitudes
on the Cyprus question, Evliyao1u claimed that Turkey did not have the right to
criticise the West because she failed to become a part of this world and to reach
its level of democracy.73
This approach of Turkish politicians to the alliance with America led them to
be too anxious to fulfil requirements of this alliance without any hesitation. At
almost every opportunity they proudly expressed their loyalty to the alliance.74
But they felt badly let down when this loyalty did not appear to be reciprocated.
70 It is ironic that as late as the spring of 1974, Turkey still had not joined the European bureau of
the U.S. State Departmeiit hut she remained the responsibility of State's Bureau of Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs. Stearns. op.cit., p.8.
71 Cumhuriyet. 23.6.1964. p.7.
72 Diileri Bakan1igz Belleteni, April 1967, pp.48, 49.
Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (IIvIMTD,), term 1, sess.3, vol.30. p.295.
Prime Minister I. Ini,iü, MMTD, tcrni 1, sess.2, vol.16. pp.570-571, 1. lnönii, ibid.. term 3,
sess.1. vol.2. p.29O. Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin, Cumhurz yet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi
(cSTD,), teriii 1. scss.4, vol.24-3, p.iOl7, the Turkish junta's announcement of loyalty to NATO
and CENTO, Camhuriyet, 27.5.1960, p.1.
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In their eyes, for instance, Turkey was right in her policy toward the Cyprus
question, therefore, she should be supported by the Western states. The feeling of
not getting enoUgl1 in return for fulfilling alliance responsibilities really made the
Turks angry.
2.4.2 U.s. Perception
For the Americans, the Turkish-American relationship meant the protection
of mutual economic and military interests rather than ideological closeness. In
their eyes, both sides had to give something in order to get some gains, meaning
that the alliance was a classic alliance relationship between two states who aimed
at maximising their gains by establishing an alliance. This also meant restriction
of independence of the two states to a reasonable extent. As former U.S. official
Harris expressed it: "The virtually complete independence in terms of military and
economic self-sufficiency that is often urged by Turkish critics of the United States
is clearly impossible." 75 The American perception of the alliance did not include
a romantic relationship forcing the two sides to support each other in every event
regardless their practical national interests.
In their dealings with the Turks the Americans expressed the importance of
having the same ideological principles. As President Johnson said in his speech
of welcome to Turkish President Sunay on 3 April 1967: "There is special close
friendship between Turkey and the United States, which can be understood only
by free people believing in a strong brotherhood relationship." 76 However, it was
America's strategic interests in that part of the world that were of prime concern to
the Americans. 77 The Americans did not oppose the undemocratic military regime
in Turkey, which came to power on 27 May 1960; they extended recognition to it
three days after the military coup and promised more economic and military aid.
The most important thing for the Americans was Turkey's continuing membership
in NATO and CENTO, helping the protection of Western interests in the Near
and Middle East.
Harris. op.cit.. pp.204-205.
76 Dzi1eri Bakanligi Belleteni. April 1967, p.47, Amerika 'da Onbir Gun, op.cit.. pp.15-
16.
'1 Stariis, op.cit., p.21.
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2.5 Patron-Client State Relationship, Dependency and Influence
2.5.1 Patron- Client State Relationship
To determine whether a patron-client relationship is the appropriate model
for Turkish-American relations it is first necessary to examine whether Turkey is
a weak (small) state which can easily be made a client. Characteristics of weak
states are summarised by Handel as follows: 78 Population: Very small. Turkey
had a large population in comparison with the population of weak states. Standing
at 36.16 million in 1973 it was larger than the population of many middle powers.
Area: Very small. Turkey's area, too, is relatively big. (780 thousand sq. km .)
Economy: 1- GNP is small in absolute terms. Turkey's GNP per capita was
very small even among weak states. (340 dollars in 1973) However, its total GNP
was relatively high among weak states. (12.16 billion dollars in 1973.) 2- Little
or no heavy industry. Turkey generally lacked large heavy industry. Its crude
steel production (1.312 thousand metric tons in 1971), energy production (11.01
million metric tons equiv. of coal), and energy consumption (18.65 metric tons
equiv. of coal in 1971) were very low in comparison with middle and great powers.
3- High degree of specialisation in a narrow range of products. Turkey largely
exported agricultural products and specialised in a few industrial products such
as textiles. 4- Small domestic market, hence high dependency on foreign markets
for imports and exports. Turkey's domestic market was relatively large but it was
still dependent on exports and imports to strengthen its economy. Its dependence
on "high-tech" technological products was considerable. 5- High dependence on
foreign capital.
Military: 1- Cannot defend itself against external threats by its own strength;
high or total dependence on external help. Turkey was not too weak to defend itself
against small and middle regional powers but it needed US and NATO protection
against the Soviet threat. 2- Total (or very high) dependence on weapon acquisition
in foreign countries. Almost all Turkey's weaponry came from the West, especially
78 Haiid'1, Weak States, op.cit., pp.52-53. See also ibid., pp.36, 41-45, Rothstein, op.cit., p.29.
The information iii paragraph 2.5.1 is based on the 1973 figures. It should be noted that Turkey's
situation is not static and there have beeii dramatic changes in some of the characteristics since
World War II. Haiidel (hiVides states into four categories; great, middle, weak (including Turkey),
and mini: and gives figures on the military and economic capabilities of states. Handel. op.cit.,
PP .1517. 25-26. 32-35, 49.
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from the USA. 3- A high proportion of strength always mobilised or at its disposal;
longer-range war potential very low. Turkey kept a very big army but lacked
modern weaponry.
The International System: 1- Limited scope of interests (usually to neigh-
bouring and regional areas). 2- Little or no influence on the balance of power
(or the nature of the system). 3- Mainly passive and reactive in foreign policy.
4- Terds to minimise risks, especially vis-a-vis the great powers. 5- Can be pen-
etrated relatively easily. 6- Strong support for international law and norms of
international organisations. Turkey had regional interests rather than global ones
but it had the potential to influence big power relations because of its strategic
importance. She continued to be a member of NATO in spite of the displeasure
of the other superpower but tried not to provoke the Soviet Union especially in
the 1960s and 1970s. Turkey allowed the stationing of U.S. experts on its territory
but it is hard to prove that it was deeply penetrated. Turkish leaders always an-
nounced support for international law and international organisations but did not
hesitate to criticise them when they seemed to be unfair in dealing with Turkish
interests.
As a conclusion it might be said that Turkey can he considered a small power
especially in comparison with European middle powers. But its level among small
states should be very high. Holbraad puts Turkey's place as the eighth-strongest
small state of Europe though she qualified as a middle power among Asian states
according to his criteria. 79 Handel mentions that Annette Baker Fox calls Turkey a
small state hut Vital, Barston and Kuznets do not even consider her as a member
of this category because she has a population of over 30 million. In Handel's
opinion Turkey quite clearly falls short of the middle powers in terms of her overall
capabilities 80
Characteristics of the patron-client state relationship, which are mentioned
by scholars, are as follows: 81 1- There must be a sizeable difference between the
C. Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, London: MacMillan Press, 1984,
pp.85-86, 89.
80 Handel. op.cit., pp.31-33.
81 C.C. Shoemaker and J. Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships, New York: Praeger,
1984. pp.13-15, 18-22, Handel, op.cit., pp.132-137, B.E. Moon, "Consensus or Compli-
aiice? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence", Interna-
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military capabilities of the two states. The bargaining power of the patron is
greater than that of the client because of the resources it has. 2- The client plays
an important role in patron (superpower) competition. Its position is determined
by the availability of other patrons who can render the client the same protection
and material support, the mobility of the clients between alternative patrons and
the degree to which the patron is dependent on the client's services. 3- The patron
and the client are closely tied to each other for a recognisable period of time.
On almost every issue the client follows the patron's lead either to get immediate
positive rewards or to accumulate goodwill and credit for the future. Sometimes
it is asked to do so, more frequently the client knows what is expected of it by
the patron and adjusts its policy accordingly. In the patron-client relationship
coercion, manipulation and authority exist implicitly in the background but are
not always iiecessarily dominant. 4- Security transactions from the patron to the
client are more prominent in the relationship. At a low level of threat to the client,
other goals such as economic development, regional leadership, and international
prestige may gain importance. Arms transfers are a powerful tool of influence for
the patron. 5- Elites of the client state absorb the patron's perceptions of the
world through foreign or domestic education. 6- The patron's goals in continuing
the relationship are more complicated: Ideological goals (demands for changes
iii the client's political, economic and social structure), international solidarity
(voting cohesion in the United Nations, signing of international agreements, visits
between senior statesmen, client announcements of international support for the
patron), strategic goals (demands for bases).
1- Military capabilities of the United States were clearly much greater than
those of Turkey. Since the USA was the main military and economic aid supplier
of Turkey, she had more bargaining power. However, Turkey's strategic impor-
tal1ce gave her rulers the capability to affect U.S. decisions in some issues. (U.S.
unwillingness to take forceful action against Turkey on the Cyprus question can
be cited as an example.) 2- Turkey played quite an important role in superpower
competition with its geographical location controlling vital outlets of the Soviet
Union. The United States attributed importance to keeping Turkey in the West-
em camp. Western European powers were poteiitially alternative of patrons for
tional Organisation, vol.39, No.2, Spring 1985, pp.308-309.
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Turkey's security and economy but Turkish rulers believed that they could not
get from anywhere else the protection and material support which they obtained
from the USA. U.S. officials, too, did not consider leaving Turkey, believing that
Turkey's services for the USA were important. This situation practically decreased
the mobility of both sides between different alternatives. 3- Turkey and the United
States were closely tjed to each other between 1947 and 1975 though this closeness
was more dominant in the 1950s. Especially in the 1950s and in the first half of
the 1960s, Turkey closely followed the lead of the USA in the international arena
though the USA did not always demand her support. Turkish leaders proudly
acted in this way, seeing it as a requirement of the Western alliance. From 1965,
they acted more independently, taking some actions against the U.S. stance (sup-
porting the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict is one example). The United States
did not use direct pressures against Turkish rulers. The Johnson letter in 1964,
which forced the Turks not to intervene in Cyprus and the U.S. Congress's de-
cision to impose an arms embargo on Turkey were exceptions in this regard and
they caused a deterioration in the two countries' relations. Indirect U.S. pressures
forced Turkish rulers to prohibit opium cultivation in 1971 but three years later
the Ecevit government reversed the decision in spite of strong U.S. protests.
4- U.S. military assistance to Turkey was prominent in their relationship. The
Turks valued it very highly, but in the detente period they paid more attention to
economic development and accepted the aid of the Soviet Union for this purpose.
They even risked the loss of U.S. aid with their policies on Cyprus and opium.
U.S. Congress tried to influence Turkish policies by using the leverage of military
and economic assistance, (the U.S. administration generally opposed the Congress
pressures but in some cases such as opium they were privately happy about it.)
but it was not able to change Turkish attitudes dramatically. 5- Turkish elites
acquired the same perceptions of the world as U.S. rulers through foreign and
mostly domestic education but they always announced that it was their choice to
adopt Western values. 6- The United States obviously wanted Turkey to adopt a
democratic system, capitalist economy and Western social structure. But it is hard
to claim that U.S. officials forced the Turks in this regard because Turkish rulers
themselves chose this way when they established their republic in 1923. U.S. rulers
generally asked for Turkey's support when they faced international crises but this
was not directed to achieving a continuous show of international solidarity. The
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Turks themselves chose to vote with the USA in the United Nations, felt pleasure
with the visits of U.S. statesmen and the U.S. Sixth Fleet and frequently announced
support for the USA in international crises. The Turks were also happy with the
U.S. use of bases on their territory. When Turkey voted with Third World countries
on the Arab-Isreali conflict and colonial issues and when reductior of U.S. Sixth
Fleet visits to Turkish ports were demanded because of public demonstrations, the
United States did not protest against Turkey.
As a conclusion, it might be said that the U.S.-Turkish relationship bore some
characteristics of the patron-client relationship but not enough to fit this categori-
sation. Especially after 1965 it cannot he said that Turkey followed U.S. policy
step by step. Nevertheless, the United States was generally happy with the Turkish
government's general attitude until July 1975 when the functioning of U.S. bases
in Turkey was halted.
2.5.2 Dependency Theories
Dependency theories are mainly related to economic aspects of the patron-
client state relationship. General characteristics of dependent countries are ex-
plained by scholars as follows: 82 The internal market of the dependent country is
internationalised and its economy is incorporated into the global capitalist system.
A large share of needs are supplied externally, a large share of markets are for-
eign and the ratio of foreign to domestic capital, technology, production facilities,
etc. is higli. Development of the economy is conditioned by the development and
expansion of another economy and by the attitude of multinational corporations.
Domestic firms buy their equipment and other capital goods from outside. The
national bourgeoisie are not completely abandoned by external powers but not
given a full opportunity to develop. There is an alliance between local and inter-
national capital and the state, derived from mutual interests. In fact, the flows
of trade and investment invoke the interests of the elites more than the masses.
The dependent state is specialised in the export of a few products and its export
82 P. Evans. Dependent Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, pp.26, 28.
31-32. 34-43. J.A. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the
Global System...", International Organisation. vol.32, No.1. Winter 1978, pp.25-26,
N.R. Pieliardsoii, "Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance", the
American Political Science Review, vol.70, No.4, December 1976. pp.1099, ilOOn, 1102.
FIaiidel. op.cit., pp.228-229. Moon, op.cit., pp.306 . 308.
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is heavily reliant upon few trading partners. Internally the following factors are
prominent: lack of integration across economic sectors, shortage of large-scale in-
dustry based on mass-production, little investment in research and development,
lack of responsiveness of production structures to increased or decreased demand,
etc.
In a global world in which all national economies are dependent on each other,
it is hard to find out which economy is dependent on which other economy. How-
ever, it should be noted that Turkey's situation generally fitted the characteristics
of developing states' economies which are largely dependent on and under the in-
fluence of developed countries and multinational corporations. The United States
was surely one of the major powers which affected the situation of world economies
and which owned giant multinational corporations. It is obvious that U.S. rulers
would try to maxirnise their economic gains and would care about interests of
U.S. firms in their dealings with Turkey. However, it is hard to claim that the
Turkish economy was totally dependent on the United States because Turkey also
had important economic contacts with other Western powers, Middle Eastern and
Eastern bloc countries and international organisations such as the IMF and the
World Bank. It is also a fact that U.S. economic assistance to Turkey dramatically
decreased at the end of the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s whereas Turkey
became the recipient of the largest economic assistance of the USSR outside East-
ern bloc countries in the same period. To study complicated economic relations
between countries and to reach a conclusion is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Some scholars' studies are directed to finding a correlation between the U.S.
aid allocations to developing states and voting agreements of these states with the
United States in the United Nations. 83 Witkoff, Richardson and Moon concluded
that U.N. voting patterns of nations that were linked to the USA through sub-
staiitial trade or aid were likely to resemble the voting of the USA, especially on
cold war issues. Witkoff's study shows that Turkey's General Assembly roll-call
relative agreement scores with the United States in 1963 was the highest among
the U.N. members while its score in 1967 was still high but came fifteenth. 84 At
E.R. Witkoff, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative
Study". the American Political Science Review. vol.67, No.3, September 1973, pp.868-
888. Ricliardsoii. op.cit., pp.l098-1109, Moon, op.cit.. pp.297-329.
84 Witkoff, op.cit.. Pp.879-88O.
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the 15th session of the U.N. (1961) Turkey's voting coincidence with the USA was
75.1 percent of the total votes cast (109 of 145); in the 16th session this figure rose
to 80.8 percent (101 of 125): (in cold war issues 33 of 37 in the 15th session, 20 of
22 in the 16th session; in issues of disarmament 7 of 8 and 28 of 34; in issues of
colonialism 28 of 38 and 31 of 38; in the Arab-Israeli conflict 3 of 8 and 8 of 9.)85
In 1967, in the fifth special, fifth emergency special and twenty-second sessions
of the U.N. Turkey's voting coincidence with the USA was 30 out of 65 (in the
Arab-Israeli conflict 3 of 15, in colonial issues 1 of 17, in cold war issues 19 of 19,
in disarmament issues 5 of 5.)86
2.5.3 Influence
In his book Couloumbis put forward some propositions of influence that could
be applied to the U.S-Turkish relationship: 87
 1- Potential influence increases as
elites in A perceive a greater need to influence and elites in B perceive a need
to accept A's influence. (After the World War lithe USA came to the position
of influencing other states as a result of its global policy. As proud and obstinate
people Turks were frequently resistant to influence.) 2- The greater the convergence
of ideological orientations and the greater the coincidence of threat perceptions
among the elites in A and B, the greater the receptivity of A's influence by B.
(Ideological closeness with Western powers made Turkish elites more receptive to
U.S. influence especially in the 1950s. The Soviet threat gave more leverage to
the USA to influence Turkish elites.) 3- The potential of A's influence in B is
modified by A and B leaders' personalities and mentalities. (Johnson was more
interventionist. B. Ecevit seemed less receptive to U.S. influence.) 4- The greater
the dependency of B upon A for its economic stability and growth, the greater
the potential of influence of A upon B. (Turkey's economic problems increased its
receptivity to U.S. influence.) 88
 5- The greater the dependency of B upon A for
sophisticated weaponry, the greater the potential for A's influence over B. (This
was very much case for Turkey.) 6- The greater the dependency of B on any actors
85 Middle East Record, vol.2. 1961, pp.4, 7-13.
86 Middle East Record, vol.3, 1967, pp.91-103.
87 T.A. Coiilouiiibis, the United States, Greece and Turkey, New York: Praeger, 1983,
pp.171-195. A stands for the USA and B for Turkey in the following explanations.
88 The authois iutcrview with former Turkish diplomat and MP Kamran Juan.
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other thaii A for the importation of vital energy sources, the less the potential for
A's influence over B. (After 1973 Turkey pursued more pro-Arab policies outside
the U.S. influence because of its dependence on oil.)
7- High-quality diplomatic services maximise capability to transform potential
influence into actual influence. (Turkish diplomacy's quality decreased the U.S.
influence, especially on the Cyprus question.) 89 8- A's potential of influence in B
increases when B is ruled by military regimes. (Turkish military regimes were more
responsive to U.S. requests°° as was seen in the opium question. Anti-American
leftist opposition was silenced during the military-backed governments.) 9- The
potential influence of A over B is proportional to the degree of internal cohesiveness
and foreign policy consensus within B. (Public consensus on the Cyprus question
decreased Turkey's responsiveness to U.S. influence on the matter.) 10- A's po-
tential influence in B is proportional to benign public attitudes in B regarding the
image and reputation of A. (Turkish public anger against the USA on the Cyprus
question decreased the U.S. leverage to influence Turkey.) 11- Perception in A
with respect to the importance of the strategic location of B relate to the degree
of influence A wishes to exert in B. (The USA did not put heavy pressure on
Turkey after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus partly because of Turkey's strate-
gic importance to her.) 12- A's influence over B is proportional to the number of
powerful states and the level of tension in the international arena. (In the 1950s
Turkey was more receptive to U.S. influence than in the detente years.)
It would be wrong to say that Turkey was under the constant influence of the
United States in the 1960-1975 period, because this influence varied in accordance
with the factors mentioned above. It might be generally said that U.S. influence
in Turkey in the late 1940s was significant, but it gradually decreased until 1974.
2.6 Examples of U.S. Influence on turkey
Many Turkish scholars and politicians beljeved that since the Truman Doctrine
of 1947 Turkish foreign policy had been totally dependent on American policy-
makers' desires and decisions. In their eyes, especially in the 1950s Turkey seemed
80 The author's interview with former Turkish foreign minister U. Haluk Bayülken.
90 The authors interview with Kaiixran man.
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to have no foreign policy interests outside her alliance with the West and she
just followed her Western allies' decisions and actions. Feroz Ahmad claims that
"throughout the fifties, Ankara pursued the foreign policy objectives set in Wash-
ington or London with conviction and without complaint." 91 F.A. Vali explains
that Turks threw themselves into the arms of their rich friend, the USA, and tied
themselves to the USA in many ways by signing bilateral agreements. In his opin-
ion, "Turkey seemed to feel that... what the United States wanted should not
he questioned." 92 Gönlübol makes his accusation much sharper: "Turkey foul1d
herself following the policies of the United States almost step by step both within
and outside NATO, thus reducing herself to the position of a satellite." 93 Ahrnet
. Esmer summarises Turkish foreign policy since the 1950s as follows:
[Aftcr joining NATO and being an ally of America] we signed numerous bilateral
agreenients with the United States and left our business in her hands. Our military is
under the command of NATO, our bases are in the hands of the Americans. our security
is (lepen(lent oii America. our economic development is dependent on American aid. We
saw it as our duty to support France, America and Britain in their dealings with the
Algeriaii, Vietnam and Suez problems. We also felt it our responsibility to defend
VVestern colonialism in the Baudung Conference of non-aligned countries. In the United
Nations votnigs we look at the arm of American representative. We have not got the
iiiitiative in foreign i)olicy.94
The United States was accused by Turkish critics of penetrating into every
sector of Turkish life by using its economic and military aid, by providing Amer-
ican education to thousands of Turks and also by inserting a lot of U.S. experts
into the Turkish military and civil service. 95 American Peace Corps volunteers,
university lecturers and any kind of U.S. experts were regarded by leftists as U.S.
agents collecting secret information on Turkey and influencing ruling elites. While
describing U.S. control, Turkish Labour Party leader M.A. Aybar said: "Like God,
America's eyes, ears and hands are everywhere in Turkey."9°
91 F. Aliniad. the Turkish Experiment in Democracy, London: the Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 1977. p.395.
02 F.A. Vahi. Bridge Across the Bosporus, Balthnore: the John Hopkins Press, 1971. pp.356,
38. 71. 116.
Giinliibol in Karpat(cd.). op.cit.. p.22.
A	 "Uyduluk Siyasetine Son". .Tvlilliyet, 24.12.1965.
° j .M. Liidii. Radical Politics in Modern Turkey. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974. pp.80-82.
96 "Di Politikamiz Nasil Olmalidir?". interview by Y. cetiiier, Cumhuriyet, 17.10.1964.
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While the criticism of some authors reflected more or less the truth, accusa-
tions of leftists were much more exaggerated propaganda aiming at attracting the
public's attention to their movement.
2.6.1 Economic Dependence
Turkish critics put forward the following claims on Turkey's economic de-
pendence on the USA: American economic aid to Turkey was used mostly by
pro-American Turkish economic elites, multinational and American companies to
strengthen their position al1d 11elped them to exploit Turkey's economic resources
and direct the Turkish economy. This was the Americans' intention as well. 97 The
Turkish economy fell wholly under the influence of the American economy with
American aid and foreign investment. American economic elites used Turkey's raw
materials and labour force for their own interests and deliberately tried to prevent
the development of the Turkish economy. 98 The consortium which was established
by several countries to supply economic aid to Turkey 90 and the American aid
agency, AID, 10° used their power to control and direct the Turkish economy and to
intervene in Turkey's domestic politics. The United States used its aid to Turkey
as a means of pressure to force Turkey to fulfil some American demands as was
seen in the Cyprus and opium questions.10'
2.6.2 U.s. Intervention in Turkish Politics
Some Turkish politicians and intellectuals, especially leftist ones, believed that
the United States intervened in Turkey's internal politics by supporting rightist
parties against leftist groups. The Republican People's Party leaders opposed
the U.S. aid to Turkey in 1958102 and the U.S.-Turkish agreement in 1959 be-
in Cumhuriyet: 1. Selçuk. "2000 Yihna Kadar", 9.8.1965. p.2. "Bayramlik".
12.4.1965. P2. "Manzara-i Umumiye", 7.1.1966, p.2.
I. St'lçiik, "NATO'ya Gobegimizden Baghyiz", cumhuri Vet. 5.11.1967. p.2. R.
',arila. MMTD, 29.4.1969, terni 2. scss.4, vol.36. p.105, B. Boran, 7iirkiye ye Sosyal-
izm Sorunlari, Istanbul: Tckin Yay,nevi. 1970, p.267, A. Kabakh, "Faydasi Ne?".
Terc?iman. 30.8.1964.
°° I. Slciik. "Maiiiara-i Umuniiye", Curnhuriyet, 7.1.1966, p.2.
100 T.Z. Ekiuci and S. Arcii. !V[A'ITD, 1.3.1968, terni 2, sess.3, vol.27, p.29, ibid.. 4.3.1968, p.158, R.
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cause they suspected that the USA was trying to save the Democrats from falling
from power.'° 3 When the American Acheson plan on the Cyprus question was re-
jected by the Turkish government in August 1964 some rumours erupted in Turkey,
claiming that the United States was looking for another prime minister in Turkey,
who would accept American plans rejected by P.M. Inönü.'° 4 Metin Toker, Ismet
Tnönü's son-in-law, claimed that in August 1964 President Johnson sent General
Porter to Turkey for this purpose. He reasoned that the CIA was aware of a radical
change in Turkey's foreign policy and was trying to prevent it. 105 In January 1965,
Inönü denied the rumours by saying: "I myself do not worry about it. America
has given definite assurances in this subject." 106 However, the visit of U.S. Am-
bassador Raymond Hare to the opposition leaders just before the parliamentary
vote on 13 February 1965, which brought down the Inönii government, caused the
accusation that he was giving orders to the leader of the Justice Party, Suleyman
Demirel, to topple the government. 107 Inönü denied the claims again in his speech
in Parliament on 1 March 1965: "I will not agree that a shadow be cast on an
honest and serious person because of a bad coincidence. In sum, at the time we
relinquished our official duties we were in complete and mutual confidence with
the American government and its ambassador." 108 Ambassador Hare told Turkish
journalists: "As decided a long time ago, I paid ceremonial visits to the leaders
of the two opposition parties. At the same time, an unexpected political crisis
came about in Turkey. There is no relation between the two events apart from
chronological coincidence. We Americans who have interest in Turkey's develop-
ment pursue the policy of keeping ourselves away from Turkey's internal politics.
Internal politics is your business, not ours."10°
After the Justice Party came to power in the elections of 1965 the left accused
103 Harris. Troubled Alliance, op.cit.. 1)1)69. 81, 83. It should be noted that some Democrat. Party
politicians subsequently claimed that tile USA wanted the DP to fall in 1960.
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it of having received American support during the election campaigns, and claimed
that America financially supported rightist groups against leftist ones and always
wanted a rightist government in Turkey. 11° Republican MP Bülent Ecevit told
his party's parliamentary caucus in June 1966 that America acted as if it was the
ally of the JP, not Turkey, and that big American companies worked like partners
of the JP. 111 He mentioned the CIA's activities in other countries, hinting that it
could do same thing in Turkey:
Iii America it has been disclosed with what dirty games the CIA is involved affecting
(IOIUCStiC politics in friendly and allied countries. It pours money into elections in order
to briiig those it wants into power and to unseat those it does not want... In order
to prepare a pretext for sinashiitg legal and democratic opposition, it has claimed that
there was a great comimiiiist danger; or else in order to prepare justification for armed
American intervention it has claimed that there was a danger of unarmed and indirect
aggression and has organised demonstrations, sabotage and civil war.1'
By mentioning the big increase in the iiumber of rightist organisations, news-
papers and magazines Ecevit hinted that their financial support had come from
America.113
National Unionist Senator Haydar Tunçkanat claimed that he found a doc-
ument consisting of correspondence between Turkish and American officials on
preventing the increase of the left's power and supporting pro-American Turkish
groups. 114
 Turkish Labour Party MP Behice Boran wrote in her book that ruling
elites and the United States had made every kind of effort to prevent the success
of the Turkish socialist movement and its party."5
When U.S. Ambassador Parker Hart claimed in January 1966 that the United
110	 Sclçiik. "Flayallerden Silkinmek", Cumhuriyet, 22.6.1966, p.2, I. Selçuk, "Bir
Iki, Uç Dört, Ustiinii Ort", ibid., 17.12.1968. p.2, Harris, op.cit., pp.136-137. Fahir
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United States always supported rightist rules, democratic or dictatorial. He argued that Turkey
was not an exception iii this regard and that the JP enjoyed the American support. Arinaoglu
further chuined that the USA affected Turkish politics through different methods and that this was
the fate of siiiall countries. Seyfl Talian. Turkish academic, totally rejected these kinds of claims,
seeing them as a part of the leftist campaign to break down U.S.-Turkish relations.
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States never prevented the planned Turkish military intervention in Cyprus' 16 while
a heated debate was going on between rival Turkish political groups on whether
the government should explain the content of the Johnson letter of June 1964; op-
position groups attacked Hart, accusing him of joining an internal Turkish political
debate on the side of the governmental party and acting like a high commissioner
or prime niinister of Turkey. 117
 Some Turkish critics believed that the United
States played a part in the Turkish military "coup by memorandum" on 12 March
1971. 118
These unproven claims cannot be taken as facts since they were made by
biased anti-American critics. Some of these critics such as Bülent Ecevit denied
any foreign intervention in Turkish politics when they were in power. The only
thing which can be said is that the United States wanted rightists to come into
power in Turkey as she did in other countries because anti-communist rightists
were more likely to pursue policies which would be compatible with U.S. interests.
This does not necessitate direct U.S. intervention.
2.6.3 Recognition of China
Some Turkish critics claimed that Turkish rulers did not recognise communist
China until 1971 merely to please their American friends though Americans neither
made any open demand nor forced the Turkish government on this matter. It was
argued that Turkey's recognition of communist China would not be a radical one
because some other NATO members such as Britain already recognised China and
it would bring trade benefits. 119 In August 1971 Turkey suddenly decided to extend
her official recognition to China after the American rulers initiated some actions
to restore normal relations with the Chinese.' 20 There was a speculation that the
USA influenced the decision by putting pressure on Turkish rulers. Turkish Deputy
116 Dii1eri Bakanlzi Belleteni, January 1966, pp.37-38.
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Prime Minister Sadi Koça denied it: "Our decision was taken strictly in the light
of Turkish interests. No foreign country influenced or advised us while taking this
decision." 121
As Turkey's voting patterns in the United Nations showed, Turkey always
followed the U.S. lead in cold-war matters even in the periods when she was not
on good terms with her. The recognition of China by Turkey was one of the
examples which fitted this trend. Turkish leaders waited until the U.S. initiative
gave them the green light to extend recognition to a communist regime in a country
where nationalist forces also claimed to represent the state. It is a classic example
of Turkish lack of confidence in communist rulers. While they had some problems
with the United States on some of their national interests, Turkish rulers did
not want to fall in disagreement with the Americans in cold-war issues as well,
which did not directly affect Turkish interests. The removal from Inönü's letter
to Johnson in 1964 of the part criticising U.S. policy in Vietnam 122 strengthens
this observation. Therefore, it might be said that Turkey wanted to please the
United States with its policy on the recognition of China but its action cannot be
presented only as an example of U.S. influence.
2.6.4 The Komer Event
The appointment of Robert Komer as the American ambassador to Turkey
at the end of 1968 was an event that was been frequently cited as an example of
Turkey's dependence on the USA and of American dominance to the point where
they felt no need to consider Turkish sensitivities. The appointment was strongly
criticised by Turkish leftist groups on the ground that Komer, who had been
involved in the American pacification programme in Vietnam, was seJt to T2'rkey to
break the power of the leftist movement. They claimed that Washington considered
Turkey its backyard like Vietnam and therefore did not hesitate to appoint an
ex-CIA agent as ambassador to Turkey. Some other Turkish critics argued that
sending an ex-CIA agent to Turkey at a time when anti-Americanism was rife
among Turkish people was a mistake. They were of the opinion that it would cause
121 Gumhuriyet, 7.8.1971, p.1, Ahinad, op.cit., p.429n.
122 The aiitliors interview with former Turkish foreign minister U. Haluk Bayülken. The incident will
be iiieiitioiied in the section on the Johnson letter in Chapter VI.
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humiliation of the Turkish government and deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations.
When Komer visited the Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara on 9
January 1969, which was established with American financial aid, leftist students
strongly protested against his visit and set fire to his car.' 23
 President Nixon's
decision to replace Korner with William Handley in April 1969 was considered a
response to the campaign of leftist groups. But it is more likely that the American
action was actually aimed at easing the position of the Turkish government against
public criticism.
The Komer event seems a propaganda action of leftists to stimulate public
antagonism toward the United States. It is hard to expect the U.S. and Turkish
governments to listen to demands of a small minority in such a matter. Since
most diplomats are involved in intelligence matters somehow, being a member
of the CIA could scarcely be an excuse to reject ambassadors.' 24
 Therefore U.S.
insistence on sending Komer cannot be seen as an act of U.S. influence. Tithe
Turkish government had wanted the withdrawal of Komer's appointment after
public leftist protests on the subject, it would have seemed yielding to far leftists'
pressures.
2.6.5 Rejection of U.S. Influence Accusations
Regardless of their political orientation, leftist or rightist, all Turkish author-
ities rejected the claim that Turkey was a satellite of the United States. Their
denials were so frequent that one can easily ask why Turkish officials needed so
many denials; these denials had the effect of increasing the suspicions of Turkey's
dependence on America. 125
 In his press conference in August 1962 Bülent Ecevit,
who was then the minister of labour, firmly criticised actions of American trade
unionist M. Thalmayer, who came to Turkey to support Turkish workers in their
struggle against American companies. Ecevit said: "some people try to present
the flow of foreign capital from our friendly allies to our country as colonialism
123 M.A. Birand et a!., 12 .tvlart, Ankara: Inige Kitabevi. 1994, pp.151-152.
124 The author's interview with Umit Haluk Bayülken.
125 P.M. Demircls press conference, Dzileri Bakanliz Belleteni, November 1966, pp.73, 75-
76: Foreign Minister çaglayangil's speech in Parliament, MMTD. term 2, sess.2, vol.11. p.127;
Deputy Foreign Minister Faruk Sükan's speech in Parliament, cSTD, term 1. sess.6, vol.42, p.21;
President Ccvdet Sunay's Victory Day speech, Gumhuri yet, 31.8.1968. p.7; Foreign Minister
Osnian Olcays speech in a private dinner, ibid., 28.5.1971, p.7.
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or iniperialism. Mr Thalmayer seems to lead this propaganda campaign against
an imaginary American colonialism... No Turkish government allows the foreign
capital to turn into a form of colonialism."'26
Some American politicians joined the defence of Turkey's independence in order
to give the impression that the United States did not intend to violate Turkey's
sovereignty for the sake of her own interests. At the dinner welcoming Turkish
President Cevdet Sunay on 3 April 1967, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said
that Turkey and the United States were not allies who merely followed one an-
other, hut they were close friends and allies who independently tried to protect
their national interests.' 27
 Ambassador Komer told Turkish daily Milliyet's cor-
respondent that the claim of Turkey's dependence on America was a myth made
up by leftist propagal1dists. He claimed that in comparison with Turkey's position
in the afterniath of the Second World War, the Turkey of 1969 was much more
independent, much stronger and less dependent on others' help.' 28 A high-ranking
American officer in NATO in Paris said that Turkey acted independently within
NATO by giving the example that Turkey rejected the implementation of NATO's
Orient Express operation on its territory.' 29 The apparent reason for the Turkish
rejection was to avoid annoying the Middle Eastern countries at a time when some
important events took place in the region.
126 Curnhuriyet. 27.8.1962, p.5.
127 Dzileri Bakartlm4i Belleteni, April 1967, p.50, Amerika'da Onbir Gun. op.cit. p.lO.
128 Milliyet. 18.4.1969.
129 Cnrnhuriyet. 26.11.1968, p.7.
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Chapter III
FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION IN TURKEY AND
USA
This chapter analyses the structure and determinants of Turkish and US. for-
eign policies between 1960 and 1975 in order to help the reader assess correctly
events of the two countries' relations, which will be mentioned in the following
chapters. It provides necessary information about factors and the formal frame-
work that affected opinions, decisions and actions of policy-makers on both sides.
It tries to illuminate the internal and international atmosphere in which relations
of the two countries took place. In order to achieve this it mentions a number of
preoccupation of each country that were not of primary concern to the other but
nevertheless influenced the background against which their mutual relationships
were conducted (for example the Vietnam war which was of enormous importance
to the USA but not to Turkey).
3.1 Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy
3.1.1 Independence and Security
The most important goal of Turkish foreign policy is to preserve Turkey's na-
tional independence and sovereignty and its territorial integrity.' 30 Turks attribute
much more importance to these aspects than other nations generally do, because
they believe that their loss or limitation during the last centuries of the Ottoman
Empire caused great damage to Turkish national interests. They know that eco-
nomic, judicial and political privileges given by the Ottoman Empire to foreigners
greatly limited the independence of the empire and damaged its economic life.
They are also aware that foreign countries accelerated the collapse of the empire
by intervening in its internal affairs in the name of protecting ethnic and religious
130 Frenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus, Baltiiiiore, London: John Hopkins Press. 1971,
1).69. .laiiies E. Sowerwine, Dynamics of Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy,
Ph.D. Thesis, Uiiiversity of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987. p.14.
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minorities. Especially in the first two and half decades of the new Turkish Re-
public, in order to ensure genuine independence and sovereignty Turkish leaders
were reluctant to enter into alliance relations with other countries or give them
economic privileges. 13 ' In the 1960s and 1970s Turkey's relations with the United
States and NATO became subject to severe criticism on the ground that they vio-
lated Turkey's independence. Even today Turkish leaders always claim that their
first priority in pursuing foreign policy is to avoid any kinds of acts which might
damage Turkey's complete independence.
Turks are also very concerned about guaranteeing their national security. The
belief that about 50 countries which were under Ottoman rule for centuries have
hostile thoughts against Turkey has led Turkish rulers to assign great importance to
security. 132 It was the national security concern which played the most important
part in forcing Turks to seek the military alliance with the West after the Second
World War, and it is mainly this same concern which has made Turkey chose to
remain within the NATO pact despite changes in the international arena.
3.1.2 Moral Values
Another important goal of Turkish foreign policy is to achieve the long-lived
dream of being recognised as an equal and respected member of the Western com-
munity of "civilised" nations with the assimilation of Turkish people into Western
civilisation) 33 Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish rul-
ing elites have believed that Turkey can reach the level of advanced countries only
if she follows the pat 11 of Western countries and joins their political, economic and
cultural organisations. They have therefore directed their efforts towards having
close relations with the West and avoided having clashes with the West in any
arena. We can say that modernisation and Westernization efforts at home greatly
affected Turkey's general foreign policy line. Especially after 1945, the maui plank
of Turkey's foreign policy was her alliance with the West. Turkish rulers have
131 Vali. op. cit.. pp. 24-25.
132 Tue authors interview with former Turkish foreign and defence minister U. Haluk Bayüiken.
133 Vali. 01).Cit., PP
.
 35-36. 56. 69, 70. 318. Metin Tamkoç. the Warrior Diplomats, Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press. 1976, p.298, tue author's interview with Turkish academic Seyfi
Tal1lt.
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always attributed great importance to attaining full participation in all Western
organisations and supported main Western activities in the international arena.
It is a traditional claim of Turkish policy-makers that their foreign policy aims
at having friendly relations with every country and helping the establishment and
continuation of peace in the international arena. On every occasion they declare
that Turkey sincerely respects international law and international treaties and
supports all peace initiatives in every part of the world. The saying of Kemal
Atatürk, "peace at home, peace in the world" is a widely accepted principle of
Turkish foreign policy. But this principle is also interpreted as preparedness for war
against possible enemy attacks and willingness to use armed force in case of need
to secure national security and interests.' 34 This principle did not prevent Turks
from intervening in Cyprus militarily, annexing Hatay and arming the Turkish
Straits. 135
Atatürkisni, which means following the main principles of the founder of the
Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, has its impact on Turkish foreign policy too.
Since the death of Atatürk, all main actors in Turkish political arena have claimed
that they have followed the path of Atatürk and worked for the survival of his
principles. As Ferenc A. Vali states, "Turkish statesmen, politicians, professors,
and even common people still quote him and profess to follow his directions."136
The main principles of the Atatürkism which were endorsed in 1937 by the con-
stitution are known as the "Six Arrows": nationalism, secularism, republicanism,
populism, statism, and revolutionism.' 37 These principles and their interpretations
are regarded by Turkish policy-makers as main references in foreign policy-making
as well as domestic policy-making.
Other moral values, too, have affected minds of Turkish foreign policy-makers.
Anti-communism and co-operating with other states against communist expansion
was one of their main concerns. They like to be seen as champions of democracy
in their dealings with other states. To gain the support of the Muslim world for
Turkish interests, they emphasise the Islamic identity of the Turkish nation.
134 Taiiikoc. op.cit.. p.301.
135 The author's interview with U. Haluk Bayüflcen.
136 \Iali. op.cit.. p.27.
137 SOweiwille. Op.cit.. P15
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3.1.3 Economic Development
Economic development and modernisation also form an important part of Turk-
ish foreign policy aims. For most Turkish ruling elites, acquiring the technological
and economic strength of the Western advanced states has been an aim of both
domestic and foreign policy making. Economic considerations played an important
part in main Turkish foreign policy decisions such as joining NATO and making
alliance with the Western powers. Turkey's needs for foreign economic assistance
affected her relations with money supplying countries. Especially after the Second
World War, Turkish leaders struggled to obtain maximum possible assistance of
the West for its economic development and modernisation. Attaining full mem-
bership in the European Economic Community also remained as an unchanged
foreign policy aim after 1959.
3.1.4 Strategic Location
Scholars who study main determinants of Turkish foreign policy give a special
place to the geographical location of Turkey. 138 It is a widespread belief among
scholars and Turkish politicians that Turkish foreign policy is under the inevitable
influence of her geopolitical location. It is claimed that Turkey cannot afford to
pursue a neutral policy outside the general superpower competition because of her
strategic place between Europe and Asia. The Turkish Straits connecting the Black
Sea with the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea constitute a potential source of power
as well as threat for Turkey, because they are key points for the main sea powers
for their presence in the Black Sea and Mediterranean. With her geographical
position, Turkey has the potential to act both as a bridge and barrier between
Europe and the Soviet Union, and between Europe and the Middle East. Turkish
politicians put a special emphasis on the bridge position of Turkey between the
two continents and between different cultures, expecting thereby to increase the
role of Turkey in world politics. Turkey's closeness to the Middle East, so long the
centre of conflict among super and regional powers, has also been an important
factor influencing Turkish foreign policy-making.
138 Vali. op.rit.. p.43. Sowerwijie. op.cit., p.24, Richard D. Robinson. the First Turkish Republic
Caiubridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp.164-165, Nun Eren, Turkey, NATÔ
and Europe, PLris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977, PP
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3.1.5 Cyprus
Since the second half of the 1950s the Cyprus question has been a constant
factor and problem of Turkish foreign policy, affecting decisions of policy makers
iii other matters as well. For Turks, Cyprus is a matter of national honour and
prestige, and policies towards it cannot be decided by a few top officials on their
own without regard for public opinion.' 39 When the Cyprus issue showed in the
1960s that Turkey was isolated in the international arena and "betrayed" by even
her allies, Turkish foreign policy became subject to public debate perhaps for the
first time in Turkish history. Thus, the Cyprus problem played a catalyst role in
attracting people's attention to matters of foreign relations and encouraging them
to express their views on foreign policy.' 40 The developments on the Cyprus ques-
tion also led the Turkish government to re-examine its foreign policy and pursue
a more flexible one aiming at putting an end to Turkey's isolation in the interna-
tional arena and gaining support of the Soviet bloc and Third World countries on
the Cyprus issue.
3.1.6 Continuity of Foreign Policy
It is widely believed among scholars and Turkish politicians that fundamentals
of Turkish foreign policy have not changed since the foundation of the Republic
in spite of slight changes in the composition of policy-makers and in the methods
and meaiis used in foreign re1ations.'' Continuity is regarded as one of the main
characteristics of Turkish foreign policy. Main political actors in the Turkish po-
litical arena including political parties, influential political figures, interest groups,
the press and the military have an undeclared consensus on main Turkish foreign
policy goals mentioned above though they attack each other on other matters. For
Turkish ruling elites the main direction and line of Turkish national policy is so
correct that trying to alter this line or even criticise it is unpatriotic and unaccept-
able.' 42 In the 1960s, foreign policy became subject to parliamentary and public
139 VaIL op.cit.. p.242.
140 Mcli,'wt Qöiiliibol. "NATO, USA and Turkey" b K.H. Karpat(ed.), Turkey's For-
eign Policy in Transition, Leideji: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.32.
141 VaIl. op.cit.. pp. 68, 78. 79. 352, Da,ikwart A. Rustow, Turkey: America 's Forgotten Ally,
Nw York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987, pp.84. 85, Tainkoç, op.cit., p.298.
142 Vali. Op.cit.. p.358.
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debate and was criticised by many politicians and intellectuals but the official line
of the government's policy remained unchanged. 143 In spite of heated discussions,
a lot of noise and emotion on foreign policy matters, the government stood firm in
pursuing its policy without reformulating it. For example, in spite of all pressures
from different groups, the Turkish government did not sever its relations with the
United States and did not think of leaving NATO.' 44 Even during the rule of weak
coalition and military-supported governments in the 1970s, special attention was
paid to foreign policy in order to prevent radical changes and the post of foreign
minister was given to respected figures from one of the niajor centrist parties or
experienced career diplomats.'45
3.2 Foreign Policy-Making in Turkey Before 1960
From the foundation of the Turkish Republic to the military coup of 1960,
Turkey's foreign policy was made exclusively by the executive branch with mini-
nium participation of other branches and groups.' 46
 At least until 1945, the leader-
ship of the Republican People's Party single-handedly directed foreign policy of the
country by using the power of the executive branch. 147
 Although the constitution
of 1924 gave the ultimate power to the Grand National Assembly, in practice the
government formed by the top leadership of the RPP decided and implemented
all domestic and foreigmi policy activities of the state.'48 Under the presidencies of
Keiiial Atatürk and Ismet Inönü foreign policies were determined by the president
and a small circle of advisers. 149 While the president took final decisions, "the
members of the Council of Ministers, the General Staff of the armed forces, a few
top Foreign Ministry officials and a few party members in the Assembly including
the Head of the Parliamentary group of the RPP and the Chairman of the Corn-
mittee on Foreign Affairs" were, from time to time, called upon to express their
143 Göiilfiboi in Karpat(cd.), pp.cit., p.22.
144 Fcroz Aliniad. the Turkish experiment in Democracy, London: tile Royal Institute of
Iiiteriiatioiial Affairs. 1977, p.407.
145 Rustow. op.cit., p.85.
146 Sowerwiiie, op.cit.. p.165, Gönliihol in Karpat(ed.). op.cit., p.i6.
117 Sowerwijie. op.cit.. p.l63.
148 IIid.. p.164.
'49 Vali, O1).Cit.. pp.41 . 43.
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views on foreign policy matters.'50
The first president of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, saw foreign policy
matters exclusively within his realm of authority and concern. In a sense, he
acted as the chief diplomat of his country.' 5 ' The second president, Ismet Inönü,
"was his own prime minister and foreign minister. He was in absolute control
of foreign relations of Turkey from 1938 to the middle of 1950.152 Holding all
powers exclusively in his hand, he appointed and dismissed prime ministers and
ministers and maintained a strict control over the election of deputies to the Grand
National Assembly.' 53 Foreign policy-making patterns remained unchanged under
the administration of the Democrat Part government, which stayed in power in
the 1950s. Foreign policy activities of the state were conducted exclusively by
the executive branch headed by President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes." 4
 Bayar and Menderes took the decision to send troops to Korea in
consultation with only the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff
and the commanders of the armed forces. The secret bilateral accords with the
United States in the 1950s were reached without consultation or ratification by
the Parliament. Turkey's Middle East policy in the l9SOs was determined only by
Bayar and Menderes.
Before 1960 foreign policy of the Turkish governments was rarely discussed
and criticised by the opposition parties and the press.' 55
 In this period foreign
policy was considered a national issue which could not be questioned by public
opinion. There was a widespread belief that the official foreign policy represented
the unanimous will of the whole nation. 156 Even after transition to multi-party
democracy in 1950, foreign policy was not made subject to political debates be-
tween the parties in spite of their severe disagreements in domestic politics.' 57
 The
'° Sowerwinc. op.cit.. p.165. Tainkoç, op.cit., p.221.
" Sowerwinc, op.cit., p.l66. Tainkoç. op. cit.. p.127.
152 Tanikoc. op.cit.. p.221.
Ibid., p.33.
154 Sowerwine, op.cit., p.l73.
'' Karpat(ed.). op.cit., p.7.
Vali. op.cit., p.4l, Tuukoc. op.cit., p.297.
'° Alimad. op.cit.. p.39O.
54
government's Middle East policy in 1958 was the first foreign policy issue to be
criticised by the opposition party.
The military coup on 27 May 1960 and the constitution of 1961 brought about
a new political atmosphere in Turkey. Under the constitution the exercise of
sovereignty was divided among three main branches, the legislative (the bicameral
Grand National Assembly), the executive (headed by the President and Council of
Ministers) and an independent judiciary.' 58
 The new constitution provided a more
pluralistic electoral system based on proportional representation, giving more place
and effectiveness to smaller parties. In the new system trade unions and voluntary
associations gained legitimacy and the autonomy of universities, the press, and the
national radio and television increased.' 59
 In the atmosphere of greater freedom
and democracy, the foreign policy of the government as well as ideological founda-
tions of the regime became subject to questioning and criticism by political parties
in parliament, journalists and columnists in the press and academics in universi-
ties. Thus the former taboo regarding discussion of foreign policy was lifted,' 60
 and
national consensus on foreign policy was broken. 16 ' Ideology entered into Turkish
politics as an important factor affecting foreign policy debates especially among
radical groups. The changes mentioned above also played a part in widening the
Turkish foreign policy-making circle, providing more political participation in the
domestic and foreign policy-making process.162
3.3 Structure of Turkish Foreign Policy-Making Process
In theory, a wide range of political actors seemed to have the potential to
participate in formulating foreign policy decisions or at least to affect them in
the 1960s and 1970s. In practice, however, the impact of these groups on foreign
policy-making differed in accordance with their real power and policy-making was
generally concentrated in the hands of the top leadership in conjunction with a
few directly involved officials.
158 the Turkish Constitution as Amended, Ankara: Babakan1ik Basiinevi, 1978, Articles 4,
5. 6, 7. pp.8-9.
Sowe'wine. op.cit., P.178.
Vali. op.cit.. pp. 40-41. 57-58, 71.
Eren. op.cit.. p.9.
162 Taiiikoc, the Warrior Diplomats, op.cit., pp. 297-298.
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3.3.1 President
The Turkish political system created by the constitution of 1961 gave predom-
inantly ceremonial responsibilities to the president, leaving actual policy-making
and implementation to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. 163 Almost
all political decisions were ratified by the president as the ultimate nominal power,
hut real responsibility for taking decisions and implementing them remained in
the hands of the government. According to the constitution, the president was the
head of state representing the whole state and nation in the international arena
and he was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The president
had the right to preside over the Council of Ministers and the National Security
Council when he felt it necessary. He was empowered to appoint a member of
parliament to form a government and to reject laws accepted by Parliament and
send them back for reconsideration. The candidate for prime ministry selected by
the president was the person whose position was more suitable to form a govern-
ment and the president had to ratify laws re-enacted by Parliament. The president
had the right to appoint the chief of the general staff upon recommendation by
the prime minister. 164
 In the foreign policy arena, the president was authorised
to receive representatives of foreign states, to appoint the diplomatic representa-
tives of his own country and to ratify and publish international agreements and
laws. 105
 In the l960s and 1970s the presidents continued to be very close to the
real decision-making centres and had the opportunity to affect real policy-makers
but they had not been in the position of making and implementing foreign policy
decisions bypassing the power of the government.
3.3.2 Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister and advised by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the chief foreign policy-making body of Turkey in
the system introduced by the 1961 coistitution. 166 In time of crises or in case of
103 Sowerwine. op.cit.. pp. 181-182. Ricinsrd C. Campany, Turkey and the United States, New
York. London: Praeger, 1986, p.41, Riun S. Shinn, "Government and Politics" in R.F.
Nyrop (ed.). Turkey, Wathiugton D.C.: the American University, 1980, p.195.
104 5owerWiiie. op.cit.. p.181.
105 Ttiiikoc. op.cit.. p.l28, Shun. op.cit.. p.195.
160 5ldnn in Nyrop (ed.). op.cit.. p.195. Vali, op.cit., p.73.
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discussing major national issues, the president and the chief of the general staff
were allowed to attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers.' 67 The prime
minister was the most important actor in shaping foreign policy of Turkey with his
duty of implementing the general government policy with the assistance of other
ministers. Some prime ministers such as Bülent Ecevit played a more active role in
foreign policy decisions. All other ministers had collective responsibility regarding
the government's general foreign policy to Parliament.' 68
 In general, the council
of ministers was more likely to reach foreign policy decisions by consensus and if a
decision was taken by a majority vote, other ministers were obliged to support this
decision. Especially from the second half of the 1960s the cabinet felt compelled to
inform and consult leaders of political parties on essential questions and to defend
its foreign policy before parliament and the electorate.'°° The vulnerability of the
government in domestic and foreign policy issues increased during the coalition
governments since the cabinet could be dismissed from power by parliament if its
actions were unacceptable to the majority in parliament.
3.3.3 Foreign Ministry
The foreign ministry headed by the foreign minister was the major loreIgn
policy-making body apart from the cabinet which formulated main foreign policy
decisions.' 70
 Implementation of foreign policy decisions and day-to-day manage-
inent of foreign affairs were in practice handed over to the foreign ministry and
its minister. As Vali states, "the ministry of foreign affairs and its minister are
in the position of exercising independent authority in matters of political detail
and are able to influence the higher level decision-making process." '' They were
able to assist and advise top foreign policy-makers and charged with preparing the
government's foreign policy program. The foreign minister held a unique position
in deciding many foreign policy matters independently and had the final say in all
matters which did not concern the council of 	 The foreign minister's
167 Vali. op.cit., p.73. Taiiikoç. op.cit.. pp. 250-251.
168 S1,j'ii'. op.cit.. pp. 195-196.
109 \TaIi. op.cit., pp.72. 79.
170 Ibid.. p.74. Sowerwiiw, op.cit., p.194.
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top advisers including the secretary general of the ministry and the general di-
rectors of the various divisions within the ministry and other high-ranking career
foreign service officers had also great influence in foreign policy decisions. 173
 The
career diplomats of the Turkish Foreign Ministry had a special place in the Turkish
political system, assuring the continuity of traditional Turkish foreign policy line
for decades. They were "the best educated, the most Westernised, and also the
most aristocratic" group among the civil service,' 74
 fully dedicated to the aim of
integrating Turkey with the Western world.lTh
3.3.4 Military
The Ministry of National Defence and its minister played a vital role in shaping
foreign policy decisions related to Turkey's national security. They were empow-
ered to prepare the government's program on national defence. The minister of
natioiial defence had the final power in deciding national security matters which
were not too important to attract the attention of the cabinet.' 76 However, the
defence minister was not the boss of the military, having no voice in the corn-
manci and control of the armed forces. Actual military policy was shaped by the
commanders of the armed forces.177
The military in Turkey had potentially great power in deciding the direction of
Turkish political system. The 1960-1973 period saw the Turkish military playing an
extensive part in ruling Turkey. Frequent interventions by the military in politics
were based on the view that Kernal Atatürk had bequeathed to the military the
duty of protecting the Republic and the reforms he had initiated. When the
military felt that politicians were unable to rule the country effectively and that
Atatürk's reforms were under threat, it saw taking over the rule of the country
and putting the train back on the track as its legitimate right and duty.' 78 The
majority of military ,offiers were in favour of a democratic regime and they were
173 Taiiikoç. O I).Cit. p.255.
174 Karpat(ed.). oprit., p.7.
17 Vali. op.cit., p.75.
l7 Sowcrwine, op.cit.. pp. 187-188.
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against politicising the armed forces through intervention in domestic politics,179
but at the same time officers expected politicians to carry out Atatürk's reforms
and take necessary measures against the extreme right and left. The officers of
the 27 May 1960 coup 18° did not allow lower-rank officers to halt the democratic
process181 but pressurised governments and political parties in order to protect
their revolution and reforms and to prevent revenge of anti-coupist politicians.182
They forced party leaders to elect General Cemal Gürsel as president and Ismet
Inönü as prime minister by threatening to prohibit all political parties.' 83 On 12
March 1971 military officers caused the resignation of the Demirel government by
delivering a stern memorandum184 and ruled the country for the next two and
half years behind the scenes through above-party governments. They suppressed
extreme groups 18 ' and passed some laws in Parliament but could not persuade
deputies to elect their candidate General Gürler as president.'86
The army commanders preferred to stay outside the policy-making process in
foreign affairs. They did not intervene in the structure of the Foreign Ministry and
left the job of foreign policy-making to famous political figures or career diplomats.
It might be said that particularly in the time of civilian rule the army acted as a
pressure group rather than policy determiner. 187 However, when issues of national
security and defence came to consideration, the government had to consider the
views of the army commanders.' 88 Especially the Supreme Military Council headed
by the chief of the general staff and attended by the commanders of the army,
navy, air forces, and gendermarie had influence On policy-makers during the crises
in which use of armed forces was considered. For example, during the Cyprus
'° Nyc. op.cit.. pp.17. 121, 133, 248.
180 For detailed information about the 27 May coup see Keesing's Contemporary Archives,
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crises in 1963-64 and 1967 the top military leadership was actively involved in the
adoption of important decisions.189
3.3.5 National Security Council
In the 1960s and the 1970s Turkey maintained a National Security Council
which was headed by the president when present or the prime minister and in-
chided the deputy prune minister; the ministers of foreign affairs, national defence,
interior affairs, finance, communication, labour, industry; the chief of the general
staff; the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and the secretary of the
NSC, who was a general. The main functions of the council were to advise the
president and the Council of Ministers on national security matters, to co-ordinate
all activities of national mohilisation and defence and to prepare national security
plans and programs.'°° Although the president had the right to preside over the
council when at present, generally the prime minister directed activities of the
council. The council became an important policy-making body on the matters of
national security aiid seemed to carry more weight in taking decisions on important
occasions than other bodies did.'9'
3.3.6 Parliament
Before 1960, Parliament acted as the legitimiser of the government's foreign
policy by accepting all governmental actions with minimum discussion or resent-
ment. 102 In the 1960s and the 1970s political parties which had different ideological
views and interests were able to gain representation in parliament. The political
system gave the political parties the chance of presenting their views to the pub-
lic through various means such as the parliamentary debates, the press and radio
and TV broadcasting.'° 3 Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s Turkish Parliament
openly discussed foreign policy issues, criticised the government's foreign policy
and influenced the government in re-examining some of its policies. At least the
'	 Duiikoç. op.cit.. p.249.
100 Vali. Bridge Across the Bospor'us, op.cit., pp. 76-77. Sowerwine, op.cit., p.185, Tamkoç.
op.cit.. p.250. Shinn. op.cit., p.196. lI D. Nelson and I. Kaplan. "National Security" in
Nyrop (cd.). Turkey, op.cit.. p.262.
191 Taiiikoc. OJ).Cit.. p.249.
102 Sowerwn'e. op.rit.. p.165. Karpat(ed.), op.cjt.. p.7.
193 Sowerwilie. op.cit.. p.249.
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government had to consider the reaction of Parliament when taking foreign policy
decisions. The possibility of dismissing the government from power through a vote
of no-confidence by parliament forced the governments, especially the coalition
governments, to act more carefully in foreign affairs. However, Parliament was not
directly involved in the foreign policy-making process and did not cause radical
changes in the general direction of Turkish foreign policy.
According to the constitution of 1961, the Turkish Grand National Assembly,
consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly, was empowered to ratify or
reject international treaties and laws 194
 and the budget of the Foreign Ministry.
The authority to permit the use of armed forces, to send troops to foreign countries
and to allow the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey was also given to the
GNA.' 95 Parliament endeavoured to check and control the government's foreign
policy activities through debates on the Foreign Ministry budget, general debates,
and parliamentary investigations, inquiries and interpellations.'°° The National
Assembly had much more direct influence on the foreign policy-making process
than the Senate had. The Assembly had direct means to supervise foreign policy
activities whereas the Senate had more general authorities such as electing the
president from among its own members, delaying or postponing bills passed by the
National Assembly and accepting or rejecting a declaration of war.197
3.3.7 Political Parties and Groups
Republican People's Party(RPP): The RPP was founded by Kemal Atatürk
and ruled the country single-handedly between 1923 and 1950. It always saw it-
self as a supporter and protector of the Turkish democratic and capitalist system
but its actions sometimes seemed at variance with this professed role of champion
of democracy. The RPP's top leadership approved the military coup on 27 May
1960 198
 and the Commanders' Memorandum on 12 March 1971.199
194 Ibid p.200, Tuiikoc. op.cit., p.259, Sltijin, "Government and Politics" in Nyrop(ed.),
op.cit.. p.193.
Taiukoç. op.eit..
196 Ibid.. p.259. Sowerwiiie. op.cit., p.202.
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198 S• Kili. C'umhuriyet Halk Partisinde Celimeler. Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Yaytnlari,
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The main problem for the RPP in the 1960s was to gain support of peasants,
workers, intellectuals and students who were being drawn into newly-emerged left-
ist movements. For this purpose party leader Isinet Inönü claimed that his party
was on the left of centre. 20° Secretary-General Bülent Ecevit furthered the idea of
"left-of-centre" and presented it to masses as the policy of the RPP. 20 ' RPP lead-
ers condemned the policies and anti-NATO and anti-American protests of extreme
leftists and limited their effect on the Turkish public. Ecevit himself claimed that
"the left of centre is the strongest wall and the most effective barrier against the
flood of the extreme left."202
Republicans seemed to pay more attention to a planned economy in which
the state sector would be the leading force, but they always felt it necessary to
declare that the private sector would be encouraged and would not be interfered.203
Specifically Ecevit's aim was to establish a social democratic regime such as some
Scandinaviaii regimes in which peasants and workers could be protected against
large-scale capitalism. 204 However, as a whole Ecevit's policy merely strove to help
the survival of the capitalist system under Turkey's special conditions.
Republicans were always staunch supporters of the Kemalist principles and
Turkey's Western connection, 205 although when they were in opposition in the
second half of the 1960s they did criticise relations with the United States and
NATO and Western attitudes toward the Cyprus question. Some Republicans
believed that the U.S.A. took some actions to prevent the RPP from coming to
power and gave support to rightist parties. 206
 The RPP's leader in the 1970s,
Ecevit, seemed to be an advocate of a more independent policy in dealings with
the West and improved relations with the Eastern bloc. 207
 However, in the end
200 Mzlliyet. 29 July 1965.
201 B. Ecevit, Ortanin Solu. Istanbul: Tekin Yayiiievi, 1973.
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204 Il)id.. pp.255-256. 329.
205 Ibid.. p.213. M. Gönliibol et al.. Ola jlarla Tzirk Dz Politikasm, Ankara: SBF Yayinlari,
No.407. 1977. pp.337-338. I. Arar, Hiikiimet Prograrnlarz, Istanbul: Burcak Yaymevi, 1968,
pp.339-340, 369, 399.
206 G.S. Harris. Troubled Alliance, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. 1972. PP.69,
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RPP leaders stressed that Turkey should be a part of the West and NATO 208
 and
when they were in power they took great care not to harm relations with the West.
Justice Party(JP): The JP, the main moderate rightist party, was estab-
lished on 11 February 1961 and ruled the country between 1965 and 1971 single-
handedly. It, too, was an advocate of the Kemalist principles and Western-style
democracy and economic system. 209 It favoured a mixed economy in which the pri-
vate sector would be the leading force, guided but not controlled or restricted by
the state. 21 ° In spite of their strong stand for secularism, JP leaders addressed the
religious feelings of the Turkish people to gain their support and accused the RPP
of encouraging atheism. 21 ' They also expected electoral gains from condemning
socialist and leftist movements and accusing the RPP of co-operating with extreme
leftists.212
The JP was a staunch supporter of Turkey's special relations with the West213
and its membership of NATO. 214
 Ironically it was also the JP government which
was pushed by internal and international factors (such as the Cyprus issue, isolation
in international arena, and detente) towards pursuing a more flexible foreign policy,
improving relations with the Eastern bloc and Third World and making some
changes in relations with the U.S.A. 215
 JP leader Demirel dared to say, "No Turkish
Prime Minister said 'No' to the United States as much as I did." 216 However, the JP
government's actions were mainly directed to appeasing the angry Turkish public
opinion. JP leaders always maintained their pro-American stand and feared that
208 B. Ecevit. "Bati'iun Bunalimi ye Tflrkiye", Ozgür Insan, June 1975.
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the U.S. commitment, and along with it U.S. military and economic aid, to Turkey
might he reduced because of the anti-American atmosphere at home.
Extreme Left: The Turkish Labour Party (TLP), established on 13 February
1962, was the main representative of socialist groups in the 1960s. When M. Au
Aybar became chairman of the party in February 1962, TLP's character changed
greatly, attracting workers, intellectuals and students who were dissatisfied with
the current regime and influencing Turkish politics out of proportion to its size
and representation in Parliament. In spite of its achievement of winning fifteen
seats in the 1965 elections, the TLP had never been a strong, homogenous party.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia iii 1968 caused ideological and factional
clisagreenients within the party. 217 After the military's intervention in politics in
March 1971, the TLP was dissolved on 20 July 1971 by the Turkish constitutional
court because it allegedly violated the law on political parties and the constitution.
Its leaders were found guilty of encouraging leftist subversive activities against the
regime.
Leftist leaders believed that Turkey could develop economically only under a
socialist regime which would make the state sector the leading force in the econ-
omy, implement a strict development plan and nationalise vital economic sectors.218
They condemned foreign capital, foreign aid and foreign debt as the means of out-
side powers and the internal elite of making Turkey dependent on foreign coun-
tries.219
Foreign policy provided a good means for leftist groups to increase their po-
litical influence by strongly opposing NATO and the West, especially the United
States. In their opinion, the United States penetrated deeply into every part of
Turkish administration and dominated all Turkey's domestic and foreign policies
by using NATO and bilateral arrangements. 22° If Turkey withdrew from NATO
217 .J.M. Landau, Radical politics in Modern Turkey. Leiden: E.J. Drill, 1974, pp.129-130.
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and ended her special relations with the U.S.A., she would have regained her
complete independence and the possibility of U.S. intervention against socialist
groups would have been reduced, giving way to the establishment of socialism in
Turkey. Leftist leaders spent a great deal of time explaining the disadvantages of
NATO for Turkey. 221 Apart from the TLP, leftist newspapers such as Yön, Ant,
Devrim, Akis, Akam and Turk Solu, 222 students, workers and trade union DISK
(the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Union) joined the condemnation of
the West.
The poor performance of the TLP in the 1969 elections alienated a large section
of the extreme left from the parliamentary system and pushed them to try extra
parliamentary actions, particularly terror and violence, to attract the attention of
the masses. Workers and students became increasingly more violent, paralysing
factories and universities. A band of student extremists, believed to be a part
of terrorist Dev-Genc organisation, started a terror campaign against American
personnel and American activities in Turkey, announcing that they would struggle
until the country was cleared from "imperialist" foreigners. When the Israeli Con-
sul General was kidnapped and murdered by those leftist terrorists in May 1971,
the Turkish government took harsh measures against leftist radicals. Suspected
leftist activists and a number of professors, politicians and journalists who were
accused of inspiring those leftist guerrillas were arrested, leftist periodicals were
closed down and the TLP was dissolved.223
Extreme Right: The Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP), later re-
named the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), followed the nationalistic line. Its
leader in the post-1965 period, Alparslan Türke, a colonel who was actively in-
volved in the 27 May 1960 Revolution and was then expelled from the National
Union Committee because of his opposition to early parliamentary elections, al-
most single-handedly directed the party and determined its policies. The party
221 Boran. op.cit.. pp.27l-273, 276. 279, 297, Aybar, op.cit., pp.325-326, 340, 379, 459-460. 463, 560,
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won 15 seats in the 1965 elections and one in 1969 though it increased its propor-
tionate vote slightly. The NAP had influence in the political arena mainly because
of activities of its youth organisations such as the Union of Homes of Ideals (Ulkü
Ocakiari Bir1ii), the Association of Young Idealists (Genc Ulküciiler Teki1ati)
and later Idealist Youth of Turkey (Tirkiye Ulkücü Genclik Teki1ati).
Nationalists believed that Turkey could not be developed by copying the regimes
of other countries such as capitalism and communism. In their opinion, Turkey
needed a completely national regime based on its own history, national traditions
and spirit, that was the regime of the Nine Lights (Dokuz Iik) whose principles
were explained by Türke. 224 They proposed a mixed economic system in which
the state would direct development and control main sectors. 225 In the thinking
of nationalists, religion (Islam) held a secondary place and was seen not as a way
of life hut as an integral and important component of Turkish culture. 226
 They
addressed religious feelings of people to gain their support. 227
 Nationalists saw
international communism and its agents at home as the most dangerous threats
to Turkey's independence and fought against them.228
 A well-disciplined para-
military organisation called the commandos or Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar) clashed
with leftists, broke up their meetings and demonstrations.229
The NAP leadership supported Turkey's alliance with NATO and the U.S.A.
as necessary components of Turkish security and favoured having close relations
with the West. 23° They paid a special attention to the situation of Turks living
outside Turkey (the Outer Turks) 231
 and strongly supported a Turkish military
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intervention in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots.232
Islamist Groups: Islamist groups (Nurcus, Süleymancis etc.) were less ac-
tive and effective in the political arena in the 1960s. Their activities were limited
to publishing Islamic books, magazines and iewspapers, arranging mass prayings
and trying to organise themselves. Among them Mücadelecis were the most active,
clashing with leftists and campaigning against so-called imperialists. 233
 Islamists
attacked communism as a godless system challenging Islamic principles and Mus-
urns and condemned "the international Jewish plot", world-wide freemasonry and
missionary activities. 234 Some considered Western imperialism equally as danger-
ous as communism and praised Islam as a system and civilisation which could
compete with Western civilisation.
In the political arena Necmettin Erbakan organised Islamists. He had been a
member of the Justice Party heading a more conservative, Islamic-minded faction.
After his cal1didacy for parliament was vetoed by the JP he was elected to Par-
liament as an independent candidate in the 1969 elections. The National Order
Party founded by Erbakan 011 26 January 1970 was closed down on 20 May 1971
011 time ground that it violated articles of the Constitution related to secularism.235
Erhakan's party re-emerged in October 1972 under the name of the National Sal-
vation Party (NSP), won 48 seats in Parliament (11.8 percent of total votes) in the
1973 elections and joined the coalition government in 1974. Seven of it members
served as ministers in the cabinet.
The NSP clearly stood for religion and made Islam the basis of its policies.
Since Salvationists were restricted by the 1a' in usimg Is\arnic terms, they used
unclear moral and traditional terms in explaining their ideas. They talked of
moral recovery and progress, i.e. Islamisation of the people. Salvationists seemed
to have accepted secularism as a pillar of the state but rejected tile interpretation of
secularism in a way that would restrict religious freedoms and put religious people
under pressure. 236 They were opposed to communism and capitalism as products
232 Tilrke,. Temel G6riiler, op.cit., pp.310-320.
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of Christian Europe 237 and proposed a mixed economy model in which the state
would play the most important part under a development plan.238
The NSP leadership was in favour of having close economic and political rela-
tions with the Muslim world rather than the West. Erbakan was strongly opposed
to Turkey's membership of the European Economic Community which he regarded
as a Christian club protecting the interests of only Christians and Jews. 239 He
claimed that it would be to Turkey's advantage to lead the establishment of a
Muslim Common Market by disassociating itself from the West. 24° When they
were in government Salvationists agreed with the RPP that Turkey should remain
within the Western security system and existing alliances.241
3.3.8 Public Opinion
From 1964 onward the Turkish press had played a special part in starting for-
eign policy discussions outside official circles for the first time and in stimulating
other private groups and the general public to join the general foreign policy dis-
cussion. 242 As the most influential public opinion creator, the press became a forum
for columnists, experts and well-known personalities to express their views on for-
eign policy matters. The government and other official policy-makers saw the press
both as an important channel of information and a gauge of public opinion. Al-
though the press had the potential to influence the views of both the general public
and the official circles with its power to express and spread its views openly, 243 it
did not achieve any radical foreign policy changes.
After 1965, university students were actively involved in the discussion of for-
eign policy matters and tried to influence the determination of foreign policy deci-
sions by using various methods such as holding press conferences and public forums,
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239 M.Y. Gcyikdagi. Political Parties in Turkey. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. p.123.
Landau, op.cit.. p.192.
241) AIiiiiad, op.rit.. pp.333. 382-383, Bozb eyli , op.cit.. pp.421, 432.
241 Aljiiiad, op.cit.. p.337.
242 HLrris. Troubl d Alliance, op.cit. , p.129, for tile role of the press see also Sowerwine. op.cit.,
pp. 264-268.
243 Sezer. Kamuogu, op.cit.. p.307.
68
organising demonstrations and boycotts, delivering their own literature and even
resorting to violence. 244 Student groups played a part in fuelling public discussion
on foreign policy and forced the government to have a more flexible attitude in
foreign policy, but they were not able to influence the government to change its
basic foreign policy line. 245 University lecturers also joined the discussion of for-
eign policy by issuing joint statements. Individually lecturers took part in foreign
policy discussions by expressing their views in newspaper columns.24°
Labour unions, too, contributed to the radicalisation of the public opinion in
the 1960s and 1970s. 247 They tried to affect the official foreign policy especially in
economic matters by organising strikes and boycotts and sometimes resorting to
violence. They used influential figures in political parties to put pressure on the
government. Business associations were also well-positioned to affect the official
circles through their financial and political resources.
Despite the widespread discussion and criticism of the government's foreign
policy by the political parties, the press, the intelligentsia, students and workers,
the interest of the average Turkish citizen in foreign policy matters remained very
little throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. 248
 In general, the passive part of the
Turkish public opinion which represented the majority of people did not feel any
concern about foreign policy issues unless those issues affected its national and
religious feelings. Questions affecting national honour or religious feelings were
more likely to attract the attention of the general public. 249 The general public
was also sensitive to foreign interferences in domestic affairs. 25° Especially in the
second half of the 1960s, the general Turkish public opinion sharply criticised the
United States and Turkey's other NATO allies over Cyprus and other issues, 251 but
did not go so far as the radical groups did in criticising the government's policies.
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3.4 Factors Affecting U.S. Foreign Policy 1960-1975
3.4.1 Anti-Communism
In the 1960-1975 period American foreign policy continued to be affected by
the opposition of American policy-makers to communism and their desire to con-
tain so-called communist expansion in different parts of the world. Almost all the
presidents and chief policy-makers saw communism directed by the Soviet Union
and China as the most important threat to the United States and other coun-
tries of the "free world". They took the communist threat so seriously that even
nationalist movements were perceived as communist-inspired subversive activities.
In the 1960-1975 period cold war clashes occurred between the United States and
communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China and American interven-
tions took place in some small countries where communism was seen as a threat
by the Americans. However, especially in the beginning of the 1970s American
politicians realised that cold war conflict was not the only option in pursuing for-
eign policy and that the USA also could get benefits from relaxing her relations
with communist countries.
Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon were sin-
cere anti-Communists, trying to strengthen American power vis-a-vis the power of
communist states. During his presidential campaign Kennedy accused his predeces-
sors of not taking effective actions against Soviet moves and frequently emphasised
the missile gap between the USA and USSR which was not real at that time. 252 He
was strongly in favour of increasing American military capacity against an imagi-
nary Soviet superiority in this arena. It was also Kennedy who advocated Ameri-
can superiority over the Russians in space by launching expensive space projects.253
Kennedy took a very tough stance on the Vietnam issue, deciding not to give any
concessions to the Vietnamese communists in order to isolate the People's Republic
of China and to stop communist expansion in East Asia. 254 He thought that if Viet-
nam was lost to communists, this victory would encourage communist movements
252 M.A. Jones. the Limits of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Pre88, 1983, p.544.
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and therefore the West would have to deal with similar challenges throughout the
world. The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated Kennedy's determination in oppos-
ing Soviet moves. He could not accept Soviet nuclear missiles on the doorstep
of America. 2 Kennedy failed to realise the true character of national liberation
wars by regarding them as communist expansionist actions.2&6 in relations with
the West, Kennedy placed considerable importance on strengthening the capabil-
ity, unity and effectiveness of the NATO alliance. He also encouraged the Western
Europeans to promote their union under the Common Market.257
Lyndon B. Johnson, too, believed that communism was the most important
threat to the "free world" and that the USA should have the responsibility of
halting its advance all over the world. 258
 Although he seemed a more moderate
leader during the presidential campaign in comparison with the Republican can-
didate, Barry M. Goldwater, who advocated a total struggle against communism
and even suggested using tactical nuclear weapons in the Vietnamese war, 259 af-
ter coming to power Johnson also struggled for an American victory in Vietnam
against communists by escalating the war. According to R.J. Barnet, Johnson
held the view that the United States must oppose all newly-established commu-
nist or communist-leaning governments in the world even if they came to power
by election.26°
Richard Nixon had the same cold-war mentality in spite of his achievements
in relaxing relations with the Soviet Union and communist China. Throughout his
political career Nixon remained a sincere anti-communist, always seeking American
superiority over communist states. 26 ' Realising the limits of the American power in
continuing the war in Vietnam and remaining under the pressure of public opinion,
Nixon decided to stop the war, but it had to be an honourable withdrawal for
the USA, therefore in order to achieve this aim Nixon did not hesitate to attack
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Cambodia and Laos to put pressure on the Vietnamese. His deteilte policy did not
meaii the end of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in different parts of the world, especially
in Thirci World countries.
To summarise, opposition to communism was the main characteristic of both
American conservatives and liberals, and of both Republican and Democrat ad-
ministrations. 262 As J.W. Fuibright, a former chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, stated, the fatal mistake of American policy-makers in this
period was to regard communism as an absolute evil and to give their opposition
to communism priority over their support for nationalist movements in the Third
World.263
3.4.2 World Leadership
American leaders saw the United States as the leader of the "free world",
having a global mission to protect countries of the world against the expansion of
monolithic communism. In their opinion, the United States was the most powerful
state iii the free world, therefore it could not afford to avoid helping and protecting
other countries against evil forces. It was the moral duty of the United States to
intervene in affairs of other countries if necessary to protect freedoms. In this
sense America appeared to undertake the job of world policeman and this concept
of world leadership strongly affected American foreign policy decisions.
John F. Kennedy was a convinced believer in the American world leadership.
On 17 September 1960 he declared tl1at "our responsibility is to be the chief de-
fender of freedom at a time when freedom is under attack all over the globe." 264 In
a television speech during the presidential campaign enney presenteà t'ne \A
as "the sentinel of the gates of freedom around the world" and said that "if we
succeed, freedom succeeds. If we fail, freedom fails". 265 In his inaugural address
Kennedy stated that the USA "would pay any price, bear any burdens, meet any
liardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success
262 J Dull. The Politics of American Foreign Policy, Eiiglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Flail. Inc., 1985. PP. 177-178, 209.
263 j.W. Fuibright. The Arrogance of Power, New York: Random House, 1966, pp.77, 78,
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264 JI. Fairlie. The Kennedy Promise, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1973, p.68.
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72
of liberation." 260 He accelerated U.S. military projects to fulfil the world leader-
ship role and formed the Peace Corps to help Third World countries as a part of
America's global mission.267
Lyndon B. Johnson devoted most of his energy to winning the war in Vietnam,
thus lie wanted to keep the confidence of world nations in American leadership and
American protection. 268
 Realising dangers of direct commitments of the United
States all over the world, the Nixon administration tried to carry on American
world leadership by applying more indirect commitments, giving the duty of ac-
tiial defence to local powers and helping them economically and militarily and
encouraging them in facing evil forces. The Nixon Doctrine is the expression of
this aim. 26° Nixon's national security adviser Kissinger stated that "the Nixon
Doctrine is our realistic way of remaining committed to the rest of the world.
It can lay a basis for a continuing practical relationship, not a basis for a total
withdrawal" 270
American governments tried to blockade revolutionary movements in the Third
World in the name of her global mission to protect the present system. They ex-
tended economic and military assistance to governments of some Third World
countries to preserve stability and the status quo. 271
 American leaders saw them-
selves in a position where they could determine whether a movement anywhere in
the world coiistituted a threat to the interests of the United States and the inter-
national community and felt that they could handle it in a way which they wished.
In most cases they even did not need to consult other countries or international
organisations. The Americans saw their world leadership as a unique opportunity
to promote the ideals of democracy and capitalism throughout the world.272
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3.4.3 Realism
The Nixon administration made some important changes in U.S. foreign policy
by decreasing the influence of ideology and the containment of communism on
foreign policy. In particular, Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger,
who taught foreign relations at Harvard University, played an important role in
shifting the direction of American foreign policy with his "realist" views. He
believed that ideology should not dominate relations between states and determine
the general line of a country's foreign policy. He and Nixon realised that the world
at the beginning of the 1970s was different from the world in the 1960s. The
old polarity between the United States and the Soviet Union had undergone a
radical change with the rise of such new centres of power and influence as China,
Japan, France and the Third World bloc. They knew that the USA could not
carry on cold war confrontations with communist powers throughout the world as
she had before and that she could not undertake coinmitnients which would lead
her to armed conflicts. The Vietnam war had showed that it was not in American
interests to carry out wars abroad on behalf of regional powers. The results of this
kind of thinking were the detente policy which aimed at having better relations
with ideological opponents and the Nixon Doctrine, which was intended to restrict
American commitments, particularly military ones, abroad.
Believing that the United States and the Soviet Union could have some com-
mon interests and that it could be to American advantage to have normal trade
relations and increased contacts with the Russians, Nixon tried to make some
changes in U.S.-Soviet relations. As a sign of his realist views, Nixon said that "we
have to live with communist powers and we have no illusion about communism,
but we must accept the realities." 273 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I between
the USA and the USSR was the most important result of Nixon's detente policy.
Nixon's visit to Moscow and his sincere efforts to ease tensions between the two
superpowers made this kind of agreement real. Another Nixon revolution in Amer-
ican foreign policy was to open relations with China. He was the first American
president to visit communist China.
273 I3ra,i'Ion, op. cit., p.i84.
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The Nixon Doctrine was a clear realisation of the limits of American power by
the American President. American retreat from different parts of the world in the
military sense was necessary and Nixon wanted to carry out this retreat without
damaging U.S. interests and prestige. In his inaugural address Nixon announced
that "the time has passed, when America will make every other nation's conflict our
own, or make every other nation's future our responsibility, or presume to tell the
people of other nations how to manage their own affairs" 274 Kissinger expressed
the doctrine as follows: "The United States alone cannot make itself responsible
for every part of the world at every moment of time against every danger and to
capitalize every opportunity." 275 According to the doctrine the United States would
continue to support her allies against their enemies by supplying economic aid and
weapons, but her allies would undertake more burdens and would face opponents
and carry out military struggle on their own. 276 It might be said that the main
goal was to preserve the position of American power in the world by establishing
a new system in which American soldiers would not be involved directly. In this
sense, the doctrine did not restrict U.S. commitments throughout the world and
did not reduce her determination to face communist threats,277 but it changed
ways of fulfilling commitments.
3.4.4 Other Moral Values
Certain moral values helped to shape U.S. foreign policy or, at least, Amen-
can policy makers used these values to justify their actions. Linked with the world
leadership concept, honour and prestige affected American leaders in some of their
actions. American presidents tried to save the prestige and honour of the United
States by escalating the war in Vietnam. In their minds, an American defeat
against a Third World power would be humiliating for the United States before the
world community. 278 Such ideas as democracy and anti-totalitarianism, freedom
and liberty, free enterprise and capitalism and anti-imperialism also affected the
minds of American policy-makers to some extent. 279
 American politicians always
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supported these ideas at home and abroad and claimed that one of their major
goals in foreign policy was the acceptance of those ideas by the world community.
However, in most cases American govermimeuts gave practical national interests
priority over moral values. Many of the governments that had received U.S. eco-
nomic and military aid and political support were totalitarian regimes violating
civil liberties. American administrations also did not criticise, but recognised and
supported many military coups in various friendly countries.280
3.4.5 Vietnam
In the second half of the 1960s and at the first half of the 1970s the ma-
jor concern of the American administrations was to gain an honourable victory in
Vietnam. In this period, preoccupation with the war in Vietnam affected many as-
pects of U.S. foreign policy deeply. The subject common to the electoral campaigns
of presidential candidates was the American military involvement in Vietnam.28'
Some suggested tough actions in Vietnam while others presented themselves as
men of peace. To secure the support of more voters, the candidates accused other
candidates on the Vietnamese issue and gave promises to the American people on
the n-matter. His failure in handling the Vietnamese issue forced President Johnson
not to become a candidate for the presidency a second time. President Nixon spent
most of his energy and time trying to achieve an honourable end of the war. The
continuation of the war divided and radicalised the American public and made
it more conscious of foreign affairs. The presidents' way of the handling the war
aroused the opposition of Congress to the presidents' foreign policy activities and
led Congress to seek the restoration of its constitutional authorities in foreign af-
fairs. The war in Vietnam caused some damage to America's relations with her
allies and prevented the United States for a certain time from relaxing her relations
with communist China and the Soviet Union.282
3.4.6 Third World
Relations with Third World countries constituted a very big part of American
policy. In the 1960-75 period the American administrations undertook commit-
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ments in the Third World in the name of facing the threat of communist expansion
and defending freedom against totalitarianism. 283 The United States provided eco-
nomic, military and political support to some Third World countries to preserve
the existing regimes 284
 and it sometimes did not hesitate to interfere in their in-
ternal affairs. Competition with the USSR in extending influence to Third World
countries and getting their support in the international arena affected U.S. foreign
policy. 28
 American policy makers pursued some moral values such as advancing
development and democracy and defending freedoms in their dealings with the
Third World.286
Economic and military aid, especially to Third World countries, was used as
an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. 287 It became a tool of the American admin-
istration in legitimising the U.S. presence in developing countries and the U.S.
involvement in domestic affairs of these states. It was used to protect American
military, political and economic interests in the recipient countries. For example,
Congress tried to affect Turkey's opium policies by threatening to cut off aid to
this country. As a part of aid programs, the Kennedy administration established
a voluntary organisation in March 1961, called the Peace Corps. Voluntary peace
corpsmen worked in developing countries to help them in such fields as education,
sanitation, irrigation, and agriculture. 288 It was presented as evidence of the claim
that the United States was fulfilling the world leadership role in a positive way.289
3.5 Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy-Making Process
A wide range of organisations, groups and individuals are involved in making
and conducting American foreign policy the president, staff men in the Wl1ite
Flouse, the members of the cabinet, especially the secretaries of State and Defence
and their departments, the National Security Council, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, many other sections
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of the executive branch, members and relevant committees of the Congress, occa-
sionally local governments of the USA, and intergovernmental and international
organisations to which the United States belongs. 290 The press, pressure groups, re-
search organisations, specialists and experts in universities and occasionally public
opinion also affect American foreign policy decisions.
3.5.1 Presidency
At the top of the American foreign policy mechanism stands the American
President. It is the president who is the centre of power, who controls the whole
foreign policy making process and takes final decisions. 29 ' For most Americans, the
President represents American national interests abroad, he is "the single source,
the symbol and the spokesman of American policy" P292 If he wants to do so, the
president has enough means and authority to dominate foreign policy, in fact he has
more freedom of action and power in foreign policy than he has in domestic policy.
The American constitution gives a wide range of authority to the president. 293 It
authorises him, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to negotiate and make
treaties with foreign countries, and appoint American ambassadors and receive
ambassadors of other countries. The constitution also empowers the president with
the role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president also can use the
powers of making executive agreements 294 and recognising foreign governments in
conducting foreign policy.
Since he is elected by the entire population, the president can stand out in most
cases as the representative of the whole nation and deal with some foreign issues
single-handedly, seeing it unnecessary to consult other branches of the American
government. Moments of crisis, especially, present unique opportunities to the
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president to increase his power 295 because almost every American recognises that
in emergency situations the president should act quickly and secretly to face the
threat immediately even without securing the approval of other government offi-
cials. 296 Cold war confrontations between the United States and the communist
bloc in the l950s and the l960s provided the American presidents with opportu-
nities to increase their power in conducting foreign policy by securing the support
of Congress and the American people. 297 The emergence of the United States as
a world power, the adoption of containment strategy for facing communist expan-
sionism, the need for handling serious crises quickly, the emotion of the American
people in supporting the presidents against communist forces, all helped the con-
centration of the power in the hands of a very few people in the presidency.
John F. Kennedy came to power with a strong determination to use the fullest
power and authority of the presidency in order to make important revisions in for-
eign policy. He believed in a strong and active presidency. In his speech on 25 Jan-
uary 1960 to the National Press Club, Kennedy declared that the president "must
above all be the Chief Executive in every sense of the word. He must be prepared
to exercise the fullest powers of his office." 298 On 3 September 1960 he claimed
that the president "is the only one who can speak for the people of the United
States." 29° In his article in the November issue of the Catholic World, Kennedy
wrote that "If Washington is the capital city of the world, the President must be its
leader... The President must be the man capable of acting as Commander-in-Chief
of the grand alliance." 300 During his term of presidency, Kennedy took bold actions
exteiiding presidential power. Without consulting Congress, he allowed the C.I.A.
to implement the Bays of Pigs landing to topple the Cuban regime, 30 ' he deepened
the American involvement in Vietnam, he challenged Soviet Premier Khrushchev
over Berlin 302 and he risked a nuclear war in the Cuban missile crisis,3°
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Lyndon B. Johnson increased presidential power especially by his tactics of
handling the Vietnam war. He took important decisions without involvement of
Congress or other governmental bodies. His group of advisers was very small and
he overwhelmed almost all of them with his personality in taking decisions. Like
President Kennedy, he kept important decisions for himself and for the group of
the Tuesday lunches, which included the Secretaries of State and Defence and
the director of the C.I.A. 304
 Johnson continued the consolidation of power in the
presidency by securing the support of Congress in escalating the war in Vietnam.
With the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, Congress almost unanimously decided
to empower the president to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack
against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression in Southeast
Asia." 305 The resolution was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2 and
by the House of Representatives by a vote of 416 to 0.°° It was considered by
many scholars a blank cheque by Congress, giving the President wide war-making
powers without having to consult Congress first. Johnson used the resolution to
justify his actions of escalating the war in Vietnam and to share responsibilities
with Congress. Johnson also ordered 22,000 American troops to the Dominican
Republic in the spring of 1965 without consulting Congress.
The presidential power reached its peak during the Nixon administration,
which succeeded iii centralising power in the White House. Nixon and his national
security adviser Kissinger both distrusted the professional foreign policy organisa-
tions and therefore preferred a system of foreign policy making which is dominated
by the president and his advisers. 307 Nixon clearly wanted to be his own Secretary
of State and therefore appointed one of his friends reliable but inexperienced in
foreign affairs, William P. Rogers, as his Secretary of State. Nixon reduced the
power of the Cabinet and the Congress in foreign affairs to the minimum point.308
His adviser Kissinger was far more influential in making foreign policy than the
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Secretaries of State and Defence. Nixon did not consult the Congress when he
ordered the American troops to invade Cambodia and Laos. Using the concept of
national security Nixon established a presidential secrecy system, 309 preventing the
public from learning many activities of the administration in domestic affairs as
well as in foreign affairs. The Nixon administration also extended the concept of
executive privileges in order to refuse to testify before congressional committees.31°
The excessive use of presidential power in foreign affairs by Nixon led the Congress
to compete with the Presidency to regain its powers in foreign affairs and to pass
some acts to limit the presidential power. When, as a result of the Watergate
Scandal, 311
 it was known that Nixon used the secrecy system to defeat his political
opponents at home, public pressure forced him to resign from the presidency.
Jimmy Carter's memoirs illuminate how a president can manipulate foreign
policy even in the aftermath of the Coiigress's forceful actions to bring the presi-
dent into line. He explains that final decisions on basic foreign policy were made
by himself, not the State Department, and that he discussed major foreign pol-
icy issues with oniy few people (the National Security Adviser, the Vice-President
and the Secretaries of State and Defence) to the extent that the Cabinet meetings
on foreign policy became almost unnecessary. 312 Carter also states that his ad-
ministration carried out negotiations with the Chinese to reach an agreement and
prepared the plan of hostage rescue from Iran without informing congressmen and
public. 313
 However, Carter admits that he faced the opposition of congressmen,
public and formidable lobbies in many issues and that many worthy agreements
were rejected because of the effective power of a small group in the Senate.314
While explaining how he struggled to gain support of public, congressmen, lobbies
and even officials of his own administration for the Panama Canal treaties Carter
reveals that he talked to one hundred senators privately and that he gained the
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vote of Jim Abourezk, a Lebanese descent, through the Prince Sultan of Saudi
Arabia.315
3.5.2 Congress
Congress has, too, wide powers in foreign policy, sufficient to check and bal-
ance the presidential power. If it wants to do so, Congress can block many foreign
policy actions of the president and it can affect the general line of American for-
eign policy. Some constitutional prerogatives of Congress in foreign affairs are as
follows: 316 (a) The advice and consent prerogative: The Senate has the authority
to give advice to the president in negotiating and making treaties and to give con-
sent to treaties. Treaties have to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate
to take affect hut executive agreements do not require the approval of the Sen-
ate. (b) Confirmation of appointments: Appointment of ambassadors and high
officials, too, has to gain senatorial approval. (c) Power of the purge: Congress has
the right to reduce, maintain or refuse foreign policy allotments suggested by the
executive branch. The House of the Representatives can legitimise, cut or refuse
the executive budget. (d) War powers: The Congress is authorised to raise and
support armed forces, to provide and maintain a navy and to declare war against
an enemy. (e) Economic powers: The Congress is empowered with the authority
of regulating commerce with foreign nations. Informally Congress constitutes a fo-
rum for national debate on foreign affairs. Discussion of foreign affairs in Congress,
testimonies of specialists and experts and responsible officials before the Congress
affect the Pisidency and the public opinion.
In spite of its wide constitutional authorities Congress did not have a powerful
voice in determining American foreign policy in the post-World War II period.
Until the late 1960s, Congress's role in foreign affairs remained very small. 317
 It
generally served as an organ justifying foreign policy actions of the American ad-
ministrations. It was regarded as a duty of the Congress to give prompt support
and consent to tIme presidents on matters of foreign relations. Congress did not
exploit the right of confirming diplomatic appointments as an instrument of policy
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and because the president could make executive agreements without the consent of
Congress, the prerogative of approving treaties was of little effect. It made small
cuts in the military budgets of the governments but the presidents generally suc-
ceeded in getting what they wanted. Congress did not reject the executive budgets.
The example of how far Congress remained under the control of the Presidency
is the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with which Congress gave a blank cheque to the
executive in committing American troops abroad.
When it appeared that Johnson's tactics of handling the Vietnam war were
not good enough to solve the problem, some Congressmen, especially some mem-
bers of Johnson's own party, began to oppose the president's actions in Vietnam.
Democrat senators William Fulbright, Frank Church, Eugene McCarthy and Vance
Hartke bitterly attacked the escalation of American military involvement in Viet-
nam. 318 At the end of 1968, Congress, especially the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, started a campaign to reassert its constitutional powers in foreign af-
fairs which it had lost to the Presidency since the end of the World War JJ•319
Congressmen had felt humiliated by the way President Johnson had used their
approval for escalating the war in Vietnam.
After Nixon came to power, Congress increased its initiatives to challenge
Nixon's struggle to concentrate power in the White House. In June 1969 the Senate
passed a resolution which asked the President not to commit the American armed
forces to hostilities on foreign territory without affirmative action by Congress.32°
When Nixon sent American troops to Cambodia in December 1970, the Senate
passed another law forbidding the President to use funds to introduce American
ground combat troops or military advisers into Cambodia, Thailand and Laos.321
In 1970 Congress also repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. In November 1971
the Senate completely rejected the foreign aid authorisation bill. 322
 The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee set up special committees to investigate the activities
of the American administration. These committees inquired into American security
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agreements and commitments 32
 and uncovered many unknown facts such as the
American secret defence pact with Thailand and excessive American involvement
in Laos.
The Congress's most important act in opposing the presidenta1 power in for-
eign affairs is the War Powers Act of 1973, which was designed to restrain the
President from taking the nation into armed conflicts and to provide Congres-
sional participation in decisions of involving American troops abroad. Congress
overrode a presidential veto in passing the act. According to the new act the Pres-
ident was forced to report to Congress within 48 hours of starting an American
armed iiivolvernent abroad and to withdraw the troops if Congress refused to agree
with it. 324
 As a sign of its determination to affect foreign policy, Congress refused
the extension of the most favourable nation status to the Soviet Union, it embar-
goed arms sales to Turkey in 1974, and in early 1975 it rejected the appeal of the
Ford administration to provide emergency military aid to the South Vietnamese
regime.
Although Congress showed some signs of affecting American foreign policy in
the 1970s, the general trend in American tradition is the domination of foreign
policy by the president. In general Congress can indirectly control the upper and
lower limits of foreign policy and it can amend or block individual actions of the
Presidency. But it has very little power to force the presidency to make changes in
the general direction of American policy. It is generally believed that congressmen
lack information and experience to make correct decisions and therefore foreign
policy cannot be left to them.
As individual united political bodies, politicaTi parties in the American tradi-
tion have very little effect in shaping foreign policy. One party does not generally
support or oppose foreign policy actions but some congressmen from different po-
litical parties take initiatives in foreign policy. Party loyalty and party unity is
very rare in foreign policy matters. There are many basic foreign policy principles
on which the political parties agreed. In the past, particularly in the post-world
War II period, a considerable part of American foreign policy was bipartisan. The
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views of an American political party are not radically different from those of the
other party. During elections the parties feel compelled to present to the elec-
torates different foreign policy options, different policy style and perceptions to
appeal to as many voters as possible. But after the elections, they return to their
state and local forms and pay very little attention to foreign policy matters and
they exercise very little influence on policy-making process.325
3.5.3 Secretaries
The secretaries of state and defence are close advisers of the president in con-
ducting foreign policy.320 But their effect on foreign policy-making process depends
on the president's willingness to consult them in shaping the policy and their per-
sonal capabilities. Some presidents may bypass the secretaries of state and defence
and forniulate foreign policy with his special advisers. Secretary of State of the
Nixon administration, William Rogers, had less effect on foreign policy than na-
tional security adviser Kissinger. The secretaries of state and defence possess the
potential to affect foreign policy decisions, provided by the important position of
their departments. They have the power to forniulate policies and take decisions
within tl1eir departments, disregarding views of department officials and profes-
sionals. Channels are available for them to express their views to the president
directly. But at the final stage their effectiveness depends on the president's will.
3.5.4 National Security Council
The National Security Council might be influential in foreign policy making in
the sense that its members have the potential to be close special advisers of the
president. President Kennedy benefited from the NSC in centralising power in the
White House and dealing with foreign policy matters. During the Cuban missile
crisis he set up an executive committee of the NSC to deal with the problem.327
During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the NSC served as an advisory
body. As a whole the council did not directly intervene in foreign policy making
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process but some of its members attended decision making meeting as advisers.
The unique position of Henry Kissinger in shaping American foreign policy is a
good example of how far a national security adviser can affect the conduct of
foreign policy. Throughout the Nixon administration period, Kissinger remained
as Nixon's principal foreign policy adviser, his chief negotiator and his leading
foreign policy spokesman. 32° Distrusting the bureaucracy, the public and Congress
in the formulation of foreign policy, 330 Kissinger structured the NSC in a new
way so that it could dominate other state bodies in affecting decisions. 331 But
Kissinger remained chief director of the NSC, denying freedom of actions to the
council. He dominated American foreign policy during his service and served as
de facto Secretary of State towering over the Secretaries of State and Defence.332
3.5.5 CIA
The Central Intelligence Agency can be influential if it is allowed to be by the
president. It was originally established to co-ordinate all American intelligence
and counterintelligence services and to perform services for the National Security
Council. The director of the CIA is one of the closest associates of the president.
Using his position, he can make recommendations to the president in foreign af-
fairs and if he gains confidence of the president he can play part in making foreign
policy. The CIA is famous for its plots to overthrow foreign governments. At the
very beginning of his presidency, Kennedy was persuaded by the CIA to give per-
mission for the Bay of Pigs operation designed to overthrow the Cuban communist
regime. 333 After the failure of the operation, activities of the CIA diminished and
the power of the agency decreased but the CIA continued to have the potential to
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331 l3randon. op. cit.. p.46, D. Lalldau, op. cit., p.140, Dull, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
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exercise considerable power. 334 The Senate investigations in the 1970s of the CIA
activities revealed that frori-i the time of the Kennedy administration onward the
CIA had plotted to overthrow some foreign governments and assassinate their lead-
ers and secretly watched the activities of individuals, groups, parties and radical
political movements.335
3.5.6 Military
The American military has the potential to influence foreign policy decisions
because there is a strong relationship between defence and foreign policy in the
modern world and the United States has been able to assume the world leadership
because of its military power. 336 During war periods, the military is more likely
to affect decisions. The secretary of defence is the boss of the Pentagon, he can
impose control over the military. The secretary of defence of the Kennedy and
Johnson administration, Robert McNamara, established a civilian control over the
Pentagon. During the term of McNamara and Clark M. Clifford the Pentagon had
a powerful hand in formulating foreign policy. 337 But during the Nixon adminis-
tration the Secretary of Defence, M.R. Laird, and the Pentagon lost their influence
on foreign policy though they prevented Kissinger from imposing control over the
military. 338 As Kissinger stated, "under the leadership of Secretary Laird, the Pen-
tagon had not attempted to assert a prerogative in wide areas of foreign policy. It
has confined itself more to strictly military considerations than has been the case
at least in the two previous administrations." 339 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, too, has a powerful position in affecting foreign policy initiatives.
3.5.7 Public Opinion
The president has to consider the reaction of the public before formulating
policies. The public sometimes might force the president to change his policies.
But it is generally too weak to oppose and challenge the president's foreign policy
Hilsman. the Politics of Policy Making..., op. cit., pp. 65-66.
335 Jrn. the Limits of Liberty, op. cit., p.565, Dull, op. cit., pp.78, 219.
330 Di11. op. cit.. p.62.
337 ]3raudon. the Retreat of American Power, op. cit.. pp.203, 209.
338 Ibid., p.212.
D. Laiida,,. op. cit., p.139.
87
actions. In fact, the president has more power of manipulating the public in foreign
matters than he has in domestic matters. The great mass of the public generally
shows no concern on a foreign issue unless that issue affects its interests. \Vhen the
escalation of the war in Vietnam by President Johnson committed more American
troops, American public opinion increasingly turned against the war and wanted
an immediate end to it. The continuing escalation gave momentum to the anti-war
and peace movements. It polarised public opinion and politicised and radicalised
many groups, especially the youth. Students, religious groups, and civil right
activists attended anti-war protests arranged throughout the country. 34° Growing
public opposition to his policies over the Vietnam issue severely dented Johnson's
prestige and forced him to decide not to run for the presidency for a second term.
During the Nixon administration, anti-war activists continued to harass the
regime. The invasion of Cambodia and Laos caused an eruption of violence and
turmoil throughout the United States and brought about student riots in college
and university campuses. Under public pressure, President Nixon felt compelled
to seek a way of terminating the war. As an immediate step he began to withdraw
a considerable number of the American troops from Vietnam. Opponents of the
war did not get what they wanted from the Nixon administration. Nixon did not
terminate the war immediately, on the contrary to gain an "honourable peace"
he escalated the war and spread it to Cambodia and Laos. However, the public
influenced Nixon's policy by forcing him to Vietnamise the war, that is to leave
the war effort to the Vietnamese rather than to increase American troops in the
battlefield.34'
In the American political system, few pressure and interest groups are con-
cerned with foreign policy decisions. Interest group structure is very weak in for-
eign affairs342 and lobbying in the field of foreign relations is relatively rare. The
most organised and effective pressure groups are ethnic associations whose mem-
bers have strong ties with a country. 343 Those organised national minorities lobby
Grant.hain, op. cit., pp. 241-243.
341 Hilsinaii. op. cit., p.104.
342 Agron Wildavsky, "the Two Presidencies" in Fox(ed.) op. cit., p.l8O, Hilsrnan, op. cit.,
pp. 69-70.
343 Wildavsky. op. cit., p.l8O Hilsinan, op. cit.. p.TO.
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in order to affect American foreign policy decisions to the advantage of their home-
land and they are supported and funded by the foreign countries with whom they
have ethnic' ties. The American Jewish community has worked for the interests of
Israel and tried to influence foreign policy decisions related to Israel. The Turkish-
American and the Greek-American communities have also worked to secure the
American support for the cause of their ethnic groups in Cyprus. 344
 Activities
of interest groups in foreign affairs are directed towards Congress as well as the
government to affect Congress decisions on matters of particular concern to their
group. The president may also use some agencies to lobby on his behalf to ensure
the acceptance of the laws supporting his policies and programs by Congress.
Sometimes senators may exert an influence on American foreign policy for
reasons that have little or nothing to do with the particular foreign policy issue but
arise from reaction to the President's domestic policies or other matters. President
Carter's memoirs are illuminating in this connection. In his account of difficulties
he faced in getting senators to accept the Panama Canal Treaties in 1979 he
records: "Jini Abourezk says that because of the closed conference meetings in
energy from which he is excluded, he's considering voting against the Panama
Canal Treaty... Even my friend Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee sent me word
that he could not vote for the second treaty because of some of his home-state
issues on which we disagreed."345
American business, too, has great interests in influencing foreign policy deci-
sions. Since its investments abroad and its world-wide trade and business contacts
are very important for the fate of its companies, American business asks the ad-
ministration to pursue a foreign policy protecting business interests abroad. In the
opinion of James Dull, "American foreign policy since the World War II has been
designed, in part, to promote American business interests abroad." He also claims
that "business is a major actor in the political process, and decision makers can-
not easily disregard its voice" P346 Big business has a great power to influence the
general policy making process because it provides financial support for candidates
Dull. op. cit... p.146. For more detailed information on the role of lobby groups see the section on
the .lolinsuii letter in Chapter VI and on the arms embargo in Chapter VII.
345 jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith. op.cit., p.lT5.
340 Pull. op.Cit., p.143.
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for the presidency and Congress and its members serve in the administration. G.
William Domhoff goes so far as to say that "... American foreign policy during the
post war era was initiated, planned and carried out by the richest, most powerful
and most international-minded owners and managers of major corporations and
financial institutions". 347 Clearly the American president is expected to pursue the
sort of foreign policy that will benefit American business interests abroad.
G. Williaiii Donihoff, "Who Made American Foreign Policy 1945-1963?" in
Fox(ed.), 01). ( W it.. p.95.
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Chapter IV
U.S.-TURKISH MILITARY RELATIONS 1960-1975
Military contacts certainly constituted the most important aspect of the Turkish-
American relationship because the two countries came together mainly as a result
of security concerns. While mutual security interests brought about a special close
alliance between the two states, the character of the relationship ended up with
Turkey's military dependence on the United States. This chapter tries to explain
how this relationship was established and took this character during the course of
time. It notes the course of events in the development of this military relationship
in the 1960s and 1970s, the problems that arose and their causes and mentions
the heated public discussion on Turkey's alliance relations in Turkish domestic
politics. It particularly emphasises the Turkish administration's attempts to alter
its image as the satellite of the USA and questions how far it succeeded in these
efforts. In order to establish a sound basis for understanding the true character of
the military relationship and for assessing U.S. influence on Turkey, the chapter
further considers why each country was important to the security and defence of
the other. (Turkey's strategic importance for the USA and U.S. military assistance
to Turkey.)
4.1 The Formation of the Formal Military Relationship
Immediately following the Second World War, in response to a threat from
the Soviet Union, Turkey began to seek an alliance with the United States.348
In 1945 the Soviet Union informed Turkey of her intention not to extend the
Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression between the two countries, which was
due to expire in November 1945, demanded military bases on the Straits and the
secession of two north-eastern Turkish provinces to her, and sought in international
forums the revision of the Montreaux Convention regulating the status of the
348 T.A. Couloiiiiihis. the United States, Greece and Turkey. New York: Praeger. 1983,
PP12'3 200.
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Straits. 340 Although the United States did not offer help to Turkey in the early
stages when Soviet pressures were more prominent, U.S. policy-makers gradually
came to the conclusion that the fall of Turkey would further encourage Soviet
expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and thus would harm specific U.S. interests
in the region as well as the general ones in the context of the newly-emerging
superpower competition. Believing that the loss of Turkey and Greece would bring
the loss of the whole Middle Eastern region, 35 ° Americans decided to undertake
responsibilities in Greece and Turkey, which were about be relinquished by the
British because of financial problems.
As a confirmation of the new policy, the United States sent a note to the Soviet
Union on 9 August 1946, stating that any attack or threats of attack against the
Turkish Straits would be a matter for the U.N. Security Council. 35 ' On 5 April
1946 the U.S. battleship Missouri visited Turkey, carrying the body of Turkish
Ambassador Minur Ertegün, who died in Washington during the war. At the joint
session of the Congress on 12 March 1947 President Truman asked the Congress to
provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey. 352
 Truman's aid proposal
was approved in the Senate with a vote of 67 to 23 on 22 April and in the House
with a vote of 287 to 107 on 22 May. Truman considered the doctrine his most
important decision since the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima; it
certified the U.S. determination to resist any Soviet aggression against Turkey
with all means at its disposal, including the force of arms. 353 In his memoirs,
Harry Truman wrote:
340 D.B. Sezer. "Turkey's Security Policies" in J. Alford(ed.), Greece and Turkey,
Aldersliot: Gower, 1984. p.54. R,C. Campany, Turkey and the United States, New York:
Praegcr. 1986. p.80. M. Gönlübol, "NATO, USA and Turkey" in K.H. Karpat (ed.),
Turkey 's Foreign Policy in Transition, Leidru: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.13.
"° G. MeGliee (former U.S. aiiibassadoi to Turkey), The U.S. Turkish NATO Middle East
Connection. London: MacMillaii, 1990. Pp.20-22.
B.R. Kuniholin. the Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
toli University Press, 1980, p.362. D. Acheson, Present at the Creation, London: Harnish
Hamilton Ltd.. 1970. p.196.
352 J.M. Colliiis; Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO
and the Middle East. Report Prepared for Special Committee on Investigations of Committee
on Foreign Affairs. 94th Congress, 1st Session. February 28, 1975, Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1975. pp.19-22, D.A. Rustow, Turkey: America 's Forgotten Ally. New
Yoik: Council on Foreigii Relations, 1987, p.89.
BR. Kimniliolni. "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present and Future", ORBIS.
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The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the Iron Curtain across
the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable
out post in a sea of conimunisni... Tue ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded
that we conie to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the world on notice that
it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom wllerever it was threatened.
The Truman doctrine marked the beginning of U.S.-Turkish defence relation-
ship on the basis of containment of Soviet and communist expansionism. 355
 The
military assistance agreement on 12 July 1947° established the first official mU-
itary contact between the two countries. Under the agreement the United States
supplied Turkey with weaponry and other military equipment, personnel for in- -
struction, and financial aid and technical advice for construction programs of road,
harbour and strategic installations. 357 On 4 July 1948 the United States signed an-
other agreement witll Turkey in order to supply economic aid in accordance with
the Marshall Plan which was aimed at helping the reconstruction of European
countries whose main industry and infrastructure were destroyed by the war.
After the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established in 1949, Turkish
officials made the utmost efforts to join the organisation for the following reasons:
Turkey needed the guarantee of NATO, especially the United States, which was the
most powerful state and leader of the Western camp, to counter the threat of its
big neighbour, the Soviet Union. 358 The NATO membership would guarantee and
institutionalise the Western aid which was essential for socio-economic development
of Turkey and inodernisation of its armed forces. Acceptance by the Atlantic
alliance would also confirm that Turkey was an integral part of the Western world
and would strengthen organic relations with the European family of nations. 359 In
Vali's words, "identification with that part of the world and with the civilisation
represented by it was to guarantee security, development, and acculturation."36°
°' H.S. Tiuiiian: Mernoi,'s. Years of Trial and Hope, vol.II, Garden City: Doubleday, 1956, pp.IOO-1Oi.
Caitipany. op.cit.. p.2. Coulounibis, op.cit., p.13.
For its text see Appendix A. Canipany, op.cit., pp.96-99, G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance,
Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.213-215.
F.A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus, Baltimore: the John Hopkins Press. 1971. pp.l25-
126.
S(Z'. op.Cit.. pp.84-SS. Coulounibis, op.cit., p.20, Cainpany, op.cit.. p.26.
Harris. op.cit.. J).44. Vail. op.cit.. p.115, Rustow, op.cit., p.9l.
360 Vali. op.cit.. p.115.
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It was clear that the Turks would not be satisfied with a membership of an
alliance of Mediterranean or Middle Eastern states which would be sponsored
by Western powers. In order to gain the trust of the Western states for NATO
membership, Turkey sent a 4,500-nian unit to the Korean war in 1950 to fight with
U.S. troops. 30 ' The Turkish brigade, which was the third largest contingent after
the American and South Korean forces, performed well during the war and earned
high praise. 362 In spite of a general hesitation within NATO and opposition of some
members, 363 NATO states gave approval to the membership of Turkey mostly as
a result of U.S. request for it. On 15 May 1951 the United States proposed to
NATO members that Greece and Turkey be accepted as full members. 364 The
proposal was accepted at the meeting of the NATO Council in September 1951
in Ottawa365 and finally Turkey became an official member of NATO with the
protocol of accession366 coming into force on 18 February 1952.
To NATO countries, specifically the United States, Turkey's membership of
NATO offered considerable advantages at that time: 367 Firstly, the south-eastern
flank of NATO would be protected against hostile forces, and Soviet aggression
and expansion would be further contained. Secondly, an additional twenty two
Turkish divisions, which were the least costly forces to maintain in the alliance,
would make an important contribution to NATO's deterrent force. Thirdly, the
presence of Turkish forces along its southern border would force the Soviet IJnjon to
361 Ibid.. p.37. Harris. op.cit., pp.39-40.
362 U.S. President .Johnsoii and Secretary of State Dean Rusk praised Turkey's Korean effort during
Turkish President Sunay's visit to the USA in 1967, Amerika'da Onbir Gun, Ankara: Yarn,
Yayiiilari. 1967. pp.10. 16.
363 M. Stearns. Entangled Allies, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992. pp.74-75.
Stearns, who was serving in the U.S. euiibassy in Ankara in the sunnuer of 1950. argues that the
high possibility of Soviet attack against Turkey at the time of the Korean crisis led Western leaders
to invite Greece and Turkey to NATO. Ibid., p.15. He cites, "the military threat to Turkey was
thought to be so grave after the outbreak of the Korean War that an evacuation plan for U.S.
residents was prepared. and a liaiidfiil of officials were designated to remain behind in the event of
a Soviet occupation of Ankara." Ibid.. p.170n.
364 Harris. op.cit.. p.42.
365 Gönliibol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit.. pp.26-27.
360 For the text see Collins. op.cit., pp.29-31.
367 Harris. op.cit.. iw4215o. Gönhiibol, op.cit., p.26, M. Göu,hiibol et al., Olaylarla Turk D1 Poli-
tikasi, Ankara: A.U. S.B.F. Yayini. 1977, p.238, Vail, op.cit.. p.117. B.R. Kunihoirn. "U.S.
Policy in the Near East: the Triumphs and Tribulations of the Tru-
man Administration" in M.J. Lacey(ed.). the Truman Presidency, Cambridge:
Caiiihridge University Press. 1991. pp.309, 316, 317.
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divert significaiit forces from Central Europe to commit against Turkey. Fourthly,
Turkey's strategic location would be a valuable asset to prevent the Soviet expan-
Sion to the Middle East, whose oil held vital importance for the Western states.
As Omar Bradley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Foreign
Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate on 15 January 1952: "Turkey, astride
the Bosporus and Dardenelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south. Turkey
flanks the land routes from the North to the strategically important oil fields of
the Middle East." 368
 Finally, Turkish airfields would be available for NATO allies
for important missions.
4.2 Relations in the 1950s
Once Turkey entered NATO, this connection served as the general basis for the
whole range of military relations between Turkey and the United States. Under
the NATO arrangement mainly Americans were involved in the Turkish military
establishment. American military advisers directed works to co-ordinate Turkey's
defence plans with those of other NATO states and tried to train, equip and organ-
ise Turkish armed forces under the American model to increase their efficiency.369
Together with arming of Turkish military forces with U.S. weapons, this heavy
American involvenient in the Turkish military structure certainly played an im-
portant role in Turkey's military dependence on the USA, which was more clearly
realised when the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975.
This situation also led to the accusation that Turkey was a satellite of the USA.
Under Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty and the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement of June 1951 Turkey and the United States entered a wide range of
bilateral military arrangements. 37° Article III states: "In order more effectively to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means
of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop
368 MGliee. op.cit., pp.88-89.
369 Harris, op.cit.. pp.53-54. C. Wolf, Garrison Community, Westport: Greenwood. 1969. pp.42-
43.
370 Gh'1iibol iii Karpat(cd.), op.cit.. p.35, Göiilfibol et a!., op.cit., pp.244, 525.
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their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. 371 Some of these
arrangements were full-fledged agreements, openly published and ratified by the
Turkish parliament, such as the Status of Forces Agreement of June 1954, which
provided privileges and immunities for non-diplomatic U.S. personnel in Turkey.372
There were also public and secret exchanges of notes and executive agreements,
which were negotiated between U.S. and Turkish officials in different ranks and
ministries and not ratified by the Turkish parliament. The Military Facilities
Agreement of June 1954 was the most important of these. Apart from formal
understandings U.S. and Turkish officials often worked out their own mutually
agreeable procedures to fill gaps or implement a general agreement.373
These bilateral agreements dealt with "such specific matters as (a) U.S. force
deployments; (b) military exercises by U.S. forces; (c) the legal and administrative
status of U.S. forces; (d) intelligence activities; (e) operations plans for U.S. forces;
(f) operations plans for joint force commands." 374 The agreements which granted
U.S. personnel immunity from the Turkish tax and law system and allowed various
kinds of U.S. facilities to operate free from Turkish taxes, rules or laws were sub-
jected to heavy criticism by Turkish public opinion later in the 1960s. The number
of U.S. personnel and dependants, who came to Turkey under the bilateral agree-
ments, reached 24,000 at its height. Some of them were military advisers belonging
to JUSMMAT, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, which was
originally established in 1947. The civilian group included members of the U.S.
diplomatic and consular missions, the U.S. Information Service, the Agency for
International Development, the Peace Corps and various private business or ed-
ucational organisations. 37° TUSLOG, The United States Logistics Group, which
was established in 1955, regulated all activities of U.S. personnel such as hospi-
tal, cleiital, veterinary, legal, weather, chaplain, mortuary, and postal services; the
371 R.F. Griinmett. United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediter-
ranean. Report for Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations. U.S. Congress. March 27, 1977. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1977. p.57.
372 For the text see Appendix B. Harris. op.cit., pp.217-220, Campany, op.cit., pp.100-b2.
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exchange and commissionary services, recreational facilities, intelligence groups,
all means of communication, the dependant schools, transportation, security, law
enforcement, control of the estate, etc.377
In formulating bilateral arrangements Turkish and U.S. officials made some
mistakes which brought about the severe criticism of the U.S. and NATO by Turk-
ish public opinion in the 1960s. Former U.S. official George Harris wrote in his
book:
Neither state exercised close and comprehensive control over American activity in
Turkey. There were no full records of the verbal understandings to which either was
oiiiniitted: knowledge of some of the more sensitive activities was extremely closely held
on both sidles. The Turkish General Staff was not organised to provide centralised co-
ordination of U.S. activities iii Turkey. Nor. indeed, was any responsible senior American
coniivaiicler iiaiiied to oversee all the various U.S. military elements in Turkey.378
Perhaps not surprisingly, in such an atmosphere of close friendship Turkish
officials and military officers belonging to different departments fulfilled requests
of their American counterparts without applying bureaucratic procedures but this
resulted in a web of written and oral bilateral agreements made by different gov-
ernment offices, each not knowing what the others were doing.379
During the 1950s, seeing no way of staying outside the East-West conflict and
alliances in a bipolar world and seeing no defence policy outside NATO, 38 ° the
Turkish governments identified Turkey's security interests with those of NATO,
especially the United States. It is striking that Turkey's entry into NATO was
approved in the Turkish Parliament by a vote of 404 to 0, with one abstention.
Foreign Minister Fuat Köpriilii told the Turkish Parliament in December 1951:
"Our national interests are identical from every standpoint with the joint interests
of NATO and with its geographic and military requirements." 38 ' In the 1950s
Wolf. op.(it.. pp.44-45.
378 {arris. Op.Cit.. p.55.
37° Gönliibol in Karpat(ed.). op.cit., pp.35-36. S. Orkunt (retired Turkish admiral), Türkiye-ABD
Askeri I1ikileri. Istanbul: Milliyet Yaynilari, 1978, p.258, the authors interview with
tired Turkish auademic and columnist Faliir Armaolu. A. Halil, Ataturkcu Dz Politika ye
NATO ye Turkiye, 18taubul, 1968, p.205.
380 Harris, op.cit.. p.51.
381 Ibid. p.45. Sec also speeches of Köprülü in 1955 and Presideiit Celal Bayar in 1956. which considered
Turkey's NATO coiinectjoii a national policy in Giinlübol et al., op.cit., pp.321-322.
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Turkey supported and joined Western initiatives in different parts of the world.382
She played a major role in the establishment of the abortive Middle East Command
and the Baghdad and Balkan Pacts, 383
 she acted as the spokesman of the West at
the Bandung Conference of non-aligned states in 1955 and she gave full support to
the West during some events in the Middle East such as the Suez crisis of 1956, the
Eisenhower doctrine384 and the Syrian crisis of 1957, the Lebanese and Jordanian
events385 and the Iraqi revolution of 1958.
The United States, in return, frequently reiterated its commitment to Turkey's
security. After the Suez crisis, on 29 November 1956, the USA declared that threats
to the territory of the Baghdad Pact members (including Turkey) would be viewed
"with utmost gravity." 386 When Turkey was threatened by Moscow during the Syr-
ian crisis, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles assured Turkish rulers that, in case of a
Soviet attack, the United States would not limit itself to a "purely defensive oper-
ation." 387 After the Iraqi revolution, at the request of Turkish officials, the United
States signed with Turkey the Cooperation Agreement on 5 March 1959, which
stated that "in case of aggression against Turkey" the United States "will take
such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" to assist Turkey. 388 The
Turkish opposition, the Republican People's Party, severely criticised the agree-
ment on the ground that it included the concept of "indirect aggression", which
could be used by the government to call U.S. intervention against internal oppo-
382 Göitlfibol in Karpat(ed.). op.cit., p.30. G.S. Harris, "Turkey and the United States"
in Karpat(ed.), op.cit.. pp.54-55, Vali, op.cit., pp.12G-l27.
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sition as Lebanese President Chainoun did 11 1958. 389
 Later in the 1960s some
Turkish critics claimed that the agreement did not bring any additional guaran-
tee for Turkey's security but constituted a threat for her independence, being a
constant reminder of the U.S. control of Turkey.390
In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration accepted "massive retaliation" as
the strategy of NATO, which required a total nuclear response to Soviet aggression
on any scale against a member of the alliance. 391
 The Turks thought that the
strategy provided enough deterrence to the Soviet threat against Turkey. The
strategy seemed reasonable in an age when the Soviet Union had considerable
advantage over Europe on conventional forces and neither of the superpowers had
long-range missiles to hit the other side from their own countries. The absence
of long-range missiles gave importance to U.S. bases in Turkey to check Soviet
military activities and to hit Soviet territory with short-range missiles. 392 When
the Soviets seemed to take the lead on inter-continental strategic missiles with the
launching of Sputnik in 1957, the United States tried to fill the missile gap by
deploying intermediate range strategic missiles (Jupiters and Thors) to NATO's
European allies. 393 The story of the Jupiter missiles which had implications for
U.S.-Turkish military relations will be mentioned in the next chapter.
Turkish initiatives in the 1950s, which in effect advanced U.S. interests in
the Middle East, and U.S. announcements of support for Turkish security, too,
strengthened Turkey's image as a faithful follower of U.S. policies.
389 MP Blilejit Ecevit was particularly outspoken in this subject. Harris, op.cit., pp.67, 69, Göulühol e
al.. op.rit.. pp.319-320, Cumhurz yet. 6.2.1960. p.S , A.H. Ijiman and R.H. Dekmejian, "Chang-ing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967", ORBIS. vol.11, Fall
1967. pp.773-774. Turkish columnist Fahir Armaoglu told the author that indirect aggression"
iiieaiit niternal subversive activities. Turkish academic Seyfi Ta.han commented that the RPP's
criticism wa.s a part of its transformation to leftism.
° Saffet. Ural, Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi (CSTD). 4.2.1968, term 1. sess.7,
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4.3 The Turkish Junta Period
The Turkish military officers who seized power on 27 May 1960 did not make
any changes in Turkey's military relations. They proclaimed in their first public
declaration that they believed in NATO and CENTO and were loyal to them.394
They held their predecessor's view on the cold war, seeing the Soviet Union as a
threat to Turkey's security and considering the U.S. and NATO connection in the
interests of Turkey. In the eyes of military rulers, U.S. economic and military aid
was vital to achieve economic development, to keep a strong army and to improve
the situation of military officers. 395 Therefore, the 27 May regime was more de-
pendent on the United States than the Menderes government had been, thus it,
too, was open to U.S. influence. 396
 In his reply to Soviet Premier Khrushchev's let-
ter, which proposed good relations between the two countries provided that Turkey
embarked upon neutrality, Turkish President Cemal Giirsel reiterated Turkey's ioy-
alty to her commitments stemming from NATO and CENTO. 397 The new Turkish
regime's attitude toward its alliances was welcomed by the U.S. President in his
message to the Turkish premier on 11 June 1960.398
The Turkish military regime seemed willing to make some changes in bilat-
eral military arrangements with the United States. In his press conference on 17
September 1960 Turkish President Gürsel hinted that the implementation method
of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement should be changed. 39° Some inter-
ministerial studies were made to deal with difficulties stemming from the use of
U.S. bases in Turkey and the Turkish Foreign Ministry gave its opinion that all
principles of non-secret bilateral agreements should be collected in a document.40°
Cumhuriyet. 27.5.1960, Vali. op.cit., pp.40, 127, Gönlübol et a!., op.cit., p.333. See also Foreign
Minister Scum Sarper's 1961 budget speech praising NATO and CENTO in Gönlübol et al.. op.cit.,
P1334-335.
Harris. ?p.tit.. p.86 , Gönliibol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit.. pp.14-15, F. Ahmad, Turkey's Experi-
ment zr Democracj. London: C. Hurst aiid Company, 1977. P.401. In his memoirs published
iii Turkish newspaper 5abah on 22.6.1994 Colonel Alparsian Tiirke, who was among the military
lea(lersllip of the 27 May coup, confirmed this point.
396 Former Turkish MP and diplomat Kamran Juan told the author that the 27 May regime was more
suhimussive to U.S. demands.
°' For the texts of letters dated June 28, 1960 and July 8, 1960 see Middle Eastern Affairs,
vol.11. no.10. November 1960, pp.317-320.
398 Göiiliibol et al.. op.cit.. pp.333-334, Cumhuriyet, 17.6.1960. p.5.
399 Göuliibol et al.. op.cit.. p.336.
400 ()rkunt. op.cit.. p.255, Haydar Tunckanat. cSTD. 3.2.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3. p.569.
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Military rulers showed particular interest in restricting the privileges and immu-
nities of U.S. personnel. To obtain the right to decide the duty status of U.S.
personnel committing a crime, the junta formed a special inter-ministerial com-
mission and proposed to U.S. authorities changes in this issue. Since the Americans
did not want to surrender this important right, no development was achieved.40'
While failing to obtain concessions from U.S. authorities, the Turkish military
junta brought a new legal mechanism under the 1961 constitution, which would
facilitate the legalisation of secret and public executive agreements with the United
States. With the new arrangement, "implementing agreements pursuant to an in-
ternational agreement... do not require approval by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly." 402 A parliamentary committee specifically noted that this article would
permit the government "to carry out some necessarily secret arrangements of the
free world defence system which we joined..."403
4.4 The Johnson Letter
U.S. President Johnson's famous letter to Turkish President Inönü in June
1964 caused changes in the Turkish perception of the Atlantic alliance. 404 Firstly,
Johnson stated that "adhesion to NATO... means that NATO countries will not
wage war on each other" and that therefore a war between Turkey and Greece
was unthinkable. This was interpreted as meaning that only the United States
could determine who could be Turkey's enemy and that Turkey could have no
enemy other than the Soviet Union. If a NATO country violated Turkey's rights,
NATO's interests would prevent her from taking any action.405 Secondly, Johnson
stated that the United States would not agree to the use of any U.S.-supphied
military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus and reminded Inönü that
"under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government
is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for
"" harris. op.eit.. pp.88-89.
402 Article 65 of the constitution cited by ibid., p.89.
403 Il)id.. p.89.
"° For the texts of both prenliers' letters see Appendix D and Middle East Journal, vol.20,
Suimuer 1966. PP
.386-393. The Johnson letter was also mentioned in the Chapter VI in the
context of the Cyprus question.
405 Göiiliibol in Karpat(ed.). 01).Cit.. pp.18. 35.
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purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished." 406 The Turks
realised that their alliance with the U.S.A. brought some limitations to Turkey's
freedom of action and sovereignty.407 Their army was equipped predominantly
with U.S. weaponry and they would not able to use them to defend themselves
against threats which were not approved by the United States.
Finally and most importantly, Johnson warned that "your NATO allies have
not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey
against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention
without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies." The Turks were
really shocked because they had based all their security on the guarantee provided
by NATO and now doubts began to emerge about the credibility of the NATO
umbrella in case of a Soviet attack. It seemed that the U.S.-Turkish alliance was
favouring one side; the Turks had taken risks to support the U.S. (Cuba and Korea)
hut the Americans did not even agree to the working of the NATO commitment
for Turkey's survival. 408
 In Sezer's words, Johnson "reserved to himself the right
to define when and under what conditions the Soviet Union could be a threat to
the security of Turkey." 409
 Johnson's remarks compelled Turkish P.M. Inönü to
conclude in his letter to Johnson that "there are between us wide divergences of
views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must
confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern.. If
NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then
it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied." 41 ° The Johnson
letter led the Turks to begin a wide-ranging re-evaluation of their alliance with
NATO and to be more cautious in their dealings with both the USA and the
USSR.
400 For the full text of Article IV see Appendix A and Harris, op.cit., pp.214-215.
407 E. Giiresin. "Amerika Dikkat Etmeli", Cumhurzyet, 25.8.1964, p.1
408 Harris in Karpat(ed.). op.cit., pp.59-GO. Fahir Armaoglu rightly commented that Turkey had
entcre(l NATO mainly to gain the conLmitment of the USA (not any other NATO members) and
that if the USA was telling Turkey now that "NATO might not protect you", this was a total
collapse of Turkey's security policy.
40g Sezer in Alford(ed.). op.rit.. pp.GS-GG.
410 In his interview with the author, former Turkish foreign minister Osman Olcay stressed this point.
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4.5 Turkish Initiatives to Gain More Independence
4.5.1 Improving Relations With Countries Outside the West
The disappointment over the Western attitude toward the Cyprus question led
the Turks to try to normalise their relations with the Eastern bloc and Third World
countries. The Soviet Union had renounced its claims on some Turkish territories
in 1953411 and made some overtures to Turkey to relax relations. All major NATO
countries had already mended their fences with the Soviet Union. However, Turkey,
seeing Soviet gestures as tactical changes, had stayed behind as the last inflexi-
ble "Cold Warrior." 412 With the realisation that NATO did not provide firm and
automatic security, Turkish rulers began to avoid getting involved in superpower
politics and provokiiig the Soviet Union unnecessarily. 413 They thought that rap-
prochement with the USSR would bring economic assistance, increasing detente in
military confrontation, hence greater security, 414
 and more international support in
matters involving national interests, especially in the Cyprus question. 415
 The re-
sult was intensive exchanges of state visits and parliamentary delegations between
Turkey and the Eastern bloc countries and USSR economic assistance to Turkey.416
After returning from his visit to Moscow in September 1967, P.M. Dernirel said: "I
think we have entered a new era in our dealings with the Russians. As is known,
there had been great strain between our countries over the years, and in the period
after World War II we had no relations at all. Now that gap has been bridged, I am
not suggesting that all the doubts are gone, but I think the hostility is gone." 417
 In
the international arena, contrary to Western attitudes, Turks gave more support
411 Göiiliibol in Karpat(ed.). op.cit., p.27.
412 IlJi(I.. pp.28. 29. 30. Vali. op.cit., pp.133, 356.
413 Szvr in Alford(ed.). op.cit.. pp.66, 76.
414 Harris. Troubled Alliance. op.cit.. p.127.
415 Uliiian L11(l Dekiiiejian, op.cit., p.779.
416 Kees'ing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-196.4, vol.14, P.20500. ibid.. 1965-1966, vol.15,
p.20936. ibid.. 1967-1968. vol.16, pp.21881, 22335. 22672. ibid., 1969-1970. vol.17, p.23632. Y.T.
Kurat. Elli Y2112k Cumhuriyetin Dz Politikasl, 1923-1973. Ankara: Turk Tarih Ku-
ritliut. 1975. pp.299-304, M. Gönlübol and A.H. Ulman, "Turk Di Politikasinin Yirmi
Yih 1945-1965", SBF Dergisi. vol.21, No.1. March 1966, pp. 174-175. On the improve-
ineut of Turkey's relations with the USSR see also G. Harris, "Cross-Alliance Politics:
Turkey and the Soviet Union". Turkish Yearbook of International Rela-
tions. vol.12. 1972, pp.1-32.
417 Milliyet. 14.10.1967. translated by Vali, op.cit.. p.179.
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to the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to Third World countries in colonial
issues. 418 Turkish rulers' new policy softened their rigid evaluation of the Soviet
threat and thus affected their perception of the alliance with NATO countries.419
However, they never considered making the Soviet Union a defence partner as an
alternative to NATO, but wanted only normalisation of relations between the two
countries.420
4.5.2 Turkish Withdrawal From MLF
A multilateral force had been suggested by the United States to cope with
anxieties of its European allies over the control of nuclear arms. It would include
Polaris missile-equipped submarines with crews of mixed nationalities. Although
Turkey did not have any special interest in joining the force, it had accepted
the idea and sent a crew to the Working Group. In January 1965 the Turkish
government declared that it would not participate in the MLF and would withdraw
its crew serving on the USS Claude V. Ricketts. 42 ' Official sources presented
financial considerations and the refusal of some other NATO members to join the
force as the reasons for the decision 422 but it cannot be denied that Soviet objections
to the plan and Turkish resentment toward the USA because of its attitude toward
the Cyprus question played an important role in the decision.423
4.5.3 U-2 Flights
In 1956 Turkey had allowed u.s. forces in the Incirlik airbase near Adana to
operate "scientific" U-2 flights but did not have detailed information on them.424
Until 1960 the United States secretly carried out the U-2 program of high-altitude
418 Tjlniaii and Dekmejian, op.cit.. p.784. Karat, op.cit..pp.303-304. On the improvement of Turkey's
relations with Arab countries see 0. Kürkcüo1u, Turkye 'nra Arap Ortadogusuna Kari
Polltlkasi, 1945-1970, Ankara: SBF Yayini, 1972.
410 Harris. Troubled Alliance, op.cit., pp.127-128.
420 Harris in Karpat (ed), op.cit., p.61.
421 Milliyet. 10. 15, 16 Jaiivary 1965, Hürriyet, 17.1.1965. Dijlerj Bakanlzi Belleteni(DBB),
January 1965. p.56. Haul, op.cit., pp.159-lGO.
422 Deputy P.M. Kenial Satir's statement, Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD), 26.1.1965,
terni 1. sess.4. vol.35. pp.173-174.
423 Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit.. p.lS1. VaiL op.cit., p.121, Gönlübol et al., op.cit., pp.522-
523. Orkunt. op.cit.. pp.392-408. "Dururn", Jk[illiyet, 15.1.1965, p.1.
424 Orkunt. op.cit., p.36O. Gönlühol et al., op.cit., p.325.
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overflights of the Soviet Union from the Incirlik base to take photographs of So-
viet missile activities. When the U-2 plane which took off from Incirlik and which
was used by U.S. pilot Gary Powers was shot down by the Soviets over their ter-
ritories on 1 May 1960,425 U-2 flights became a subject of public discussion in
Turkey. Soviet Premier Khrushchev's speech on 7 May 42° and the Soviet note to
Turkey on 13 May warned Turkish officials over their "allowing foreign military
aircraft to use their airspace for the preparation and execution of intrusions into
Soviet airspace." 427 While the Turkish government announced that it "has never
authorised any American aircraft to fly over Russian territory for reconnaissance
flights or any other reason," 428 Turkish politicians and newspaper columnists crit-
icised the United States over the timing of the Powers flight but generally blamed
Khrushchev for sabotaging the Paris summit under the pretext of the incident
and defended the necessity of the U-2 flights. 429 Later in the second half of the
1960s, in the atmosphere of heavy criticism of the United States, Turkish critics
mentioned the Powers incident frequently to warn against Turkey's involvement in
an unwanted conflict because of the U-2 flights.
In December 1965 another U.S. reconnaissance plane which started its journey
in Incirlik accidentally crashed in the Black Sea while flying over international
waters. The Soviet government and press complained that Turkey was allowing
its territory to be used for dangerous missions. 43° Turkish military authorities
particularly felt resentment since the flight of the plane occurred without their
knowledge. 431
 On 28 December 1965 the Demirel government asked the United
States to stop all reconnaissance flights carried out from Turkish bases. 432
 The
United States tried to persuade the Turks to reverse their decision through the
425 For d'tails of tile events and statements of both the U.S. and USSR governments see Keesing 's
Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960. vol.12, pp.17425-17429.
426 Khrushchev said: "The Governments.., of Turkey must be clearly aware that they were accomplices
of this flight because they permitted tile use of their airfields against tile Soviet Union. This is a
hostile act on their part against the Soviet Union." Ibid.. p.l7427.
427 Ibid., p.17429, Goniubol et ai., op.cit., p.328, Orkunt, op.cit., pp.368, 374, Gwmhuriyet, 14.5.1960,
p.1.
428 Keesing 'S.... vol.12. p.17430.
429 Harris. op.cit.. p.57.
Ibid.. pp.165-16G.
431 Orkunt. op.cit., pp.377-378.
432 P.M. Siileyinan Demirel's press conference on 7 February 1970, DBB, February 1970, pp.101, 106.
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visit of the U.S. commander in NATO to Turkey, 433 but such flights were not
resumed in the 1965-1975 period. 4
 This Turkish attitude showed how serious
the Turks were in their decision to be more cautious in their dealings with the
superpowers. It was also an act aimed at easing intensive public criticism directed
toward the government on its military relations with the USA.
4.5.4 The Use of the Incirlik Base for non-NATO Purposes
During the landing of U.S. marines in Lebanon in 1958, the United States dis-
patched 1,600 U.S. Army troops in Germany to Incirlik to prepare to join in the
Lebanese action. U.S. authorities notified Turkish officials of the troops' move-
ment only after the fact, rather than consulting with them prior to the action.435
The Turkish opposition criticised the deployment of U.S. troops to Incirlik on the
grounds that they came on the initiative of Washington, not Ankara. 436 In the
second half of the 1960s Turkish critics stated that the 1958 incident showed that
the United States, whenever it wished, could use the Incirlik base for military
purposes otl1er than NATO defence plans and thus could drag Turkey into a war
against its will or at least could harm Turkey's relations with its neighbours.437
The Demirel government took the position that joint defence bases could be
used only against an attack from the enemy camp under the NATO agreement.438
When the Arab-Israel war broke out in June 1967 the Turkish Foreign Minister
told the Turkish Parliament that the bases could not be used without the explicit
Orkimt. op.cit.. p.380. çaglayaiigil's interview with Cern in I. Cern, Tarih Aczszndan 12
Mart, Istanbul: Ceiii Yayinevi. 1980, pp.303-304.
DemireFs press conference, op.cit., p.106.
Harris, op.rit.. pp.66-67, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.35, Orkunt, op.cit., p.266. J.W. Lewis, Jr., the
Strateg?c Balance in the Mediterranean, Washington D.C.: The American Enterprise
Institute, 1976. p.30.
436 GnliiboI et at. op.cit., pp.315-3l6, Turkish academic Seyfi Ta1ian agreed that the use of the
Iiicirlik base by the Americans was a mistake but he also pointed out that the perception of the
Soviet threat led Turkish rulers to itiake concessions to the USA aiid that the use of the Incirlik
base was one of them.
Coin, op.cit.. p.273, T. Ataöv. Amerika NATO ye Turkiye, Ankara: Aydinhk Yaymevi,
1969. pp.218, 219, 0. Böliikbaii, MMTñ, 19.2.1969. term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.42, D. Avciolu,
"Türkiye'deki Amerikan Usleri", Yön, 25.11.1966. pp.8-9, N. Arda "Türkiye'deki
Amerikan Usleri", ibid.. p.7, A. Ipekci, "Usler Sorunu", Ivlilliyet, 21.5.1970, p.1.
438 United States Security Agreements, op.cit., p.l862.
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permission of Turkey.° Reportedly, in the 1967 war Turkey allowed the United
States to use communications stations but did not allow her to use bases for re-
fuelling or supply activities.440 During the Lebanese disturbances of October 1969
Turkish P.M. Demirel openly said that Turkey would not let the United States use
the Incirlik base for a landing in Lebanon, recalling the principle that joint bases
could not serve for operations to interfere in internal affairs of other states.44'
When the Jordanian government suppressed the Palestinian commando uprising
in September 1970, Turkish authorities showed the same sensitiveness toward pos-
sible use of bases by the United States." 2 However, at that time Turkey allowed
the U.S. to use bases for the evacuation of U.S. citizens in Jordan and transfer of
supplies from Incirlik to Amman.443
These Turkish actions demonstrate that the Turkish government did not want
deterioration of its relations with other states because of its contacts with the
United States, which threatened that it might not come to Turkey's help if she
was attacked by the Soviet Union. Turkish rulers also apparently wanted to prove
that their defence policy was not totally dependent on the USA and that they
could reject important demands of the Americans even in the security area. One
cannot predict how Turkish authorities would have acted if the United States really
needed to use the Turkish bases for its operations in the Middle East. However, it is
certain that the Americans felt displeasure with the Turkish attitudes mentioned
above. U.S. officials and politicians sometimes cited these attitudes while they
claimed that Turkey was not co-operating with the USA adequately in the defence
area.
4.5.5 Duty Status Issue
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951 certified that in case of "of-
fences arising out of any act or mission done in the performance of official duty"
a NATO country would surrender jurisdiction to the allied country whose person-
IIvIMTD. 8.6.1967, terni 2. sess.2, vol.18, p.168.
440 Ktiiiiholiii, "Turkey and NATO". op.cit., p.426.
"' Cumhuriyet. 31.10.1969, pp.l.7.
442 Harris. op.cit.. p.l6G, Cern. op.cit., p.273.
443 Kuiiilioliii. "Turkey and NATO", op.cit.. p.426. Collins, op.cit., p.17.
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nel were charged with the crime. 444 The real problem was the definition of duty
status and of the right to determine it. Turkish Law no. 6816 of 16 July 1956
clarified that the words of "in the performance of official duty" meant "while on
a general duty status." 445 On 31 July 1956 the Turkish Ministry of Justice sent
instructions to judicial authorities throughout Turkey that jurisdiction would be
left to U.S. officials upon certification by the senior American commander that the
offender was on duty when the crime was committed."° Thus, the initial U.S.-
Turkish arrangements left the interpretation of what constituted "duty" to the
U.S. commander.
A major incident which caught the attention of Turkish public opinion was the
traffic accident in November 1959 in which Lieutenant Colonel Allen I. Morrison
ran into a contingent of the Presidential Guard, killing one and injuring eleven
others. Morrison was tried by U.S. authorities since he was considered on duty
at the time of accident and fined 1,200 dollars. 447
 Finding it inadequate, the
Turkish press protested against the punishment448
 and later publicised all actions
of U.S. personnel including incidents involving Turkish national symbols such as
the Turkish flag and the statues of Atatürk.
In the 1960s Turkey's sacrifice of jurisdiction over U.S. personnel was heavily
criticised by Turkish columnists and politicians as a breach of sovereignty remi-
niscent of the old capitulations. It was claimed that exemption of U.S. personnel
from Turkish justice went beyond NATO's general agreements, keeping the limits
of related personnel and the "duty" concept too wide. It was believed that U.S.
personnel were abusing their rights under the present arrangement at the expense
0f Turkish citizens. 449 It should be noted that American personnel felt that Turkish
" Harris. op.cit.. p.57.
445 ibid.. p.58. H. Tunçkaiiat. Ikili An1amalar-zn Içyüzü, Istanbul: Tekin Yayiiievi, 1975. pp.237-
238.
44° Harris. op.cit.., p.58. Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.238-240.
" Harris, op.cit.. p.59.
448 Cumhuriyet. 9-17 March 1960.
"° Göuliibol in Karpat(ed.). op.cit.. p.243. the author's interview with Fahir Arivaoglu, Ataöv, op.cit.,
p.2i5. Saffet Ural, cSTD, 4.2.1968, term 1, sess.7, vol.45-3, p.451. M.A. Aybar, MMTD,
7.11.1965. t'rni 2. sess.1, vol.1. pp.l76-l77 in C'urnhuriyet, H. Erolu, "ABD Tie Aramizdaki
And1aina1arin Yeniden Gözden Gecirilmesi". 7.9.1964. G. Güueri. "Resrni
Görev Dolayisiyla I1enen Suclar", 23-24.11.1965, B. Akel. "Amerikan Usieri
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law was irrational and unfairly applied to them.45°
Starting in the early 1960s Turkish and U.S. officials held long-lasting nego-
tiations on the duty status issue, 45 ' revolving around the Turkish right to reject
the certificate of the U.S. commander. Finally, on 24 September 1968 the United
States and Turkey signed the Duty Status Agreement formulating procedures to
be followed by the Turkish General Staff if it rejected the duty certificate. 452 Al-
though Turkish rulers declared that the new agreement, which was published in
July 1969, constituted the most suitable solution to the duty status problem, 453 it
gave Turkish officers the right of objecting to certificates given by Americans but,
as Turkish critics claimed, the Americans had the final say in the matter. 454 Thus,
in the duty status issue, Turkish authorities could not obtain the result which
they wanted to obtain, but they hoped that the new arrangement would improve
their image in the eyes of Turkish people as a government which could force the
Americans to make changes in the previous defence arrangements.
4.5.6 Problems Related to U.S. Personnel
Turkish public opinion attacked customs and tax privileges granted to U.S.
personnel, 455 U.S. PX shops (Post of Exchanges) and Army Postal Service (APO),
claiming that Americans, staying out of Turkish control, carried out large-scale
black-market activities and illegal currency trafficking and smuggled Turkish his-
toric and cultural treasures out of Turkey. Turkish critics stated that activities of
U.S. personnel harmed the Turkish economy, deprived Turkey of an important in-
come source and affected social life of Turkish society in a negative way. 456 Arrests
ye Ikili Anlamalar", 18.12.1965, A. Kabakli, "Faydasi Ne?", Tercüman, 30.8.1964.
° Wolf. op.cit.. pp.191-l92. Seyfi Tahan agreed with WoWs point that some incidents happened
because U.S. personnel did not understand the Turkish way of life. He commented that these
incidents were exaggerated by anti-American leftist groups as a propaganda moans.
451 S. Demirel. MM TD. 9.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, pp.289-290.
452 Appendix E, Harris, op.cit.. pp.225-228, Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.244-248, Gönlübol et a!., op.cit..
PP•532- s3.
453 Deniircl's press conference. op.cit., pp.108-109.
454 Harris. op.cit., pp.168-169. Tunçkanat. op.cit., pp.249-250, E. celik, "Ikili Anlamalar",
Cumhuriyet. 25.3.1970, p.2, A. Ipekçi, "Durum", Milliyet, 25.5.1970, p.11.
For the text of the U.S.-Turkish tax exemption agreement of 1954 see Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.251-
270.
Harris, op.cit., p.60. Gönliihol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., p.37, Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.7l, 294, Rifat
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of some Americans carrying out black-markeetering gave ammunition to Turkish
people for their criticism.457
The radical left showed their anger toward Americans by demonstrating against
visits of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, attacking its personnel, 458 and targeting U.S. person-
nel and facilities in Turkey. 45° The Sixth Fleet visits were seen by leftists as a U.S.
demonstration of its influence on Turkey. 46° They protested, sometimes violently,
against each visit of the Fleet in the second half of the 1960s. The intervention
of police and rightist groups in demonstrations resulted in serious clashes and the
death of some people. 461 While Turkish authorities saw nothing wrong in visits of a
friendly country's fleet, 462 the U.S. administration continued the Sixth Fleet visits
in spite of violent demonstrations, but it eventually reduced the number of visits
toward the end of the 1960s upon the advice of the U.S. ambassador to Turkey.463
Labour strikes in U.S. bases brought some clashes between U.S. personnel
and Turkish workers. Concerned with the situation of U.S. personnel affected
by the strikes, some U.S. senators came to Turkey and held talks with Turkish
authorities on the subject. 464 The Turkish government's decision to postpone the
strike of the Harb-I trade union in U.S. bases on the ground that the strike would
damage national security at a time when a NATO operation would take place
caused angry protests of Turkish critics who claimed that the government came
under U.S. influence and cared about U.S. interests rather than Turkish workers.465
Baykal. MMTD. 24.2.1966, term 2. sess.1, vol.4, p.463. "Modern Kapitülasyonlar
ye Amerikan Kacakçi1ii". Yön. 3.12.1965. pp.5-9, K. Eseugin "Tiirkiye'deki
Amerikan Personeli", Cumhuriyet, 10.4.1965, p.2, Ulmnan and Dekmejian, op.cit.,
Harris. op.cit., p.60, Curnhuriyet, 4.12.1965, p.i.7.
458 Harris. op.eit.. pp.l69-l71, Vali, op.cit., p.143, cumhuriyet, 16-19 July 1968, 11-17 Febru-
ary 1969, 20-22 December 1969, Un2ted States Security Agreements..., op.cit.. p.1832,
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971-1972. vol.18, p.24637.
"'° Currihuriyet. January-March 1971.
460 • Selçuk. "Pencere". Cumhuriyet, 17.10.1967, p.2. T. Ataöv, "Altrnci Fib Defol".
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461 M.A. Birand et al., 12 IViart, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi. 1994, pp.148-150, 153-154.
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DBB. September 1968, p.58.
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As a result of the anti-American atmosphere in Turkey, the United States took
some measures to make the U.S. presence in Turkey less obvious. It shifted some
irritant elements in Ankara such as the Post of Exchange and the American school
to isolated locations. Economic pressures at home, too, forced the Americans to
reduce the number of U.S. personnel in Turkey and to transfer soine facilities to
the Turks. 466 The Anadolu Kavai and Manzarah joint defence installations near
Ankara (1968), radar sites in Trabzon and Samsun and the cili airbase near Izmir
(1970) were turned over to Turkish authorities. 467 The number of U.S. personnel
and their dependants was cut down from 24,000 in 1968 to 16,000 in 1970.468
Turkish authorities saw the Sixth Fleet events and the labour strikes as actions
of far-leftist groups and therefore they did not demand any response from the
Americans. Neither apparently did they make any demands to U.S. officials on the
subjects of the number of U.S. personnel, their high profile in big cities and the
transfer of some facilities to Turkey. But they warmly welcomed U.S. initiatives in
these issues, which eased their position before Turkish public opinion. To counter
public criticism of tax privileges of U.S. personnel, the Turkish government signed
an agreement with the United States in May 1967, making the Americans subject
to Turkish custom arrangements.46°
4.5.7 Passage Through Straits
Until January 1966 Turkish authorities had permitted American ships armed
with missiles to pass through the Straits. But beginning in 1966 the Turks changed
their interpretation of the limitations imposed by the Montreaux agreement and
no longer permitted the passage of U.S. ships armed with anti-aircraft missiles.47°
They seenied determined not to treat the United States specially in this issue as
466 The statement of Robert J. Pranger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, United States
Security Agreements. op.cit., p.1861.
467 Deiiiire1s press conference. op.cit., p.i07, DBB, June 1968, pp.34-35, 38-41, Gönlübol et aL,
op.cit.. pp.533-534, Cumhurz yet, 15 June 1968, 1 July 1970.
468 Harris, op.cit., p.167. United States Security Agreements..., op.cit., p.186O. Demirel
stated in his press conference in February 1970 that the number of U.S. personnel in Turkey in
1970 was 7,000. op.cit.. p.107. According to Collins there were 6,570 U.S. personnel in Turkey in
November 1974. Collins, op.cit.. p.3n.
469 Cumhuriyet, 7.5.1967. pp.1. 7.
° Cumhuriyet. 28.4.1966. pp.1,7, Harris. op.cit., pp.171-172, Ulnian and Dekmejian, op.cit.. p.781,
Göiililbol and Ulinan, op.cit., p.175.
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well, as a part of their policy of being more cautious in their contacts with the
Americans.
4.5.8 NATO's New Strategy
Appreciating the threat of annihilation for both superpowers in a global con-
flict with nuclear weapons, the Kennedy administration suggested in 1961 that
NATO should meet Soviet aggression with a flexible response rather than an all-
out attack. In December 1967 the NATO Defence Planning Committee formally
gave approval to the strategy of flexible response. 471 Turkey officially supported
the U.S. position on the new strategy but some Turkish officials and senior mili-
tary officers expressed doubts about it: The strategy implied a difference between
"wing" and "centre"; the centre would be defended at its perimeter but a localised
Soviet attack on Turkey would be met in depth, sacrificing Turkish territories, or
Turkey would be left to the aggressor for the sake of central regions. 472 To counter
the weakness of the strategy, NATO defence planners proposed various schemes
such as the ACE Mobile Force for immediate deployment, atomic demolition mu-
nitioiis for mining the borders with atomic bombs and an integrated naval unit in
the Mediterranean. 473 But none of them allayed Turkish anxieties. Nevertheless,
the Turks had no choice but to accept the flexible response strategy and to try to
obtain guarantees for Turkey's security in accordance with this strategy.
NATO's flexible response strategy was subjected to heavy criticism by Turkish
politicians, newspaper columnists, academics and retired military officers: 474 The
471 Harris. op.cit., p.l49. Göiiliibol et.al., op.cit., pp.537-538, Orkunt, op.cit.. pp.247-248 DinireFs
press collf(rellre. op.cit., pp.118-l2O, Gii1übol in Karpat(ed.). op.cit., pp.43-44, the author's in-
trvivw with S'yfi Taliaii.
472 Harris. op.cit.. p.150 , Vali. op.cit.. p.l2l.
Harris. op.cit.. p.1SO. Vali. op.cit.. pp.121 - 122 . 163, N. Eien, Turkey, NATO and Europe,
Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977. pp.19-20, P.M. Deniirel praised these
sehieiiies iii his press conference in February 1970, op.cit.. pp.130-132.
In MMTD: F. Giiley. 24.2.1968, terni 2, sess.3, vol.26. p.342; B. Boran, 19.2.1966. terni 2. sess.l.
vol.3. p.573; B. Boraii. 18.2.1967. terni 2, sess.2. vol.13. p.396; I. Inönii, 22.1.1970, terni 3. sess.l.
vol.2. p.290: S. Orkunt, 24.5.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.393; in C'STD: M. Atakh. 31.1.1969, term
1. sess.8. vol.50-3, p.498; Göiiliihol in Karpat (ed.). op.cit., p.45; D. Sezer, Kamuoyu ye Dz
Politika. Ankara: AU. S.B.F. Yayiiu. 1972, pp.377. 414-415, 477; Ataöv. op.cit.. p.222; Orkunt,
Ol) .c i t .. pp.248-249: in Cumhiiriyet: M. Ok, "NATO Stratejisi ye Milli Strateji",
20.4.1968. Al-I. Uliiitii. "Tiirkiye ye NATO", 23.5.1968, A. Yildiz, "NATO, Ikili
An1ama1ar ye Bilinmesi Gereken Gerçekler", 12.2.1970; A. !pekçi, "Esnek
Mukabele Nedir?". Mzlliyet, 23.5.1970.
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new strategy protected the superpowers almost completely but did not provide
total security for Turkey. Under NATO planning large areas of eastern Anatolia
would he abandoned and the main defence line would be established along the
Zagros and Taurus mountain chains. Thus, the new doctrine left Turkey exposed
to aggression and made her a first target and forward front of a possible war. P.M
Demirel rejected all these claims in his press conference in February 1970: The
new nuclear balance made the change of strategy necessary. An aggressor could
not risk a niilitary operation against Turkey because it would result in a change in
the balance of Europe and the outbreak of a global war. The new NATO strategy
did not see Turkey as a dispensable area nor made any differentiation between the
centre and wings.47
4.5.9 Control of Nuclear Weapons
In connection with implications of the flexible response strategy, Turkish critics
argued that Turkey did not have the right to use nuclear weapons on its territory
but their presence attracted the Soviet threat. 47° In their opinion, the Soviet
Union could bomb the bases armed with nuclear weapons in case of a war with the
Western world or as a preventive strike. Or the United States could drag Turkey
into a war against her will by using nuclear weapons on Turkish territory, which
were not under the control of the Turkish government. 477 It was suggested that
either Turkish control should be established over nuclear weapons or all nuclear
weapons in Turkey should be withdrawn.478
DBB. February 1970. pp.120-121.
Fahir AriiiaoIu told the author that this was a Soviet propaganda. He argued that even if there
were no nuclear weapons in Turkey. the Soviet Union would still see Turkey as one of first targets
duiing a possible East-West confrontation because of her strategic position. Seyfi Talian rightly
pointed to the fact that the same critics of nuclear weapons severely condemned the withdrawal of
tiLe Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963.
Sever. op.eit.. pp.369. 377. 401, 414-415; Orkunt, op.cit., pp.248-249; Ataöv, op.cit., p.219: in
}tIA'ITD: M. Karinca. 24.2.1966. term 2, sess.1, vol.4. p.471, B. Boran, 5.1.1967, term 2. sess.2,
vol.11. pp.88-89: in C1umhuriyet: S. Orkunt, "Yine Ikili Anlamalar", 24.10.1967.
M. Ok. "Türkiye Nükleer Bir Hedef midir?", 6.10.1968; A . S . Esmer. "NATO
Cenderesi". Milliyet. 4.4.1968: N. Arda. "Tiirkiye'deki Amerikan Usleri",
Yori. 25.10.1966. p.7.
478 The RPP's NATO report in 1968 in Cumhuri yet. 8.2.1975: F. Güley. MMTD 24.2.1968. term
2. sess.3. vol.26. p.342. S. Koç, ibid., p.353; M. Atakh, CSTD 31.1.1969, term 1. sess.8. vol.50-3,
p.499.
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P.M. Dernirel answered these claims in his press conference: Nuclear weapons
in Turkey were defensive and short-range, and could not be used without Turkey's
consent because they were subjected to the double-key system. The launching
devices of weapons and their use after a NATO decision were entirely in the hands
of Turkish personnel. Nuclear weapons in Incirlik which were not subjected to
the double-key system could only be used with the decision of the NATO Council
in which Turkey had the power of veto. Military installations in Turkey did not
constitute a threat for Turkey or its enemies but they were legitimate defence bases
providing additional deterrence.479
From the beginning Turkey had accepted the close supervision of nuclear
weapons by the United States and appreciated the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of
1954.480 But in the 1960s to counter the possibility that their allies might not
come to their help in case of an aggression Turkish military planners demanded
an increased role in the planning and decision for the use of nuclear weapons. The
Turkish General Staff insisted that one of the revolving seats in the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group established by NATO in December 1966 should be allocated to Turkey.
The Turkish government requested placing of nuclear mines in the eastern Turkish
border hoping that the United States would relax the system of dual control im-
posed on nuclear arms. But when it was realised that the legal limits of the U.S.
system precluded any effective surrender of U.S. control, Turkish rulers dropped
the matter officially in May 1969.481 Thus, they did not obtain any concrete results
on the control of nuclear weapons which they could use against public criticism.
4.5.10 Bilateral Agreements
Starting at the end of 1965 Turkish public opinion expressed intense criticism of
the U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements for the following reasons: 1- Bilateral agree-
ments did not have any legal basis since they were not approved by the Turkish
Parliament. 2- They were not related to NATO arrangements but mainly served
U.S. interests. 3- They included articles which gave the United States excessive
" DBB. February 1970. pp.103 . 110, 124-126.
480 Collins. op.cit.. p.4.
481 Harris. op.rit.. pp.152-153.
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rights at the expense of Turkey's independence, security and economic develop-
inent. 4- The United States had complete control over military installations based
on bilateral agreements, Turkish authorities had no power to check them. 482 There
were widespread calls among Turkish critics for abolition or at least reconsideration
of bilateral agreements.
Turkish rulers coul1tered accusations by claiming that under the 1961 constitu-
tion bilateral agreements did not need to be approved by the Turkish Parliament
and stating that if they really had violated Turkey's interests, the previous govern-
ments would have made some changes in them. As for military bases, they were
Turkish territories, belonged to Turkey and Turkish authorities had the power to
check them at any time. They were established for defensive purposes under NATO
arrangements and did not serve a particular country.483
Under strong domestic pressure, the Demirel government asked the United
States on 7 April 1966 to open negotiations to review and bring up to date exist-
ing bilateral arrangements. Washington accepted the proposal on 18 April 1966.484
Turkish rulers generally admitted that there were some gaps and mistakes in bilat-
eral arrangements that needed to be corrected. 485 P.M. Demirel stated in his press
conference: "For over ten years preceding 1965 there were scattered agreements
482 lii MMTD: M.A. Aybar, 7.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, pp.176, 179, R. l3aykal. term 2,
sess.1. vol.4. pp.462.463, K. Esengin, 12.4.1967. term 2, sess.2, vol.16, p.78, B. Boran. 20.2.1968,
term 2. spss.3. vol.25, p.472; in C'STD: H.O. Bekata, 27.6.1967, term 1, sess.6. vol.42, p.20,
S. Ural, 4.2.1968. term 1, seas.7, vol.45-3, p.452; Sezer. op.cit., pp.342. 368, 369. 399, 400-
404. 406: the RPP's NATO report in Cumhurz yet, 8.2.1975; M. Gönliibol, "Turkiye ye
Ikili And1ama1ar", Milliyet, 12.7.1969; D. Avciolu, "Tllrkiye'deki Amerikan
Usleri", Yön. 25.11.1966. pp.8-9: the author's interview with F. Arniaoglu; I. Selcuk, "Su
Aci Gerçek". Currihuriyet, 26.11.1965, p.2, E. celik, Tiirkiye'nin Dm Politika Tar-
ihi. Istanbul, 1969. p.159. Seyfi Tahaii told the author that Turkey gave some concessions to the
USA oti the control of military bases because of her general security lntere8ts but she did not have
the technological capacity to control them even if she was allowed to do so. Former Turkish foreign
iidnister Osinaii Olcay made the more or less same comment.
483 In M7V[TD: P.M. S. Demirel. 8.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, pp.257-258, Defence Minister A.
Topalohmi. 24.2.1966. tcrni 2, sess.1, vol.18, p.490, Foreign Minister calayaiigil. 17.2.1967, term 2
sc.',s.2. vol.13, pp.366-367. 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3. vol.25, p.489; DBB, June 1968, pp.39, 41.
484 TIme Turkish government's press release on 3 July 1969, the Il/fiddle East Journal. Winter
1970, vol.24, p.72. See Appendix F.
485 Foreign Minister çalayangu, .1VIM TD, 6.1.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.11. pp.126, 128, ibid., 19.2.1969,
termil 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.'78, F. Slikan, CSTD, 27.6.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.42, p.21, the govern-
imient's white paper, DBB, November 1966. p.63, the author's interview with former Turkish
foreign minister U. Haluk Bayiilken.
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concluded by several authorities not based on any principles. We were up against
a practice whose legal grounds and content were not known and which led to great
difficulty and complaints." 486
 According to Harris, former U.S. official, through
reconsideration of bilateral agreements,
The Turkish civilian authorities sought essentially a thoroughgoing reaffirmation
of Turkish sovereignty and control over every facet of military co-operation with the
United States. To obviate recurrent criticism that some American activities in Turkey
fell outside the bounds of NATO, the Ankara authorities wished the agreement to state
sj)ecifically that all joint defeiise co-operation would take place pursuant to the NATO
Pact and within the limits of NATO commitments. The Turkish side wanted to establish
for the record its right to have full and detailed knowledge before granting permission
for uiy American activity... The Ankara government felt an overriding concern to
demonstrate that the United States did not operate these facilities as a sovereign lesee,
but rather shared them with Turkey for mutually beneficial purposes.487
According to statements of Turkish rulers, officials of the Turkish Foreign Min-
istry and the General Staff, working together, reviewed all bilateral agreements
with the United States,488 prepared a basic draft agreement including general prin-
ciples on which bilateral accords should be based and submitted it to the U.S.
Embassy on 8 September 1966. After the Americans made their own preparations
Turkish Foreign Ministry and U.S. Embassy representatives started negotiations
officially on 20 Jaiivary 1967.489 Turkish authorities occasionally informed Turk-
ish public opinion of developments on the matter. 49° In his various speeches to
parliament, Foreign Minister çalayangi1 read out the general principles on which
U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements would be based. 49 ' Given the diverse nature of
arrangements and the sensitivity of the problem, the pace of negotiations proved
extremely slow. Many technical questions arose; the removal of files and related
officials by the 1960 regime, the status of verbal understandings, Turkish expec-
tation of additional aid, the absence of the U.S. ambassador for some time and
changing some agreements completely caused delay.492
486 DBB, February 1970. p.106.
"	 Harri• J',oahlcd Aihance, oI).cit.. pp. 160-161, 162.
4 The author's interview with U.H. Bayülken.
489 çg1ayaiigil. CSTD. 1.2.1967, term 1. sess.6, vol.38-3. p.377; çaglayaiigil, MMTD, 19.2.1969,
terul 2. sess.4. vol.34. p.T7; Demnirel's press conference, DBB, February 1970, p.104; Orkunt,
op.Cit.. pp.257-258: Tunçkanat. op.cit., pp.302, 304.
490 GöiiIübol et al.. op.cit., pp.528-529, Sezer, op.cit., 	 .524-527, DBB, April 1967. p.84.
491 MMTD. 6.1.1967. term 2. sess.2, vol.11, pp.125-126; DBB, JanuarY 1967, p.73; MMTD,
20.2.1968, ternl 2. sess.3, vol.25. p.489 Vail, op.cit., pp.139-140.
492 Harris, op.cit.. pp.161-163. Vail, op.cit.. p.139.
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After two years and four months of extensive and detailed negotiations, on
3 July 1969 Turkish Foreign Minister calayaigi1 and U.S. Ambassador William
J. Handley signed the Defence Co-operation Agreement in Ankara. 493 The agree-
meiit, which was kept secret from the public under the 1961 constitution, replaced
the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, revised some of the bilateral agreements
and attempted to clarify others. It was to be supplemented by individual accords
to govern each U.S. activity or facility in Turkey. The Turkish government's press
release on 3 July 1969 and P.M. Demirel's press conference on 7 February i97O
gave general information about the agreement and cited its basic principles: No
action could be taken from installations without Turkey's consent. Turkey retained
property rights of the areas allotted to joint defence installations. Turkish author-
ities had the full control over and the right to inspect them and to assign their own
military or civil personnel to these areas. The Turkish government would be able
to restrict American utilisation of bases in the event of a national emergency. The
joint management and utilisation principle would be applied in these installations.
The 1969 Agreement was the most important effort of Turkish rulers to gain
initiative in their military relations with the USA. The published general principles
of the agreement showed that they were quite successful in this regard. However,
one cannot reach a conclusion because military agreements between the USA and
Turkey remained classified. The tone of the general principles leads to the comment
that efforts of Turkish authorities were largely directed to appeasing public opinion.
The new arrangement was not satisfactory to the mainly leftist anti-American
groups49° but it was more acceptable to moderates. 497 Opposition parties called
for a debate and approval of the agreement by parliament; when the government
chose not to seek parliament's approval, the opposition heavily criticised it.498
4°3 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969-1970, vol.17, p.23484.
For the text see the Middle East Journal, Whiter 1970, vol.24, pp.72-73, DBB, July 1969,
pp.30-35. Appendix F.
For the text see DBB, February 1970, pp.98-139, for its English translation see Harris. op.cit.,
pp.229-238. Appendix G.
496 Tiinçkaiiat. op.cit., p.324.
°' Fahir Arinaoglu told the author that with the 1969 Agreement Turkey established full sovereignty
over the l)LS('S.
498 N. Eriin, tvIMTD. 23.5.1970, terni 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.347.
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4.6 Other Matters
4.6.1 Detente
Although Turkish officials expressed their pleasure with the detente between
the two blocs, they had doubts over the West's attitude toward the Soviet camp.
They feared that the new approach would destroy the Western sensitiveness toward
the Soviet threat, would harm the consolidation of NATO and would encourage
communist expansionism. 40° Turkish authorities were particularly concerned about
the U.S. troop reduction in Europe in 1968 and subsequent strategic arms limita-
tion and mutual force reduction talks with the Eastern bloc because they thought
that Moscow could transfer its troops in Europe to the Turkish border.50°
4.6.2 Military Aid
Turkish defence planners felt that Turkey needed more U.S. aid to modernise
the Turkish military establishment. But there was already a wide divergence in
1966 between Turkish expectations and availability of U.S. military aid. In his
visit to Turkey in February 1966 the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence, John
McNaughtoii, proposed a five-year program of modernisation for Turkish armed
forces calling for 134 miliion dollars a year in U.S. aid starting in 1967. Turks
were unhappy about the amount of aid and its allocation between different forces.
Washington failed to meet even this level in the years following the first year.501
4.7 NATO Discussion in Turkish Politics in the 1960s
4.7.1 Views of Those Who Criticised NATO
The following remarks are typical of the criticisms made in Turkey at the
tirne:°
S. Drinirl. Büyük Tiirkiye. Istanbul: Dergah Yayuilari. 1975. pp.412-413.
°O Harris. op.cit.. pp.15O-151 U.H. Baylilken (Turkish foreign minister), "Turkey's Foreign
Policy". Foreign Policy. No.1. March 1973, p.70.
501 Harris. op.cit.. pp.153-160, Harris in Karpat(ed.), op.cit.. pp.65-66.
02 Tlws' criticisilis constitute public questioning of characteristics of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, which
were iiientioued in Chapter II.
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All Turkish armed forces were assigned to NATO and put under the command
of foreign generals. Even the most senior Turkish generals were under the command
of a NATO lieutenant-general. Turkey could not use its armed forces and military
equipment given by NATO for its national interests which fell outside of NATO
purposes. The Turkish Army was organised in accordance with NATO's interests
and defence strategy which did not suit Turkey's realities. After Turkey entered
NATO, all military equipment was bought from the United States, thus Turkish
forces became dependent on the U.S. in every aspect and the national defence
industry was destroyed. The present situation which restricted Turkey's freedom
of action was not compatible with Turkey's independence, sovereignty and national
defence. 503
 Turkey should develop a national force through her own resources to
create a local deterrence. The national defence industry should be developed and
a national defence strategy should be created.504
NATO did not arm the Turkish army with modern weapons and kept it below
the NATO standards. 505 Weapons which were given by NATO were outdated
and did not suit Turkey's defence requirements, their maintenance expenses were
high hut their fire-power was low. 500 NATO provided more military equipment for
503 Sezer. op.cit.. pp.267,268, 375,376, 379, 381,382, 413, 417; in MIvITD: H. Atainan, 9.1.1963,
term 1. sess.2. vol.10. p.655. A. Ouz, 7.9.1964, term 1. sess.3, vol.32, p.312, R. Baykal, 24.2.1966,
termim 2. scss.1, vol.4, pp.462.463, M. Karmca. ibid., pp.470,471. B. Boran, 5.1.1967, term 2, sess.2,
vol.11, p.87, B. Boran, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, pp.395-397, B. Boran, 24.2.1968. term
2. sess.3. vol.26. pp.358,359, I. Kabadayi, 19.2.1971, term 3, sess.2, vol.11, p.625; in CSTD: A.
Yildiz, 1.2.1967. term 1, sess.6. vol.38-3. p.356. H. Tunçkaiiat, ibid., pp.570,571; in Cumhuriyet:
I. Selcuk, "Maglup Devietler Gibi", 10.9.1964. "Ordunun Itildigi cikmaz",
23.2.1967, "Sjlahli Kuvvetler Problemi", 3.2.1969, the RPP's NATO's report, 8.2.1975;
Haul. op.cit.. p.171; the author's interview with Kamran maim. To counter these accusations Turk-
ish authorities claimed that Turkish forces were under Turkish control in the time of peace amid
WO1I1(1 coiiie under NATO's command in the event of a war to defend the region amid that Turkey
could u,,e its forces at. any time for its own interests as the Cyprus crises proved. See in AlIvITD:
S. Demirel. 9.11.1965. terni 2, sess.1. vol.1, p.288, Defence Minister A. Topalolu, 18.2.1967. term
2. sess.2. vol.13. p.412. S. Demuirel, 30.9.1968, term 2. sess.3. vol.28, .7i4, clayangil, 19.2.1969.
Lerimi 2. .sess.4. vol.34. p.76; in C'STD: A. Topaloglu. 3.2.1967, term 1. sess.6, vol.38-3, p.594.
Sezer. op.eit.. p.359. M. Karmca, JkIIVITD, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1. vol.4, p.471: B. Borami.
il)id.. p.573; A. Ymldiz, CSTD, 1.2.1965, terni 1. sess.4, vol.24-3, p.995; K. Esengin, "]VIilli
Ordu Ne Demektir?", Cumhuriyet, 9.2.1969; the RPP's NATO report, Cumh'urjyet,
8.2.1975. For this purpose the Turkish press and other groups organised fund-raising campaigns
which gamed the support of the government. See Harris, op.cit., p.154, S. Bölükbai, Superpow-
ers arid the Third World. New York: University Press of America. 1988. p.123.
Sezer. op.cit.. PP• 376-377. 381, 414, 423. 473-474, B. I3oran, 11/IIVITD, 17.2.1969, term 2. scss.4.
vol.33. p.404. FEalil. op.cit.. p.17l, A.H. Ulman. "Turk Ulusal Savunmasi Uzerine
Diiiince1er". SBF Dergisi. vol.21, No.4, December 1966, p.205.
°° B. Borami. JIIIVJTD. 18.2.1967. term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.395; Ulman. op.cit.. pp.203-2O5. The
119
Greece than it provided for Turkey, and thus changed the balance between the two
countries' military power in favour of Greece.507 NATO, specifically the United
States, did not provide enough military and economic aid in comparison with
Turkey's contribution to NATO and responsibilities which she undertook within
the alliance. 508 For NATO, Turkey maintained the second largest military force in
terms of numbers in the alliance by using her limited resources which should be
allocated for economic development, put her survival under threat, paid for salaries
of U.S. personnel and maintenance of NATO installations while not receiving any
reI1t, etc.50°
As the Cyprus crises and the Johnson letter proved, NATO did not provide
total security for Turkey and did not protect her from a Soviet attack. 51 ° Article
V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which called upon members to help the member
under attack, was too flexible to require automatic aid of NATO. 51 ' Events showed
coiumeiit of David C. Jones. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a Senate hearing:
Over the years. the Turkish Armed Forces have been equipped almost totally with arms and
e(11ip1I1e11t that were being phased out of U.S. and NATO inventories. Due to lack of replacements,
Turkey has been compelled to keep in its inventory World War II and Korean vintage arms and
eql1i)n1e11t far beyond their scheduled phase out. M-47 tanks, F-84, F-lao and F-102 aircraft, and
ships over 30 years old are but a few examples." The Military Aspects of Banning Arms
Ad to Turkey: hearing before the Committee on Armed Services; U.S. Senate, 95th Congress,
2iid session. Juiie 28, 1978. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p.45.
Sezer, 01).Cit.. pp.473-474. y • çetiner, "Atina Ankara'ya Tercih Edildi", Cumhurzyet,
29.4.1965.
508 Ik[MTD: F. Güley. 21.2.1962, term 1. sess.1, vol.3. p.92; A. Tahtakthc, ibid., p.142: Z. Dorman,
2.1.1963. term 1, sess.2, vol.10, pp.516-Si7; H. Atanian, 9.1.1963, ibid., pp.655-656; A. Ouz,
11.1.1963. terni 1, sess.2, vol.11. p.71; S. Koç. 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.387.
509 Sezer. op.eit., pp.377. 379,381; F. Güley, IVIIVITD. 21.2.1962. op.cit., p.92; A. Ouz, MIvITD,
11.1.1963, op.ciL. p.71; I. Selcuk "Kolombun Yumurtasi", Cumhuriyet, 31.8.1964.
p.2. The remark of the U.S. Commander in Chief in NATO in 1978, Alexander Haig: "Turkey has
historically and traditionally contributed at a relative level above the overall NATO average and at
as much as twice tIme rate of some NATO forces. This created a drag on their economic development
('flort'...... the IV[ilitary Aspects.... op.cit.. p.17. For ideas claiming that it cost the Americans
l(sS to buy security from the Turks than to produce it at home see E.N. Botsas. "The U.S.
Cyprus Turkey Greece Tetragon; the Economics of an Alliance",
Journal of Political and Military Sociology. vol.16. No.2, Fall 1988. pp.252-253, G.E.
Gruen. "Ambivalence in the Alliance...", ORBIS, vol.24, No.2, Summer 1980.
p.368 B. Ayres. "Turkish Foreign Relations", Khamsin, No.11, pp.119, 120. Turkish
rulers stated that even if Turkey were not in NATO, she had to keep the size of her army for her
defence: Defence Minister I. Sancar, MMTD, 14.1.1963. term 1. sess.2. vol.11, p.111. Foreign
Minister ctglayLngil's speech in the budget committee, DBB, January 1969, p.37, I.S. caglayangil.
"NATO ye Türkiye", Milliyet, 8.4.1968.
5)0 Sezer. op.cit., pp.164-l65. 376. 413-414, 422-423; in IVJIt'ITD: A. Ouz, 7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3,
vol.32. p.312; B. l3oran, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3. pp.572-573; R. Baykal, 24.2.1966, ibid.,
1)462; B. J3oran. 24.2.1968. term 2. sess.3, vol.26. pp.358, 360.
511 1. !miöiiii, MMTD, 22.1.1970. term 3, sess.1, vol.2. pp.290-291; H. Tunckaiiat, cSTD. 3.2.1967,
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that the United States interpreted Article V differently from Turkey. 512 As was
seen during the Cyprus crises, NATO restricted Turkey's freedom of action and
decision in her national causes. 513
 Loyalty to NATO and looking at events from
NATO's point of view made Turkey's foreign policy inflexible and alienated her
from Muslim Arab countries and the Third World and thus deprived her of their
votes in the United Nations.514
Turkey was not able to act independently within NATO, it had no say in
NATO organs which decide and implement policies. 515
 Turkey's membership in
NATO could drag her into a war between the military blocs which was unrelated
to her national interests. 516
 The United States kept NATO under her control,
determined its strategies and policies and used it for her own interests.517
terni 1, sess.6. vol.38-3, pp.570-571; B. Boran, "NATO Nedir ye Ne Degildir?",
VIzlliget. 5.4.1968. Coninienting on the absence of NATO's automatic aid, P.M. Deniirel said in
his press conference: "In a collective security system formed by independent and sovereign states
the agreenteilts could not have been otherwise. Like Turkey, other NATO countries are also tied
by the provisions of their constitutions and the will of their parliaments... But NATO has taken
5011W measures to counter this shortcoming." DBB, February 1970, p.130.
512 Collitis cites in his report: State Department interpretations submit that shape, extent and timing
of U.S. responses "would in the final analysis depend on the nature of the attack, the defensive
capacity of the state or states attacked, and other relevant circumstances." According to State
Departuieiit authorities Article V will be inoperative if Greece attacked Turkey. or vice versa, since
it "does not cover an attack by one NATO member on another." Collins, op.cit., p.3 and 3n. See
also the statement of Rodger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, in 1970 in this regard
in Unitcd States Security Agreements..., op.cit., pp.1771, 1855.
Sezer. op.cit.. pp.164. 374, A.H. Ulmnan, "Ulusal Savunmamizm Sorunlari", Gumhuriyet,
15.2.1967. p.2. A.H. Ulman, "Türkiye ye NATO", SBF Dergzsi. vol.12, December 1967,
Sezer. op.cit., p.380, Eren, op.cit., p.20, I. Selcuk, "NATO", Cumhurzyet, 11.9.1965, p.2.
515 i• Selcuik. "NATO'ya Girelim", cumhuriyet. 20.6.1973, p.2. Turkish rulers claimed
that Turkey acted independently within the NATO framework. As an example, in October 1968
she refused to allow the Orient Express inanoeuvres to be held along the Syrian border. Vali,
op.cit.. p.136. They stated that Turkey had equal rights with the other members in all organs
of the alliamice and had a role in policy making and implementing. Foreign Minister F.C. Erkin,
MMTD, 9.1.1963. term 1, sess.2. vol.10, pp.629-630, Defence Minister I Sancar, MMTD.
14.1.1963. term 1. sess.2, vol.11, p.111, the author's interview with Kamran man.
510 Sczer. op.cit.. pp.377. 422; Eren, op.cit.. p.20; in IVIIVITD: M. Karinca, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1,
vol.4. pp.469.470. B. Boran. 5.1.1967. term 2, sess.2, vol.11, p.89, B. Boran. 24.2 : 1968 , term 2,
.sess.3. vol.26. p.363, I. Jnömiü, 22.1.1970, terni 3, sess.1, vol.2, p.292; in 	 umh'uriyet: A.H.U1-
"Ian. "Turk-Amerikan Ihki1eri", 25.11.1966, p.2,1. Selçuk, "NATO Guvenligimizi
Sagliyor mu?", 2 1.7.1967. p.2. Turkish authorities claimed that NATO could not drag Turkey
into a war against her wishes because decisions in the NATO Council were taken unanimously.
cain,ytmigirs stateineuit to Bayram Gazetesi on 13 March 1968. DBB, March 1968. p.43. Vali,
op.cit.. P
.135. clayauigil, MIi.ITD, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.489, the author's interview
with Osmnaii Ol(ay.
517 Se'/.er. op.cit., pp.37 .l.375, 379.382, 402, 413, 416; Ataöv, op.cit., p.221; in lt'IIIvITD: A. Oguz.
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The necessity of keeping an alliance with the West could not he explained
by the Soviet threat. Turkey had resisted the post-war Soviet pressures alone
without receiving any help from the West. 518
 The Soviet Union could not dare
to attack Turkey since such an action would bring great dangers for her." 9
 The
Soviet Uiiion was no longer a threat' 2° or only threat for Turkey 52 ' or its danger
decreased greatly. 522
 Turkey sl1ould determine its defence policy considering other
threats as well, take great care not to provoke the Russians 523 and improve her
relations with the Eastern bloc countries.
4.7.2 Views of Those Who Defended Turkey's NATO Connection
Turkish politicians, colunmists and academics who believed that Turkey should
continue to be a member of NATO voiced the following ideas which explain impor-
tance of the USA and NATO for Turkey's security quite well: The Soviet Union
was a close threat for Turkey as it had been in the past. The recent events such as
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet involvement in
the Middle East and the Soviet naval penetration into the eastern Mediterranean524
demonstrated that the Soviet policy of expanding her territory and sphere of influ-
ence had not undergone any substantial change. Since Turkey was located within
the expansion zone of the Soviet Union and since she was not capable of meeting
the Soviet expansion with her own resources, Turkey needed the alliance of NATO
to balance the Soviet power.' 2 ' Turkey could not remain outside the conflict of
7.9.1964. terni 1. sess.3, vol.32, p.312. B. Boran, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.360; ç. Ozek,
"Turkiye Amerika NATO", Mzllzyet, 13.9.1964. Turkish rulers rejected the claim
that NATO was under the control of the U.S. by stating that all important decisions in NATO
were taken by the Council in which every member had the power of veto. P.M. Demirel, MMTD,
9.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, p.288, the author's interview with Kamran I,,an.
518 Sezer. op.cit., pp.271, 403, 461-462.
510 B. Boraji, MMTD. 17.2.1967. term 2, sess.2, vol.13. p.3-tG, D. Avcioglu, "Di Politika
Tabulari", Yön, 25.3.1966, p.3. A.H. Ulnian. "Ulusal Savunmamizin Sorun-
lan". Cumhuri yet, 8.2.1967, p.2.
520 Sezer, op.cit.. pp.459-460. 462.
521 Ibid.. pp.375 - 376 . 413, 423, B. Boran, MMTD, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3. p.572.
529 Sezer, op.cit.. pp.269, 416, 420.
523 Iii MtVI TD: B. BoralL, 5,1.1967, term 2, sesa.2, vol.11. p.88. B. Boraii, 17.2.1969, term 2, ses.4,
vol.33. p.408.
524 Stearns, Entangled Allies, op.cit., pp.64-65.
525 Gönliibol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit.. pp.47.48; Vali, op.cit., p.375; Sezer, op.cit., pp.426,427. 444-
445. 449-451. 464.465: F. Arn,aohi, "Turkey and the United States: A New
Alliance". The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations. vol.6. 1965, p.12; in
122
superpowers because she was located in a strategically important area; geopolitical
and historical factors compelled her to join a defence pact (NATO). 526 She did not
have enough economic and military power and other elements to be able to pursue
a neutralist policy; neutrality did not suit Turkey's interests for the time being.527
NATO brought restrictions and responsibilities for Turkey as it did for the
other members, 528 but its benefits were much greater. NATO provided security for
its members including Turkey since it was established. 529 It maintained balance of
power and peace in Europe, 53° it forced the Soviet Union to pursue more moderate
policies 53 ' and to renounce her demands on Turkey. 532 NATO continued to be the
most important guarantee of Turkey's defence, deterring her enemies.
NATO provided Turkey with military aid in the form of arms equipment,
ammunition, repair parts, construction projects, training and miscellaneous ser-
vices. 533
 From the financial point of view, Turkey's benefits from NATO were
far superior to the value of her contribution to the alliance. 534
 If Turkey did not
receive the NATO aid, she could not have maintained a well-disciplined modern
Il'JMTD: l.S. calayaiigil. 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3, p.592, I. Sarigöz, 24.2.1966, term 2,
scss.1. vol.4. pp.476-4'17, S. Koç, 18.2.1967, term 2. sess.2, vol.13, p.396, 1. Sarigöz, 17.2.1969. term
2. s'ss.4, vol.33. p.412, Y. Menderes, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.64; A. Kabakh, "NATO'dan
cikmak, çikmamak", Tercürnan, 27.5.1968.
520 Vali. op.cit., i)p.38l -382 ; Sezer, op.cit., pp.427, 432, 451, 462-463; in MIvITD: I. Sarigöz,
24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, pp.476-477; S. Koc, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.387. S.A.
Emnrc. 24.2.1968. term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.396. C. Kirca, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.56; C.S.
B.trlas. "Di Politika ile Oynanmaz", Cumhuriyet, 13.9.1964, p.2.
527 Sezer. op.cit., pp.302-3O3, in MIt'ITD: N. Eriui, 9.1.1963. term 1, sess.2, vol.10. p.648, R. Baykal,
24.2.1966, term 2. sess.1, vol.4. p.463. I.S. çaglayangil, 17.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.36'?;
Ariminoglu. "Turkey and the United States...", op.cit., p.13; Sezer in Alford(ed.).
op.cit.. l).83, time author's interview with Osnian Olcay.
528 The authors interview with U. Haluk Bayülken.
.529 Gziliihol in Karpat(ed.). op.cit.. p.48; I. Giritli. Neden NATO'ya Evet?, Istanbul: Ak
Yayinlarm. 1968. pp.12, 51; C. Bahan, "NATO'ya Hayir", Cumhurz yet, 22.2.1972. p.2;
in !iiIVITD: S. Demnirel. 9.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, p.28'?, N. Diler, 19.2.1969, term 2, 8ess.4,
vol.4. p.61. T. Feyziolim, 23.5.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.341.
530 Vali. op.cit.. pp.162. 163; President C. Sunay's speech in White House on 3 April 1967, Amerika 'da
Onbir Gin. op.cit., p.2G; I.S. caglLymii1gil. "NATO ye Turkiye", Mzlliyet, 8.4.1968.
531 Sezer. op.cit.. PP
.416 . 464, C. Kirca, MMTD, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.450.
Sezer. op.cit.. pp.432, 442-443, 464, A. Kabakh, "Yine NATO", Tercuman, 14.12.1967.
53 Collins, op.cit.. p.4, F.C. Erkin, MMTD, 9.1.1963. term 1, sess.2, vol.10. p.630, Botsas, op.cit.,
p.252. the author's interview with U.H. Bayfllken.
1'iirkeys quota in NATO for the cost sharing is 1.1 percent. Vali, op.cit., p.124, S. Orkunt,
MMTD, term 3, sess.4, vol.34, p.443.
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army 535 and she would have to spare more resources for her defence, cutting down
her economic development efforts. 53° Since Turkey could not maintain her defence
with her own resources she had to rely on the assistance of NATO.537
Through her membership in NATO, Turkey became a part and an equal mem-
ber of the West. She benefited greatly from consultation, discussion and exchange
of views in various subjects among Western powers. 538 Within the NATO frame-
work, Turkey was continuing her political, economic and cultural relations with
the West in a better way. 539 Due to her membership of NATO, Turkey obtained
information about modern warfare and equipment. Her general staff gained expe-
rience and first-hand knowledge through participating in discussions and exercises
at high levels. 540 Turkey could better defend her interests and national causes and
influence international developments by remaining in NATO, thus participating
political and defence discussions and decisions of NATO.54'
NATO membership could also dissuade the United States, which had naturally
different interests in the region than Turkey, from taking forceful actions against
her. If Turkey was not a NATO member, the United States could directly threaten
her on the Cyprus issue. 542 If Turkey left NATO, the balance of power between
Turkey and Greece would lean in favour of Greece and the Turkish stand on the
Cyprus question would be weakened. NATO aid to Greece would be to the dis-
advantage of Turkey, and Western powers were more likely to support the Greek
cause on Cyprus.543
Göiiliibul hi Karpat(ed.), op.cit.. p.49; Sezer. op.cit., p.445; Vali, op.cit., p.124; in TerciLman:
A. Kahakli, "Yine NATO", 14.12.1967, "Nicin NATO'dayiz?". 25.5.1968.
0 \iah. Op.Cit.. p.162; Sezer. op.cit., pp.445-446; i.s. çalayangil, "NATO ye Türkiye".
Mzll?yet. 8.4.1968: in MMTD: ça)aygn, 19.2.2909, term 2. sees.4. -oL34. &f. t?u,
19.2.1971. turin 3, scss.2, vol.11, p.621.
Sezer. op.rit.. pp.421 . 439, 445. 451; in MMTD: j .S. çaglaygil, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1. vol.3,
p. 592. A. Topaloglu. 24.2.1966, term 2. sess.1, vol.4. p.489, çalayangil, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3,
vol.25, p.481.
538 Vali. op.cit.. pp.124-125.
39 j.S. clayaitgi1. MMTD, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.75.
540 Eren. op.cit.. pp.48-49; F.C. Erkin. MMTD, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.630; S. Orkunt,
"NATO, Milli Güvenlik ye Otesi". Cumhuriyet, 10.4,1968, p.2.
541 Eren. op.cit.. p.49: iii MMTD: C. Kirca, 19.2.1969, terns 2, sess.4, vol.34. p.57, T. Feyziolu,
22.1.1970, term 3. sess.1, vol.2. p.297, the author's interview with U.H. Bayülken.
542 The author's interview with U.H. Bayülken and Osman Olcay.
Giiulübol hi Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.4849; Vali, op.cit., p.161; S. Orkunt, "NATO, Milli
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The NATO discussion in Turkish domestic politics had been iiiitiated by radical
leftist groups, organisations, students and scholars, and the Turkish Labour Party
members, who wanted Turkey's complete withdrawal from NATO on the 20th
anniversary of NATO's establishment, that is 1969. The reformist slightly leftist
part of Turkish public opinion supported the idea that Turkey should reduce her
participation in NATO and disengage herself from the United States. 545
 Liberal,
pro-Western critics saw NATO as a necessity for Turkey and stated that Turkey's
defence ties with the West should be maintained provided that present mistakes in
Turkey's relations with NATO and the United States were corrected. 546
 Rightists
and extreme rightists supported Turkey's NATO and U.S. connection for reasons
of Turkish self-interest and security and fear of communism; they accused critics
of NATO of trying to make Turkey a satellite of the Soviet Union."7
All opposition parties except the TLP were in favour of Turkey's membership
of NATO on the condition that relations should be revised. 548
 The major opposi-
tion party, the Republican People's Party, commissioned a panel chaired by Nihat
Erim to report to the party's top policy organ on NATO. The committee's report in
spring 1967 weighed the pros and cons of Turkey's NATO membership and recom-
mended that Turkey retain its NATO ties but with substantial change. The RPP's
formal policy paper which was released to the public in July 1967 approved the
committee's recommendations by watering down the criticism of NATO. 549 RPP
leader Isinet Inönü, in his various speeches, expressed his support for Turkey's
NATO connection provided that Turkey did not pursue policies which would pro-
voke any of the superpowers. 55° All the Turkish governments from 1960 to 1971
Güvenlik ye Otesi", Curnhttri'jet. 10.4.1968, p.2; A. pekci, "NATO Sorunu",
Milliyet, 20.5.1970; T. Feyzioghi, MMTD, 23.5.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.343.
Harris. 1972, op.cit.. p.141, Sezer. op.cit., pp.331. 342, 379, Vail, op.cit.. p.103.
Vail, op.cit.. p.102.
546 Ibid.. p.101, Sezer, op.cit.. PP•275' 282 . 284, 384. 387, 415, 417, 463, S. Orkuiit, "NATO, Milli
Güvenlik ye Otesi", Curnh.uriyet, 11.4.1968, p.2.
7 Vali. op.cit.. p.104. Sezer, op.cit.. pp.428, 447, 450, A. Kabakh, "NATO III", Terciirnan,
15.12.1967.
548
	
	 MMTD: S. Koç, 24.2.1968. term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.353. S.A. Emre, ibid., p.357, 0. Bölükbai,
19.2.1969. tCrlfl 2. scss.4, vol.34, p.41.
Harris. op.cit.. pp.141-142, Vail, op.cit., pp.160-161, Sezer, op.cit., pp.340-341, cumhuriyet,
10.7.1968. p.7, 8.2.1975.
55° Vali. op.cit.. p.83. 1.	 önü, MMTD, 12.3.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.3, p.449. cumhuri yet,
19.10.1966. p.7, 14.1.1968, p.7, 6.10.1968. p.7, 2.4.1970. pp.1,7.
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promised that tl1ey would strengthen Turkey's relations with NATO. 551 With the
help of some factors such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, change in France's
adamant position within NATO with the fall of De Gaulle and Inönü's stand in
favour of NATO, the NATO discussion on Turkish politics lost its momentum after
1969552 and opimon polls showed that the majority of Turkish people supported
Turkey's membership of NATO.553
It should he noted that ideas of both critics and supporters of Turkey's NATO
connection carried some correct points and their discussion helped the Turkish
governments assess their defence policies more realistically. The one who sees the
content of the Johnson letter which was mentioned previously in the chapter cannot
help appreciating criticisms directed toward Turkey's alliance with the USA and
NATO. Turkish critics were right in stating that security could not be entrusted
oniy to NATO. It was obvious that interests of NATO and Turkey could clash
with each other in some matters or NATO might decide not to come Turkey' help
in case of attack for different reasons. Turkey itself had to ensure its security
by taking measures, including inodernising its army which was equipped with
outdated weapons at that time. On the other hand, NATO was certainly a great
guarantee for Turkey's security, contributing to different aspects of its defence. Any
alliance would bring costs and problems as well as benefits, the important thing
was to find the right balance and Turkey could do it by staying within NATO. One
important point is that many aspects of Turkey's alliance with NATO, which were
subjected to criticism, were hidden in secret arrangements, therefore one could not
make any judgernents on these issues.
551 i Arar, Iliikümet Programlart, !stanbul: Burcak Yaymevi, 1968, pp.3l1-312, 339-340, 369,
399. 424. 479. 487.
552 Harris, op.cit.. pp.142-143.
Vali. op.eit.. pp.112-113, Eren, op.cit., pp.46-47, Böliikbai, op.cit., pp.122-123. In his report
to th' Congress. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers stated that the anti-American Turkish
l(fti5ts coiistituted very small percentage of Turkish population and that they targeted the Turkish
gow'rniiivnt as well as America. A BD Diileri Bakani Rogers 'in Kongreye Sunduu
Rapordan Bolumler. Ankara: Ainerikan Basiii ye Kültür Merkezi, 1972, p.3.
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4.8 Military Relations in the 1970s
4.8.1 The Arms Embargo
As a reaction to Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus i July and Au-
gust 1974, the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. With the
provisions of section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act entering into force on
5 February 1975, "all military assistance, all sales of defence articles and services
(whether for cash or by credit, or arty otl1er means), and all licences with respect to
the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war" to the Turkisil
government were suspended.555
Supporters of the arms embargo claimed that Turkey had violated U.S. law by
employing U.S. arms and equipment in its military intervention in Cyprus contrary
to the provisions of the agreements under which these arms had been sold to it.556
It was stated that U.S. failure to impose an embargo on Turkey would alienate
Greece, a strategically vital ally of the United States. 557 Some congressmen went
so far to say that the United States did not need Turkey any more because its
strategic value and benefits to NATO and the U.S. had sunk to almost zero.558
The U.S. administration opposed the arms embargo for the following strategic
reasons: 1- Turkey, whose strategic importance with respect to the Soviet Union
and the Middle East remained vital to the Western alliance, could be alienated
and consequently Turkey might seek non-NATO resources to satisfy its defence
The anus embargo issue wa.s also mentioned in Chapter VII in the context of the Cyprus question.
Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1979; Current Legislation and Re-
lated Executive Orders, vol.1, U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office. 1980. p.11 3.
Coi,loitmbis. op.cit., p.104. Campany, op.cit.. pp.75, 76. P.Y. Watanabe. Ethnic Groups,
Congress and American Foreign Policy, London: Greenwood Press, 1984, pp.113,114.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (PL 87-195) and the Military Sales Act of 1968 (PL 90-629)
stipulated that defence articles and services to any country should be furnished solely for internal
security and legitimate self-defence and that any substantial violation of these provisions should
relJ(lCl the violator imiiiediately ineligible for further assistance.
Couloumbis. op.cit.. p.104.
558 Sezer in Alford (ed.). op.cit.. p.63. Senator Walter Mondale's speech on the opium issue in S.
Tahian, "Turkey's Relations With the U.S.A. and Possible Future De-
velopments". Foreign Policy, vol.8. Nos.1-2, 1979. pp.20-21, Grueii, op.cit.. p.372.
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requirements. 550
 2- The suspension of the U.S. activities in some Turkish installa-
tions because of the embargo resulted in the loss of some intelligence information
on Soviet space, missile and military systems development, operations and train-
ing. It hampered the U.S. capability to develop countermeasures to Soviet weapons
systems under development and degraded intelligence acquisition used to monitor
and verify compliance with the SALT agreements. 56° 3- The embargo had impaired
the cohesion and strength of the south-eastern flank of NATO. 561 4- The fighting
capability, deterrent posture and material readiness of the Turkish armed forces
had been diminished and the Turkish NATO forces had been weakened. 562
 5- The
unavailability of Turkish ports for the U.s. 6th Fleet visits had created morale and
other problems for the fleet. 563 6- In the final analysis, the embargo had degraded
NATO's overall military capabilities and adversely affected U.S. national security
interests.564
The Turkish side responded sharply to the embargo, stating that the Congress
action constituted a unilateral violation of defence co-operation accords between
the two countries. 565 The embargo was perceived as a hostile act that undermined
the capability, preparedness and effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces. 566 On 25
July 1975 the Turkish government declared that the Defence Co-operation Agree-
ment of 1969 and all other related agreements had lost their legal validity and
that all U.S. installations in Turkey passed under the full control and custody of
the Turkish armed forces. The fncirlik air base was to be used only for direct
Couloninbis. op.cit.. pp.104-lO5; Cainpany. op.cit., p.77; the Military Aspects of Banning
Arms Aid to Turkey. op.cit.. pp.8, 62. In the latter reference, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance. Secretary of Defence Harold Brown. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David C. Jones,
Coniiiiaiicler iii Chief iii U.S. European Command Alexander Haig. five former supreiiie allied
coniiitanders and Colonel Phelps Jones preseiited arguments for the necessity of lifting the arms
eI1Il)argo.
The It'Iilitary Aspects.... op.cit., pp.8, 26, 48. 49. Watanabe, op.cit., pp.l09, 131, L. Stern,
the Wrong Horse. New York: Times Books, 1977, pp.152-154.
561 The Military Aspects. op.cit.. pp.4. 11.12, 15.
562 Ibid.. pp.4-5. 7. 9-10, 12. 23-24, 39. 48.
ii,d.. 1)48.
564 Ibid.. pp.4. 10. 62. Watanabe. op.cit., p.1O9.
5CC' J MJi'ITD: M. Altinsoy. 20.2.1975, term 4, sess.2. vol.9. p.369, 1. Miiftüolu. 21.2.1975. ibid.,
p.444, S. Oatiiik. ibid., p.452. H. Ulman, ibid.. p.457. Foreign Minister M. Esenbel. ibid.. p.46O.
Foreign Miiiistcr I.S. çalayaiigi1, 12.6.1975. term 4. sess.2, vol.12, p.579. H. Savaçi, 28.4.1976,
term 4. sess.2. vol.19, p.120: Prime Minister S. Irmak's statement in Gumhuriyet, 4.2.1975. p.7.
560 Sezer iii Alfird(ed.), op.cit.. p.66, B. Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies" in Al-
ford(ed.). op.cit.. p.137.
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NATO purposes. The decision also meant the suspension of operations at four
intelligence-collecting centres at Karamürsel, Sinop, Diyarbakir and Belbai.567
On 6 October 1975 the U.S. Congress partially lifted the arms embargo; it
exempted from the embargo military deliveries contracted for before the effective
day of the embargo, that meant arms worth 185 million dollars. 568 But the Turkish
administration did not allow the resumption of functioning of U.S. bases in return.
To complete the account of this important aspect of Turkish-American relations
and to see the period of our study in perspective it will now be necessary to go
beyond the 1975 cut-off point, so in the succeeding pages of this chapter we shall
include references to more recent developments.
According to the statement of U.S. Defence Secretary Harold Brown, between
1975 and 1979 Turkey was authorised credits of 425 million dollars under the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing Program. 509 In this period Turkey also
purchased U.S. military repair parts, maintenance services and spares totalling 31.2
million dollars through the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)57°
and received about 265 million dollars worth of military equipment from other
Western powers. 571
 On 26 March 1976 Turkey and the United States signed a
new Defence Co-operation Agreement, providing 800 million dollars in EMS and
200 million dollars in grant aid over a four-year period. But it was not approved
by the Congress and was never implemented. 572 On 26 July 1978 the U.S. Senate
voted to repeal the embargo, the House followed through on August 1. President
Carter signed the embargo repeal legislation on 26 September 1978, thus lifting
567 Curnhuriyet, 26.7.1975, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.151. Grinimett, op.cit., pp.43-44, the Military
Aspects.... op.ciL. pp.8. 72.
568 U.S. Public Law 94-104 in current Legislation.... op.cit., pp.247-249, Campany. op.cit., p.63,
Ri,stow. op.cit., p.lO4. Kuniiioim. "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., p.440.
569 The Alilitary Aspects.... op.cit., pp.2l-22, 32, Campany, op.cit., p.63, Kuniholin, op.cit.,
p.440. For tile detail('d information about the military equipment received by Turkey ill this
period see the Military Aspects.... op.cit., p.76.
570 The Military Aspects..., op.cit., pp.35, 48. 79.
571 jbid.. p.33.
572 Griinniett, op.eit., pp.44. 88-93(text), Coulounibis, op.cit.. p.l5l, Carnpaiiy, op.cit., p.63, Stern,
op.cit.. PP15-156
573 U.S. PL 95-384 in cuii-ent Legislation, op.cit., p.320.
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the embargo completely. On 9 October 1978 the Turkish government terminated
the suspension measures implemented in U.S. bases and facilities.574
On 29 March 1980 Turkey and the United States signed an updated Defence
and Economic Co-operation Agreement (DECA). 575 It was a five-year executive
agreement, renewable annually, which would implement the NATO treaty. The
United States undertook to provide defence equipment, services, and training to the
Turks; Turkey, in return, authorised the United States to maintain forces and carry
out military activities at specified installations. A U.S.-Turkish Joint Commission
was created as a mechanism for discussing how to use Turkey's resources for its
security objectives.
The arms embargo and suspension of functioning of military bases in Turkey
represented a serious cut-off on U.S.-Turkish military relations though the two
states renmained allies within NATO. The embargo did not achieve its original
declared aim, Turkish concessions on the Cyprus question, but it reminded the
Turks that their defence was heavily dependent on the United States. By nullifying
the 1969 agreement, the Turks showed that they were not merely a stooge of
the United States. But they could not save themselves entirely from military
dependence on the USA. U.S. imposed conditions on aid in the following years
continued to be a headache for Turkish authorities.
4.8.2 Use of Bases
The use of Turkish territory by the United States for non-NATO purposes
continued to be a sensitive issue in the U.S.-Turkish military relations in the
1970s and the 1980s. During the Arab-Israel war ill 1973, the Turkish govern-
ment announced again that the jncirlik airbase could not be used for non-NATO
purposes. 576
 Allegedly, at that time, Turkey permitted Soviet overflights and naval
transit through the Straits to resupply Egypt and Syria (normally the Soviet Union
has this right) 577
 but she did not allow the United States to use bases for direct
Cotilomuhis. op.cit.. p.106, Kuiiiholm. op.cit., p.42711.
675 For the texts of the snails agreement and supplementary agreements see Campany. op.cit.. pp.l03
123. Appendix H.
° (1urnhuriyet. 17.10.1973. p.7.
R.F. Griininett and E.B. Laipson, Turkey 's Problems and Prospects: implications
for U.S. Interests, Report Prepared for the Subcommittee n Europe and the Middle East of
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combat or logistical support though she permitted the Americans to use communi-
cations stations. 578 During the Iranian revolution in 1979 Turkey allowed the use
of bases for evacuation of U.S. citizens 579 but did not cooperate with the hostage
rescue mission to Iran in 1980 . 580 The use of the Incirlik base by U.S. planes to
attack Iraqi positions during the Gulf War of 1991 showed that the United States
could obtain the use of bases for non-NATO purposes if she really needed them.581
The Turkish government announced in 1979 that it would not permit U-2 flights
from Turkish territory as part of the proposed monitoring of SALT II agreement
unless the Soviet Union agreed. 582
 One controversial issue in the 1980s was the
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which was suggested by the Americans to be
used in emergency situations in the region. In October 1982, Turkey and the
United States signed a co-located operating bases agreement, providing for the
modernjsation of the ten Turkish airfields and the construction of two new ones
in eastern Anatolia. To counter rumours that the airfields could be used for a
Western intervention in the Gulf, Turkish authorities emphasised that the 1982
agreement had no connection with RDF and that the use of the airfields would be
limited to NATO missions.583
4.8.3 Turkish Perception of NATO
In the 1970s, all the Turkish parties which had members in parliament sup-
ported Turkey's membership of NATO provided that Turkey took measures to meet
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980, p.48, Senator Mandela's speech in Ta.han, op.cit., p.20. Gruen, op.cit., p.372,
J. Galen, "Turkey As a Self-Inflicted Wound...", Armed Forces Journal
International, June 1980, p.71.
578 Kuniholni, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit.. p.426.
57 Ibid., H. Binnendijk and A. Friendly, Turkey, Greece, and NATO: The Strained Al-
liance, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, March 1980, Wash-
iiigton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p.29.
580 Rustow, op.cit., p.113.
581 During the Gulf War NATO countries promised Turkey that if she came under attack because of
the use of the Incirlik base NATO would come to her help. The author's interview with Fahir
Armao1u.
582 Grueii, op.cit., p.376, M.M. Boll, "Turkey's New National Security Concept...",
ORBIS, Fall 1979, p.611, Binnendijk and Friendly, op.cit., p.12.
583 W. Hale, "Turkey, NATO, and the Middle East" in B. Lawless(ed.), For-
eign Policy in the Middle East. Durham: University of Durham, 1985, pp.57-58. Kumii-
liolm. "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., pp.438-439, G. Harris(ed.), The Middle East in
Turkish-A merzcan Relations, Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1985, p.ix.
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her security needs independent of NATO, was not dragged into conflicts unrelated
to her national interests, and maintained her freedom of decision and action.584
As a result of the American arms embargo, Turkish authorities became aware of
Turkey's dependence on the United States in terms of military equipment and
came to the conclusion that security could not be totally entrusted to their NATO
allies. 585 They developed a new national security concept aiming at expansion of
domestic defence industry for self-sufficiency in defence. 58° The REMO plan which
was created to modernise the Turkish armed forces and to manufacture weapons
at home was perceived as a step in this direction.587
Turkish rulers also expressed some adverse criticism of NATO: 588 Turkey's de-
pendence on one source (the U.S.) within NATO constituted a disadvantageous
position for Turkey's defence. NATO did not help Turkey to modernise her de-
fence structure in accordance with technological developments. Turkey had been
carrying too heavy a burden for NATO, allocating to NATO a proportionately
greater part of her national income and manpower than any other member. Turkey
had neglected her economy because of her defence burden. Turkey's contribution
to NATO should be equal to NATO's contribution to Turkey's security and her
position in NATO should not provoke her neighbours.
In the 1970s Turkey seemed more eager to develop relations with the Soviet
Union and her other neighbours, creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence.589
Although she did not purchase any Soviet military equipment she received from
the Soviet Union economic aid worth 650 million dollars between 1974 and 1979.°
Eren, op.cit., p.47; in JVIIvITD: LF. Cuma1to1u, 21.5.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.4, p.527, S. Selek,
ibid.. p.530, Defence Minister H.E. Iik, ibid., p.550, H. Ulman, 22.5.1974, ibid., p.625, Foreign
Minister T. Güne, ibid., p.630, Prime Minister B. Ecevit, 3.7.1974, term 4, 8e88.1, vol.6, pp.363-
364, H. Ulman, ibid., p.430, A. Akarca, 21.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9, p.'454, H. Sava4çl, 13.5.1976,
term 4, sess.3, vol.19, p.496.
585 Sezer in Afford (ed.), op.cit., pp.66, 67.
580 Boll, op.cit., pp.613-614, P.M. B. Ecevit's statements in Eren, op.cit., p.50, I. Gürkari, NATO,
Turkey and the Southern Flank, New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980,
p.36.
587 In IvIMTD: M. Altinsoy, 20.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9, p.368, H. Savaci, 13.5.1976, term 4,
sess.3, vol.19, p.497.
588 Ecevit (Prime Minister) in Afford (ed.), op.cit., pp.136-139.
580 Ibid., p.1.38, Gürkan, op.cit., pp.35,36.
590 Campany, op.cit., pp.80-81, Kunihoim, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., p.427, CSIA Euro-
pean Security Working Group, "Instability and Change on NATO's Southern
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In July 1976 Turkey permitted the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev to pass through the
Straits. 591
 In July 1978 Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit paid a much publicised
visit to Moscow, signing there a document on friendly relations and co-operation.
Although the document reiterated many of the basic principles of the Helsinki
Agreement and fell short of a non-aggression pact, it caused anxieties in the West-
ern powers. 592 In spite of these developments, the Turks still saw the Soviet Union
as a threat to Turkish security, and in particular the rising power of the USSR in
the Mediterranean worried them. 593 Turkish rulers also continued to express their
doubts about detente, mutual troop reduction talks with the Eastern bloc and the
possibility of Soviet troop transfers from Europe to the Turkish border.594
4.9 Thrkey's Benefits From the United States and NATO
The following information leads to the conclusion that crucial benefits from
the United States in military area compels Turkey to continue its alliance with the
USA.
Flank", International Security, Winter 1978, p.172, Grimmett aud Laipson, op.cit., p.45.
591 CSIA, op.cit., p.l72, Galen, op.cit., p.71.
592 CSJA, op.cit., p.l12, Boll, op.cit., p.621, Galezi, op.cit., p.71.
in JvtJl'ITD: Defence Minister M. Izmen, 20.2.1973, term 3, sess.4, vol.34, p.454, LF. Cuinaho1u,
21.5.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.4, p.527, F. Sükan, ibid., p.535; CSIA, op.cit., p.151.
H. l3atu (Turkish diplomat), "New Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy",
Foreign Policy, vol.5, No.4, 1976, pp.14-15; in MMTD; Defence Minister M. Izmen, op.cit.,
p.45'1, Foreign Minister T. Güne, 22.5.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.4, p.630, Prime Minister B. Ecevit,
3.7.1974, term 4, ses.1, vol.6, p.364.
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4.9.1 Military and Economic Aid
Table 1: US ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY 1946-1985(millioflS of dollars)
Fiscal Yea] Military Economic
	
1946-1948	 68.8	 44.5
1949	 83.5
1950	 7.3
1951	 43.1
1952	 102.0
	
1949-1952	 225.1
1953	 151.8
1954	 238.2
1955	 178.2
1956	 191.3
1957	 152.4
1958	 249.4
1959	 196.3
1960	 92.6
1961	 85.9
	
1952-1962	 1,107.8
1962	 156.4	 195.9
1963	 172.2	 165.3
1964	 101.6	 -_174.8
1965	 118.4	 -_193.0
1966	 126.5	 160.2
1967	 160.8	 150.0
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Fiscal Year Military Economic
1968	 121.1	 85.8
1969	 124.6	 91.3
1970	 122.8	 90.2
1971	 142.1	 82.7
1972	 152.6	 66.9
1973	 148.6	 22.9
1974	 147.5	 5.5
1975	 109.1	 4.4
1976	 -	 -
1977	 125.0	 0.2
1978	 175.4	 1.1
1979	 180.3	 69.6
1980	 208.3	 198.1
1981	 253.0	 201.0
1982	 403.0	 301.0
1983	 403.0	 491.0
1984	 718.0	 442.0
1985	 704.0	 477.0
Sources: Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Divi-
sion, Office of Financial Management, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and As-
sistance from International Organisations, Obligations and Loan Authorisations,
July 1, 1945- June 30, 1973, p.28; Tiirkiye 'ye Amerikan Iktisadi Yardimlari, 19ij9-
1968, Ankara: Maliye Bakan1ii, November 1968 (this source gives great detail
of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey); Binnendijk and Friendly, op.cit., p.17';
Grirnrnett and Laipson, op.cit., p.38; Harris, op.cit., p.l55; Botsas, op.cit., p.253;
Couloumbis, op.cit., p.178.
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Tables prepared by Shorter give some idea of the amount of U.S. military
assistance to Turkey in comparison with Turkey's Gross National Product and
total military expenditure. He converted U.S. aid in dollars to Turkish liras. In
the table "military assistance import" represents the U.S. aid to Turkey.
Table 2: TURKISH MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GNP (BILLION TL)
Years Total Military Expenditure Military Assistance Import GNP
1948	 0.733	 0.203	 10.1
1949	 0.712	 0.156	 9.3
1950	 0.730	 0.131	 10.4
1951	 0.817	 0.165	 12.3
1952	 1.134	 0.409	 14.3
1953	 1.318	 0.491	 16.8
1954	 1.556	 0.620	 17.1
1955	 1.542	 0.465	 21.1
1956	 1.641	 0.482	 24.3
1957	 2.090	 0.824	 30.5
1958	 3.734	 2.264	 38.5
1959	 3.281	 1.128	 47.7
1960	 3.196	 0.786	 51.0
1961	 3.468	 0.750	 53.7
1962	 4.389	 1.419	 60.7
Source: F.C. Shorter, "Military Expenditures and the Allocation of
Resources" in F.C. Shorter(ed.), Four Studies on the Economic Development of
Turkey, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1967, pp.38-43.
On average, over the 15-year period (1948-1962), U.S. assistance constituted
34 percent of Turkey's total military expenditure. In 1970 total U.S. aid to Turkey
constituted 2.1 percent of Turkish Domestic Product (272 million dollars in 12.8
billion dollars). This percentage became 0.71 in 1980 (406 million dollars in 56.9
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billion dollars) and 1.4 in 1985 (734 million dollars in 49.7 billion do1lars). 95
 U.S.
economic aid to Turkey between 1950 and 1964 was equivalent to 17 percent of
total gross investment and 35 percent of total public investment in Turkey, 596
 and
it contributed to Turkey's economic growth substantially. However, too much em-
phasis on security led Turkish rulers to attribute secondary importance to economic
development .'
Immediately after World War II, the United States was the most important
trading partner of Turkey but she was replaced by West Germany after 1951. The
USA's share in Turkey's trade constantly fell between 1960 and 1978: 24.2 percent
in 1960-65, 15.4 percent in 1966-72 and 8.4 percent in 1973-78. Between 1956 and
1966 and between 1969 and 1972 the United States shipped grain and other prod-
ucts to Turkey Under Public Law 480, which allows the sale of surplus agricultural
products to Third World countries against payment in local currency. Clearly,
EEC countries were more important trade partners for Turkey than the USA was.
Their share in Turkey's trade continuously increased, reaching 46 percent in 1973-
1978. 598
In the 1980s Turkey was the third largest recipient of the U.S. military and
economic aid after Israel and Egypt. The U.S. Congress had a pattern of condi-
tioning aid on good Turkish behaviour on the Cyprus question and limiting it to
a ratio (10:7) between the assistance given to Turkey and Greece.59°
Rustow, Turkey, op.cit., pp.136-137.
596 L. Tansky, U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries, New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, 1967, pp.60-62.
Ibid., pp.60, 167, 177.
598 W. Hale, the Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey, London:
Croorn Helm, 1981, pp.234, 240, 244-245, Industrialization and Trade Strategy, Washing-
ton: the World Bank, 1982, pp.417-418, A.O. Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Eco-
nomic Develpment: Turkey, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, pp.183-184,
Z.Y. Hershiag, Jurkey, the Challenge of the Growth, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968, pp.253,
373, Vail, op.cit., pp.326, 332.
R.N. Haas, "Managing NATO's Weakest Flank; the United States,
Greece and Turkey", ORBIS, vol.30, No.3, Fall 1986, p.466. For a detailed study
of the 10:7 ratio see Stearns, op.cit., pp.40-50.
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4.9.2 Military Equipment
Table 3: MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES
Item	 Number	 Supplier
Aircraft	 -	 -
Lockheed T-33 A-N
	 36	 USA
Lockheed RT-33A
	 18	 FR Germany
Lockheed T-33 A-N	 30	 USA
Beech T-34 Mentor	 24	 Canada
Cessina T-37C	 25	 USA
Lockheed T-33	 12	 FR Germany
Lockheed T-33	 9	 USA
Cessina T-410	 20	 USA
Beech T-42 Boron	 5	 USA
Republic F-84F	 (130)	 USA
Republic F-84F
	 42	 FR Germany
Republic F-84F	 42	 FR Germany
Republic RF-84F	 (30)	 USA
Republic RF-84F	 (5)	 France
NA F-86D Sabre	 50	 USA
NA F-86K Sabre	 (65)	 Netherland
NA F-100C SuperSabre	 260	 USA
NA F-100C SuperSabre 	 40	 USA
NA F-100F SuperSabre	 (25)	 USA
	
Convair F-102A Delta Dagger	 36	 USA
Convair TF-102	 3	 USA
	
Lockheed F-104 Straight fighter 	 32	 USA
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Item	 Number	 Supplier
F-104 Straight fighter 	 113	 -
F-104D	 45	 -
F-104S	 18	 -
TF-104	 12	 -
TF-104G	 4	 -
F-4E Phantom	 80	 USA
RF-4E	 7	 USA
Northrop F-5 Freedom fighter	 140	 -
Beech C-45
	 (8)	 USA
C-47A	 64	 -
Douglas C-54
	 3	 USA
Lockheed C-130 Hercules	 10	 USA
Transall C-160	 20	 FR Germany
Piper L-18 Super Cub	 200	 USA
Canadair CL-13 Sabre Mk4	 25	 UK
Canadair CL-13 Sabre	 82	 Canada
Cessna 421	 20	 -
Cessna U-17A	 20	 USA
Cessna 206
	 8	 USA
Dornier Do-27
	
15	 FR Germany
Dornier Do-27	 3	 FR Germany
Dornier Do-28	 14	 FR Germany
Dornier Do-28B-1	 5	 FR Germany
Bell 47G
	 (5)	 USA
Agusta-Bell 47	 20	 Italy
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Item	 Number	 Supplier
Agusta-Bell 204B	 13	 Italy
Agusta-Bell 204B	 7	 Italy
Agusta-Bell 2O5lraquois	 3	 USA
Agusta-Bell 2O6AJetRanger 	 (35)	 -
Grumman S-2 Tracker	 8	 Netherlands
Grumman S-2 Tracker	 12	 USA
Grumman TS-2	 2	 USA
Srat 223 Flamingo	 15	 FR Germany
Britten-Norman BN-2lslander 	 2	 UK
Missiles	 -	 -
Nike Ajax	 75	 USA
Nike Hercules	 (75)	 USA
	
Usamicon MGR-1 Honest John (24)
	 USA
NWC Sidewinder	 (600)	 USA
MBB Bo 810 Cobra2000 	 (300) FR Germany
MBB Bo810 Cobra2000	 (500) FR Germany
Martin Bulipup (AGM-128) 	 300	 USA
Nord SS.11	 (100)	 France
Hughes TOW(BGM-71A)	 -	 USA
Penguin	 -	 Norway
Naval Vessels	 -	 -
Submarine GuppylA,II,IIA,III 	 9	 USA
Submarine Gur Class 	 7	 USA
Submarine rescue ship 	 1	 USA
Submarine depot ship	 1	 USA
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Item	 Number	 Supplier
Destroyer Gearing class
	 9	 USA
Destroyer AllanMSummer	 1	 USA
Destroyer Fletcher class 	 5	 USA
	
Destroyer Milne class 	 4	 UK
Motor torpedo boat Jaguar	 7	 FR Germany
	
Torpedo boat Nasty	 4	 FR Germany
	
Patrol boat Akhisar	 5	 USA
	
Patrol boat Ashwlle	 2	 USA
	
Coastal escor Batia	 9	 Canada
Coastal mine layer
	 6	 USA
Mine layer	 1	 Denmark
Mine layer	 2	 FR Germany
Coastal mine sweeper MCB	 4	 Canada
Coastal mine sweeper Adjutant
	 12	 USA
Coastal mine sweeper MSC
	 3	 USA
Cape inshore mine sweeper	 4	 USA
Motor launch	 4	 USA
Motor launch	 9	 FR Germany
Repair ship	 1	 USA
	
Boom defence vessel	 2	 USA
	
Boom defence vessel	 1	 France
Gunboat	 7	 USA
Fleet ocean tug	 1	 USA
Barracks craft
	 1	 USA
Supply ship	 1	 FR Germany
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Item	 Number	 Supplier
Armoured fighting vehicles	 -	 -
M-36	 (25)	 USA
M-26 Pershing	 (100)	 USA
M-24 Chaffee	 (50)	 USA
M-47 main battle tanks	 500	 USA
M-48A1 main battle tanks	 2,775	 USA
M-48A5 main battle tanks	 180	 USA
Leopard 1A3 main battle tanks 	 77	 FR Germany
M-60A1 main battle tanks	 -	 USA
M-41 Lighttank	 (100)	 USA
	
M-113 armoured personnel carrier 1,400	 USA
	
M-59 armoured personnel carrier (400)
	 USA
V-150 commando vehicle	 USA
M-44 and M-52	 24	 FR Germany
M-74	 69	 FR Germany
M-59 155mm towed guns	 150	 USA
M-107 175mm self-propelled guns 	 36	 USA
M-1O1A-1 105mm howitzer 	 600	 USA
M-114A1 155mm howitzer	 400	 USA
M-7 105mm howitzer	 345	 USA
M-44 155mm howitzer 	 108	 USA
M.110 203mm howitzer 	 -	 USA
M-1A1 40mm antiaircraft gun	 900	 USA
M-51 75mm antiaircraft gun 	 -	 USA
M-118 90mm antiaircraft gun	 -	 USA
M-117 90mm antiaircraft gun	 -	 USA
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Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms
Trade Registers, Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksel International, 1975, pp.126-
130; Journal of Defence and Diplomacy, vol.3, No.9, September 1985, pp.34-35;
Binnendijk and Friendly, op.cit., p.15; C.F. Foss, Jane's Pocket Book of Towed
Artillery, London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1977, pp.31, 87, 133, 135, 197, 239,
247, 251, 253; R. Pretty, Jane's Pocket Book of Missiles, London: MacDonald
and Jane's, 1978, pp.49, 64, 84, 149, 201; J.W.R. Taylor, Jane's Pocket Book
Major Combat Aircraft, London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1978, pp.23, 49, 51, 97,
131, 149, 151, 185, 191; J.E. Moore, Jane's Pocket Book 1 Major Warships, Lon-
don: MacDonald and Jane's, 1978, pp.20, 44-46, 125-127, 146, 181, 189, 209; C.F.
Foss, Jane's Pocket Book Modern Tanks and Arrnoured Fighting Vehicles, Lon-
don: Jane's, 1981, pp.21, 57, 59, 61, 63, 149, 207, 209, 215, 259, 263, 265, 267,
269; Lewis, op.cit., pp.130, 136, 143, 150, 152, 153. For claims that equipment
of the Turkish army is antiquated and that its control systems are inefficient see
Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., pp.440- 4Al, Galen, op.cit., p.66-67,
Journal of Defence and Diplomacy, op.cit., p.34.
According to Military Assistance Program Data of U.S. Defense Security Agency,
the United States delivered the following military material to Turkey as of 7 Au-
gust 1974:600 (a) Tactical aircraft (some tactical aircraft, plus all 8 inch howitzer,
and Honest John rockets can be used for tactical nuclear purposes): 965. (b)
Destroyers: 2. (c) Submarines: 7. (d) Tanks (all types): 3,915. (e) Armoured
personnel carriers: 1,827. (f) Self-propelled artillery: 861. (g) Towed artillery:
1,127. (h) NIKE missiles: 540. (i) Honest John missiles: 831. (j) Recoilless rifles
(90-106mm); 2,044. (k) Mortars (81mm- 4.2in): 1,248. (1) Machine-guns: 14,296.
(m) Rifles: 320,450. (n) 1:4 ton trucks: 22,588. (o) Two and half ton trucks:
23,928. (p) Tactical radios: 21, 811.
4.10 Importance of Turkey for the USA
The information in the following sections, which was derived from articles,
books and speeches of scholars and Turkish and American officials, considers mostly
the period before the disengagement of the Soviet Union, and therefore expresses
600 Cited by Collins, op.cit., p.50. The wide discrepancies between above lists and this list may be
accounted for by the fact that the latter list refers to outright U.S. grants to Turkey whereas the
former lists include items purchased.
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the viewpoints concerned as they were stated at the time. Some of the points made
then might be applied to the post-Soviet Union period as well.
4.10.1 Importance of Turkey's Strategic Position
Under the provisions of the Montreaux Convention, Turkey has control over
the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which link the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean. She was in the unique position of being able to close the Straits and
thereby deny the Soviet Black Sea Fleet access into the Mediterranean and cut off
all Soviet naval vessels operating in the Mediterranean from their horneports and
lines of communications. If the Turkish control over passage through the Straits
was abrogated, Soviet naval vessels would enjoy a significant surge capacity in times
of international crises or war and thus NATO forces would have to contend with
much greater Soviet power in the Mediterranean. The Straits were the major route
used by Soviet navy and merchant ships to reach the Mediterranean, North Africa
and the Middle East. With the Straits and the Suez Canal open, Soviet ships
could easily reach the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. Turkey had the potential to
deny these vital opportunities to the Russians. The requirements to give advance
notice to warship transit and to traverse only on the surface by submarine in the
Straits provided continuing intelligence opportunities for the West in peacetime.
Soviet ships could easily be monitored in this way.60'
Turkey has control over the high plateau of Anatolia which commands the
entire Fertile Crescent down to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. She lies along the
roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian
Gulf; she commands land, sea and air communications in much of the Balkans and
the Middle East. She controlled the ideal Soviet land route to oilfields of the Persian
Gulf. 602 Turkey was also in a position to regulate and deny Soviet overflights to the
601 The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey, op.cit., pp.7, 16, 24, 41, 47;
Vail, op.cit., pp.4t5, 216-217; Couloumbis, op.cit., pp.137, 187; Campany, op.cit., pp.v-vi; McGhee,
op.cit., p.170; M. Krahenbuhl, Turkish-American Relations; An Affair to Remem-
ber, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1974, p.2; Haas, op.cit., p.458; Gürkan, op.cit., p.13;
Lewis, op.cit., pp.28, 31-32, 70-72; Collins, op.cit., pp.5-6, 15,17; United States Security
Agreements, op.cit., p.1817; Stearns, op.cit., pp.53. 59.
602 Karpat (ed.), op.cit., p.2, Vail, op.cit., pp.xi-xii, Cainpany, op.cit., pp.v-vi, McGhee, op.cit., pp.88-
89. L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran, Cambridge.
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951, p.145.
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Middle East. 603
 She served as an obstacle and powerful deterrence to any Soviet
aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.604
Apart from Norway, Turkey was the only NATO country which shared a long
border (1500 mile) with the Soviet Union. 605
 She was vital to the security and
stability of NATO's southern flank and constituted the first line of defence for the
flank. 606 The Turkish armed forces strengthened NATO in the eastern Mediter-
ranean, enabling it to control the region and giving to it superiority against the
Soviet power in the area. 607 Turkey contributed the second largest land force to
NATO; 490,000 men, 15 divisions and 20 air squadrons. 608 The Turkish forces tied
down 50 Warsaw Pact divisions on the east of Turkey and Baltic fronts, which
could otherwise be concentrated against other areas of NATO, including the cen-
tral sector. 609 Turkey served as a staging ground for counterattacks against the
Soviet Union and provided facilities for NATO forward tactical operations and sup-
port activities. 610 And finally Turkey provided a valuable link between the Islamic
World and the West as a member of both the Islamic Conference and NATO.61'
4.10.2 Importance of U.S. Bases in Turkey
The United States had 61 military facilities in Turkey as of June 30, 1976.612
The following conflation of American assessments of some of them illustrates the
importance of these facilities to the U.S.
Intelligence-collection stations: 613 1- Sinop (on the Black Sea coast in
603 Sezer iii Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.63, Collins, op.cit., p.17, the Military Aspects..., op.cit., p.3.
604 McGhee, op.cit., pp.88-89, Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.63, Thomas and Frye, op.cit., p.145,
Coffins, op.cit., p.5, the Military Aspects..., op.cit., pp.6,9, 16,74.
605 The Military Aspects..., op.cit., p.3, Gürkan, op.cit., pp.14-15.
606 Vali, op.cit., pp.xi-xii, 373, Campany, op.cit., p.v, Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.63, Krahenbuhl,
op.cit., p.2, the Military Aspects..., op.cit., p.6.
607 McGhee, op.cit., p.170, Collins, op.cit., pp.ix,9.
608 The Military Aspects..., op.cit., pp.3,16, 62,74, Collins, op.cit., p.9.
609 The Military Aspects..., op.cit., pp.6,9, 10,17, 24,47,74, Collins, op.cit., pp.9,16, McGhee,
op.cit., p.l'TO, Hans, op.cit., p.,458.
610 The Military Aspects.... op.cit., p.6.
611 Campany, op.cit., p.vi.
612 Griminett, op.cit., p.8n.
613 jbid., p.39, Couloumbis, op.cit., pp.135-136, Lewis, op.cit., pp.29-30. For the following information
on bases see also Grinimett and Laipson, op.cit., pp.15-23, Binneudijk and Friendly, op.cit., pp.8-9.
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north-central Turkey almost directly opposite Yalta): A radar monitoring and
communications facility, manned by personnel from the Army Security Agency
(ASA), a component of the National Security Agency (NSA). It collected data
on the Soviet Union's air and naval activities in the Black Sea area, as well as
that country's missile testing activities. 2- Samsun (on the Black Sea coast in
north-central Turkey): A communications site, associated with Sinop, manned by
personnel of the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), also a component of
NSA. Radars at Samsun had been tracking down Soviet missile test shots from
Kapustin Yar (east of Volgograd) since 1955 - including SLBMs. 614 3- Karamürsel
Air Station (located on the south-east shore of the Sea of Marmara and south-east
of Istanbul): A communications and monitoring installation which tracked Soviet
naval traffic in the western Black Sea area and the area surrounding the Straits.
It was manned by USAFSS personnel. 4- Diyarbakir Air Station (in south-eastern
Turkey near the Syrian border): A long-range radar and communications complex
that tracked Soviet missile launches from various Soviet testing sites and monitored
other Soviet military activities. Its activities were carried out by personnel of
USAFSS. 5- The Be1bai Station (near Ankara in central Thrkey): A seismographic
detection base which monitored Soviet nuclear tests.
Intelligence collection installations were vital to monitor Soviet military activ-
ity in the south-eastern military districts of that country, development of certain
Soviet weapons systems, Soviet nuclear explosions and missile tests, and Soviet
compliance with SALT treaties, ABM and Test Ban treaties.°' 5 U.S. Secretary
of Defence Harold Brown stated that some of them were irreplaceable and more
important than those in Greece.°'° The former NATO Supreme Commander, Gen.
Lyman Lemnitzer, described their importance as follows: "There is no area in the
world comparable to Turkey as a vital base of intelligence-gathering operations
against the Warsaw Pact... These bases when fully operational are capable of pro-
viding valuable and irreplaceable intelligence coverage for which no substitute is
available." 617
614 Collins, op.cit., p.13.
615 The Military Aspects..., op.cit., pp.16, 26,65, Collins, op.cit., p.13, Grimmett, op.cit., pp.37,
46-47, Lewis, op.cit., pp.30-31, Gruen, op.cit., p.367.
616 The Military Aspects..., op.cit., p.26.
617 Campany, op.cit., p.57.
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The U.S. Defence Communication System (DSC) terminals: 6 in Eu-
ropean Turkey, 5 in Ankara area, 13 in Jzmit area, 3 in Izmir area, 7 in Diyarbakir
area, 2 in Incirlik area, 3 in Malatya area, 1 in Sinop and 1 in Samsun. 618 The Ya-
manlar facility in western Turkey just north of Izrnir connects Turkey with Greece
through the Mt. Pateras terminal, located south of Athens. It is also connected
to the ahin Tepesi terminal, which links the Karamürsel-Yalova communications
terminals with a number of European Turkey DSC sites and with the Elmada
terminal, which is located north-east of Ankara. The Elmada terminal is linked
to the Samsun communications facility near the Black Sea coast and the Karata.
terminal near the Incirlik Air Base, which is connected with the Malatya terminal
in east-central Turkey. The Malatya terminal is linked to the Diyarbakir terminal
which houses a Defence Satellite Communications System earth terminal that is
connected with Lakehurst Naval Air Station in Lakehurst, N.J.°'9
NADGE (NATO's Air Defence Grand Environment) early-warning
radar sites: They are spread throughout Turkey: Ankara, Izmit, Eskiehir,
Lüleburgaz, Bartin, Diyarbakir, Merzifon, Perembe, Pazar, Erzurum, Mardin,
ç anakkale, Sarikila, Kargapazar. 62° 19 fully-integrated, semi-automatic sites astride
the Aegean centralise missile and aircraft warning efforts in that area and direct
air defence actions in response to proven and possible threats. 62 ' For Soviet air-
craft overfiying near either Greece or Turkey, warning could be provided while
these aircraft were over Bulgaria or the Black Sea. Early-warning is critical to the
operation of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.622
Airbases, stations: 1- The Incirlik Air Base (located near the city of Adana
in south-central Turkey): The major tactical fighter base in Turkey, where USAFE
(U.S. Air Forces, Europe) F-4 squadrons from Torrefon Air Base in Spain and
Avaino Air Base in Italy serve on a rotational basis. U.S. fighters located at
incirlik are the most forward deployed land-based American aircraft in the eastern
Mediterranean that are capable of launching a tactical nuclear airstrike in the event
618 Collins, op.cit.. pp.62-63.
619 Griinmett, op.cit., pp.39, 41.
620 Collins, op.cit., p.62.
621 jbid., p.12.
622 The A'Iilitary Aspects..., op.cit., pP6'62
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of conflict in the region.° 23 2- Karamürsel Air Base (near the city of Izmit): It might
be used to guard against any threat to the Straits.° 24 3- The Ankara Air Station:
Ankara also houses The Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT)
and the U.S. Logistic Group (TUSLOG), which is the central logistical and support
command for all U.S. supply services in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle
East. 625 4- The tzmir Air Station (in west-central Turkey off the Aegean coast)
and the çigli Air Base: Jzmir is the site of an air support base for USAFE, as
well as the headquarters of NATO's Allied Land Forces, South-eastern Europe
(LANDSOUTHEAST) and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF). A
USAFE tactical airbase is located in cili, north of Izmir.626
ACE High communications sites: 12 communications sites in Turkey
are associated with NATO's tropospheric scatter network (ACE High): Ankara,
Izinir, Eskiehir, Elmadag, Amasra, Merzifon, Perembe, Pazar, Sivas, Diyarbakir,
Mardin, Adana.°27
Storage facilities: Iskenderun and Yumurtalik are the most important sup-
ply, and storage centres for U.S. military forces in the extreme eastern Mediter-
ranean.°28
The Kargaburun U.S. Navy LORAN (long-range aid to navigation) station,
located on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara, is an installation which
assists U.S. military aircraft in fixing their positions in the eastern Mediterranean
from long ranges through electronic radio-navigational devices.629
The report of Grimmett claims that in the event that the United States had
to withdraw from its bases in Turkey,
Greece would be able to provide the most viable and useful base sites for reloca-
tion from Turkey of naval and air support installations and facilities for tactical fighter
aircraft... Certain defence communications installations currently in Turkey could be
623 Griminett, op.cit., p.41, Collins, op.cit., p.1O, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.136.
624 Lewis, op.cit., p.30.
625 Griminett, op.cit., p.'ll, Collins, op.cit., p.12, Couloumbis, op.cit., pp.135, 136, Lewis, op.cit., p.30.
020 Griminctt, op.cit., p.41, Collins, op.cit., p.12, Coulomnbis, op.cit., pp.135, 136, Lewis, op.cit., p.30.
027 Collins, op.cit., pp.12, 62.
628 Grimxnett, op.cit., p.41.
629 Jbid., p.41, Coulouinbis, op.cit., p.135.
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replaced by use of other communications systems, including those that presently in-
terconnect with Greece, and through the use of satellites. All of the above, of course,
would require the approval of the Greek government.630
Mentioning the views of U.S. policy-makers that some intelligence facilities in
Turkey could not be replaced, Grimmett's report states: "Yet since collection of
intelligence data on the Soviet Union's military activities by the United States
does not depend upon Turkish installations alone.., the essential problem... would
be a loss of information that could strongly confirm data... obtained from other
sources." As alternatives it gives satellites, Crete, Greece and Iran (unavailable
after l979).°' These opinions cannot change the fact that U.S. officials attributed
great importance to their facilities in Turkey.
4.10.3 Turkey's Position With Respect to the Middle East
Turkey's importance to the United States with respect to the Middle East can
be understood better if U.S. stated aims in the Middle East are mentioned: 1- To
deter Soviet armed aggression against the region. 2- To secure NATO's southern
flank. 3- To encourage stability in the Middle East. 4- To support friendly states
like Israel. 5- To maintain western supply lines in the Mediterranean. 6- To ensure
continued access to Middle Eastern oil.632
Turkey protected the Middle East against Soviet expansion and influence by
constitutiiig a barrier between the Soviet Union and the region. 633 The United
States would lose substantially its political and military posture and influence in
the Middle East without the collaboration of Turkey. 634 In the absence of the
Turkish barrier, "Soviet support for and accessibility to such countries as Syria
and Iraq would have been much more pervasive and potentially threatening to
630 Grimrnett, op.cit., p.45.
631 Ibid., pp.46-47. See also Collins, op.cit., p.17.
632 Grinimctt, op.cit., p.5, Collins, op.cit., p.2.
633 McGhee, op.cit., pp.xvi, 174, 176,177, B. Lewis's Preface in Rustow, op.cit., pp.vii, ix, Rustow,
op.cit.. pp.107. 110, Ta.han, op.cit., pp.21, 22, the Military Aspects..., op.cit., pp.6, 75.
Former U.S. ambassador Stearns claims that the hope that Turkey would help discourage Soviet
take-overs in the Middle East was exaggerated. He argues that as was proved by the Gulf War
Turkey is likely to play the role of stepping stone rather thaii a barrier in the context of the Middle
Ba-st. Stearns, op.cit.. pp.52-53.
634 Vali, op.cit., p.312, Collins, op.cit., p.ix.
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U.S. interests in the region"° 35
 and Israel would not be able to "maintain its status
as a regional power and cope with continuing Arab hostility without the risk of
facing... the full force of the Red Army."° 36
 Turkey neutralised potential risks of
the Middle Eastern region for U.S. global strategy,° 37
 contributed to the stability
of the region, which was essential for U.S. interests 838
 and provided an important
access to the Middle East and Africa. 639
 The Incirlik air base in Turkey served as
a staging base for U.S. contingents for use in the Middle East and an important
stopover for transport airport en route to the Persian Gulf.64°
Some developments in the 1980s increased Turkey's importance to the United
States vis-a-vis the Middle East: 1- The Middle East continued to be NATO coun-
tries' main source of energy (oil and gas) and raw materials which were essential
to their economic well-being. 64 ' 2- Soviet military build up in its southern mil-
itary districts, the invasion of Afghanistan, the expansion of Soviet influence to
Aden and Ethiopia, and growing Soviet military presence in Syria threatened the
regional balance. 3- The Iranian revolution in 1979 and growth of Islamic fun-
damentalism in its aftermath posed threats to the stability of the region. 4- The
Iranian hostage crisis. 5- The Iran-Iraq war in the l980s. 642 6- The upgrading of
some airfields in eastern Turkey in the early 1980s made Turkey more valuable as
a possible base for rapid deployment in the Middle East.° 43 7- The important role
played by Turkey in the allied coalition against Iraq in 1991 led U.S. officials to
assess Turkey's strategic significance in its Middle East context once again.644
635 13.R. Kunihoim, "Turkey and the West", Foreign Affairs, vol.70, No.2, Spring 1991,
p.39.
636 fiustow, op.cit., p.110.
637 Ibid., p.111.
638 The Military Aspects..., op.cit., p.15.
639 Ibid., p.3.
640 Collins, op.cit., p.16.
64i Richard Burt, "Turkey and the Reagan Administration" in Harris(ed.), op.cit..
p.l9, Gürkan, op.cit., pp.4, 34, the Military Aspects..., op.cit., pp.24,47.
642 Burt, op.cit., p.19, Barry Rubin, "Middle East Policy in the Turkish Context"
in Harris (ed.), op.cit., pp.75,78.
643 Rustow, op.cit., pp.113-114.
644 Kunihoim, "Turkey and the \Vest", op.cit., pp.34,43.
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4.11 Conclusion
The close military relationship in the 1950s opened the way for U.S. influence
on Turkey and eventually brought about the anti-American atmosphere of the
1960s in Turkey. The closeness of the relationship during honeymoon period in the
1950s was for beyond that is seen in normal inter-state relations. The excessive
confidence of Turkish rulers in the United States as a close companion who would do
anything to protect her "dear" partner against hostile forces led them to entrust the
Turkish military establishment to American experts. The presence of U.S. military
officers and the flow of U.S. military equipment were enthusiastically welcomed.
Together with a firm stance in favour of Western powers in international forums,
this situation caused the portrayal of Turkey's image as the satellite of the United
States in the eyes of international community. The following factors brought about
the spread of anti-Americanism among Turkish people in the 1960s: Misconduct by
officials on both sides who exceeded their authority by signing of various bilateral
military agreements; misuse of their rights and privileges by U.S. personnel in
Turkey; U.S. use of Turkish territory for secret reconnaissance flights; free political
discussion atmosphere in Turkey, which was introduced by the 1960 constitution;
apparent U.S. indifference to the fate of Turkish Cypriots at the hands of the
Greek Cypriots; President Johnson's bitter letter, which stated that NATO might
not protect Turkey against a Soviet attack and which warned that Turkish rulers
should not use U.S.-supplied weapons for purposes not approved by the USA.
Public pressures and the disappointing attitude of the USA led Turkish rulers
to take some actions to gain initiative in their military relations with the Ameri-
cans. Their actions, which displeased U.S. officials to some extent, surely showed
that they were not merely a puppet of the United States and that they might
reject important U.S. demands if these demands were not compatible with Turk-
ish interests. However, it should be stated that changes brought about by these
actions were not radical and that the real character of the U.S.-Turkish military
relationship which was hidden in secret bilateral agreements continued to be a
mystery. Turkey's military dependence on the United States has also continued
up to now though Turkish rulers sought alternative defence partners and sources.
U.S. officials sometimes felt disappointment with some Turkish attitudes in the de-
fence area such as the use of bases and U-2 flights but they were generally pleased
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with Turkey's commitment to NATO and the availability of Turkish bases for their
general use. Nevertheless, U.S. authorities knew that Turkey could take drastic
measures against them in the defence area if she was forced to do so.
152
Chapter V
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962
AND TURKEY
The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 came to a point which concerned
Turkey's very survival. The crisis had started in mid-October 1962 when Ameri-
can U-2 planes spotted some Soviet SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) on Cuban soil
and President Kennedy decided to enforce a naval blockade of Cuba. While the
two superpowers approached the brink of armed conflict, probably a nuclear war,
removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for the Soviet removal of its
missiles from Cuba seemed to many an appropriate way to end the crisis. At the
peak of the crisis, on 27 October 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev officially
proposed such a solution. The Cuban crisis presents a good example of evaluating
different aspects of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, which were mentioned in Chapter II.
In this chapter events and discussions surrounding the Jupiters during the crisis
will be studied in order to explore how Turkey's alliance with the United States
made her a party to a superpower conflict and put her survival under threat.
5.1 History of the Jupiters
When the Soviets successfully launched the first Sputnik in 1957, the Eisen-
hower administration feared that the Soviets were leading the West in nuclear
armament and that a deterrence or at least a confidence gap was emerging. To
strengthen NATO both militarily and psychologically, the United States gained
unanimous approval of NATO members for stationing American-made intermediate-
range ballistic missiles in Europe.° 45 However, most NATO allies declined to accept
deployment of missiles on their territories because they were fearful of provoking
The Times, 29 October 1962, p.8, B.J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis:
Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?", Political Science Quarterly, vol.95, No.1,
Spring 1980, pp.98-99, M.R. Beschloss, Kennedy v. Rhrnshchev. London and Boston: Faber
and Faber. 1991, p.439.
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Soviet aggression, becoming a target of a nuclear war and provoking domestic
opposition. 646 Only Britain, Italy and Turkey consented to take these missiles.647
The agreement for installing fifteen Jupiters in Turkey was signed in October
1959 between the USA and Turkey. According to the agreement "the missiles
would be owned by the United States...; the weapons could be launched only on
the order of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (an American) on the ap-
proval of both American and Turkish governments; and the sites would be manned
by soldiers of both nations."° 48 The Turkish government did not make this agree-
ment public though Foreign Minister Fatin Rütü Zorlu promised in January 1959
that the Turkish Parliament would be informed when the Jupiter agreement was
concluded. 649 The Jupiters went to Turkey at about the time of Soviet Premier
Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959.650 Preliminary installation ar-
rangements were accomplished during the era of the Menderes government, which
was toppled by a military coup on 27 May 1960.651 Despite strong Soviet objections
to these activities the new Turkish military regime went along in carrying out pre-
liininary works at the same speed. Turkish crews were sent to America for special
training and installations for the missiles were constructed in the Izmir area in the
west of Turkey. As George Harris stated, "the Turkish military rulers appeared
far more eager to receive these missiles than Washington to provide them."652
The Jupiters were installed in Turkey in late 1961 by the Kennedy adminis-
tration to implement the 1959 agreement. They became fully operational in about
July 1962 . 653 But the actual transfer of the first Jupiter missile (warheads remained
under American control) to Turkish armed forces took place on 22 October 1962,
on the same day Kennedy announced the quarantine of Cuba.654
646 Bernstein, op.cit., p.99, "Bayazi", Forum, 1 June 1964, p.4.
647 Beschloss, op.cit., p.439, R.L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Wash-
ington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989, p.71n.
648 Bernstein, op.cit., p.99.
649 G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.92.
650 fleschloss, op.cit., p.439.
651 G.S. Harris, "Turkey and the United States" in K.H. Karpat (ed.). Turkey's
Foreign Policy in Iransition, Leiden: E.J. BrilI, 1975. p.58.
652 Ibid. p.58.
653 Bernstein, op.cit., p.100, T.C. Reeves, A Question of Character: A Life of John F.
Kennedy, New York: The Free Press, 1991, p.375, Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., p.92.
J.G. Blight and D.A. Welch, On the Brink, New York: Hill and Wang, 1989, p.172.
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5.2 U.S. Attempts to Remove the Jupiters from Turkey
As early as 11 February 1961, a report of the Joint Congressional Committee
on Atomic Energy, entitled "the Study of US and NATO Nuclear Arrangements",
recommended that "construction should not be permitted to begin on the Jupiter
sites in Turkey. Instead of placing obsolete liquid-fuel IRBMs in Turkey, an alter-
native system such as Polaris submarines should be assigned to NATO." 655 Unlike
the Jupiters, which were inaccurate and vulnerable, "the Polaris would add to
deterrence and better protect the United States, NATO and Turkey" since they
were "mobile, concealed and thus virtually immune from a Soviet attack."656
U.S. President John Kennedy raised the question of the Jupiters in a National
Security Council meeting on 29 March 1961. According to a NSC memorandum on
this meeting, which was dated 6 April 1961, the president instructed a committee
consisting of officials of Departments of State and Defence and the CIA to review
the issue of stationing IRBMs in Turkey. 657 A member of this committee, George
McGhee, reports in his book that in a meeting he was asked by the president,
"if I thought the Turks would permit us to take the IRBMs out. I replied that I
doubted it..." 658 In his book McGhee also cites that in their talk during a CENTO
meeting the Turkish foreign minister strongly opposed removal of the IRBMs be-
cause Turkey "had put a good deal of money into the installations of the Jupiters,
which had just come into place", and therefore "it would be difficult for the Turkish
people to understand their removal without any compensating additions to their
security." 659 McGhee's report on 22 June 1961 to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's
special assistant for national security, argued against cancellation of the Jupiters
project; "in the aftermath of Khrushchev's hard posture at Vienna, cancellation...
might seem a weakness," 66 ° moreover, the Turkish military was unwilling to aban-
655 G.T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971, pp.3lln, 312n, Blight
and Welch, op.cit.. p.172. Bernstein, op.cit., p.100.
656 Bernstein, op.cit., p.100.
657 Blight and Welch, op.cit., pp.100-101.
658 G. McGhee, The US Turkish NATO Middle East Connection, London: MacMillan
Press Ltd., 1990, p.166.
659 Ibid., p.166.
660 Bernstein, op.cit., p.101, D. Detzer, The Brink; Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, London: J.M.
Dent and Soiis Ltd., 1979, p.157, Beschloss, op.cit., p.439.
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don the project. 661 General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces
in Europe, warned that the Turks could feel insulted if the Jupiters were removed
and that this could cause some problems within NATO.662
In Dean Rusk's account, in their meeting in May 1961, Selim Sarper, the
Turkish foreign minister, told him that "they had just gotten from their parliament
the appropriations for the Turkish side of the cost of those missiles, and it would
be very embarrassing to go right back to them and say that they were being taken
out... It would be very bad for the morale of Turkey as a member of NATO
if they were taken out before Polaris submarines were in the Mediterranean to
take their place."°° 3 In fact, as Secretary of Defence McNamara confirmed, there
were no extra Polaris submarines at that time to offer the Turks. 664 A study of
the American administration on the Jupiters, which was completed in early 1962,
deduced that these missiles were worthless, and therefore should be phased out.665
It seems that Turkish military leaders who were anxious to obtain modern
weaponry believed that the Jupiters, which were a part of their military asset,
increased Turkey's military capabilities and strengthened its security against the
Soviet Union. The newly installed civilian government was in no position to insist
on withdrawing missiles over the opposition of the Turkish armed forces. 666 Turkish
officials probably did not think about strategic liabilities of the missiles. For them
the Jupiters "added prestige, emphasised Turkey's role in NATO, and exaggerated
the warmth of relations with a great power, the United States. The missiles were
political assets abroad and possibly at home."667
661 Bernstein, op.cit., p.101.
662 Detzer, op.cit., p.157, Beschloss, op.cit., pp. 439-440.
663 Blight and Welch, op.cit., p.173. See also Allison, op.cit., pp.141, 226, R.F. Kennedy, Thirteen
Days, New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1971, p.72, Bernstein, op.cit., p.102, Hafiier,
op.cit., pp.3l8-3l9. Former Thrkish foreign minister U. Haluk Bayülken confirmed Sarper's re-
sponse. According to him, Sarper agreed with the Americans but thought that Turkish military
rulers who recently overthrew the government could misunderstand the U.S. proposal. Bayülken
told the author that he himself heard the U.S. proposal from Dean Rusk.
664 Bernstein, op.cit., pp. 101-102.
665 Allison, op.cit., p.141, E. Abel, The Missile ('risis, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966, p.190, D.L.
Hafner. "Bureaucratic Politics and Those Frigging Missiles", ORBIS,
vol.2l, no.2, Summer 1977, p.318.
666 Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., pp.92-93.
667 Bernstein, op.cit., pp.99, 100.
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In August 1962 during a National Security Council meeting President Kennedy
ordered U.S. officials to investigate what action could be taken to get the Jupiters
out of Turkey in the light of the new Soviet bloc activity in Cuba. 668 It is clear that
Kennedy linked the Jupiter missiles in Turkey to the Cuban problem, presumably
concerning that the Soviets might justify an arming of Cuba with nuclear arms
by pointing to the Jupiters iii Turkey. In the late summer of 1962 when Secretary
of State Rusk was in Europe, President Kennedy pressed Undersecretary of State
George Ball to push forward the issue. 669 During their talks, the Turkish ambas-
sador to Washington told Ball that removal of the Jupiters would have harmful
effects on Turkish public opinion. 070 After this initiative State Department offi-
cials decided not to pursue the issue so as not to allow relations with the Turks to
deteriorate.
Some authors claim that before the Cuban crisis erupted Kennedy had already
ordered the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy and erased this
issue from his mind assuming that his orders had been carried out. According
to these authors, Khrushchev's proposal of Turkey-for-Cuba trade on 27 October
1962 made Kennedy aware of the fact that his orders had not been implemented by
American bureaucrats. However, as most authors who studied the Cuban missile
crisis argue, although President Kennedy several times gave instructions to review
the matter of removing the Jupiter missiles, he never actually ordered their re-
moval and knew that they were still in Turkey when the Cuban crisis broke out.671
The NSC Action Memorandum of 23 August 1962, the last move of the Kennedy
administration before the Cuban crisis to remove the Jupiters, ordered State De-
partment officials only to study what actions could be taken to get the missiles out
of Turkey. Even if it had ordered their removal, it would be practically impossible
to finish the job by the time when the Cuban crisis came about. 672 During the
°68 rteeves, A Question of Character, op.cit., p.3T5, Bernstein, op.cit., pp. 102-103.
669 Bernstein, op.cit., p.102, Allison, op.cit., pp.142, 226, Kennedy, op.cit., pp.72-73, Abel, op.cit., pp.
190-191.
°° Abel, op.cit., p.191, Allison, Essence of Decision, op.cit., p.142.
671 Reeves, op.cit., p.375, Garthoff, Reflections..., op.cit., p.71n, Bernstein, "the Cuban
Missile Crisis", op.cit., pp. 103-104, Detzer, the Brink, op.cit., pp.157, 244, G.W. Ball,
the Past Has Another Pattern, New York: W.W. Norton, 1982, p.501n.
672 Bernstein, op.cit., p.103.
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crisis the Turkey-for-Cuba trade was discussed by American officials and Kennedy
was aware of it and he was himself involved in some of these discussions.673
5.3 Role of Jupiters in the Russian Move in Cuba
To explore the role of the Jupiters in the Soviet action to arm Cuba with
nuclear weapons will show to what extent Turkey contributed to a major move of
a superpower with nuclear missiles on its territory, whose warheads belonged to
another superpower.
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev began questioning encirclement of the Soviet
Union by American military bases as early as 1958 when he complained to Adlai
Stevenson, the Kennedy administration's ambassador to the United Nations, that
"we see ourselves surrounded by military bases... The Americans have bases in
England, Turkey, Greece... What would the Americans think if the Russians set
up bases in Mexico or some other place? How would you feel?" 674 In June 1959,
Khrushchev expressed his feeling of humiliation by the American nuclear bases
close to the Soviet border during his conversation with Averell Harriman, two-time
American presidential candidate who had served as Franklin Roosevelt's wartime
envoy to Stalin.675
In summer 1959 U.S. President Eisenhower predicted that placing the Jupiters
near the Soviet Union could lead the Russians to take actions in other places: "If
Mexico or Cuba had been penetrated by the communists and then began getting
arms and missiles from [the Soviets], we would be bound to look on such devel-
opments with the gravest concern and in fact... it would be imperative for us to
take... offensive military action." 67° In the same summer, Premier Khrushchev
complained to U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon about the American plan to
station the Jupiters in Turkey.677
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When some rumours erupted in February 1961 that the Americans were plan-
ning to transfer ownership of the Jupiter missiles to the Turks, Nikita Ryzhov,
the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, asked the Turkish foreign minister to tell him
what was going on. 678 During their summit meeting in June 1961, Khrushchev told
Kennedy: "can six million people really be a threat to the mighty United States?
If the United States felt threatened by tiny Cuba, what was the Soviet Union to
do about Turkey and Iran? These two countries are followers of the United States.
They march in its wake, and they have U.S. bases and rockets." 679 In his interview
with American columnist Drew Pearson in August 1961, Khrushchev pointed to
the American bases in Turkey; "maybe they are going to blow us up here."68°
It was suggested that Khrushchev first got the idea of deploying nuclear missiles
to Cuba in April 1962 during his talk with Defence Minister Marshal Rodion
Malinovsky in Crimea. 68 ' Malinovsky told him that nuclear missiles in Turkey, just
across the Black Sea, "could in a short time destroy all our southern cities... The
Americans have surrounded us with bases on all sides, and we have no possibility
and right to do the same."682
During his visit to Bulgaria in May 1962, Khrushchev strongly criticised the
installation of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. 683 The Soviet government issued a
public statement on 11 September 1962 complaining that
The whole world knows that the United States has ringed the Soviet Unioii and
other socialist countries with bases... They have brought armaments there in their ships,
and these armaments stationed along the frontier of the Soviet Union - in Turkey, Iran,
Greece, Italy, Britain, Holland, Pakistan and other countries belonging to the military
blocs of NATO, CENTO and SEATO... They consider this their right! But to others
the United States does not permit this even for defence...684
Under this awareness of what American bases and missiles around the Soviet
Union meant, the Soviets were struck with the idea of using the same American
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tactic to prevent the Americans from toppling the Castro regime in Cuba.° 85 In a
memoir attributed to himself, Khrushchev stated: "We had to establish a tangi-
ble and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean. But what
exactly? The logical answer was missiles. The United States had already sur-
rounded the Soviet Union with its own bomber bases and missiles. We knew that
American missiles were aimed against us in Turkey and Italy." 686 In a meeting of
Soviet officials, Soviet premier Khrushchev favoured missile deployment to Cuba
"to repay the Americans in kind for surrounding the Soviet Union with military
bases and missiles" and to teach them "what it is like to live under sights of nu-
clear weapons." Khrushchev thought that "faced with a fait accompli of secretly
installed missiles the pragmatic Americans would not dare to take irrational risks
and would learn to live with them just as the Soviet Union had learned to live with
American missiles in Turkey, Italy and West Germany."687
Before the Cuban crisis, the last time Soviet Premier Khrushchev expressed
his sharp objections to the installation of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy was
during his meeting with Foy Kohier, the new American ambassador to Moscow,
on 16 October 1962.688 Unlike American leaders Khrushchev was aware of the fact
that in a few days the first Jupiter missile launch position in Turkey would be
turned over to the Turks 689
 and perhaps misunderstanding that the Turks would
gain the ability to trigger the missiles led him to attribute too much importance
to the matter.°°° He told Kohler: "Just because I am building a fishing port in
Cuba, you want to go to war. After all I'm not doing anything you haven't done
to me in Turkey and Iran."69'
After the Cuban missile crisis broke out Soviet officials in the United Nations,
Britain and the USA urged a trade-off between Soviet missiles in Cuba and the
Jupiters in Turkey. 692 Soviet ambassador Ryzkov raised the issue in his meeting
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with Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun C. Erkin on 25 October 1962.°° In his
letter to Kennedy on 27 October 1962, Khrushchev stated:
...your actions, in effect, mean that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with
military bases... literally around our country... You say that Cuba worries you because
it lies at a distance of ninety miles across the sea from the shores of the United States.
However, Turkey lies next to us... You have stationed devastating rocket weapons... in
Turkey literally right next to us.°94
It is clear that the Soviets were always worried about nuclear weapons in
Turkey, very close to their country. They also used the issue for propaganda in
their confrontations with the Western camp. In any case Turkey was considered
a threat by the Soviet Union, therefore she was at the top of the Soviet defence
agenda. It is also fair to say that by giving the idea to them, the presence of the
Jupiters in Turkey contributed to the Soviet decision to deploy missiles to Cuba,
which brought the world to the edge of a nuclear war. Thus Turkey became an
indirect cause of a superpower conflict. However, it should be stated that the
Soviets did not originally intend to trade the Cuban missiles for the Jupiters.°95
When they faced a difficult situation arising from the strong American response,
by offering a trade-off Soviet officials probably wanted to gain something from a
bad situation and to appease military hawks at home.
5.4 Missile Trade Discussions During the Crisis
From the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis American officials predicted
that the Soviets might propose a trade-off between Turkish and Cuban missiles,
and they made preparations bearing this possibility in their mind. 696 Even before
Soviet missiles were spotted in Cuban territory a National Security Council staff
member prepared an argument rejecting similarities between Turkish and Cuban
missiles in the case of a Soviet demal1d to trade them: Soviet weapons in Cuba
were offensive and deployed secretly, Americaii weapons in Turkey were defensive
and deployed openly.697
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According to the notes of Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy's close counsel, in
the initial meetings of the Executive Committee (ExCom), which was established
by Kennedy to deal with the Cuban crisis, "the removal of our missile bases in
Turkey in exchange for the removal of the Cuban missiles [was discussed]... as
a possibility which Khrushchev was likely to suggest if we did not." 698 In the
meeting on Tuesday, October 16, some members suggested that Khrushchev might
be preparing to trade off the Cuban missiles for the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy.699
On Wednesday, October 17, even hawkish members who were in favour of an air
strike against Cuba proposed making a deal with the Soviets, withdrawing all
American nuclear forces based in Turkey - aircraft as well as missiles - in return
for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. 70° On the same day Adlai Stevenson,
the American ambassador to the United Nations, warned President Kennedy that
the world opinion would equate American missiles in Turkey with Soviet missiles
in Cuba and recommended that "you should [make] it clear that the existence of
nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything."701
According to Kennedy's special assistant Arthur Schlesinger's quotations from
minutes of the ExCom meeting on Friday, October 19, "more than once during the
afternoon Secretary [of Defence] McNamara voiced the opinion that the United
States... would at least have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey
and would probably have to pay more besides... to get the Soviet missiles out of
Cuba." On Saturday and Monday McNamara voiced the same opinion again and
emphasised that the United States would be lucky to get out of the crisis with
only a trade of the Turkish missiles. Nobody in these meetings raised objection to
McNamara's remarks.702
On the Saturday, October 20th, meeting of the ExCom, Adlai Stevenson recom-
mended that the United States should establish a bargaining position and should
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consider offering to abolish the American naval base at Guantanamo and to with-
draw its Turkish and Italian Jupiter missile bases if the Soviets would withdraw
their Cuban bases, and to send U.N. inspection teams to all the foreign bases
maintained by both sides to prevent their use in a surprise attack while the dis-
mantling was being carried out. 703
 In Stevenson's opinion, it was almost certain
that the Soviets would propose the trade and world opinion "would ask why it was
right for the United States to have bases in Turkey, but wrong for the Russians to
have bases in Cuba." 704 He was not proposing a simple trade but he was thinking
that to accomplish the significant goal of removing all Russian presence from the
Caribbean the United States ought to pay some price such as giving up some bases
of debatable military value.705
According to A.M. Schlesinger, who saw the classified ExCom minutes, after
hearing Stevenson's proposal almost every participant of the meeting "jumped on
Stevenson." 706
 Most participants feared that Stevenson's suggestion, by starting
with concessions, would legitimise Khrushchev's action and give him an easy tri-
umph. It would mean offering to pay Russia to take the missiles out and looking
weak and backing down against the Soviet Union. 707 Robert Kennedy, brother and
Attorney General of President Kennedy, was among those who strongly objected
to Stevenson's proposal. 708
 He told Stevenson's aide Schlesinger on Monday, 22
October, that "we will have to make a deal at the end, but we must stand ab-
solutely firm now. Concessions must come at the end of negotiations, not at the
beginning." 709 He also warned President John Kennedy that "he [Stevenson] is
not strong or tough enough to be representing us at the United Natioiis at a time
like this." 71° President Kennedy replied: "I think Adlai Stevenson showed plenty
of strength and courage, presenting that viewpoint at the risk of being called an
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appeaser... Maybe he went too far when he suggested giving up Guantanamo,
but... I admire him for saying what he did."711
111 the ExCom meeting in which Stevenson made his proposal President Kennedy
rejected his ideas. 712 From his point of view, accepting the removal of the Jupiters
would cause loss of American prestige, damage trust of NATO members in Amer-
ica and seem to confirm the idea Charles De Gaule planted that the United States
would sacrifice the interests of its allies to protect its own security. According to
ExCom minutes reported by Schlesinger, "Kennedy agreed that at an appropriate
time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to take strategic missiles
out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by the Russians. But he was firm
in saying that we should only make such a proposal in the future."713
On October 21, W. Averell Harriman, assistant secretary of state, counselled
President Kennedy about Khrushchev's position at home and likely Soviet pur-
poses and hinted that offering a trade of the Cuban and Turkish missiles might
rescue Khrushchev from taking a radical action to appease hawkish military lead-
ers. Harriman informed Kennedy that "there has undoubtedly been greatest pres-
sure on Khrushchev for a considerable time to do something about our ring of
bases, aggravated by our placing Jupiter missiles in Turkey."714
A State Department group working on U.N. aspects of the Cuban missile crisis
headed by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk
on Sunday, 21 October. During the meeting a proposal for a U.N. Security Coun-
cil resolution embracing mutual concessions for both American and Soviet sides,
perhaps including a missile trade, was put forward by Stevenson and seconded
by Secretary Rusk. There was a feeling among the participants that "if the mis-
siles were to be given up anyway, it might make sense, from the viewpoint of
U.N. planning, to offer that concession to gain a tactical advantage in the Secu-
rity Council." 715 According to Chayes, proposals were ultimately abandoned not
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because they added up to a 'Munich' but because they had great tactical disad-
vantages. One could not be sure that they would really satisfy demands of the
Soviets. "All the proposals would have required consultation with other affected
parties. The United States could hardly propose... drastic changes in the Turkish
defence posture without talking to this ally first."716
After Kennedy's speech on Tuesday, October 22, announcing a naval blockade
of Cuba, some American officials expressed their strong objections to a possible
trade-off of the Jupiters in Turkey. According to Bernstein, one American official
warned that "the danger in Turkey can be especially acute... Tithe alliance or the
United States seems to be pulling away from [Turkey] it could lead to the fall of
the present government."717
On Wednesday, October 24, George Ball drafted and sent duplicate telegrams
to the American ambassador in Turkey and the American NATO delegation in
Fontainebleau. 718 The telegrams stated that the administration considered "that a
negotiated solution for removal of Cuban offensive threat may involve dismantling
and removal of the Jupiters" and requested these American diplomats to assess the
political situation in Turkey and smooth the way for such an operation, without
harming America's relations with an important ally, Turkey. Ball's telegram also
asked if Turkey would consent to withdrawal of the Jupiters if there was some mili-
tary replacement such as deployment of an American-controlled Polaris submarine
or establishment of a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) within NATO.719
Bernstein cites the reply of Raymond Hare, U.S. ambassador to Turkey, to Ball
as follows:
[Hare responded that] removal of the Jupiters as part of an explicit trade would
weaken NATO and injure American relations with Turkey... Turkish officials would
greatly resent that 'their interests were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.'
They were proud that, unlike the Cubans, they were not tile stooge of a great power.
Both Turkey's political and military power were at stake... and the Jtipiters fulfilled
both needs... Hare reluctantly suggested a secret Soviet-American arrangement (without
Turkey's knowledge) and then the prompt dismantling of the missiles.72°
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The American ambassador to NATO, Thomas Finletter, also replied to Ball's
telegram that the Turks would resent the idea greatly. He warned State Depart-
ment officials that making a trade-off with the Russians could encourage them to
initiate other adventures and frighten other NATO members by leading them to
think that the next time they could be asked to give up some military capability
to appease the Soviets.72'
Meanwhile, the idea of a missile trade had been discussed in European press
and United Nations corridors from the beginning of the week. The British newspa-
per, The Guardian predicted that a Soviet countermove against the Jupiter bases
in Turkey was possible 722 and suggested "what is sauce for Cuba, is also sauce for
Turkey." 723 In fact, as Chayes states, "British newspapers of all political shades
had been urging the dismantling of the Turkish missiles as a basis for settlement
from the first announcemeut of the cisis." 724 Txe ctok of tk Ti'i'.s of Lo'o'a
on 26 October 1962 stated:
If it could be brought about there seems to be one way which President Kennedy
could secure the elimination of the missile bases in Cuba. That is by opening up
the broader question of precautions against surprise attack. Comparisons between the
Cubaii and the Turkish bases are hotly and quite rightly resented by most Americans.
The history and the whole extent are, indeed, different. Even so a case can be made for
banishing offensive missiles from each base.725
British Labour Party leader, Hugh Gaitskell, complained about American in-
sistence on continuing the crisis by pointing to American missi]es in Turicey: "if
indeed there were to be an American attack on Cuba on these grounds, it would
be difficult to see how the Russians would not able to justify a similar attack on
Turkey. If the ground for attack is that there are nuclear bases in neighbouring
territories, I am afraid this seems to follow."726
A more open proposal to trade Turkish for Cuban missiles as a way of ending
the crisis came from Washington Post columnist Walter Lippmann. In his column
on Thursday, 25 October, Lippmann stated:
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The way [of ending the crisis] is to try to negotiate a face-saving agreement. The
only place that is truly comparable with Cuba is Turkey. This is the only place where
there are strategic weapons right on the frontier of the Soviet Union... The Soviet
missile in Cuba, like the U.S. NATO base in Turkey, is of little military value. The
Soviet military base in Cuba is defenceless and the base in Turkey is all but obsolete.
The two bases could be dismantled without altering the world balance of power.727
It was likely that Soviet leaders, who probably thought that Lippmann's col-
umn spoke for the President, assumed that the White House was sending up a trial
balloon through Lipprnann. 728 Beschloss speculates that
once Lippmann made his Thursday proposal, Kennedy may have thought it useful
to call Khrushchev's attention to one route by which they could negotiate an end to the
crisis. Had lie wished to warn Khrushchev away from such a route of bargaining, he
could have easily asked Salinger [his press secretary] to issue a statement to the effect
that the United States could not accept the suggestion of a Turkey-for-Cuba trade that
had appeared in public prints. Knowing Khrushchev might assume that Lippmann was
proposing the trade on his behalf, the President let the column stand.3°
On Thursday, October 25, a special National Security Council committee rec-
ommended the withdrawal of Turkish missiles in return for removal of Soviet mis-
sues from Cuba. Not to antagonise the Turks and other NATO members such an
offer "might be expressed in generalised form, such as withdrawal of missiles from
territory [near] the other [great power]."73°
On Friday, October 26, Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland proposed
that only nuclear powers should station nuclear weapons in their territories, thus
the United States and the Soviet Union should withdraw their nuclear arms from
non-nuclear countries including Turkey and Cuba. Endorsing Cleveland's resolu-
tion, Averell Harriman suggested that "agreement should not be put forward as
a trade over Cuba [and Turkey] but as a first and important step towards disar-
mament." 731 On the same day, to provide a face-saving solution for the Soviets
a special NSC committee recommended suggesting "a summit conference, to be
preceded by the agreement of NATO and Turkey to accept a Multilateral Force
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and to remove missiles from Turkey and Italy." 72 Director of the Policy Planning
Council Walt W. Rostow's solution was to secure NATO's speedy approval for
MLF with an agreement to dismantle the Jupiters. He thought the Soviets "could
read it [dismantling the Jupiters] as a way of helping them off the hook." 733 In the
ExCom meeting in Friday morning, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson predicted that
the Soviets would ask the United States to guarantee the territorial integrity of
Cuba and to dismantle U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey. John McCone, director of
the CIA, strongly objected the linkage of Cuban missiles with Turkish missiles.734
According to Garthoff, several recent Soviet disclosures revealed that there was
a previously unreported meeting of Attorney General Robert Kennedy with the
Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, at the Soviet Embassy on
Friday, October 26. In this meeting, when Dobrynin complained about Ameri-
can double standards in considering the presence of American missiles in Turkey
legitimate while denying legitimacy of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Robert Kennedy
asked if the Turkish missiles were really important for the Soviet Union and in-
formed Dobrynin that President Kennedy was planning to phase out the Jupiter
missiles in Turkey. "He, then, left the room to talk with the president, and upon
his return confirmed the president's intention to remove the missiles from Turkey
if the overall situation was normalised. Dobrynin then reported this possibility to
735
It is clear that all U.S. officials were willing to trade the Jupiters in Turkey with
Soviet missiles in Cuba on the condition that the Turks and other NATO members
would not know about it and/or would not show resentment against it. Most of
U.S. officials were even in favour of risking resentment of NATO members to oust
the Soviets from the Caribbean in a peaceful way whereas some of them were really
worried about its repercussions for U.S. relations with Turkey and NATO. In any
case Turkey was on the discussion table, being a part of the missile crisis, and
Turkish authorities did not know about it.
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5.5 Russian Moves to End the Crisis Peacefully
The first Soviet initiative to find a peaceful solution for the Cuban crisis came
on Friday, 26 October, through an unofficial channel. Aleksandr Fomin, a counsel-
lor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, lunched with John Scali, the diplomatic
reporter of the American ABC TV, and asked him if the United States "would
be interested in settlement of the Cuban crisis along these lines: Bases [in Cuba]
would be dismantled under the U.N.'s supervision and Castro would pledge not to
accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever, in return for U.S. pledge not to invade
Cuba." 73° When President Kennedy heard Fomin's proposal he agreed with Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk that it was an acceptable basis for the settlement and told
Scali: "Tell them you've gotten a favourable response from the highest authority in
the government" 737 adding, "without attributing it to the President". John Scali
then informed Fomin that "I have reason to believe that the United States gov-
ernment sees real possibilities in this and supposes that the representatives of the
Soviet Union and the United States in New York can work this matter out with
[U.N. Secretary General] U Thant and with each other." 738 Fomin, then, promised
that this information would be passed on immediately to the highest levels.
Soviet Premier Khrushchev's long personal letter to Kennedy on the evening
of the same day repeated the same general proposal made by Aleksandr Fomin.
The letter stated: "If assurances were given that the president of the United States
would not participate in an attack on Cuba and the blockade lifted, the question
of the removal or the destruction of the missile sites in Cuba would then be an
entirely different question."739
These acceptable Soviet proposals made American officials optimistic about
ending the crisis peacefully and caused great relief. But when the ExCom met
in the morning of Saturday, October 27, a new message from Khrushchev had
arrived. Khrushchev's new letter added a new element to the solution of the crisis:
Removal of American missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal from
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Cuba. Roger Hilsman, the State Department intelligence chief, later recalled that
"it was the blackest hour of the crisis."740
The proposal in Khrushchev's second letter was as follows:
We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive
weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the United Nations.
Your representatives will make a statement to the effect that the United States, on its
part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its
analogous weapons from Turkey... Of course it is necessary that the governments of
Cuba and Turkey would allow these [U.N.] representatives to come to their countries
and check fulfilment of this commitment, which each side undertakes... We, having
assumed this commitment in order to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba
and Turkey and to increase their confidence in their security, will make a statement in
the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet government gives a solemn pledge to
respect the integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in
its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory as a place
d'armes for such invasion and also will restrain those who would think of launching an
aggression against Turkey either from Soviet territory or from the territory of other
states bordering on Turkey.74'
The American government would give exactly same assurances regarding Cuba.
The reasons for Soviet Premier Khrushchev including a missile trade in a set-
tlement of the crisis could be summarised as follows: Firstly, in their meeting on 26
October, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the American president was willing
to phase out the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Dobrynin reported this exchange
to Moscow. Secondly, a missile trade to end the crisis was popular in the Western
press and U.N. corridors and the Soviets knew this. Thirdly, Walter Lippmann's
open proposal of a missile trade might have been seen by the Soviet rulers as a trial
balloon of the Americans. Finally, it is possible that hawkish Soviet military lead-
ers put pressure on Khrushchev for radical action and that Khrushchev proposed
the missile trade to appease them.
On why Khrushchev did not propose the Turkey-for-Cuba trade in his first
letter Beschloss states:
Georgi Kornienko [a counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1962] and
other Soviet officials suggested in 1991 that on Friday night [26 October 1962], the
Chairman [Khrushchev] was convinced that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent and
that to achieve a quick settlement, he dropped his intention to demand removal of the
740 Bernstein, op.cit., p.113.
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Turkish missiles... By Saturday, surrounded by his generals, Khrushchev considered
such an assault more remote and thus included the demand in the second letter.742
With Khrushchev's proposal Turkish missiles were put on the bargaining table,
thus Turkey became a direct part of the crisis outside the knowledge and intention
of her rulers.
5.6 Danger of a Nuclear War and Turkey
It was considered highly possible by American officials that if America attacked
Soviet missiles in Cuba and thus killed Soviet citizens there, the Soviet Union
would retaliate by attacking the Jupiter missiles and American bases in Turkey.743
As early as Tuesday, October 23, Secretary Rusk had told George Ball that "we
have won a considerable victory. You and I are still alive." On that morning the
Secretary of State's fears had not been realised. The Russians had not blocked
the autobahn to Berlin. They had not bombed the Jupiter bases in Turkey or
moved to close the Dardanelles. 744
 In the ExCom meeting on Saturday, October
27, President Kennedy said that the NATO countries did not realise that if the
USA carried out an air strike against Cuba probably in two or three days and the
Soviet Union answered by attacking Turkey all NATO was going to be involved.
The president, then, would have to decide whether he would fire nuclear missiles
in Turkey.745
When a Soviet SAM missile shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane
over Cuba on 27 October, killing its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., a nuclear
war between two super powers seemed even more imnisnent. Eare in tix 'ek,
the ExCom had decided that if a U-2 were shot down, the United States would
retaliate against a single SAM site. If a second U-2 were attacked, the United States
would destroy all SAM sites in Cuba. According to Allison and Robert Kennedy
"in the ExCom [meeting on Saturday, 27 October], there was almost unanimous
agreement that the United States had to attack early the next morning" with
bombers and fighters and destroy the SAM sites. 746 Kennedy's counsel Theodore
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Sorensen later wrote that "our little group seated around the cabinet table in
continuous session that Saturday felt nuclear war to be closer on that day than at
any time in the nuclear age."747
In spite of eagerness among top American officials for an attack, President
Kennedy decided to stand back and give one more chance to the Soviets. 748 The
president held back on the order until they could be sure that the U-2 plane had
not accidentally crashed but had been shot down by a Soviet missile. 749
 His most
important concern at that moment of the crisis was a nuclear holocaust causing
a human tragedy all over the world. He told the ExCom members that "it isn't
the first step that concerns me, but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth
step - and we do not go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so."°
According to Allison, this process of escalating to a nuclear war would directly
involve Turkey at the beginning.75'
Robert Kennedy described those critical moments and President Kennedy's
concern about involvement of other countries in his memoir as follows:
His mind went to other areas of the world... If we attacked Cuba and the Russians
reciprocated with an attack on Turkey, would or should the Turkish missiles be fired?
He ordered preparations taken to defuse missiles with atomic warheads, so that he
personally would have to give permission before they were used. What role Turkey and
the rest of NATO have in determining our response? Within a very short time, they
might be faced with decisions of life and death. Before that happened, should they not
have a right to learn what we were deciding to do, particularly if that was likely to affect
them in such a rapid and possibly devastating way? These hourly decisions, necessarily
made with such rapidity, could be made only by the president of the United States,
but any of them might close and lock doors for peoples and governments in many other
lands, we had to be aware of this responsibility at all times, he said, aware that we were
deciding, the president was deciding, for the United States, the Soviet Union, Turkey,
NATO and really for all mankind.752
Thus, the presence of the Jupiters on its territory positioned Turkey under a
direct threat of a nuclear war and put its fate in the hands of the Americans and the
Soviets. She could be one of very few targets which would be seriously damaged
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in a limited nuclear war which would be halted before escalating to involve the
whole humanity. In the event of an all-out nuclear war, Turkey's situation would
not present a special, different case than others.
5.7 Role of the Jupiters in Resolving the Crisis
In the Saturday morning meeting of the ExCom (October 27), President Kennedy
was really frustrated with hearing the new Soviet proposal. The Turkish missiles
had put him in a very difficult situation. Because of them, Kennedy was confronted
with one of two difficult choices: to give in to this Soviet demand and look weak
and shake the Western alliance or refuse the Soviet proposal and possibly bring
about a thermonuclear war. 753
 In one point of the discussions Kennedy boiled
with anger and reportedly shouted: "Get those frigging missiles off the board!"754
Hafner suggests that "the President, in his anger that Saturday morning, seemed
to think that if the Jupiters had not been there, no Soviet proposal for a trade-off
would have been possible. That is unlikely." 755 There were other bargaining points
and it was easy for the Soviets to come with another trade proposal.
At that moment of the crisis President Kennedy had come to a point that
he was now utterly determined to withdraw American missiles from Turkey in
order to remove a target that the Soviets could legitimately strike in retaliation
for an American action or subject to a trade again in the future. He seemed to
be ready to come to terms with Khrushchev's proposal. The President privately
talked with Secretaries McNarnara and Rusk at the close of the morning session
of the ExCorn (27 October), instructing them to consider the possibility of missile
trade very carefully. He did not want to offend or frighten Turkey and other
NATO members. He assigned McNamara's deputy Roswell Gilpatric to spend the
afternoon in McGeorge Bundy's office at the White House with representatives
of the State Department and the Joint of Chief Staff and prepare a scenario for
withdrawing the Jupiters from Turkey and Italy in the possible earliest time.756
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In the afternoon meeting President Kennedy pondered upon the notion of
bargaining. Although he was willing to get rid of the Turkish missiles, President
Kennedy regretted that "the Russians had made the Turkish proposal in the most
difficult way," 757 "it's not as if it was a private proposal, which would give us an
opportunity to negotiate with the Turks. Khrushchev has put it out in a way that
the Turks are bound to say they don't agree to this." 758 Kennedy also said:
we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and Berlin over missiles in
Turkey which are of little military value. From the political point of view, it would be
hard to get support on an airstrike against Cuba because many would think that we
would make a good trade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey... We cannot
propose to withdraw the missiles... but the Turks could offer to do so. [They] must be
informed of the great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have
to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over the missiles.'9
In the ExCom meeting after 4 p.m. Kennedy expressed his feeling that "we
would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days... If we could succeed in
freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then
we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians." When Bundy warned
that "if we sound as if we wanted to make this trade to our NATO people and to
all the people who are tied to us by alliance, we are in real trouble", the President
replied, "yes, but if we refused to discuss such a trade and then take military
action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult situation." 76° In the meeting some
members and the Joint of Chiefs staff suggested a military action: reject the trade,
defuse the Jupiters in Turkey, inform the Soviets, and then attack Cuba. Kennedy
did not like the idea because "if the Russians do attack the NATO countries [in
retaliation], we do not want them [NATO allies] to say that they had not been
consulted about the actions we were taking." 76 ' At one point President Kennedy
said, "the best position now was to let Khrushchev know that the United States
was glad to discuss Turkish missiles with them once we get a positive indication
that they've ceased their work in Cuba."762
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In late afternoon in the cabinet room Kennedy suggested again, "I think... I'll
just say [to Khrushchev], 'of course we ought to try to go to the first route which
you suggest'... But it seems to me we ought to have this discussion with NATO
about these Turkish missiles." 763 In an informal discussion following the afternoon
meeting, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson asked George Ball "why we were not
prepared to [accept the trade proposal] if we were prepared to give up the use of
U.S. missiles in Turkey?" Ball responded that "last week we thought it might be
acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would
save Berlin. Why not now? We can... replace the missiles in Turkey by assigning
Polaris submarines to the area" •764
As for the issue of preparing a response to Khrushchev's letters American offi-
cials differed. State Department officials generally were in favour of sending a letter
openly rejecting the trade proposal. In the morning session of the ExCom meeting,
Assistant Secretary of Defence Paul Nitze had said that "it would be an anathema
to the Turks to pull the missiles out... The next Soviet step would be a demand
for denuclearization of the entire NATO area." McGeorge Bundy's view was that
"we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally.., to serve our own
interests, i.e., getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba." 765 Rusk and Ball predicted
that such a trade "would undermine the faith of the whole alliance in America's
pledged word" and State Department's Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson argued
that "the Russians would certainly interpret the President's acceptance as proof
of weakness." 766 In the afternoon session, Rusk and Ball submitted a draft letter
as response from the American President to Khrushchev answering arguments of
Khrushchev's latest letter, rejecting a missile trade and demanding a halt to work
on the missiles in Cuba. 767 The other members, including Robert Kennedy, ob-
jected to the draft by arguing that "it would be difficult for the administration
to persuade world opinion, and perhaps opinion at home as well, that prolong-
jug or intensifying the crisis was preferable to withdrawing obsolete missiles from
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Turkey."768
Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen came up with the idea that President
Kennedy should ignore Khrushchev's second letter and respond to the terms of
the first letter. With the President's instruction, Robert Kennedy and Sorensen
left the room, drafted a letter consisting of their proposal, and submitted it to the
ExCom. With minor changes the committee accepted the letter and gave consent
to sending it to Khrushchev. 769 The deal which was proposed by Kennedy's letter
to Khrushchev on October 27 was as follows:
1- You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate
United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards,
to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2- We, on our part,
would agree -upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United
Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments- (a) to remove
promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an
invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would
be prepared to do likewise.770
Although the letter did not mention the Jupiter missiles specifically, it left the
door open for some future arrangement about them. It stated:
The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work
toward a more general arrangement regarding 'other armaments', as proposed in your
second letter which you made public... If your letter signifies that you are prepared
to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to
consider with our allies any useful proposals.
But Kennedy's letter also warned: "The continuation of this threat, or a pro-
longing of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader
questions of European and world security would surely lead to an intensified situ-
ation on the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world."771
After sending this letter to Khrushchev, in order to ensure world peace Pres-
ident Kennedy asked his brother Robert Kennedy to make a private arrangement
with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the Jupiters. This secret decision was taken
by the President in the Oval Office in the presence of Rusk, Bundy, McNamara,
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Sorensen and Robert Kennedy after the afternoon meeting of the ExCom on Oc-
tober 27 . 772 It was Dean Rusk who proposed it. According to McGeorge Bundy's
notes, "the fact that Rusk, stalwart on interests of the NATO alliance, made the
proposal encouraged rapid consensus and presidential decision... Rusk was aware
of the President's own favourable inclination and saw it as appropriate to assist
the President in using this diplomatic asset."773
Robert Kennedy's memoir cites his meeting with Dobrynin as follows:
[I told Dobrynin:] We had to have commitment by tomorrow that these bases would
be removed ... He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would
remove them... Perhaps his country might feel it necessary to take retaliatory action;
but before that was over, there would be not only dead Americans but dead Russians
as well. He [Dobrynin] raised the question of our removing the missiles from Turkey. I
said that there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of
threat or pressure, and that in the last analysis this was a decision would have to be
made by NATO. However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove these
missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal
some time ago, and it was our judgement that, within a short time after the crisis was
over, these missiles would be gone.774
Robert Kennedy also warned that the understanding would be cancelled at
once if the Soviets tried to claim public credit for removing the Turkish missiles.775
Robert Kennedy's message to Dobrynin had double characteristics, an ultirna-
turn coupled with a way out. It threatened an American attack on Cuba unless the
Soviets agreed with terms of the American proposal. On the other hand, it showed
a way out to the Soviets by stating the American pledge not to invade Cuba in
return for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. The American concession
of withdrawing the Jupiter missiles in Turkey was aimed at saving the face of the
Soviets and smoothing the way for them to accept a peaceful solution. It had to be
kept secret, otherwise the American administration would come under attack from
several sides, including the Republicans, the Pentagon, militant ExCorn members
and America's NATO allies.
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When Dobrynin complained in 1989 that Americans were still refusing to ac-
knowledge that the Jupiters were part of an explicit Soviet-American deal to settle
the missile crisis, Sorensen made the following statement:
Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert Kennedy's book did not adequately express
that the 'deal' on the Turkish missiles was part of the resolution of the crisis. And here
I have a confession to make... I was the editor of Robert Kennedy's book... His diary
was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but at that time it was still a secret even
on the American side, except for the six of us who had been present at that meeting.
So I took it upon myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is why the Ambassador
is somewhat justified in saying that the diaries are not as explicit as his conversation.776
In the Saturday night meeting of the ExCom the participants agreed not to
tell other NATO countries and Thrkey about the private missile deal. Kennedy
told the ExCom members what should be said to U.S. ambassador to Turkey:
Let's give him an explanation of what we're trying to do. We're trying to get it
back on the original proposition of last night... because we don't want to get into this
[Jupiters] trade. If it's unsuccessful, then... it's possible that we may have to get back
on the Jupiter thing. If we do, then we would of course want it to come from the Turks
themselves and NATO, rather than just the United States. We're hopeful, however,
that that won't come. If it does, his judgement on how it should be handled.., we're
prepared to do the Polaris and others, does he think this thing can be made?777
Meanwhile a special message was sent to Finletter for Sunday's NATO meeting,
emphasising that he should not "hint of any [American] readiness to meet Soviet
Jupiter exchange proposal."778
On Sunday morning, October 28, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy's letter
by accepting its terms without referring to the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The
crisis was over now.779
According to more recent revelations of Dean Rusk in 1987, in the evening
of 27 October 1962 after Robert Kennedy's departure to see Dobrynin, President
Kennedy privately asked Secretary Rusk to deliver a secret message to Andrew
Cordier, former U.N. parliamentarian. Rusk's statement is as follows:
[T]here is a postscript which I only can furnish. It was clear to me that President
Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the
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missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event. He instructed
me to telephone the late Andrew Cordier, then at Columbia University, and dictate
to him a statement which would be made by U Thant, the Secretary General of the
United Nations, proposing the removal of both the Jupiters and the missiles in Cuba.
Mr Cordier was to put that statement in the hands of U Thant only after further signal
from us. That step was never taken and the statement I furnished to Mr Cordier has
never seen the light of day. So far as I know, President Kennedy, Andrew Cordier and
I were the only ones who knew of this particular step.78°
As was understood from this revelation, the United States, as a last resort,
would accept an open trade which was literally proposed by an independent person.
It is clear that President Kennedy was ready to pay the political price rather than
go to war. Dean Rusk said in 1987 that he felt the Cordier pioy "would have been
used before we landed troops in Cuba, because landing those troops... would have
been a major escalation from the Soviet point of view."78'
On Monday, 29 October, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin brought Robert Kennedy
an unsigned draft letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy, spelling out their secret
agreement on the Turkish missiles. Dobrynin's original aim was to ensure a formal
American pledge to withdraw the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and to get a presi-
dential letter fulfilling this purpose. 782
 According to Dobrynin's account of this
meeting "Robert Kennedy told him that it would be very hard for the United
States to accept the letter, since withdrawal of the Turkish missiles had to be
sanctioned by NATO. This would take time. He renewed his guarantee, on behalf
of the President, that the missiles would be gone within four to five months."783
After studying the letter with President Kennedy, the next day Robert Kennedy
told Dobrynin that they could not accept any such written exchange. There could
be no quid pro quo in this matter. He said: "Take back your letter, reconsider
it and if you feel it is necessary to write letters then we will also write one which
you cannot enjoy. Also if you should publish any document indicating a deal then
it is off and also if done afterward will further affect the relationship [of the two
countries]." Although Robert Kennedy assured Dobrynin that the missiles would
be gone in a near future, he emphasised that "it was important not to publicise it"
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because he and the President would appear to be "purveying a falsehood to the
American public."784
The secret initiatives of the American administration which were mentioned
above were known to only few people close to President John Kennedy. Other
members of the ExCom, the American Congress, the American people and Amer-
ica's allies believed that the President was determined not to bargain with the
Soviets on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. American officials publicly claimed that
the Jupiter missiles did not play any kind of role whatsoever in resolving the Cuban
crisis. On 29 October 1962 Rusk cabled Ambassadors Hare and Finletter that "no
'deal' of any kind was made involving Turkey." In 1963, McNamara told the House
Appropriations Committee: "without any qualifications whatsoever there was ab-
solutely no deal between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the
removal of the Jupiter weapons from either Italy or Turkey." 785 In his testimony in
an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1963,
Dean Rusk told Senators that the administration had long been planning to phase
out the Jupiters and that their removal was "not the basis of any deal or agree-
ment". When Senator Bourke Hickenlooper asked whether the Secretary meant
that the removal of the missiles from Turkey "was in no way, shape or form, di-
rectly or indirectly, connected with the settlement, the discussion or manipulation
of the Cuban situation," Rusk replied: "that is correct, sir."788
It is clear from revelations that the Jupiters were a part of the U.S.-Soviet deal
in ending the crisis. Kennedy had secretly pledged to scrap the Turkish missiles
without informing the Turks. American authorities were even prepared to make
the trade openly if it was necessary. Turkish response and interests obviously held
secondary place for the Americans who were dying to see the end of the crisis.
5.8 Turkey's Attitude During the Crisis
From the outset of the Cuban missile crisis, Turkey stood staunchly behind its
ally, the United States, and without hesitation gave its full support to all American
actions during the crisis. Turkey was one of the first countries which announced
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that it would comply with the American decision to establish a naval blockade of
Cuba. 787 On 22 October 1962, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, Prime Minister
Ismet Inönii, Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin and Chief of the General Staff
Cevdet Sunay met in the presidential palace. They confirmed that Turkey was
one of the first targets of a possible war and discussed what precautions could be
taken to minimise the loss in Turkey if a war broke out. Prime Minister Jnönii said
that his government was going to support America without condition until the last
moment of the crisis. In his opinion, America was right in its worries about Cuba
and should be supported by Turkey as a requirement of Turkey's commitments to
the NATO alliance.788
In his speech to the Turkish Parliament on 24 October 1962, Inönü said:
Thrkey's whole hope is that the dispute could be solved by peaceful means. But
if one of our allies asked us to do our duty, we shall of course fulfil our obligations.
We are keeping steadily in mind as a faithful ally the complaint and serious anxiety
of the United States... We are quite sure that the American nation is sincerely trying
to achieve a peaceful solution as befits a great nation which sincerely desires to live in
peace. 789
On the same day, President Gürsel told journalists: "America is our friend
and ally. We have to sympathise with the American attitude [towards the Cuban
crisis]. We, the Turkish nation, are determined in respecting alliances to which we
belong, therefore there is nothing odd in our attitude of supporting our friends in
their difficult times."79°
After the Cuban crisis, Turkish officials continued to express their sympathy
with America's attitude during the crisis. In his speech to the Turkish National
Assembly on 19 January 1963 Foreign Minister Erkin praised the American ac-
tion which "prevented the crisis from developing to more dangerous stages and
abolished the miscalculation of the enemy side that the United States was not
determined enough to protect vital interests of the West." Erkin also proudly
mentioned that the speech of the Turkish prime minister in front of Parliament,
787 M. Gönlflbol, et al., Ole ylarla Turk Dz Politikasi, Ankara: A.U. S.B.F. Yaymlari, No.
407. 1977, p.338.
788 M. Toker, "Ismet Paa ile 4 Buhranh Yil", Milliyet, 4 February 1969, p.5.
789 Millet Ivleclisi Tatanak Dergisi (MMTD), 24 October 1962, term 1, sess.1, vol.8, p.246.
790 Cumhuriyet, 25 October 1962, p.5.
181
which declared open support for America, strengthened the feelings of trust and
gratification of America and other NATO members towards Turkey.79'
The Turkish public, too, supported America during the Cuban crisis. But
the Turkish people did not know that the crisis put Turkey under a great danger.
Most Turks were not even aware before the crisis that there were American-made
Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory. On behalf of the main opposition party, MP
Fethi Teveto1u told the Turkish press that the Justice Party had endorsed the
government's attitude which suited "Turkey's alliance relations and its important
place within NATO." 792 Youth organisations issued statements backing America
and the Turkish government's attitude and sent a Turkish flag and a letter to
American President Kennedy, supporting his policy. According to Metin Toker,
the Turkish government was receiving messages approving its position from all over
the country.793
While supporting the American side during the Cuban crisis, the Turks greatly
resented ideas making comparisons between Cuba and Turkey and proposing a
trade-off between the Turkish and Cuban missiles as a way of ending the crisis.
Accepting the missile trade under Soviet pressure was impossible for the Turks.
They were proud that they were not the stooge of a great power and could not
stomach the bargaining of their interests by a great power to appease an enemy
state.
When Khrushchev's official proposal of the missile trade was known by the
whole world, Turkish officials did not make any comment on it. The Times cor-
respondent interpreted this situation as follows: "Behind the almost complete si-
lence one can detect a certain irritation that Turkey was not consulted or, it seems,
hardly even informed, before the American-Soviet exchange of messages involving
Turkey's defence arrangements and vital interests." As the correspondent stated,
Turkish officials followed the American line in interpreting the proposal of missile
trade: "There is no similarity between the Cuban and the Turkish bases, not only
because of the complete different fashion in which they were set up [the Cuban mis-
siles were deployed secretly while the Turkish ones were deployed openly], but also
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because the Turkish bases are NATO bases and are part of a well-publicised West-
ern defence network." The correspondent cited the view of a source close to the
Turkish Foreign Ministry: "The question of any withdrawal of missile bases from
Turkey is a matter not for Turkey alone but for the whole of NATO to decide."794
On 31 October 1962, in his statement to the press, Turkish Foreign Minis-
ter Feridun C. Erkin indirectly commented on Soviet demands of withdrawal of
American missiles from Turkey: "Those who have demanded abolition of our bases
first should themselves promise to abolish their bases which constituted a threat
to Turkey." 795 Later on 9 January 1963 Erkin told the Turkish Parliament that
during the Cuban crisis the Soviets tried to bargain the Jupiter missiles in Turkey
with Cuban missiles but this Soviet proposal was flatly rejected by the Ameri-
cans. He also added that no decision concerned Turkey could be taken without its
participation. 706
The Turkish press showed great anger against Khrushchev's official proposal
of a missile trade-off. Earlier on 24 October 1962 Cumhuriyet columnist Ecvet
Güresin had warned that in order to put the Americans in a difficult situation
the Soviet Union could try to make bargain on NATO bases in Turkey. 797 Other
newspaper columnists claimed that it was not fair to make comparisons between the
Cuban and Turkish missiles because while the former was offensive and changed the
status quo, the latter was defensive and kept the status quo which was established
in 1957. Therefore, the press comments suggested, neither Turkey nor America
could take the Soviet proposal into consideration. 798 In fact, Turkish officials and
Turkish people were almost sure that their ally, the United States, would not make
such a concession which would harm the cohesion of the NATO alliance.
5.9 Implications of the Crisis for Turkey
When the Soviet-American deal on the Cuban and Turkish missiles was known
by the world, it caused a deep resentment and apprehension in Turkish public
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opinion and led to accusations that the United States decided to withdraw the
Jupiters as a part of its deal with the Soviets without consulting the Turkish
government, which actually owned the missiles (but not their warheads), for the
sake of her own interests, pushing the Soviets out of the Caribbean and preventing
an armed combat with them. It was feared that she treated Turkey as a client
state whose interests were negotiable with enemy states. It was clear that in the
future when American interests demanded, the United States would not hesitate
to engage in deals with other powers at the expense of Turkey.799
The Turkish prime minister in 1962, Ismet Inönii, made the following expla-
nations to the Turkish Parliament later in January 1970: The Americans told the
Turkish leaders that they wanted to remove the Jupiter missiles in Turkey because
they were outdated and obsolete and to replace them with Polaris submarines
carrying nuclear missiles. The Turkish rulers found the American proposal rea-
sonable, therefore accepted it without hesitation. But later they found out that
the Americans had made a deal with the Soviets on the missiles. Keeping this
fact in mind, the present Turkish leaders should be careful about not allowing the
Americans to involve Turkey in unwanted crisis situations against its will.800
Another implication of the Cuban crisis for the Turks was that Turkey might
become a target for a Soviet nuclear attack because of American bases and nuclear
weapons on its territory. Soviet premier Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy on 27
October 1962 had stated as a part of its proposal that the Soviet Union would
give a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and sovereignty of
Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs and not to invade it. It means that
if the United States did not accept the Soviet proposal the Soviet Union might
do the opposite. In fact, according to Metin Toker's account of the Cuban crisis,
the Turkish leaders felt that their country together with the United States was on
the brink of a nuclear war. Ismet Inönii was fearing that it would be too difficult
this time to keep Turkey out of the war if a conflict erupted between the two
superpowers. 801 During the crisis Turkey went through almost a state of war for
Turkish columnist Fahir Armaoglu rightly commented that the Turkish response to U.S. attitude
on the Cyprus question after 1963 was so strong mainly because of U.S. attitude on the Cuban
missile crisis.
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few days. The Soviet ambassador in Ankara, Ryzhov, was threatening Turkish
politicians by saying that a nuclear war was at the door of Turkey. The Turkish
rulers were thinking that if a nuclear war erupted, the Hiroshimas of this nuclear
war would be Istanbul and Ankara.802
During the Cuban crisis, probably for the first time the Turkish rulers realised
tl1at increased military force did not mean increased security. The crisis showed
that having nuclear missiles and being part of NATO might not deter enemies.
Danger of war could arise without warning and Turkey's alliance ties might not
be able to do anything about it. This was a serious blow to the long-held security
perception of Turkish leaders. It made them accept the withdrawal of the Jupiter
missiles without voicing strong complaints. The Turks also understood that a
decision taken by Washington might jeopardise Turkey's security and her very
existence. The lives of 30 million Turkish people might come under threat because
of a disagreement between the two superpowers in a region which is thousands of
miles away from Turkey.
5.10 Removal of the Jupiters and its Implications for Turkey
Immediately after the Cuban crisis was over, American officials began to take
necessary actions for the removal of the Jupiters. Defence Secretary Robert Mc-
Namara said later that at the end of the Cuban crisis, "right away I went back to
the Pentagon and ordered them [the Turkish missiles] withdrawn, cut up and pho-
tographed so that I could personally see that those missiles had been destroyed."803
Reportedly McNamara told John McNaugton, the general counsel of the Defence
Department: "I'm going to tell you something. I don't want you to ask any ques-
tions about it. I don't want you to say to anybody else why it's being done, 'cause
I'm not going to tell you, I just want you to do it, and I want every single missile
removed out of Turkey." 804 On Monday, 29 October 1962, an interdepartmental
task force was assembled to work on the removal of the Jupiters under the chair-
manship of McNaughton, who said in the first meeting: "Those missiles are going
802 Ibid., 5 February 1969, p.5.
803 Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev, op.cit., p.588n.
804 Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., p.98.
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to be out of there by April 1, [1963] if we have to shoot them out."805
On 9 November 1962 Dean Rusk advised President Kennedy that the Jupiters
in Turkey and Italy should not be withdrawn in the near future on the grounds
that "they were useful sponges in the event of a Soviet first strike because the 45
missiles would be targets for Soviet weapons that would otherwise be aimed at
Western Europe... If the Jupiters were soon removed, American credibility would
be found wanting, and allies besides Turkey and Italy might no longer trust the
United States. But as modern and effective weapons systems come into being...
and as the Cuban missile crisis recedes, the phasing out of the [Jupiters] would at
a later time be entirely feasible." 80° Rusk's argument was not incompatible with
the U.S. promise to the Soviets that the missiles would go in about five months. In
early November 1962 and January 1963, McBundy's aide Robert Komer, ignorant
of the deal, strongly advised against the withdrawal of the missiles from Turkey,
pointing to uncertainties in Turkish political outlook.807
In January 1963, Turkish and American officials discussed what should be done
about the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. On 9 January 1963 Turkish Foreign Minister
Erkin informed the Turkish National Assembly that Turkey would join the joint
discussions in NATO, which would consider the value of NATO's present weapon
systems. He said that if NATO decided to replace some weapon systems with
others because of technological changes it would strengthen the security of NATO
and Turkey and therefore Turkey would accept it.808
Eventually Erkin declared in the Turkish Parliament on 17 February 1963 that
the Turkish government officially informed the American atn6assadot üì
that Turkey accepted the American proposal to replace the Jupiter missiles in
Turkey with Polaris submarines which would be placed in the Mediterranean.809
In April 1963 the United States and Turkey exchanged notes for this end. 81° On
805 Chayes, the Cuban Missile Crisis, op.cit., p.98n, Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics...",
op.cit., p.319.
806 Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., pp.98-99.
807 Ibid., p.99.
808 Sezer, op.cit., p.133.
809 JvIA'ITD, 17 February 1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.13, PP. 222-223.
810 flarris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., p.94.
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25 April U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara informed President Kennedy, "the last
Jupiter came down [in Turkey] yesterday", and it would be flown out at the end
of the week. A Polaris submarine with 16 missiles was deployed to the area.811
The removal of the Jupiters was met by the Turkish public opinion with a cer-
tain degree of caution. Some articles appeared in the press, expressing doubts that
the removal of the Jupiters would weaken Turkey's defence system and cause a se-
curity gap in deterring the Soviet Union. Some newspaper columnists warned that
after the Jupiters were gone, Turkey's strategic importance might seem decreased,
therefore foreign aid to Turkey might be reduced. 812 In his speeches to the Turkish
Parliament, Foreign Minister Erkin stated that these kinds of doubts expressed
by Turkish writers were baseless. He explained that Polaris submarines had many
advantages in comparison with the Jupiters, therefore in terms of Turkey's security
and defence deployment of Polaris submarines was a success for the Turkish gov-
ernment. Denying the loss of Turkey's strategic importance Erkin also said that
American officials gave assurances on the continuity of aid.813
In fact, the removal of the intermediate range Jupiters from Thrkey did cause
a change in strategic importance of Turkey. Turkey no longer had nuclear missiles
in its territory, which could reach the Soviet Union. Thus it ceased to present
a kind of danger to the Soviets, which would attract the first strike in the event
of conflict. It no longer held the position of extreme importance in the cold war
conflict, which it had occupied in the past. 814 The Turkish military continued to
welcome the American strike aircraft, equipped with nuclear weapons, which were
stationed in Turkey in accordance with a tactical rotation agreement concluded in
February 1957. But these aircraft did not pose such a compelling threat for the
Soviets since they had effective surface-to-air missiles to face strike aircraft. In the
eyes of the Turkish military leaders, strike aircraft served to assure the American
811 Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., p.99.
812 Sezer, op.cit., p.134, "Durum", Milliyet, 4 and 13 February 1963, p.1, E. Güresin, "NATO'da
Görii Degiik1igi ye Toplantilar", C'umhuriyet, 20.1.1963.
813 MIi'ITD, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.629, ibid., 17.2.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.13, pp. 222-
225. Former Turkish foreign minister Bayülken told the author that Foreign Ministry officials did
not deplore the removal of the Jupiters because they would go any way since they were outdated.
814 G. Harris, "Turkey and the United States", in Karpat(ed.), Turkey's Foreign
Policy in Transition, op.cit., pp.58-59, Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., p.95.
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involvement in defending Turkey in the event of a Soviet attack.815
5.11 Conclusion
The Cuban missile crisis was one of the most important influences on U.S.-
Turkish relations during the period of our concern. In particular, it played a part
in the cautious attitude of Turkish rulers in military relations with the USA from
1965. It also sharpened the Turkish disappointment over the American attitude
toward the Cyprus problem.
It is instructive to consider the relevance of theoretical explanations to this
crisis in the ligl1t of historical account we have outlined above. The crisis consti-
tuted a very good example of costs and dangers of the U.S.-Turkish alliance for
its smaller partner, Turkey. The Turks had entered into alliance relations with the
USA to protect their security against more powerful enemies, especially the Soviet
Union. They had also welcomed the stationing of the Jupiters on their territory,
thinking that it would help the defence of Turkey and the whole NATO region.
But the crisis showed that alliance relations with one superpower and allowing the
presence of its weapons and forces in the country might also attract and increase
the threat of the other superpower and drag Turkey into a terrible nuclear war over
an issue in the outbreak of which she actively played no role. The Soviets would
prefer to attack Turkey as a first step because the similarity between the Cuban
and Turkish missiles would justify their action and also attacking the weakest,
the smallest link in the Western alliance might have prevented escalation of the
conflict.
The crisis also showed difficulties of having alliance relations with a big power
for a small state. U.S. authorities had easily put Turkey on the bargaining ta-
ble without consulting with Turkish rulers. This was totally the opposite of the
Turkish attitude of consulting with the Americans even in matters which did not
concern the USA. In cold-war matters the Turks would not dare to take one step
before informing U.S. rulers. In this context, the Cuban crisis shows that U.S.-
Turkish contacts bore the characteristics of the patron-client relationship at that
time. Turkish expectation of reward and praise from the Americans for their
815 Harris in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.58-59, Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., pp.94-95.
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steadfast support for the USA during the crisis also fits this pattern. This un-
conditional Turkish support for the big ally without considering national interests
first constitutes another aspect of the patron-client relationship.
The Cuban crisis also reflects the Turkish perception of their alliance with
the USA. The Turks had thought that the apparent close relationship between
the two countries, which depended on having same ideological principles, required
unconditional support for each other. That was why they supported America
wholeheartedly during the crisis. They would not expect from the Americans to
bargain interests of an ally with the enemy. They would be proved to be wrong in
their opinion for the second time later during the Cyprus crises.
The Cuban crisis also confirmed the idea that the agreement between super-
powers could be to the disadvantage of small powers. Finally, it should be stated
that as was explained earlier, Turkey's strategic location (the stationing of the
Jupiters near the Soviet Union) contributed to the outbreak of a conflict between
the two superpowers and that the removal of the Jupiters decreased strategic im -
portance of Turkey, thus reduced its bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States.
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Chapter VI
THE CYPRUS QUESTION BETWEEN 1960 AND 1965
AND ITS EFFECT UPON TURKISH-AMERICAN
RELATIONS
The Cyprus question and the U.S. attitude toward it were major influences
on Turkish foreign policy, and undoubtedly played an important role in shaping
Turkish-American relations and affected the alliance between the two countries
in the 1964-1975 period. It is, therefore, necessary to study the Cyprus question
to comprehend characteristics of the two countries' relations and alliance. For
the sake of clarity it is convenient to divide our consideration of this topic into
two chapters, each marking separate critical developments in Cyprus that had
profound but different influences on Turkish-U.S. relations. The first of these
two chapters will examine the effects of the breakdown in 1964-65 of the 1960
constitutional regime. The following chapter will cover the 1974 Sampson coup and
the subsequent Turkish military intervention. In the present chapter the events
between 1960 and 1965 will be reviewed briefly and then Cyprus policies of Turkey
and the United States and the impact of the Cyprus issue on relations and the
alliance between the two countries and on foreign policies of each state, especially
Turkey, will be analysed.
6.1 The 1960-1963 Period
The Zurich-London settlement of the Cyprus question in 1959816 and the sub-
sequent declaration of the independent Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960817
were welcomed by the United States. For American policy-makers a serious mat-
ter which threatened the co-operation of the three NATO powers, Greece, Britain
and Turkey, had beeii eliminated and thus the stability of the Western alliance
816 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960, vol.12, pp.16643-16647, 16657-16661. (The
source gives details of negotiations and agreements.)
817 Ibid., p.17730.
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had been saved. 818 President Eisenhower praised the settlement as a "a victory
for common sense", an "imaginative and courageous act of statesmanship" and
a "splendid achievement" P819 Deputy Under-secretary of State Murphy endorsed
it as a happy solution and the statesmanlike action of America's allies. 820 Sub-
sequently, tl1e Americans expected that Cyprus would join Britain, Greece and
Turkey to form a solid bulwark against communism and allow the United States
to use its existing communication facilities in Cyprus and the British sovereign
base areas on the island.82'
Turkey was pleased with the settlement of the Cyprus issue since Turkish
Cypriots were granted constitutional guarantees which would protect their exis-
tence as a separate community and would provide their participation in the admin-
istration effectively. 822
 Moreover, Turkey's fears that Cyprus could fall into hands
of a hostile state and threaten Turkey's security seemed to be eliminated by the
Treaty of Guarantee, which authorised Turkey to intervene militarily in the island
to protect the status quo.823
It soon became clear that the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities would
not cooperate sufficiently to enable the new regime to work successfully. As early
as the summer of 1961, the American administration had worried that the system
of guarantees assuring the stability of Cyprus would break down soon. In August
1961, Kennedy said: "It seems to me if the situation is as desperate as we hear it
is, we cannot continue to rely upon our policy of hoping that the guarantor powers
818 v Coufoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question"
in M.A. Attalides(ed.), Cyprus Reviewed, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977, p.108.
819 J Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, London: K. Rusteni and Brother, 1986, p.124.
820 E.B. Laipson, "Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy" in J.T.A.
Kouinoulides (ed.), Cyprus in Transition 1960-1 985, London: Trigraph, 1986, p.58.
821 T.A. Adams and A.J. Cottrell, Cyprus Between East and West, Baltimore: John Hopkins
Press, 1968, p.56.
822 Keesing 'S..., vol.12, p.17069.
823 S. Böliikba.'i, Superpowers and the Third World, New York: University Press of America,
1988, p.38. Former Turkish foreign minister U. Haluk Bayülken told the author that experienced,
high-quality Turkish diplomats obtained successful results on the Cyprus question in the U.N. in
the 1950s and succeeded in getting a favourable solution of the problem so that Turkey was able to
have a say in the future of Cyprus in the following years. In his interview with the author, Turkish
academic Seyfi Talian agreed with this point.
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will shoulder the principal share of the Western burden." 824 In 1962 Kennedy and
Vice-President Johnson separately urged Cypriot leaders to act to deter the growth
of the communist movement in Cyprus.825 Nevertheless, the Americans were ex-
tremely reluctant to intervene directly in the matter, fearing to alienate their allies,
Turkey and Greece. 82 ° When intercommunal disputes in Cyprus worried the State
Department officials in February 1963, Secretary of State Rusk sent a cable to
the American Ambassador in London, stating,: "We want Britain to emphasise
to Greeks and Turks similarities [in] their present positions and guide them to a
common stance and coordinated three-power pressure on Cypriot communities."827
The Turkish response to disputes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on
violations of the Cypriot constitution was to send notes warning the Greek side
that they would not allow any change in the constitution, 828 but Turkish warnings
were mild in order not to cause a crisis.
6.2 The Cyprus Crisis of December 1963
On 30 November 1963 Cypriot President Makarios submitted to Turkish Vice-
President Küçük a memorandum proposing thirteen substantive amendments to
the Cypriot constitution. 82° On 16 December the Turkish government rejected the
entire memorandum as totally unacceptable and insisted that no change whatso-
ever could be made in the constitution. 83° On 21 December widespread shootings
and killings began in Cyprus when the Turkish community was targeted by the
Greek police and ex-terrorist irregulars who wanted the unification of the island
824 H.W. Brands, Jr., "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964", Middle East-
ern Studies, vol.23, No.3, July 1987, p.350.
82 Ibid., p.350, Bölükbai, op.cit., p.54, Adams and Cottrell, op.cit., pp.59-60.
826 Brands, op.cit., pp.349, 350-351.
821 Bölükbai, op.cit., p.55.
828 lnönü's Address in the Turkish National Assembly on 5 May 1964 as quoted by S. Bilge et a!.,
(eds.). Cyprus: Past, Present2 Future, Ankara, 1964, pp.97-99, Foreign Minister Erkin's
speech in Parliament on 9.1.1963, Keesing's..., 1963-1964, vol.14, p.19257.
829 J36lükbai, op.cit., pp.55-56, Keesing's..., vol.14, p.20113, M. Taxnkoc, the Turkish Cypriot
State, London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1988, p.'73, Z. Stavrinides, the Cyprus Conflict,
Loris Stavrinides Press, 1976, p.12.
R. Stephens, cyprus, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, p.180, D.S. Bitsios, Cyprus; the Vulner-
able Republic, Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975, p.125, Keeszng's...,
vol.14, p.20113.
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Witl1 Greece (enosis).831
The Turks were convinced that the Greek side had tried to achieve constitu-
tional changes and Ultimately enosis by force under a pre-planned programme, the
Akritas plan. 832
 Turkish rulers informed Western states that they took the events
in Cyprus seriously and threatened to intervene in the island as a guarantor of
the Cyprus system. 833
 On 25 December Turkish jets flew over Cyprus to warn
Greek Cypriots. 834
 The Turkish warnings had their effect on 26 December. Greek
Cypriots accepted the establishment of a joint peace force consisting of Turkish,
Greek and British forces on the island.835
As the hostilities began and spread over Cyprus, the immediate American con-
cern was to bring about a cease-fire or at least contain the fighting and thus to
prevent a military clash between Turkey and Greece and to save the southeastern
flank of NATO. 836 The Americans did not want the breakdown of the political
system of the Cyprus Republic because it could create conditions that might be
exploited by AKEL (the Cypriot Communist Party) and the Russians. The United
States also opposed the internationalisation of the Cyprus question through the
discussion of the problem in the United Nations and preferred its solution within
a Western setting securing Western strategic interests. To fulfil these purposes
U.S. officials urged restraint on all sides and particularly asked the Turks not to
831 Reddaway. op.cit., pp.137-138, N. Crawshaw, the Cyprus Revolt, London: G. Allen and Unwin,
1978, pp.366-367, Stephens, op.cit., pp.182-184, The Historical Background of Cyprus
and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ankara: The Cyprus-Turkish Cultural
Association, pp.23-24, 31-32, Keesing's..., vol.14, pp.20113-20114.
832 N. Eriin Bildiim ye Gördii. iim Olcüler Icinde Kzbrzs, Ankara: Ajans-Türk, 1975,
p.207, R.R. Denktash, the Cyprus Triangle, London: K. Rusteiu and Brother, 1988, pp.26-
27, Bölükbai, op.cit., p.57, N. Erim, "Reminiscences on Cyprus" Foreign Policy,
vol.4, Nos.2-3, February, 1975, p.158, Tamkoc, op.cit., p.'14, Y.T. Kurat, Elli Yillik (umhurzyetzn
Di Politikasi 192S-1973, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1975, pp.294- 295. Independent ob-
servers and even Greek Cypriots confirmed the existence of the plan. C.H. Dodd. The Cyprus
Issue, A Current Perspective, Huntingdon: the Eothen Press, 1994, p.4.
833 Erim, Bildigim ye Cördiigiim... , op.cit., p.208, Bilge, et al. (eds.), Cyprus, op.cit., p.5,
Stephens, Cyprus, op.cit., p.184, Keesing's..., vol.14, p.20114.
834 Bilge et al., (eds.), op.cit., p.7.
835 T. Ehlrich, Cyprus: 1958-1967, London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p.58, Stephens,
op.cit., p.185, Crawshaw, op.cit., p.367, Keesing 'S, vol.14, p.20114.
836 V. Coufoudakis in Attalides (ed.), op.cit., p.11O, J.S. Joseph, Cyprus; Ethnic Conflict and
International Concern, New York: Peter Lang, 1985, p.127, Adams and Cottrell, op.cit.,
p.56.
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intervene in Cyprus 837 though they did not condemn the action of Turkish jet
fighters which were provided under NATO auspices and assigned to the NATO
command. 838 To tone down the Turkish threats to invade Cyprus, President John-
son sent a letter on 26 December 1963 to Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, stating
that the United States was ready "to support any and all actions proposed by the
three guarantor powers which offer any reasonable hope of assisting in a peaceful
solution."839
The State Department's policy directive to the U.S. representatives in the
United Nations on 27 December shows that the United States did not want to get
too closely involved in the Cyprus question:
The U.K., Greece and Turkey have treaty responsibilities. We look to [the] U.K.
to take [the] lead to keep debate in constructive channels... The U.S. should take a
back seat during debate but should discreetly seek [to] keep discussion in [a] moderate
key, particularly when chair... We assume, however, it will be necessary for the U.S.
to speak. Our statement should not discuss [the] merits of Cypriot complaint against
Turkey or of background issues which brought on recent communal violence, but should
stress [the] need for those concerned to work out their differences... [the United States]
did not want to "do anything to abet [the] Greek Cypriots in their efforts [to] bypass
[the 1959] treaties.84°
W. Averell Harriman, undersecretary of state for political affairs, summarised
his impressions and worries after the U.N. Security Council meeting on 27 Decem-
ber 1963 in a cable to various American embassies: "The results of this meeting
were to weaken current efforts to reestablish law and order on Cyprus, to strengthen
the hands of extremists in both communities on Cyprus and in Greece and Turkey
and to provide an opportunity for Soviet and other anti-Western propaganda ini-
tiatives."84'
6.3 The NATO Plan of January-February 1964
On 25 January 1964, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir David Ormsby-
Gore, informed U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball that Britain could no
837 Bö1ükbai, op.cit.. pp.58. 60, Johnson's letter to Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders in H.i. Salih,
Cyprus: the Impact of Diverse Nationalism in a State, Alabama: University of
Alabama Press, 1978, p.35, Brands, op.cit., p.351.
838 G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington D.C.: Americaii Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.108.
839 Salih, op.cit., p.35.
440 Quoted by BöIükbai, op.cit., p.Ol.
841 Brands, op.cit., p.351.
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longer undertake primary responsibility alone for keeping peace in Cyprus 842 and
said that "Her Majesty's government has concluded that it is best to establish an
international force on Cyprus, and early rather than later." 843 Such a force could
be broadly based but should include detachments only from NATO countries.844
When George Ball responded that the United Stated did not want to get involved
because it "had far too much on [its] plate", the ambassador warned that if such
a NATO force could not be summoned, Britain would turn the Cyprus question
over to the United Nations.845
On the same day George Ball told Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara
and General Maxwell Taylor, "we must tell the British that we have other respon-
sibilities which we will continue to bear. They must bear theirs." 846 McNamara,
too, was reluctant to broaden American responsibilities but "he was fully aware
that an exploding Cyprus could not only endanger... Mediterranean position [of
America] but undermine the whole southern flank of NATO." 847 In the evening
Ball discussed the matter with President Johnson. The President was reluctant to
accept the British proposal but since he understood the seriousness of the Cyprus
question he directed Ball to draw up an acceptable solution. 848 Half an hour later
George Ball told Ormsby-Gore that the United States would support a NATO
force diplomatically and logistically, but that no American troops would be com-
mitted. 849
 He said, "[we] did not wish [to] move into another political problem
with no end in sight... We are prepared to do what we could with Greeks and
Turks but [we are] not sure what could be said that [is] new... [The] U.K. should
understand that we viewed getting involved with greatest reluctance."85°
Under constant pressures from Turks that they would invade Cyprus unless the
842 G.W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, p.340,
Brands, op.cit., p.349.
843 E. Weintal and C. Bartlett, Facing the Brink, London: Hutchinson, 1967, p.18.
844 Ball, op.cit., p.340.
845 Brands, op.cit., p.349, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.l8.
846 Brands, op.cit., p.352.
847 Ball, op.cit., p.341.
848 Ibid., p.341.
849 Brands, op.cit., p.352.
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USA did something, 851 the U.S. administration revised its decision in a few days.
In order to appease hawkish Turkish commanders and also to warn the Turks on
the fatal consequences of unilateral intervention, President Johnson dispatched
General Lyman Lemnitzer, the American commander of NATO, to Ankara and
Athens on 28 January 1964.852 By 29 January 1964 President Johnson had decided
to approve a plan for American participation in a peace force. 853
 The conditions for
participating in the NATO plan were summarised by George Ball to McNamara:
"We should insist... 1- that the duration of the force be limited to three months, 2-
that the Greeks and Turks agree not to use their unilateral intervention rights for
three months, and 3- that they agree on a mediator who was not representative of
any of the three guarantor powers but from another NATO European country."854
Even after the Greek Cypriot side rejected the NATO plan on 4 February
1964 , 855
 the United States tried to achieve the implementation of the plan. On
7 February Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated in a press conference that the
United States was willing to participate in a peacekeeping operation in Cyprus with
other NATO partners. 856 George Ball was dispatched by President Johnson from
9 February 1964 to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia to sell the plan. In the first stage
of his visit Ball stopped in London on 9 February 1964 to talk to British officials.
In London Ball also talked to the Cypriot foreign minister, Sypros Kyprianou.
Kyprianou was so adamant in rejecting the NATO plan that, as Brands states,
Ball came convinced that the idea was futile... He began to fear that even if such
a force made it to the island, the American contingent would be singled out for attack
by Cypriot terrorists - an opinion seconded by the CIA. However, because the United
States had made a commitment to the NATO force, Ball did not want the Johnson
administration to be seen as backing out... As he described to Johnson, his plan was to
place on Makarios' shoulders the primary onus for... [America's] non-participation.857
On 10 February George Ball talked to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü
851 Ibid.. pp.63-64, Ball, op.cit., p.341.
852 Salih, Cyprus, op.cit.. p.34, Brands, op.cit., p.352.
853 Brands, op.cit., p.352.
854 Ball, op.cit., p.341. For the full text of the Anglo -American proposal for a NATO force, which
was submitted to the parties concerned on 31 January 1964, see Keesing's..., vol.14, p.20116.
855 For Makarios's note to Britain and the USA see Keesing's..., vol.14, p.20116.
856 Salih, op.cit., p.33.
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in Ankara and persuaded him to accept the NATO plan. 858 Inönii insisted that
the United States must "move swiftly; Turkish patience was running out. Given
the excited state of public opinion, any overnight flare up of killing on the island
might force the Turkish military to intervene... So long as nothing was done to
impair Turkey's right of intervention to protect the Turkish Cypriot population, the
Turkish government was prepared to go along with the Anglo-American proposal
for a NATO force." 85° Meanwhile, on 10 February, the U.S. State Department
clarified that the United States had no intention of imposing any solution on any
side on the Cyprus question and that it "has no preconceptions or preference as
to the shape or form of final solutions that might be developed for the Cyprus
problem... The United States must emphasise that it does have a major interest
in the maintenance of peace in the eastern Mediterranean... It will do whatever it
can to assure that objective."860
During their meeting on 12 February, Makarios, Greek Cypriot President, re-
jected Ball's proposal for a NATO peace force and suggested that the whole matter
of peacekeeping force must be submitted to the U.N. Security Council. In George
Ball's view, "Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so
that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypri-
ots. Obviously we would never permit that." 861 Ball warned Makarios that if he
continued to block a solution that would eliminate Turkey's reason for interven-
ing, "the Turks... would inevitably invade, and neither the United States nor any
other Western power would raise a finger to stop them." 862 In the evening Ball
cabled President Johnson and Dean Rusk that "overwhelming pressure must be
brought on Makarios to frighten him sufficiently to consider some move to halt the
killing." 863
Meanwhile, on 12 February, Greek Cypriots broke a cease-fire agreement and
launched a massive attack against the Turkish positions in Limassol. Rumours
then spread that Turkish ships were sailing for Cyprus and later that a military
858 M. Toker, "Ismet Paa ile 4 Buhranh Yil", Milliyet, 7 February 1969, p.5.
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invasion had been prevented by American diplomatic efforts and the deliberate
obstruction of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. 864 Secretary of State Rusk directed George
Ball to return to Turkey "to keep [the Turks] at home." 865 In their meeting Ball
wanted Inönü not to intervene in Cyprus until the U.N. Security Council discussed
the issue and assured him that the United Nations would take no action nullifying
Turkey's intervention right and that Makarios would get a severe lesson at the
U.N. •866 In Ball's words, "Inönü reluctantly agreed but emphasised that if there
were further serious violence on the island, Turkey would no longer stand still."867
When he left Ankara, Ball was convinced that Turkey was seriously thinking
of intervening in Cyprus. He cabled to President Johnson from London on 16
February: "we can count on only a few days. Even that time could be foreshort-
ened by a major incident in Cyprus. The Turks are not bluffing." 868 "Both the
governments and people of Turkey and Greece want peace but.. they cannot, by
their own unaided efforts, avoid catastrophe. They can be pushed off a collision
course only by some outside agency... The Greek Cypriots do not want a peace-
making force; they just want to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots." 869 As a
last minute attempt, Ball proposed to bypass Makarios entirely and organise a
joint peace force composed of Greek, Turkish and British units. It would be an
action of the three guarantor powers to exercise their rights of intervention under
Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. 87° President Johnson accepted the proposal
and asked the British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home to convene a summit
conference to implement the plan, 871 but the British refused to go along with the
plan. 872 When Ball reported this to President Johnson, "Johnson agreed that the
United States had gone as far as we should try to deflect a tribal conflict. Now
884 Stephens, Cyprus, op.cit., p.189.
865 Bolükhai, op.cit., p.7l.
866 Ball, the Past..., op.cit., p.347, Prime Minister Jnönü's letter to President Johnson, 13 June
1964, Appendix D, Middle East Journal, vol.20, summer 1966, pp. 386-389, Toker, op.cit., 7
February 1969, p.5.
867 Ball, op.cit., p.347.
868 BöliikbMl, op.cit., p.71.
869 Brands, op.cit., p. 354, Ball, op.cit., p.347.
870 Brands, op.cit., p.354, Bö1ükbai, op.cit., p.71.
871 Bölükbai, op.cit., p.71, Weintal and Bartlett, Facing the Brink, op.cit., p.21.
872 Brands, op.cit., p.354, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.21.
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our oniy available course was to work through the United Nations."873
The Americans certainly would have liked the discussion of the Cyprus problem
within the NATO framework. In this way, they could assert their influence more
easily and the involvement of the Eastern bloc and non-aligned countries in a
matter which mainly concerned NATO powers could be prevented. However, since
Makarios was adamant in rejecting it and he was supported by Greek rulers the
Americans saw no way other than allowing the discussion of the matter in the
U.N..
The Turks had accepted the NATO plan mainly because it provided for Amer-
ican participation. They hoped that the Americans would deter Greek Cypriots
from continuing their atrocities. The spokesman of the Turkish government, A.
Ihsan Göii, expressed pleasure with the U.S. decision of participating in the peace
force: "Our great ally America has recognised the importance of the Cyprus ques-
tion and, therefore, has decided to work for the restoration of peace and security
in Cyprus." 874 For Turkish P.M. Inönii U.S. involvement would make it easier for
him to call for U.S. mediation during crisis situations and resist the pressures of
pro-intervention circles at home. 875 Moreover, the plan would provide for a tem-
porary solution in the absence of Turkish military intervention which stemmed
from Turkey's technical unpreparedness. 876 Turks also preferred the involvement
of NATO rather than the United Nations, which was the aim of the Greek side,
fearing that the U.N. could abolish their role as guarantor power.877
6.4 The U.N. Security Council Meeting on Cyprus
Before the U.N. Security Council met to discuss the Cyprus problem, the
United States tried to dissuade Greeks from taking the matter to the U.N. and
working for a resolution which would support mainly the Greek cause and alien-
ate Turkey. Allegedly, U.S. officials threatened the Greek delegation in the U.N.
873 Ball, op.cit., p.348.
874 Cumhuriyet, 30.1.1964, p.7.
87& Bö1iikbai, op.cit., p.65.
876 Toker, op.cit.. IVIilliyet, 7 February 1969 p.5.
877 P. Windsor, NATO and the Cypnzs Crisis, London: the Institute for Strategic Studies,
1964, pp.10-11.
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with not preventing Turkish intervention in Cyprus and proposed to them a draft
resolution which seemed to support the Turkish viewpoint. 878 However, according
to Greek representative Bitsios's accounts, on 17 February he received the follow-
ing statement from America's U.N. ambassador, Adlai Stevenson: "Press reports
from London that the United States is seeking to isolate Archbishop Makarios, and
favours settlement of the communal conflict in Cyprus by partition, are untrue...
The United States has no position on the terms of any settlement."879
During the 1096th meeting of the Security Council in February 1964,880 U.S.
ambassador Stevenson made the following points: "the Treaty of Guarantee forms
an integral part of the organic arrangements that created the Republic of Cyprus.
In fact, it is so-called a basic article of the Constitution of Cyprus... This treaty
or any international treaty cannot be abrogated, cannot be nullified, cannot be
modified either in fact or in effect by the Security Council of the U.N."88'
The major business before the Council... was the restoration of communal peace
and order. His government had no position as to the shape of a final settlement of the
Cyprus problem. The leaders of the two communities had to work out their differences
together but in the present climate this was patently impossible. The Security Council
had therefore to make an effective contribution to the reestablishment of conditions in
which a long-term political solution could be sought with due regard to the interests,
the rights and the responsibilities of all parties concerned... [The United States] was
[not] even proposing that the international force be comprised only of NATO military
units [but] recommended that the Council, in consultation with the Secretary General,
appeal to the parties concerned to move ahead quickly in working out peace-keeping
arrangements to which other states could make a contribution.882
As the first part of Stevenson's speech supported mainly the Turkish theory of
the validity of the Lomion-Zurich agreements, the secona part o it sought a more
balancing attitude which aimed to accommodate the views of both sides.
On 4 March 1964 U.N. Security Council accepted a different resolution from
the Anglo-American proposal which regarded the London-Zurich agreements as
the basis of the independence of Cyprus and which mentioned the rights of the
878 Bitsios, op.cit., pp.141-146.
879 Ibid., pp. 142-143.
880 Keesing's..., vol.14, pp.20118-20119.
881 Salih. op.cit.. p.37.
882 Cyriot Complaint of Turkish Aggression and Interference	 its Internal Af-
jrs ', International Organisation, vol.18, 1964, p.482.
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guarantor powers to intervene in Cyprus. 883 Yet the American officials did not
consider it a defeat for the United States. They reasoned that their aim, which
was endorsed by the resolution, was "to install a U.N. force as quickly as possible,
while assuring that the resolution did not nullify the intervention rights of the
guarantor powers, since the Turks would not stand still for that. We sought also
to keep the Soviet Union as far as possible out of the action." It was in fact a
success for the United States because both sides were happy; "Makarios regarded
it as foreclosing the Turkish right to intervene, the Turks saw it as preserving their
intervention rights."884
The United States endorsed the Security Council resolution which required the
establishment of the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the appointment of a
mediator. She pledged financial support for the force and help with the airlift of its
troops. 885 In the eyes of American officials, UNFICYP "was a satisfactory substi-
tute for a direct NATO presence on the island, since the participating countries did
not include any eastern bloc nations." 886 However, the appointment of a mediator,
did not satisfy American officials entirely, therefore they sought alternative peace
mediation ways in the following months.
The Turkish side, too, seemed happy with the acceptance of the Security Coun-
cil resolution. They welcomed the resolution in their public statements, noting that
it did not abrogate Turkey's right of intervention and but would hopefully help the
restoration of peace and stability in Cyprus.887
When Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish positions in Paphos, Nicosia and Kyre-
nia on 8 March 1964,888 the Turkish government sent a strong ultimatum to Greek
883 Reddaway, Burdened With Cyprus, op.cit., p.159. For the text see Keesing's..., vol.14,
p.20l 19.
884 Ball, the Past Has Another Pattern, op.cit., p.348.
885 Laipson in Koumoulides(ed.), op.cit., p.60.
886 Ibid., p.61. On the UNFICYP see also T.W. Adams and A.J. Cottrell, "American Foreign
Policy and the U.N. Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus", ORBIS, vol.12,
No.2, Summer 1968, pp.490-503, J.M. Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping",
Intern ational Organisation, vol.20, 1966, pp.1-lI, R. Higgins, "Basic Facts on the
U.N. Force in Cyprus", The World Today, vol.20, January-December 1964, pp.347-
350.
887 M. Göuliibol et al., Olaylarla Turk D2 Politikasi, Ankara: A.U. S.B.F. Yaymnlari, No. 407,
1977, p.396.888 Bölükbai, Superpowers..., op.cit., p.72.
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Cypriots and informed the United States that it would invade the island if the at-
tacks did not stop. 889 In order to prevent the Turkish action, U.S. officials secured
the quick arrival of the U.N. contingent to Cyprus through intensive diplomatic
efforts. Subsequently tension eased and Turks postponed their action.89°
6.5 The Johnson Letter of June 1964
6.5.1 The Johnson Letter
The Greek Cypriot administration's rapid militarization efforts and its decision
to introduce military conscription caused another Cyprus crisis.' On 2 June 1964,
the Turkish National Security Council decided to intervene in Cyprus militarily.892
Nevertheless, Turkish Prime Minister Inönü decided to consult with American
officials before starting military operations, though his foreign minister, F. Cemal
Erkin, opposed him, arguing that if the United States was informed of the action
she would certainly stop it. 893 On 4 June 1964 In6nü said to U.S. Ambassador
Raymond Hare: "all GOT [Government of Turkey] has in mind is [to] occupy part
of [the] island and stop there. Greeks could [also] occupy part [of it] and [the
U.N.] force could remain between them. From that position one could get down
to meaningful discussion." 894 Hare asked for a twenty-four hour delay of Turkish
action to consult with his administration and Inönü accepted it.
Meanwhile, the United States took some actions apparently to prevent Turk-
ish action. The U.S. commander of NATO, General Lemnitzer, warned Turkish
militarY leaders about possible harmful results of a Turkish military intervention
889 Erini, Bildigim ye Gördzlg2m... , op.cit., pp.256-257, 264, Böliikbai, op.cit., p.'73, Bitsios,
op.cit., p.159, Curnhuri yet. 13 March 1964, p.7, Stephens, op.cit., p.l91, Keesing's..., vol.14,
p.2O12O.
890 J3ölükbai, op.cit., p.73, Prime Minister Inöuü's response to President Johnson, Appendix D, Mid-
dle East Journal, op.cit., p.389.
891 Keesing's..., vol.14, p.20125, E. Miitercinilcr, Kibris Bari Harekatinin Bzlznmey_en
Yó'nlerz. Istanbul: Yaprak Yaymevi, 1990, p.97, Eriin, op.cit.. p.298, T.A. Couloumbis, I he
United States, Greece and Turkey, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.62.
892 Weintal and Bartlett, Facing the Brink, op.cit., pp.21-22, Erim, op.cit., pp.300, 309.
893 C. Arcayürek, Yeni Dernokrasi, Yeni Arayzlar, Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1984, p.274, M.A.
Birand et al., 1. Mart, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, pp.104-105, the author's interview with former
Turkish foreign minister U.H. Bayulken. Former Turkish diplomat and MP Kamran luau and
Turkish academic Seyfi Tahan supported Erkin's argument.
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in Cyprus for NATO interests. Allegedly, Americans positioned a Carrier Task
Force of the Sixth Fleet between Cyprus and Turkey to prevent a movement of
Turkish troops onto the island895
 and used electronic means to block Turkish com-
munications so that Turks could not carry out the military operations successfully.
Rodger Davies, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, denied these allegations
in his testimony before a Senate committee in 1970. He promised to senators to
supply the information where the Sixth Fleet was at that time but later it was
recorded in the Senate papers that this information was classified.896
In Washington, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, aided by Assistant Secretary
of State Harlan Cleveland and his deputy Joseph Sisco, prepared a letter to be
sent to the Turkish premier. In the view of Undersecretary of State George Ball,
who saw the letter before it was submitted to Johnson, the letter was "the most
brutal diplomatic note" which he had ever seen and "the diplomatic equivalent of
an atomic bomb." He said to Rusk: "I think that may stop Inönii from invading
but I don't know how we'll ever get him down off the ceiling after that. The
Secretary looked at me with a sweet smile. 'That'll be your problem' he said."897
On 5 June 1964, the letter was signed by President Johnson and sent to Turkish
Prime Minister Inönü.
In the letter, 898 President Johnson expressed his grave concern on the Turkish
decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus and stated
that "such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching conse-
quences, is [not] consistent with the commitment of your government to consult
fully in advance with us... I must... first urge you to accept the responsibility
for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken."
Johnson claimed that Turkey's action was inconsistent with the Treaty of Guar-
antee because it did not consult with other guarantor powers and its action would
895 Ibid., p.76, . Selcuk, "Pencere", Cumhuriyet, 9 April 1965, p.2.
896 United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Greece and
Turkey, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Corn-
mitinents Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session,
Part7, June 9 and 11, 1970, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, p.1831.
897 Ball, op.cit., p.350. Former U.S. ambassador Stearns calls the letter, "a startling specimen of
diplomatic overkill." M. Stearns, Entangled Allies, New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Press, 1992, p.36.
898 For its text see Appendix D and Middle East Journal, vol. 20, Summer 1966, pp. 386-388.
The Johnson letter was also studied in Chapter IV in the context of military relations.
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result in partition of the island which was excluded by the Treaty. Calling Inönü's
attention to the possibility of a war between Turkey and Greece as a result of
Turkish action, Johnson reminded him that a war between the two countries was
unthinkable. He warned that NATO might not help Turkey in case of the Soviet
involvement and stated that the USA could not allow the use of U.S.-supplied mil-
itary equipment by Turkey in its intervention in Cyprus. Finally, Johnson assured
Inönfl that the United States had "no intention of lending any support to any
solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community" and would
remain "deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypri-
ots." Johnson also invited Inönü to Washington to discuss the Cyprus question.
In the opinion of American officials the harshness of Johnson's letter was neces-
sary to deter the Turks effectively from invading Cyprus and thus to prevent likely
fatal results. 899
 Although the letter aroused bitter resentment in Turkey, American
leaders did not regret it and believed that the letter had its desired effect since
no Turkish military action was taken. They believed that they had chosen the
lesser evil, i.e. alienating the Turks rather than having a war between Greece and
Turkey.90°
It should be noted that the intensive and organised campaigning of Greek-
Americans on the Cyprus question influenced at least the timing of the Johnson
letter and its undiplomatic, brutal tone because Greek-American votes held im-
portance in the approaching presidential elections. 90 ' Greek-American individuals,
various associations of Greek people including the Orthodox church had bombarded
President Johnson with letters and cables urging him to pressurise Turkey not to
invade Cyprus. Many messages referred to Johnson's candidacy for presidency.
President Johnson was aware of the importance of Greek-American votes. Greek-
Americans were far more numerous than Turkish ones and were located in some of
the big urban centres that controlled large numbers of electors. Some Democrats,
including Johnson, were concerned that Republican candidate Goldwater would
gain their votes by trading on the Cyprus question.
899 Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.24, H. ahin, Gece Gelen Mektup, Istanbul: Cep Kitaplan,
1987. pp.48-50, Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., p.115.
000 Rodger Davies' statement in United States Security Agreements, op.cit., pp.1834-1835.
901 For detailed information see J.M. Landau, Johnson's 1964 Letter to Inönii and Greek
Lobbying at the White House, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 1979.
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Turks interpreted the Johnson letter as abandonment of Turkey by the United
States in favour of Greece. Prime Minister Inönü was reported to have said to
his cabinet: "Our friends and our enemies have joined hands against us." 902 The
letter was perceived as an ultimatum, forcing Turkey to act in a certain way and
thus constituting a clear U.S. intervention in Turkey's sovereign affairs. 903
 In MP
Nihat Erim's words, it included every kind of threat except only one sentence, that
was that if Turkey did not comply with the letter's content in a short time, the
U.S. Sixth Fleet would have bombed the Turkish ports. 904
 According to former
Turkish foreign minister Bayiilken, high-level Foreign Ministry officials saw John-
son's threat as bluff because they believed that the United States could not let
the Soviet Union attack Turkey since it would harm U.S. interests first. 905 This
explanation does not reflect the general political atmosphere in Turkey and the
tone of Turkish rulers' statements at that time and it does not eliminate the fact
that the Turks really feared that they could be abandoned by the West. But the
explanation coincides with Inönii's real intention which will be mentioned later in
this chapter.
The Johnson letter was kept secret from the public but Turkish people knew
that it had prevented Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. When the text of the
letter was released by the White House in January 1966,906 the anti-Americanism
was already popular among Turkish people. Leftist circles saw it as confirmation
of the fact that Turkey was merely a satellite state of the United States. 907 Other
people thought that the United States went too far in pressurising Turkey while
not preventing the Greek side from violating rights of Turkish Cypriots.
The question of why Turkey complied with the Johnson letter should be dealt
F.A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1971, p.132.
903 "Amerikan Elçisinin Siyasi Komiser Edasi", Forum, 15 January 1966, p.6,
A. Ipekci, "Mektup mu, Ultimatom mu?", Milliyet, 15.1.1966, p.1, B. Ecevit,
"Mektuplar", Akis, 22.1.1966, pp.8-9.
904 MIVITD, 29 December 1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.2, p.164.
905 The authors interview with Bayülken.
906 On the occasion of the release of Johnson and Inönü's letters, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey,
Parker T. Hart, stated that U.S.-Turkish relations continued to be friendly even after the exchange
of these letters. He showed Inönü's visit to Washington in June 1964 and the joint comminique at
the end of this visit as the proofs of this fact. Dzzleri Bakanligi Belleteni, January 1966,
p.60.
907 i• Selçuk, "Pencere", Cumhuriyet, 14 January 1966, p.2.
205
with here very briefly. One reason might be the fear of Turkish leaders that U.S.
military assistance would be suspended. Even American "refusal to furnish repair
and replacement parts might have been almost as effective within a short period
as the removal of equipment already provided" and might have mutilated Turkish
military forces. 908
 Secondly, Turkish leaders could not act against the will of the
two super-powers, that was why no Turkish MPs suggested intervening in Cyprus
and ignoring the American warning during the closed session of Parliament. 909
 The
Turks could not afford to have a major rupture in their relations with the USA.91°
However, the most important reason lies in Turkish P.M. Inönü's reluctance to
intervene in Cyprus militarily. 91 ' He was not sure that the Turkish armed forces
would achieve a decisive military victory in Cyprus because they were neither
trained, equipped nor positioned to undertake a landing on Cyprus. 912
 Inönü also
feared that a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus might endanger Turkey's
security by involving the Soviet Union in the matter. 913 Soviet leaders had already
warned Turkey not to invade Cyprus and had announced their support for Makarios
in case of an outside aggression. The best option for Inönü was to consult with
American rulers and to seek their approval for a military intervention in Cyprus.
This could eliminate at least the alienation of the United States. American leaders
could give their consent to a limited Turkish military operation and they could
prevent an outbreak of war between Turkey and Greece.
Some suggest that Ismet Inönü deliberately informed American leaders of the
decision to intervene in Cyprus and he deliberately leaked preparations of Turkish
armed forces to the public. He was sure that the United States would step in and
warn Turkish rulers not to resort to military action.°' 4 Then, Inönii would cancel
the nilitary operation and blame the United States for his own inactivity. 915 Thus,
908 Ehlrich, Cyprus, op.cit., p.84.
909 Nihat Erim, MMTD, 7 October 1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.327.
910 United States Security Agreements..., op.cit., pp.1834-1835.
911 Toker, "Ismet Paa ile...", op.cit., 7 February 1969, p.5.
912 Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit.. p.107, Sa.hin, op.cit., pp. 104-105, Birand et aL, op.cit.,
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913 l3ölükbai, op.cit., p.76.
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he would be able to appease pro-intervention public opinion and military leaders
at home. ilsmet Inönü also might have assumed that apparent Turkish insistence
on military intervention would lead American leaders to put more pressure on the
Greek and Greek Cypriot side°' 8 and would deter Greek Cypriots from attacking
the Turkish community in Cyprus. 917 Other instances of Inönü's political acumen
lend plausibility to this interpretation.
6.5.2 Inönii's Response to Johnson
Writing to Johnson on 13 June 1964 , 918 Inönii pointed out that the Turkish
government had, at American request, postponed its decision to exercise its right
of unilateral action in Cyprus, which was granted by the Treaty of Guarantee.
Johnson's message, "both in wording and content", had therefore been disappoint-
ing for an ally like Turkey, who had always given the most serious attention to its
relations with the United States. Johnson's letter had "brought to the fore sub-
stantial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these
relations." Contrary to Johnson's claim, on several occasions Turkey did consult
with the United States and the other guarantor powers on its decision to inter-
vene in Cyprus, and complied with American demands not to intervene, though no
positive development was achieved in the Cyprus question. However, this did not
mean that Turkey gave up its right to intervene in Cyprus. Finally, the Turkish
premier stated:
As a member of the [NATO] alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and
rights. We do not pursue any other aim than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in
compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to
be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to the
sense of justice inherent in tile character of the American nation.
At the end of his letter Inönü accepted Johnson's invitation to Washington to
discuss the Cyprus problem.
916 flarris, op.cit., p.114.
917 M. Tamkoc, the Warrior Diplomats, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976, pp.
266-267.
918 For the letter's text see Appendix D and Middle East Journal, vol.20, Summer 1966, pp.388-
393.
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6.5.3 Short Evaluation
The Johnson letter constitutes the most important event of U.S.-Turkish con-
tacts on the Cyprus question, which affected the subsequent situation of relations
between the two countries. It is clear that the Americans heavily pressured Turkish
authorities to prevent their intervention in Cyprus. The Turks had expected U.S.
opposition to their planned action but the severe tone of the U.S. warning certainly
disappointed them to the extent they began to have doubts on the value of their
alliance with the USA. Up to that point they had not faced a U.S. action which
appeared to treat Turkey as a satellite. As proud people, the Turks could not
stomach Johnson's threats which put Turkey in a position of puppet state which
was expected to listen to advice from its big partner. The most unacceptable thing
for Turkish rulers was the use of the U.S.-Turkish alliance (which was supposed
to serve Turkish interests) by the Americans as a threat to prevent their action
in a vital national interest. The Americans probably made a mistake by ignoring
realities of Turkish politics and interests and by concentrating only on prevention
of Turkish intervention which was expected to bring grave dangers for NATO and
U.S. interests.919
6.6 American Mediation Efforts on the Cyprus Problem
6.6.1 George Ball's Visit to Greece and Turkey
From the outset of the Cyprus crisis the United States tried to pursue a policy
which would not alienate both Greece and Turkey. After sending a harsh letter to
Turks, President Johnson felt that an equally severe presentation should be made
to Greek rulers, warning them not to provoke the Turks on the Cyprus question.
Johnson also thought that neither the NATO machinery nor the United Nations
mediation efforts would provide a solution to the Cyprus issue, and that therefore
the United States should intervene in the matter directly, offering its mediation
between the concerned parties. He considered it necessary to encourage Turkey
and Greece to find a solution to the problem through bilateral talks. In order to
achieve these aims, Undersecretary of State George Ball was dispatched to Greece
and Turkey in mid-June 1964.
919 Stearns, op.cit.. p.24.
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In Athens on 10 June 1964 Ball told Greek P.M. Papandreou that "disaster
was avoided only by President Johnson's forceful intervention and his adamant
insistence that there could be no war between NATO allies" 920
 and that if Greece
did not show greater co-operation, the United States would not take such a hard
line again. 921 When Papandreou complained about Turkish intervention threats,
Ball said that "nobody could determine how the threat of intervention contributed
to the turbulence over Cyprus, nor how the turbulence gave reality to the inter-
vention threat." 922 Reiterating that the United States had no formula for a Cyprus
settlement and was committed to no side in the matter, Ball informed Papan-
dreou that President Johnson was of the opinion that only the prime ministers of
Turkey and Greece could work out a satisfactory formula for a settlement through
mutual concessions. Pressing the Greek prime minister to undertake talks with
the Turkish P.M. Ball said: "If you, Mr Prime Minister, and the Turkish govern-
ment, take no immediate and effective action, the Cyprus crisis can expand into
war, or open the way to communism in the eastern Mediterranean." 923 Papandreou
seemed unmoved, he did not accept Ball's proposal. In Ball's words, "against all
the evidence, he [Papandreou] still seemed to assume that Greece could pursue its
goal of enosis without danger of the Turks invading Cyprus, since he apparently
took it for granted that the United States would always stand ready to thwart the
Turks." 924
 Nevertheless, Ball persuaded Papandreou to visit the United States to
have talks with President Johnson.925
In his meeting with Prime Minister Inönfl in Ankara on 11 June, 926 in his
own words, Ball "reassured him rega'ccliig th 'anrSh o kinenCa'S ulrler11sW1p br
Turkey and our desire to cooperate closely with the Turks in resolving a fester-
ing quarrel... America, I told him, was not partial to the Greek side; indeed, we
recognised that the Greek Cypriot majority had largely created the problem by ter-
rorising the Turkish Cypriots. I made clear that we totally mistrusted Makarios...
920 Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., pp. 25-26.
921 Ball, the Past Has Another Pattern, op.cit., p.353, A. Papandreou, Democracy at
Gunpoint, London: Andre Deutsch, 1970, p.101.
922 Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.26.
923 Weintal and Bartlett. op.cit., p.26, Ball, op.cit., p.353, Papandreou, op.cit., p.101.
924 Ball, op.cit., p.353.
925 papandreou, op.cit., p.101.
926 Cumhuriyet, 12 June 1964.
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Inönü was deeply troubled and personally hurt by the scolding he had received from
President [Johnson]." After Ball gave reassurances, Inönü said that the American
"attempt to promote a settlement based on strong principles is an encouraging
development, but experience had shown that principles are sometimes abandoned
when the time comes to translate them into concrete measures." 927 Inönü also
told Ball that Johnson's letter included "all the juridicial thunderbolts that could
be assembled. And, of course, as a result, you have committed some errors and
some unjust things. Our foreign office will answer the thunderbolts." 928 The U.S.-
Turkish joint communique on the same day stated that America believed that any
solution of the Cyprus problem should be compatible with the interests of both
Turkey and Greece.929
6.6.2 Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers' Visit to the USA
Inönü's visit to the United States took place between 22 and 26 June 1964.
The joint Turkish-American communique on 23 June reaffirmed the validity and
binding effects of the existing treaties on Cyprus as a starting point for a new solu-
tion. 930 This was considered a great success by Turkish rulers because the validity
of the Cyprus treaties was their main viewpoint. In his press conference in New
York on 25 June Inönü stated: "We believe in the present regime in Cyprus, which
is based on the Cypriot constitution and the international agreements on Cyprus.
But we even accept enosis on the condition that it should be implemented with its
original form, i.e. one part of the island is left to Turkey, another to Greece."931
According to accounts by Nihat Erim, who was in Inönii's official delegation, of-
ficials from the State Department inquired the opinion of the Turkish delegation
on the proposal of leaving Cyprus to Greece in return for a Greek island on the
Aegean Sea.° 32 Americans also showed that they were not worried about the arrival
of pro-enosist Greek General Grivas in Cyprus, arguing that he had gone there to
927 Ball, op.cit., p.354.
928 Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.28.
929 Curnhuriyet, 12 June 1964.
930 Erirn, Bildigim ye Cördiiuirn..., op.cit., p .329, Diileri Bakanligi Belleteni, July
1964. pp.l6-17, Keesing 'S..., vol.14, p.20268.
931 Erirn, op.cit., p.330, Sarica et al., op.cit., p.76.
932 Erini, op.Cit., p.328.
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fight communists not Turks. 933 It seems that enosis in return for some concessions
to Turks was on the agenda even at that time.
During Greek P.M. Papandreou's visit to Washington on 24 and 25 June 1964,
President Johnson and other high-level U.S. officials allegedly pressured him to
have direct talks with Turkish P.M. Inönü on the Cyprus problem by threatening
that otherwise they would not prevent a Turkish military intervention in the is-
land. 934 But Papandreou remained unmoved. In Ball's words Johnson "liked Prime
Minister In6nü, with whom he could talk straight forwardly. If the Greek leader
had shown anything like the same understanding, serious progress could have been
made."° 35 On 26 June George Ball proposed to the Greek delegation that Greek
and Turkish representatives meet separately in Geneva with Dean Acheson, former
secretary of state. 936 After U.N. Secretary-Genera) U Thant gave corisent to the
plan on the condition that talks would be held under the chairmanship of the U.N.
mediator, Greeks, too, accepted it.937
In order to ensure that Greek-Turkish bilateral talks would take place John-
son sent a letter to Papanclreou on 2 July 1964, urging him to send dekgates to
Geneva. 938
 Papandreou responded harshly against the United States, asserting
that Johnson's letter was an ultimatum of the same kind Greece had received from
the Nazis in 194O.
	 Nevertheless, he reiterated his promise to send delegates to
Geneva.
While encouraging Turks and Greeks to have direct talks under the auspices
of American mediation, American officials emphasised that their efforts were not
intended to forestall the U.N. mediation. When the U.S. administration was crit-
icised in the U.N. because of its attempt, the White House issued a statement
Ibid., p.334.
Papandreou, Democracy At Gunpoint, op.cit., pp.102-104. Greeks had received the same
warnings from the U.S. ambassador to Athens and President Johnson through the Greek am-
bassador in Washington in the first two weeks of June. Brands, "America Enters the
Cyprus Tangle", op.cit., p.355.
Ball, op.cit., p.355. See also Keesing 'S..., vol.14, p.20268.
936 papandreou, op.cit., p.103.
Ball, op.cit., pp. 355-356, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., pp.28-29.
938 Coufoudakis, "United States..." in Attalides (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed, op.cit., p.113,
Salih, Cyprus, op.cit., p.47.
939 flail, op.cit., p.356, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.30.
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claiming that the American initiative was not incompatible with the U.N. media-
tion efforts. The statement noted that the peace-keeping and peace-making role
belonged entirely to the United Nations and the only aim of the American efforts
was to prevent an armed combat in the eastern Mediterranean.94°
6.6.3 The Acheson Mission
The Geneva talks between Turkish and Greek representatives began on 8 July
1964 under the chairmanship of U.N. mediator Sakari Tuomioja. No Cypriot rep-
resentative had been called to the talks. Dean Acheson was present at Geneva as
the special envoy of President Johnson but he undertook the actual mediation re-
sponsibility. On 14 July Acheson submitted his proposals, the Acheson plan, to the
Turkish and Greek delegations headed by NThat Erim and IVicolareisis: C'gras was
to be free to choose to unify itself with Greece (enosis). On the Carpas peninsula in
the northeast of Cyprus a territory was to be given to Turkey. TñIs territory was to
become an indivisible part of Turkey and Turkey was to have full sovereignty over
it and to have the right of stationing as large a military force as it wished on the
territory. The Greek island of Kastellorizion (Meis) was to be ceded to Turkey.94'
In Acheson's own words, his plan was to bring about the union of Cyprus with
Greece but also provide for Turkey "a military presence unhampered by the need
for tripartite consent at every turn. A sequestered base for ground, air and sea
forces not only could be a defence for Cyprus but prevent its being used hostilely
against Turkey, could defend the sea approaches to the south Turkish seaports,
and be a constant reminder on the island of Turkish presence and interests."942
It seemed that the Acheson plan could solve the Cyprus problem permanently
to the advantage of the United States and the West. If it was implemented, Cyprus
would be removed from the non-alignment camp and would be placed in the NATO
sphere. The power of Makarios and AKEL which were thought to be harmful to
Western interests would be neutralised. Friction between two NATO allies would
be eliminated and the alienation of Turkey and Greece from the Western alliance
940 Bitsios, Cyprus, op.cit., p.166.
°' Erirn, Bildigim ye Gördiigiim..., op.cit., pp. 351-359, Salili, op.cit., pp.47-48. Articles which
are related to only Cyprus were ignored.
942 P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus, the Tragedy and the Challenge, Washington: American Hellenic
Institute, 1975, p.47, Salih, op.cit., p.50, Adams and Cottrell, op.cit., p.66.
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would be prevented. The extension of Soviet influence to the region would be
blocked .°'
For Turkish rulers, the Acheson plan seemed to satisfy Turkey's interests.
Hence the Turkish government authorised the Turkish delegation to continue ne-
gotiations on the basis of the Acheson plan and to try to achieve the enlargement
of Turkish sovereign base area. 944 During the talks, while Nihat Erim emphasised
Turkey's security interests on Cyprus and the necessity for Turkish control over
a portion of the island, Turkish commander Turgut Sunaip claimed that the base
area offered to Turkey was too small to provide for enough space for Turkey's mil-
itary activities. 945 The Greek delegation totally opposed the secession of Cypriot
territory to Turkey and instead they offered to lease a small base to Turkey for
twenty-five years. 94° Meanwhile, the talks were interrupted by the outbreak of new
violence in Cyprus.
It should be noted that during the summer of 1964 American officials consid-
ered exploiting the hostility between Greek Cypriot leader Makarios and Greek
General Grivas to solve the Cyprus problem. American intelligence had reported
that the antipathy between the two persons still existed and was growing. "Though
Grivas was... a passionate advocate of enosis", George Ball thought that "he might
be easier to work with than Makarios" and established an underground contact
with Grivas through Socrates Iliades, chief lieutenant to Grivas. 947 Ball and Gri-
vas agreed that Cyprus would be united with Greece and as compensation some
bases would be turned over to Turkey. Makarios, who was the chief obstacle to
such designs, would be ousted. 948 When clashes broke out in Cyprus in August,
all these schemes were upset.
Couloumbis, op.cit., p.4'T, M.A. Attalides, Cyprus, Nationalism and International Pol-
itics, Edinburgh: Q Press ltd., p.19, P.N. Vanezis, Makarios, London: Abelard-Schuman, 1974,
p.133.
" Erirn, op.cit., pp.360, 372.
Ibid., pp.3'17-350, 359-362.
946 Ibid., pp. 363-366, 372-373, 376-378.
Ball, op.cit., p.357.
948 Ibid. p.357, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit. , p.116, Attalides, Cyprus, op.cit., p.70, Brands,
op.cit., p.357, Weintal and Bartlett, Facing the Brink, op.cit., p.32.
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6.6.4 The August 1964 Fighting in Cyprus
On 6 August 1964, the Greek Cypriot forces under the command of General
Grivas 949
 launched a major attack from land and sea against the Turkish positions
in the Kokkina-Mansoura area in the northwestern part of the island.° Turkish
leaders feared that, encouraged by Turkey's inactivity, Greek Cypriots would try
to resolve the Cyprus question by force and remove the major pockets of Turkish
Cypriot resistance. Nihat Erim told Prime Minister Inönü that he had the impres-
sion from his talks with American mediator Acheson that the Americans would not
oppose a limited military action to give a lesson to Archbishop Makarios. 951 On 8
August Turkish jet fighters supplied by the United States bombed the positions of
Greek forces around Kokkina.952
American officials moved to contain the fighting in Cyprus and prevent a pos-
sible Greco-Turkish war. On the night of 8 August 1964, President Johnson sent
identical letters to Makarios, Papandreou and Inönü, urging the greatest possi-
ble restraint. 953
 Dean Rusk's cable to Papandreou asked him to cooperate with
General Grivas in neutralising Makarios, who was threatening a general massacre
in Cyprus unless the Turkish air raids were stopped. On August 9, Rusk sent a
cable to the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Henry Labouisse, stating that while the
USA was pressuring the Turks to halt their air raids, Papandreou must abandon
"horsetrading or equivocation or passionate oratory and act decisively to restore
peace in Cyprus"
In New York the U.N. Security Council accepted a resolution which was pre-
pared by U.S. and British representatives. 955 The resolution requested the in-
terested parties to establish a cease-fire and to refrain from any action liable to
Grivas had secretly returned to Cyprus with the knowledge of the Greek government. He openly
announced that his intention was to unify Cyprus with Greece. Keesing 'S..., vol.14, p.20270.
950 Ehirich, Cyprus, op.cit., pp.62-63, Stephens, Cyprus, op.cit., p.196, Crawshaw, the Cyprus
Revolt, op.cit., p.371, Salih, Cyprus, op.cit., p.50, Keesing's..., vol.14, p.20265.
951 Erirn, op.cit., p.381.
952 M. Sarica et al., Kibris Sorunu, Istanbul: Istanbul TJniversitesi Yayinlari, 1975, p.81, Bölükbai,
op.cit., pp.82-83, Bitsios, Cyprus, op.cit., p.170, Salih. op.cit., p.51, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit.,
32-33, Keesing's..., vol.14, p.20270.
953 Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.33, Brands, op.cit., p.357, Keesing '5..., vol.14, p.20266.
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214
aggravate the situation. During Security Council talks U.S. Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson emphasised that all hostilities should stop, because as long as any of
them continued all would continue and it would mount up to a dangerous inter-
national war.° 5° With Soviet Premier Khrushchev's urging, 957
 Makarios accepted
the U.N.'s cease-fire call. In spite of strong opposition by menibers of the Turkish
National Security Council, Turkish P.M. Inönü, too, ordered cessation of aerial
bombing.958
6.6.5 The Second Acheson Plan
On 15 August 1964 the Greek and Turkish representatives met again with the
U.N. mediator and Dean Acheson in Geneva. On 20 August Dean Acheson put
forward his so-called Second Acheson Plan whose main aim was to overcome the
objections of the Greek side: 1- Cyprus was to be free in choosing enosis. 2- A
military base on the Carpas peninsula was to be leased to Turkey for fifty years.
3- The Greek government was to give strong guarantees to the Turkish Cypriot
community regarding human and minority rights. 4- With the consent of the Greek
and Turkish governments, a high commissioner from an international organisation
was to be appointed for Cyprus.959
On 21 August the Turkish delegation informed Acheson that the Turkish gov-
ernment decided to reject the plan because the renting of a small territory in return
for enosis did not meet Turkey's long-term security interests. 960 Acheson told the
Turkish representatives that he was not going to press the Greeks to make more
concessions. The plan was the last opportunity to find a peaceful solution to the
problem with the help of the American administration. If the Turks rejected it,
no NATO countries would appreciate Turkey's position. 96 ' The Greek side, too,
rejected the plan because of Makarios's opposition.962
956 Bitsios, op.cit., pp. 173-174.
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On 18 August 1964 Dean Acheson had sent a message to George Ball, suggest-
ing that he should "liquidate" the Geneva effort. Ball responded that this would
encourage Makarios to drive the island into another crisis and bring about Turkish
military intervention. In his next cable to Ball, Acheson stated that the United
States should stop irritating the Turks and Greeks by trying to pressure them into
a Cyprus agreement. If the United States walked away, both sides would realise
that they alone were responsible for finding a way out. Finally Acheson said that
if an American retreat from Cyprus brought on a showdown with Makarios, "then
let it come."°° 3 After the rejection of the second Acheson plan by both sides, the
American administration adjourned its Geneva efforts on 31 August 1964 by calling
Acheson to Washington.
6.6.6 The Aftermath of the Geneva Talks
In September 1964 at a meeting of top U.S. officials including President John-
son, Dean Acheson stated that a stalemate was reached in the Cyprus question
because of Makarios's adamant attitude and that a violent and uncontrolled Turk-
ish invasion of the island would be inevitable unless something was done. Acheson
and Ball argued that the only solution to the problem was the fait accompli of a
controlled Turkish invasion of the island. In their plan, the Turks would seize the
part of Cyprus which they would have received under the first Acheson plan and
then the Greek and Greek Cypriots would instantly proclaim the unification of the
rest of Cyprus with Greece.964
In fact, Acheson had raised the issue with the Turks during the Geneva talks.
On 4 August 1964 he told the Turkish delegation that he did not advise them to
resort to military force but if they did so, America would not oppose them. 965 After
the rejection of the second Acheson plan, Acheson said to the Turkish delegation
again: "I am privately and friendly telling you: If you can invade the part of
Cyprus which was reserved for you without causing too much bloodshed the Sixth
Fleet does not obstruct your way but protects you." Turkish commander General
Turgut Sunaip took the proposal to Inönü the next day. Inönii rejected it by saying
963 Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., pp.34-35.
964 Brands, op.cit., pp. 358-359.
965 Brim, op.cit., p.369.
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that he could not initiate such an adventure without the official approval of the
American administration 966
In the September meeting, Acheson and Ball told President Johnson that the
Turks liked their scheme and all that was required to put the plan into motion was
a signal from Washington. When Johnson summed up the scheme by saying that a
resort to force was inevitable and that the only question was "whether it should be
messy and destructive or controlled and eventually productive, in accordance with
a plan," Acheson agreed that this was a fair summary. Initially Johnson seemed
interested in the proposal but in the end he rejected it. The Vietnam war was
already a major trouble for him, he could not consent to the outbreak of another
one. He thought that Turkish invasion might not be as clean as Acheson and Ball
expected and that it might escalate to a major war. At least the next few months
would not be a good season for a war because of the approaching presidential
election.967
American officials were generally of the opinion that the Greek side was pri-
marily responsible for the failure of the Geneva talks. A few months later Dean
Acheson wrote to the U.S. ambassador to Egypt:
We came to close an understanding which might have cropped the Archbishop's
whiskers and solved the idiotic problem of Cyprus to your Mr Nasser's disappointment
and chagrin. Our weakness was Papandreou's weakness... He gave away our plans at
critical moments to Makarios... A little money, which we had, the Greek 7th Division
in Cyprus, which the Greeks had, and some sense of purpose in Athens, which did not
exist, might have permitted a different result. The Turks could not have been more
willing to cooperate.°68
In his speech before the Chicago Bar Association on 24 March 1965, Dean
Acheson said:
There was little doubt that from a legal point of view the treaties were binding
upon the parties... Merely to restrain the Turks from intervention would be, in fact,
to interveiie against them... Time was running strongly against the Turks, due to
the military build up on the island and the Archbishop's increasing pressure to crush
Turkish Cypriot resistance to his imposed regime... The Turks were quite willing to
pick up discussions at the point where the Kokkiiia fighting interrupted them. But they
966 Ibid., p.406.
967 Brands, op.cit., pp. 359-360.
968 jl,id. , p.3&S.
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saw that in making any further concession to unresponding Greeks, they would merely
be negotiating with themselves.969
President Johnson scolded the Greek ambassador to Washington harshly be-
cause of the Greek stubbornness on the problem.97°
In September 1964 the U.N. Security Council, too, discussed the Cyprus ques-
tion. U.S. ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States disapproved any
air attacks on Cyprus launched from outside, hinting Turkish air attacks against
the island. He also clarified that the United States had never agreed to the use
of arms furnished under its military assistance for any purpose not specified in
assistance agreements.97'
6.7 U.S. Policy Toward the Cyprus Question
The main American concern on the Cyprus question was to contain the con-
flict and to prevent it from escalating to a greater war between Greece and Turkey.
The deterioration of relations and outbreak of an armed combat between Turkey
and Greece, which were strategically important allies of the USA, 972
 contained the
following dangers: Firstly, NATO could be destabilized and weakened in facing
the enemy camp and its southeastern flank could collapse. Secondly, the politi-
cal, military and economic co-operation between the United States, Greece and
Turkey could be undermined and thus the presence of American bases and facili-
ties in these countries could be threatened. Thirdly, the Soviet Union could have
the opportunity to destabilize the Western camp by involving itself in a matter
concerning NATO countries. Finally, the prestige of the Western alliance could be
harmed since the hostility would be a great embarrassment to the Western bloc
and a symbol of the Western disunity.
As a result of this thinking, American officials paid attention to the possibility
969 s• Tahan, "Turkish-US Relations and Cyprus", Foreign Policy, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February 1975,
pp.l 68-169.
Brands, op.cit., p.358.
971 International Organisation. vol.19. 1965, p.87.
H.J. Psomiades, "the United States and the Mediterranean Triangle;
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viewed, op.cit., p.201, T.A. Couloumbis, the United States, Greece and Turkey, New
York: Praeger, 1983, pp.24, 28.
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that the Cyprus question could push Turkey and Greece to sever their ties with
NATO and to seek better relations with the Soviet Union to the extent that they
could fall under Soviet influence. Turkey's efforts in this direction led Americans
to be more careful in not alienating her with their attitude on the Cyprus question.
They sought assurances from Turkish leaders that these efforts would not weaken
their ties with the Western alliance.
The United States had strategic concerns over Cyprus in the 1960s. The island
is located at the cross-roads of the three continents and the major routes connect-
ing the West with the East. It is 44 miles south of Turkey, 64 miles west of Syria,
130 miles northwest of Israel, and 240 miles north of Egypt and the Suez Canal.973
Cyprus commanded the outlets of the pipelines on the coasts of Syria, Lebanon,
Israel and Egypt, the northern entrance of the Suez Canal and the line of contain-
ment of the Soviet Union along its southern borders. 974 Some developments in the
1960s seemed to increase the strategic importance of the island: "the growth of So-
viet political and military missions in various Arab states, the growth of the Soviet
fleet in the area; the continuing Arab-Israel crisis; the increasing American concern
about Middle Eastern oil supplies and the protection of oil shipping routes; the
prospect of a reopened Suez Canal and the loss of American bases and base rights
in the area." 975 Cyprus could provide useful bases in the eastern Mediterranean for
the West.
The British retained two sovereign Cyprus bases, Dhekelia and Akrotiri, and
enjoyed the privileges of military use of Cypriot air space, transport and land.
They could allow the United States to benefit from the same facilities whenever
they wanted. Akrotiri especially was a very important RAF base and could be
used by the United States and NATO to support operations in the Middle East
and to defend NATO's southeastern flank. 976
 Makarios had already allowed the
United States to use communication facilities in Cyprus, including radio listening
and broadcasting stations and the horizon radar installations for the detection of
ICBM launches in the Soviet Union and communications between Middle Eastern
Joseph, Cyprus, op.cit., p.119.
'' A.G. Xydis, Cyprus: 'What Kind of Problem" in Attalides (ed.), op.cit., p.28.
Coufoudakis, "United States..." in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.109.
976 Attalides, Cyprus, op.cit.. p.158.
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and Eastern bloc countries. 977 It was important for Americans to prevent Cyprus
from falling into the hands of enemies. They would have preferred the island
to come under NATO control (as a consequence of enosis or partition) than to
remain under the Cypriot administration that pursued a policy of non-alignment.
But their priority lay in having good relations with Greece and Turkey. The U.S.
position in the eastern Mediterranean was much more dependent on Greek and
Turkish bases than the Cypriot ones.978
In the minds of U.S. officials the first thing which should be done on the Cyprus
question was to bring the violence and clashes in Cyprus to an end. This could open
a way to negotiations between the interested parties to find a political settlement.
Americans pressurised the parties to the conflict from time to time to refraii, fro.m
taking any actions which would worsen the situation in Cyprus. They particularly
put pressure on the Turks to deter them from invading the island. In order to
maintain peace, the United States also supported ti'e Uni1d Ntioiis 'peace-keepIng
force in Cyprus diplomatically and materially. U.S. leaders prelerred all attempts
to seek a solution to be made through quiet diplomacy. They did not want a
problem concerning Western states to be aired in international forums, thinking
that it would provide an opportunity to enemies to undermine and humiliate tie
Western bloc.
American leaders were generally reluctant to put forward a proposal for the
Cyprus question because they feared that their proposal would alienate at least one
ally. They frequently announced that the United States was in favour of a settle-
ment which would protect the interests of all the interested parties. They thought
that only an agreed settlement between Greece and Turkey through bilateral talks
could bring a permanent solution to the problem because the two states had the
power to influence the Cypriot communities. For this purpose, the United States
pressed Turkish and Greek officials especially in the summer of 1964 to come to-
gether to find a peaceful way of the Cyprus problem. During these bilateral talks,
the United States came up with a proposal to be discussed by the two sides, which
Ibid., p.13, P. Oberling, the Road to Bellapais, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982,
p.124.
978 J.C. Campbell, "the United States and the Cyprus Question, 1974-1975"
in V. Coufoudakis (ed.), Essays on the Cyprus Conflict, New York: Pella Publishing, 1976,
p.14.
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could be called enosis, partition or double enosis. It seemed that the present posi-
tion of independent Cyprus did not suit Western and American interests because
it was very likely that it could attract Soviet influence to the region and cause a
war between Turkey and Greece. The unification of the island with Greece (enosis)
with some concessions to Turkey could solve the problem in accordance with the
Western interests. In this way, Cyprus would be put into NATO's ranks, a com-
munist take over in the island would be prevented and Greece and Turkey would
be kept happy. The Geneva talks and the Acheson plans were directed to achiev-
ing this aim. When it was understood that this scheme would not be successful,
American policy shifted to the acceptance of a unitary independent Republic of
Cyprus so long as the NATO alliance was not damaged by the situation in the
island. But American politicians always kept the enosis scheme as an alternative
in case other solutions failed and encouraged the Greek and Turkish governments
to hold secret bilateral talks on the question.
Another American concern related to the Cyprus question was to prevent corn-
munist influence from advancing in the Mediterranean region. At that time it
seemed that the Soviets had changed the balance of power and gained the upper
hand in the Middle East by having a close relationship with non-aligned, anti-
Western Arab regimes. If Cyprus fell under Soviet influence, the Western interests
in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East could be damaged greatly. To
restore the balance of power in the region it was vital to keep the Soviet influence
away from Cyprus.
American officials had already been alerted by the policies of the Cypriot ad-
ministration. The Makarios regime had appealed to the Soviet Union for support
on the Cyprus question and showed readiness to rely on the Soviet support to
protect its security. It signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union and made
contacts to obtain Soviet weapons. The Cypriot government also pursued a non-
aligned policy in its foreign relations and had close contacts with the non-aligned
countries, especially with Nasser of Egypt, who seemed to pursue anti-Western
policies. It rejected all Western designs for the Cyprus problem, gave communists
a respectable political role in the state machinery, announced that it rejected all
military alliances and declared that it would not allow the use of Cypriot bases
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against the Arabs in case of fighting between Arabs and Israel. 979 The strength
of the Cyprus communist party, AKEL, also worried Americans. The party was
well-organised, had substantial popular support and was an influential factor in
Cyprus politics. It was opposed to the presence of Western nuclear bases on the
island and had tried to turn public opinion against Britain and the United States.
If it gained political control, it could allow the Soviet fleet to use the Cyprus ports.
In order to prevent Cyprus from becoming a threat to Western interests, Ameri-
can policy was directed, to some extent, to the elimination or at least neutralisation
of political capability of Makarios and the communist elements. American contacts
with Greece and Cyprus aimed at finding a solution to the Cyprus problem, ex-
cluding Makarios and AKEL.
The overall U.S. policy on Cyprus mentioned above made it necessary to pre-
vent any Turkish intervention in Cyprus and to pressure the Turks to act in a cer-
tain way when required. American authorities were not able to control the Greek
Cypriots entirely to prevent their actions against Turkish Cypriots. But a Turkish
intervention in Cyprus presented more dangers for them, i.e. a Greek-Turkish war
and damage to NATO. It was therefore imperative for U.S. rulers to check Turkish
actions on Cyprus. However, they failed to predict how the Turks would respond
to their warnings, which were, maybe unnecessarily, too harsh for an independent
state. U.S. officials might have been deceived by the fact that until that time the
Turks always became the most loyal ally within NATO and always attributed great
importance to pleasing their American ally with their actions. It seems that the
Americans did not understand the pride of Turkish authorities. One reason for the
severe U.S. warning to Turkey might be that as a result of being a superpower the
United States expected that a small country such as Turkey should listen to its
advice in a matter which could concern the whole Western camp. Scolding of the
Greek ambassador by Johnson strengthens this view. 98° However, when U.S. offi-
cials realised that they could alienate the Turks and eventually lose their alliance,
which was important for U.S. interests, they acted more cautiously.
979 Attalides, op.cit., p.15.
980 Johnson told the ambassador: "America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If those
two fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's tail. If your
Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his government
and his constitution may not last very long." Brands, op.cit., p.358.
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6.8 Turkish Policy on the Cyprus Question
The Cyprus question was a national cause for Turkey, concerning its national
prestige, self-esteem and honour. The problem addressed deep-rooted feelings of
the Turks. Since she gained her independence, Greece had expanded at the expense
of Turkey's territories. The Turks had saved their mainland, Asia Minor, from the
occupation of Greece but lost important Aegean islands to her. The island of Crete
had been gradually weaned away from them under the pretext of self-government
and finally surrendered to Greece. The Turks were determined not to allow the
same thing happen again. In their minds, modern Turkey was no longer a sick
man whose just claims could be ignored. 98 ' Turkish P.M. Inönü said in Parliament:
"Cyprus is a national cause for us, concerning each home and each individual in
this country. We are right and we are determined to find a just solution for this
problem. It will be solved in conformity with the honour and dignity of the Turkish
nation. Any solution contrary to this will be beyond the capacity of any power to
force us to accept."982
In the eyes of Turkish leaders, Cyprus had a great strategic importance to
Turkey. 983 It is located in a position overlooking the southern ports of Turkey, lying
just over forty miles from the Turkish coast, and therefore it controlled Turkey's
vital strategic approaches and consequently had fundamental importance to her
defence. The Turks argued that if Cyprus was controlled by an enemy power
or a weak state such as Greece, in case of war Turkey would be in a dangerous
situation, isolated from the outside world. If Cyprus passed to Greece, Turkey's
entire Aegean and Mediterranean coastlines would be controlled by an unfriendly
Greece, which was a traditional enemy.
In their dealings with the Cyprus question, Turkish officials always stated that
their main aim was to protect the lives and rights of Turkish Cypriots. They
claimed that this responsibility had been given to Turkey by the international
agreements on Cyprus. In their view, Turkey had to act as protector of Turkish
981 Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus, op.cit., p.242.
982 IvIMTD, 5 5.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.210.
983 M.A. Ramady, "the Role of Turkey in Greek-Turkish Cypriot Communal
Relations" in Coufoudakis (ed.), Essays..., op.cit., p.2, Psomiades in Attalides(ed.). op.cit.,
p.203, Vail, op.cit., p.242, Bilge, "the Cyprus Conflict and Turkey" in Karpat(ed.),
op.cit., pp.142, 183.
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Cypriots who had the same ethnic origin, cultural and religious background and
who had nobody else to rely on in saving them from discrimination by the Greek
majority.
For the Turks, the most suitable solution to the Cyprus problem was the
partition of the island between the Turks and the Greeks and the separation of
the two ethnic communities in Cyprus. In their view, the hatred between the two
communities, which stemmed from having absolutely different national identities
with different cultural, political and religious values, was so great that it would
be dangerous and unreasonable not to separate them. The harrowing experiences
which Turkish Cypriots suffered at the hands of Greek Cypriots in 1963 and the
following years had shown that the Greek majority rule in Cyprus would not protect
rights of the Turkish community. That was why Turkey accepted the first Acheson
plan as the basis of negotiating a solution for Cyprus. The plan would have
also satisfied Turkey's security concerns. The Turks were convinced that short
of partition only federal government could give Turkish Cypriots security.984
Turkish leaders believed that their Cyprus cause was just and that it was the
Greek side which caused all the troubles and atrocities. They expected that their
Western allies, especially the United States, which was the leader of the West,
would show a decisive reaction to the Greek attacks against the Turkish Cypriots
and pressurise Greece and Makarios to stop their violence. 985 Turkey had supported
its Western allies in all situations even by putting its own security in danger and it
was now the West's turn to support its faithful ally Turkey in her just cause. This
kind of action would also be a requirement of Western principles such as justice and
human rights. However, instead of pressuring the Greek side Americans demanded
more concessions from Turkey each time Makarios rejected a new proposal and the
violence in Cyprus continued. Consequently Turkish leaders grew impatient. 986
 In
984 Prime Minister Inönüs speech in Parliament on 3 September 1964, Keesing 'S..., 1965-1966,
vol.15, p.20267, Gönlübol et al., Olaylarla..., op.cit., p.400, Foreign Minister I. Sabri calayangil,
C'wmhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi (GSTD), 1.2.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3,
p.376.
985 Turkish P.M. tnönü's statement to AP agency correspondent: "The USA should know all facts
about the Cyprus question and undertake its responsibilities." Cumhurz yet, 26.1.1964, p.1.
Turkish radio's broadcast: 'The United States, which is the spokesman of peace cause in the world
should have warned her ally Greece on her illegal actions in Cyprus." Cumhuriyet, 9.6.1964, p.7.
986 M. Toker, "Turkiye Yol Agzinda", Akis, 4 April 1964, p.7, M. Toker, "Ismet Paa
ile...", Mill'iyet, 19.2.1969, p.5. Statements of President C. Gürsel, Defence Minister I. Sancar
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their view, this was an abandonment of Western principles by the West itself since
the victims were non-Christian Turks.
Turkish rulers began to hint of changes in Turkey's traditional Western-oriented
foreign policy. In his interview with Time magazine in mid-April 1964, P.M. Inönii
stated that while Turkey had done her best to preserve its alliance with the West,
her allies had been competing with enemies in destroying the Western alliance and
warned that "if our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will
break up and then a new kind of world order will be established under new condi-
tions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place. I had faith in the leadership
of America, which has responsibility within the Western alliance, I am suffering
now as a result of this attitude."987
Turks began to think that the monolithic pro-U.S. and pro-Western foreign
policy did not meet Turkey's national interests entirely. They realised that the
interests of Turkey and the Western powers would not always be identical and that
they could clash with each other in some situations. The Cyprus question created
a conflict between Turkey's interests and her commitment to the NATO alliance
and manifested that NATO could restrict Turkey's freedom of action in matters
that concerned her. It also became apparent to Turkish leaders that Turkey was
isolated in the international arena and had no support in her national causes.
Consequently, Turkish policy-makers began to reassess Turkey's foreign policy, her
relations with the United States and her position within NATO. Knowing that the
ties between the West and Turkey were based on complementary interests rather
than identical ones, they tried to be more flexible in their dealings with the West,
the Warsaw Pact and the Third World.988
It would be wrong to conclude that Turks really considered making radical
changes in their traditional pro-Western foreign policy and in their relations with
the USA. When such an interpretation circulated among Turkish political circles,
Turkish leaders were quick to deny it. Prime Minister Inönii said in Parliament:
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In their dealings in connection with the Cyprus question our allies have from time
to time created the impression that they are not interested in the problem or have no
influence on it. In complaining about these actions of our allies we have been obliged
from time to time to use such expressions as would indicate the psychological mood of
a sincere and sorrowful friend. Beyond this, the interpretation to the effect that we are
to depart from the main course of our foreign policy which we have followed and that
we are to abrogate our treaties are untrue... We sincerely hope that our allies will take
a stance which distinguishes the guilty from the innocent and show their loyalty to the
[Western] alliance, legal principles and justice.989
During his visit to Washington in June 1964, Inönii also stated that "our
allies in NATO have neither left nor betrayed us. They only insist that Turkey
and Greece should agree on a solution. We want our allies help us. Any change
in Turkey's foreign policy is out of the question." 99° Opposition MPs expressed
doubts about the implications of Inönü's statement to Time. Faruk Sükan and
Gökhan Ev1iyaolu warned that any changes in foreign policy would bring fatal
results.99'
6.9 Turkish Public Opinion on the Cyprus Question
The Cyprus question had a great impact on Turkish public opinion. For the
first time, Turkey's foreign policy became a subject of public discussion, and anti-
Americanism gained popularity among Turkish people. Leftist circles, university
students, intellectuals and the press loudly criticised the United States. Mass
demonstrations were arranged. 992
 U.S. personnel and buildings in Turkey were
attacked and the shouting of "Yankee, go home!" was heard in Turkish streets for
the first time.
The following criticism was common among Turkish critics: While the United
States herself was bombing North Vietnam under no international agreement, she
was preventing Turkey from using her legal intervention right to save lives of Turk-
ish Cypriots and to stop bloodshed in Cyprus. 993
 The tone of American dissuasion
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was reminiscent of the tactics of eastern bloc countries and colonial powers.994
American attitude tilted to the Greek side and encouraged them in their violence
against Turkish Cypriots. The Second Acheson plan proposed pure enosis (unifica-
tion of the whole Cyprus with Greece). While threatening Turkey not to intervene
in Cyprus, Americans did not warn Greeks over their shipment of arms and men to
Cyprus and their use of U.S.-supplied arms against Turks.° 95 The United States,
which was opposed to communism all over the world, did not care about the in-
crease of the strength of Cypriot communists under Makarios's political protection
because the victims were Muslim Turks.996
Turkey had given steadfast support to the United States in international crises
such as Korea, Cuba and Vietnam and always been a faithful ally of the West,
but the USA did not show the same sensitivity toward Turkey's just cause.997
The U.S. attitude was not compatible with Western principles to which Turkish
leaders attributed great importance. Americans tolerated violation of basic human
rights by the Greek side and only watched the massacre of Turkish Cypriots.998
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Turkey should stop consulting with the Western powers and intervene in Cyprus
militarily to solve the problem permanently. 999 It was also high time for Turkey
to reconsider its friendship, alliance and agreements with the West, which did not
protect Turkish interests adequately.'°°°
It should be noted that there were also some Turkish critics who warned that
Turkey should not alienate the West by criticising it harshly on the problems which
stemmed from her own mistakes.100'
6.10 Epilogue
The barrage of criticism at home and the U.S. attitude toward the Cyprus
question led Turkish rulers to initiate some actions such as the bombing of Cyprus
in August 1964 to demonstrate that they were not under the influence of the United
States in their actions on the Cyprus issue. However, Turkish authorities did not
want to cause the deep resentment in the USA because they needed the alliance.
They tried to limit the damage done by public criticism to the alliance with the
United States and NATO. While explaining the Acheson talks and the American
attitude toward the Cyprus question to the Turkish Parliament on 3 September
1964, Turkish Prime Minister Inönü preserved a calm and detached tone:
The United States has reconfirmed that it has tried sincerely to find a way of
settlement for the Cyprus question, which could be accepted by both sides... We have
wanted the United States to play an active role in finding a solution to the problem,
not to be indifferent to it... The main American concern has been to prevent a war
between two NATO allies... She believed that the problem would be solved through
cooperating with the leaders of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus... The main reason for the
failure of American efforts is that tile United States misjudged the characteristics of
the Greek and Cypriot administrations.., and that the two governments misled the
American leaders.'°°2
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U.S. rulers, too, did not want to alienate the Turks and lose the alliance with
Turkey, since the alliance served U.S. interests. They tried to heal the wounds with
Turkey and to appease the angry Turkish public opinion. The U.S. administration
issued public statements renewing its commitment to protect Turkey's security, and
promising continuity of economic and military assistance.'°° 3 When the Turkish
government rejected U.N. mediator Gab Plaza's plan on Cyprus and Gab Plaza
himself as mediator 1004
 the United States did not raise any objection to Turkey.
She tacitly agreed with Turkey that the U.N. mediation would bring no solution
to the problem.
In December 1965, the United States voted against the U.N. General Assembly
resolution which appeared to support Makarios's claim for the independence of
Cyprus and to discount the Turkish claim to the right of intervention in Cyprus
based on the Treaty of Guarantee. The resolution recognised that "the Republic
of Cyprus, as an equal member of the United Nations, is, in accordance with the
Charter, entitled to and should enjoy full sovereignty and complete independence
without any foreign intervention or interference." 1005 The resolution was passed
by 47 votes to 5 with 54 abstentions. The Western and Eastern bloc countries
abstained, while the Third World countries of Africa, Asia and South America
voted in favour of the resolution. The countries who voted against it were Turkey,
the United States, Albania, Iran, and Pakistan.'°°6
The American opposition to the resolution was justified by American officials
on the ground that it seemed to violate the existing treaties on Cyprus and to favour
only one side of the problem. But the main American concern was to restore the
prestige of the United States in Turkey, which was shaken by the Johnson letter.
During the U.N. General Assembly talks on Cyprus between 11 and 17 December
1965, American representative Charles W. Yost made the following points:
The Security Council had recognised that a solution to the Cyprus problem could
not be imposed but should be reached by negotiation. accommodation and mediation.
The Assembly should therefore refrain from any action inconsistent with the measures
already taken by the Security Council. and it should in particular refrain from passing
1003 Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., p.120.
1004 Keesing's..., vol.16, p.20989.
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judgement on the positions of the parties or on the issues in dispute. The United States
had no preferred formula for a settlement of he Cyprus problem. It merely hoped that
the parties would move toward the agreed solution envisaged in the Council's resolution
of March 4, 1964.1007
In his speech to the U.N. Security Council in August 1965, Yost had recon-
firmed the American consideration that the London-Zurich agreements were still
valid. His main points were as follows:
The government of Cyprus had not been content with extending the mandate of
its House of Representatives but had gone one step further and amended the electoral
law. This was inconsistent with the London-Zurich agreements and the constitution of
Cyprus. However, whatever legal rights any of the parties might claim, his delegation
joined the Secretary General in urging all those concerned to refrain from any action or
threat of action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus or to endanger international
peace.'°°8
The American vote against the U.N. General Assembly resolution did not undo
the negative impression of the USA in Turkey. Some Turkish critics claimed that
America could have influenced other states to vote against the resolution if she
had wished, but American representatives in the U.N. did not make any effort in
this direction.'°° 9 In fact, during the U.N. General Assembly talks the exercise of
American influence on behalf of Turkey was not out of the question. The Greek
and Greek Cypriot representatives feared that such an American initiative would
be disastrous for their attempt to pass a resolution supporting their cause. Hence,
they made strong representations to the U.S. mission twice, when they thought that
the United States was attempting to persuade Latin American states to support
Turkey. These Greek actions were generally successful because the United States
did not engage actively in the struggle to pass a resolution on Cyprus.'°'°
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1008 Ibid., vol.19, 1965, p.987.
1009 H. Uysal, op.cit., p.5, Cumhuriyet, 28.12.1965, p.7.
1010 FLU. Keohane, "the Study of Political Influence in the General Assem-
bly", International Organisation, vol.21, 1967, p.232.
230
Chapter VII
THE CYPRUS QUESTION BETWEEN 1965 AND 1975
AND ITS EFFECT UPON TURKISH-AMERICAN
RELATIONS
This chapter covers serious developments such as the Turkish intervention in
Cyprus and the U.S. embargo on Turkey and concludes with an assessment of their
effect upon the relationship and the theoretical implications.
7.1 U.S. Efforts to Promote Talks Between Turkey and Greece
American rulers hoped that a small concession (probably a military base) by
the Greeks to Turkey could solve the Cyprus problem to the advantage of all
Western powers, including Greece and Turkey, with unification of the island with
Greece. Therefore, they encouraged Greek and Turkish officials to have bilateral
talks. The Americans certainly disliked the excessive Greek Cypriot opposition to
such plans and Greek support for this opposition. This was probably the reason
for apparent U.S. pressures on the Greek side after 1965.
Allegedly, U.S. authorities put enormous pressure on Greek governments be-
tween 1965 and 1967 and on the Greek junta after 1967 to have secret bilateral
talks with Turkey to find a solution to the Cyprus problem along the Acheson
plan lines. It was also claimed that their dislike for George Papandreou's atti-
tude toward the Cyprus question led the Americans to play a role in ousting his
government in July 1965 and the Greek military coup in April 1967.
Among other reasons, 101 ' U.S. officials disliked Andreas Papandreou, son of
Greek P.M. Papandreou and minister in the cabinet, because of his open support
1011 T.A. Coulounibis, the United States, Greece and Turkey, New York: Praeger. 1983, p.49,
H.I. Salih, Cyprus; the Impact of a Diverse Nationalism on a State, Alabama:
University of Alaban,a Press, 1978, p.54, M. Goldbloom, "United States Policy in
Post-War Greece" in R. Clogg and G. Yannoponlos (eds.), Greece Under Military
Rule, London: Secker and Warburg. 1972, pp.234, 237.
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for Greek Cypriot President Makarios's policies.' 012 The Greek right wing press
had attacked A. Papandreou over his alleged role in the Greek rejection of one
version of the Acheson plan which would bring the union of at least the major
portion of Cyprus with Greece. 1013 He had told Eric Rouleou of Le Monde: "Cer-
tain Western powers have attempted to create a rift between President Makarios
and our government by asking us to condemn his policies... An agreement based
on enosis and a Turkish military base must be excluded as long as the Cyprus
government is against it." The statement further deepened the friction between
the U.S. and Greek governments. American diplomats loudly protested against it
and consequently A. Papandreou resigned from his post.'°'4
In March 1965 the U.S. embassy in Athens was alarmed by the news that a ship
carrying Soviet ground-to-air missiles had left Egypt and was on its way for delivery
to Cyprus. Upon American protests, Greek Defence Minister Garoufalias went to
Cyprus to discuss the matter. 1015
 Greek Cypriot leader Makarios declared that
Garoufalias's action was ordered directly by U.S. Secretary of Defence McNamara.
He claimed that obeying the Pentagon's instructions, Garoufalias prevented the
delivery of Soviet missiles to Cyprus and withdrew from Cyprus all Greek officers
who could have trained their Cypriot counterparts to handle the missiles.'0'6
As a result of American pressures, Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos
and his Turkish counterpart Iik held talks on the Cyprus question at the meeting
of NATO foreign ministers in London in May 1965.1017 Makarios condemned the
talks, stating that they could lead to the partition of Cyprus. In July 1965 Greek
Prime Minister Papandreou resigned because of his disagreement with the King
over his undertaking the defence minister post. It was claimed that the USA took
part in this development by supporting the King mainly because of its dislike
for Papandreou's Cyprus policy. 1018
 Given the general U.S. suspicion that leftist
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Ltd., 1979, p.72.
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powers, including Papandreou's party, would harm American interests, this claim
needs to be taken cautiously.
The next Greek minority government under the premiership of Stephanopoulos
seemed to attribute more importance to its ties with NATO. Hence it was inclined
to solving the Cyprus problem through talks with Turkey for the sake of NATO's
interests. Encouraged by the Americans, Greek rulers sought union of Cyprus
with Greece with some compensation to Turkey.'°'° On these lines the Greek and
Turkish foreign ministers had contacts in May, 102° June and December 1966. Since
the Greeks did not give consent to Turkey's having full sovereignty over a Cypriot
territory, no agreement was achieved.102'
It was claimed that the United States, if not involved directly, at least gave
consent to the Greek military coup on 21 April 1967 which forestalled the in-
evitable election victory of George Papandreou's Centre Union Party disliked by
Americans, among other reasons, because of its Cyprus policy.' 022 According to
Stern, CIA station chief Maury in the American Embassy in Athens disclosed that
"senior members of the CIA country team met in January 1967... We concluded
that a victory by the Papandreous would seriously damage vital U.S. interests
in the eastern Mediterranean area, weaken the southern flank of NATO and se-
riously destabilize Greek-Turkish relations then severely strained by the Cyprus
situation."°'3 The new Greek junta regime, too, supported by Americans, was in
favour of having bilateral talks with Turks to solve the Cyprus problem in a way
which would be compatible with NATO interests.'024
On 9 and 10 September 1967, the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece,
Suleyman Demirel and Kollies, met in the Turkish and Greek border towns, Kean
and Alexandroupolis (Dedeagatch). Kollies's proposal was the union of Cyprus
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to Greece (enosis) and territorial adjustments on the Greco-Turkish border in
favour of Turkey. The Turks rejected enosis and demanded either a return to the
1960 regime or double enosis (secession of some Cypriot territory to Turkey).'°25
After returning to Turkey, Demirel declared in his press conference that Turkey
rejected enosis and insisted on the validity of the London-Zurich agreements on
Cyprus.'°2° In Andreas Papandreou's words, "Demirel's statement fell like a bomb-
shell in Greece. Papadopoulos and the junta government had had a resounding
defeat."°27 In Turkey, opposition MPs criticised the Kesan-Alexandroupolis talks
on the ground that they were held under the influence of foreign powers and sought
union of Cyprus with Greece.'°28
7.2 1967 Cyprus Crisis
7.2.1 The November 1967 Fighting in Cyprus
On 15 November 1967 Greek Cypriot forces under the command of General
Grivas attacked and occupied the Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodhoros
(Boazici) and Kophinou (Gecitkak).1029 The Turkish side believed that Greek at-
tacks were organised attempts to achieve the enosis recently rejected by Demirel.'°3°
Reportedly, the Greek Cypriot offensive was arranged by Grivas on orders from
the Greek junta.103'
The Turkish government issued a public statement condemning the attacks
strongly and warning that the crisis might go beyond the borders of Cyprus.'°32
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The Turkish ultimatum to Makarios, which threatened aerial bombardment brought
about withdrawal of the Greek forces from the two Turkish villages.' 033
 By the
end of November 17, the U.N. force in Cyprus had achieved a cease-fire. 1034 How-
ever, staying under strong public pressure, especially from the press, military com-
manders and parliament, to intervene in Cyprus,'° 35
 on November 17, Turkish
P.M. Süleyman Demirel sent an ultimatum-like note to Greece, making certain
demands.'°36
It seemed that Turkey was poised to invade Cyprus if Greece did not accept its
demands. Between November 17 and 22, a war atmosphere rapidly developed.1037
The Turkish armed forces lacking enough equipment and trained personnel were
not ready for a landing in Cyprus and Turkish rulers were not willing to launch
a military intervention. However, they seemed determined to resort to military
option if necessary to save Turkey's prestige.'038
7.2.2 The Vance Mission
The main American concern was to restore peace in Cyprus and thus to prevent
an outbreak of a Greco-Turkish war. American officials tried to restrain both sides
from taking any action which would worsen the situation. U.S. ambassador to
Turkey, Parker Hart, told Turkish Foreign Minister calayangi1 that President
Johnson requested Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus but chose not to send a
written message because of the Turkish public's reaction to the Johnson letter in
1964 . 1039
 A task force of the U.S. Sixth fleet was deployed close to the shores of
Cyprus, apparently to deter the Turkish invasion. 1040 On 22 November, the United
States joined Britain and Canada in proposing a settlement formula.'°41
1033 Bö1ükba.i, op.cit., p.135, Sarica et al., op.cit., p.143.
1034 Ehlrich, op.cit., p.105.
1035 Bölükbai, op.cit., p.136. E. Mflterciniler, Kzbris Barz Hare katinin Bilinme yen Yönleri,
Istanbul: Yaprak Yaymevi, 1990, p.117, Keesing's..., vol.16, p.22435.
1036 Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.142n, Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 211-212.
1037 Quotations from Washington Post and The Daily Telegraph in Papandreou, op.cit.,
pp.211-212.
1038 Bö1iikbai, Superpowers..., op.cit., p.135, Miltercimler, op.cit., pp.120, 137.
1039 Böliikbai, op.cit., p.l37.
1040 Ibid., p.l3T, Sarica et a!., Kibris Sorunu, op.cit., p.144.
5041 Ehiricli, Cyprus, op.cit., p.110.
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When the Greek government rejected the Turkish demands on 22 November,
President Johnson dispatched Cyrus Vance, the former deputy secretary of defence,
as his special envoy to mediate between the sides of the conflict. Cyrus Vance "was
told that Turkish troops were already at the embarkation port and were expected,
according to intelligence, to invade Cyprus the next morning. This would mean
war between Greece and Turkey." President Johnson instructed Vance: "Do what
you have to to stop the war. If you need anything, let me know."°42
As a first step, Cyrus Vance manoeuvred to gain time to be able to mediate
between the sides. In his meeting with Turkish P.M. Demirel on November 23,
Vance obtained the Turkish government's promise that it would not invade Cyprus
in the next few days.'° 43 Then Vance shuttled between Athens and Ankara to find
a settlement formula agreed by both sides. Subsequently, Makarios could be put
in the position of either accepting the settlement or being the isolated cause of a
continuing crisis. Although Vance pressed the Turkish side as well as the Greeks,
this time there would be no repetition of the Johnson letter in 1964. A Johnson
letter-like threat could cause total alienation of Turkey from the United States.
This time, it was the Greek side which caused the crisis and thus threatened the
cohesion of NATO, therefore it should make major concessions to end the crisis.
Nevertheless, Greece should be approached properly to provide her with a ladder
she could climb down.1044
The official American position was that Vance acted only as a mediator and
did not threaten sanctions against either side. But there were some rumours that
the United States would cut off its military aid to both sides. Ehirich rightly
suggests that "even if Vance did not directly discuss future military assistance for
Greece and Turkey, the issue must have been very much in the minds of leaders
in those countries, for both depended on American assistance to maintain their
armed In Ankara, reportedly, Vance reminded Turkish officials of the
American view that the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment by Turkey in
its operation against Cyprus was not compatible with the assistance agreements
1042 Bö1ükbai, op.cit., p.139.
1043 Ehlrich, op.cit., pp.1 11-112.
1044 T.W. Adams and A.J. Cottrel, Cyprus Between East and West, Baltimore: John Hopkins
Press, 1968, p.72.
1040 Ehirich, op.cit., pp . 111-112.
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between the two countries. 1046 In Athens, he pressured the Greeks by saying that
the United States was unwilling to continue deterring the Turks from invading
Cyprus.'°47
The Greek colonels seemed prepared to compromise because they did not want
to worsen their already uneasy position in NATO by a conflict with Turkey.'°48
By 30 November Cyrus Vance had persuaded the Greek junta to agree with the
Turks on the following points: 1- The demobilisation of Turkish armed forces
that had been poised for war. 2- The gradual withdrawal of Turkish and Greek
forces over the number authorised by the 1959 London-Zurich agreements. 3-
Compensation to the Turkish Cypriots in Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou for
their losses resulting from the Greek Cypriot attacks. 4- Expansion of the size
and powers of the U.N. force in Cyprus to prevent repetition of fighting. 5- The
disbandment of the 20,000 member Greek Cypriot National Guard. 6- The recall of
Greek General Grivas to Athens. 7- The authorisation for Turkish Cypriots to form
their own local governments and police forces in their enclaves. 8- Disengagement
where the fighting was taking place.1049
On the same day Cyrus Vance took his plan to Makarios. But he was unable
to overcome Makarios's refusal to dismantle the National Guard.'° 5° The crisis
was over when both Greece and Turkey announced on 3 December 1967 that they
would comply with the appeal of U.N. Secretary General U Thant, which called
for the withdrawal of all foreign troops illegally introduced into Cyprus and the
dismantling of paramilitary forces on the island.1051
Concerns, aims and tactics of the Americans during the 1967 Cyprus crisis were
almost same as those in 1964 when Turkey threatened to resort to military force.
The only difference was that U.S. rulers acted more cautiously this time in order
1046 Sarica et al., op.cit., pp. 146-147, Miitercirnler, op.cit., p.124.
1047 Salihi, Cyprus, op.cit., p.59.
104$ G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.123.
1040 Salih, op.cit., p.59, Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, op.cit., pp. 212-213, M. Tamkoç,
the Turkish Cypriot State, London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1988, p.94, Keesing 's...,
vol.16, p.22436.
1050 l3ö1iikbai, op.cit., pp. 140-141, J.S. Joseph, Cyprus; Ethnic Conflict and International
Concern, New York: Peter Lang, 1985, pp. 141-142.
1051 l3ö1iikbai. op.cit., p.141, Ehlrich, Cyprus, op.cit., pp. 114-115, Keesing '5..., vol.16, p.22437.
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not to alienate Turkey. They succeeded in preventing Turkish intervention in 1967
without causing deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations but their mediation effort
increased the Turks' determination to solve the Cyprus question in their own way
because U.S. intervention brought no important change in the Cyprus situation
from their own point of view. The Turkish intervention in 1974 was the eventual
outcome.
7.2.3 Reaction of Turkish Public to U.S. Mediation
Since the memory of the American prevention of Turkish military intervention
in Cyprus in 1964 had not yet faded from the minds of Turkish people, when the
United States became involved in the November 1967 crisis, Turks, especially leftist
circles, assumed that the United States would block Turkish action again. During
the crisis, leftist university students organised anti-American demonstrations. U.S.
mediator Vance could not land on the civilian Esenboa airport in Ankara because
of demonstrations but had to land on the military Miirted airport.'° 52 Leftists
claimed that Americans forced Turkish rulers not to launch military intervention
for which a real opportunity was created by the Greek Cypriot attacks and thus
prevented a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem.1053
The majority of Turkish critics thought that this time the American attitude
was totally different from its stance during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. They believed
that the Americans now distiiiguished the guilty from the innocent and pressed
Atl1ens to accept Turkish demands and thus favoured the Turkish position.'°54
Turkish authorities claimed that they acted independently during the crisis and
did not come under American pressure. They denied the claim that the decision
not to intervene was a result of U.S. pressures'°55 and proudly announced that they
1052 Bölükbai, op.cit., p.140.
1053 Selcuk, "Pencere", 26-28 November 1967, Cumhuriyet, p.2, B. Boran, Millet Meclisi
Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD), 4.12.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.22, pp.330-331, ibid., 20.2.1968,
term 2. sess.3, vol.25, p.468.
1054 E. Giiresin. "Gunun Notlari", Gumhurzyet, 23.11.1967, p.1, "Durum", Mzllzyet.
11.12.1967, p.1, Cokun Kirca, MMTD, 20.2.1968. term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.454, T. Feyzioglu,
MMTD, 23.1.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.31. p.425, A.H. Ulman and R.H. Dekmeijian, "Chang-
ing Partners in Turkey's Foreign Policy 1959-1967", ORBIS, vol.11, Fall
1967, p.784.
1055 Foreign Minister !.S. caglayaiigil, M7vITD, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, pp.482, 487.
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used Turkish forces and bases assigned to NATO for Turkish interests during the
crisis.'056
7.3 Greek-Turkish Secret Talks on Cyprus (1967-1974)
After the November 1967 crisis, both the Turkish and Greek governments were
still willing to have secret bilateral talks to find a political settlement to the Cyprus
problem. The Greek junta, which was largely dependent on the United States for
its survival, seemed to attribute more importance to its membership of NATO.
The Greek colonels were willing to find a solution to the Cyprus question, based
on the lines of the Acheson plan, i.e. enosis in return for some compensation to
Turkey. This kind of solution would satisfy their traditional aim of unifying Cyprus
with Greece and please their American allies. They made public statements to this
effect. 1057 By late 1969 Greece and Turkey had resumed their secret talks on the
Cyprus question. 1058 The talks between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers,
Olcay and Palamas, during the Lisbon meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 3-
4 July 1971 seemed rather promising. 1059 Reportedly the two sides had moved
closer to a consensus on some form of double enosis.'° 6° However, extreme pro-
enosist elements in Greece and Cyprus resorted to terrorist acts at this time, and
prevented the achievement of a solution 106 ' because their activities soured relations
between the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments and also between the Turkish
government and the Greek regime.
Greek contacts with the Turks did not please the Greek Cypriots. In fact, there
was a strong enmity between the Makarios regime and the Greek junta between
1967 and 1974 because of their different approaches to the Cyprus question. While
1056 Defence Minister A. Topaloglu, Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi, 4.2.1968, term 1,
sess.7, vol.45-3, p.489.
1057 Greek Premier Caramanlis' interview with Le Monde and The Times in Papandreou, op.cit.,
pp. 219-220, Greek P.M. Papadopoulos' statement to Mdli yet in Attalides. Gyprus. op.cit.,
p.132, A.G. Xydis, "The Military Regime's Foreign Policy" in Clogg and Yanuopou-
los (eds.), op.cit., p.203.
1058 Coufoudakis, "United States..." in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.125.
1059 Bölükbai, Superpowers..., op.cit., pp. 172-173. M. Stearns, former U.S. ambassador to Greece,
describes the Lisbon meeting as "the closest the two communities have come to an agreement." M.
Stearns. Entangled Allies, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, pp.113-115.
1060 Stern, the Wrong Horse, op.cit., p.90, Couloumbis, the United States..., op.cit., p.78,
Coufoudalcis, op.cit., p.l26, Attalides, op.cit.. pp.132, 153-154.
1061 Stearns, op.cit., pp.113-li5.
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the Greek junta tried to achieve enosis with some compensation to Turks in order
not to harm its ties with the Western alliance,' 002
 Makarios was in favour of pure
enosis, strongly opposing any Turkish involvement. 1063
 Makarios's non-aligned
policy and good relations with the eastern bloc was also an important reason
for Greek dislike for him.' 064
 Allegedly, in order to achieve enosis Greece tried
to overthrow the Makarios regime by actively supporting the pro-enosis terrorist
organisations in Cyprus and taking part in many assassination attempts against
Makarios.'° 6 ' In September 1971 George Grivas escaped from his house arrest in
Athens and secretly entered Cyprus to head the fight for enosis, allegedly with the
knowledge of Greek rulers. He reactivated the terrorist organisation EOKA in the
form of EOKA-B and assumed its leadership.1066
7.4 Turkey's Cyprus Policy (1967-1974)
As was understood from the statements of Turkish officials, their Cyprus poi-
icy between 1967 and 1974 contained the following elements: 1- Turkey's security
concerns had to be considered. 2- Cyprus could not be unified with another state
unilaterally. 3- The international agreements on Cyprus could not be abrogated
or changed by one side unilaterally. 4- One community in Cyprus could not im-
pose its own regime over the other. 5- The power balance in the Mediterranean
and the Aegean region which was established by the Lausanne treaty could not
be changed in favour of one side.'° 67
 In this period the Turkish government paid
little attention to developments in Cyprus since it was preoccupied with domestic
1062 Couloumbis, op.cit., p.78, P.N. Vanezis, Cyprus: the Unfinished Agony, Cyprus: Abelard-
Schuman, 1977, p.46, V. Coufoudakis, "the Dynamics of Political Partition and
Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies; the Cyprus
Case" in V. Coufoudakis (ed.), Essays on the Cyprus Conflict, New York: Pella Pub-
lisbing Company, 1976, p.46.
1063 J)enktash, the Cyprus Triangle, op.cit., p.55. Makarios's address to a mass rally in Nicosia
on 8.2.1973 in Keesing's..., 1973, vol.19, p.25778.
1064 5tern. op.cit., p.86, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.77.
1065 ölükbai, op.cit., p.l68, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., pp. 125-126, Attalides, op.cit.,
p.131.
1066 Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.126, Denktash, the Cyprus Triangle, op.cit., pp.60-61,
Stearns, op.cit., pp.115-u6, Keeszng 'S..., 1971-1972, vol.18, p.25033. On the EOKA terror see
Keesing's..., vol.19, pp. 25778, 25979-25980, 26115, ibid., 1974, vol.20, p.26603.
1067 Sarica et al., Kibris Sorunu, op.cit., pp.129, 139, 150, Demirel's press conference, Dzileri
Bakanlzgz Belleteni, April 1967, p.85.
240
problems. Turkish rulers gave the impression that they were happy with intercom-
munal talks and preferred the solution of the problem in a way acceptable to the
Greek side as well.' 068 The Ecevit-Erbakan coalition government, which came to
power at the beginning of 1974, considered that the most suitable solution for the
Cyprus question was federation giving autonomy to Turkish Cypriot enclaves but
excluding territorial separation of the two ethnic communities in Cyprus.1069
7.5 U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus (1967-1974)
After the November 1967 Cyprus crisis, the United States stopped its diplo-
matic efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. The negotiations between
the representatives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Glafkos Clerides and Rauf
Denktash, which began on 24 June 1968,1070 seemed to suit American interests
since they brought a relative calm to the Cyprus issue. Thanks to the intercom-
munal talks whose main aim was to make the 1960 constitution work in a way
that would protect Turkish minority rights and also permit the Cyprus govern-
ment to function, an international conflict would disappear from the agenda of the
American administration at least for the time being. Therefore, the United States
endorsed and gave support to these talks.'° 7 ' American policy turned to support
for the Makarios regime and the independence of Cyprus.'° 72 The long-held anti-
Makarios American view seemed to be replaced with a favourable attitude to the
Archbishop.1073
The United States also seemed to favour the Turkish side's position. During
Turkish President Cevdet Sunay's visit to Washington in April 1967, President
Johnson officially supported the two community concept of the Turkish side, re-
jecting the terms of "majority" and "minority" for Cypriot groups.'° 74 The joint
1068 Bölükba.i, op.cit., pp.147, 171.
1069 Sarica et al., op.cit., p.l73, Bölükbai, op.cit., p.l78.
1070 On the intercommunal talks see Keesing 'S..., vol.16, p.22883, ibid., 1969-1970, vol.17, pp.23635,
24041, 24117, ibid., vol.18, pp.24398. 24673-24674, 25032-25033, 25367, ibid., vol.19. pp.25700,
25979, ibid., 1974, vol.20, pp.26310, 26603.
1071 Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., pp. 119-120, 123, Attalides, Cyprus. op.cit., p.153, Stern,
op.cit.. p.91.
1072 Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.127.
1073 E.B. Laipson, "Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy" in J.T.A.
Kournoulides (ed.), Cyprus in Iransition 1960-1985, London: Trigraph, 1986, p.67.
1074 Attalides, op.cit., p.153, Adams and Cottrell, Cyprus Between..., op.cit., p.68.
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Turkish-American communique which was issued at the end of this visit stated that
the two Presidents agreed that the existing treaties on Cyprus had binding effects
and would continue to be an essential element in seeking a settlement formula.'°75
American rulers also supported bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey on
the Cyprus question. These talks would reduce American involvement in the con-
flict, put greater responsibility on the regional powers'° 76
 and make it easier to
reach a settlement since Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were dependent
on Greece and Turkey. While the intercommunal talks and Greek-Turkish bilat-
eral talks continued but reached nowhere, American officials became more worried
about the situation in Cyprus. In 1973 there were reports that the United States
pressurised the parties to the conflict to reach a quick solution.1077
In spite of their policy mentioned above, the Americans continued to prefer
the unification of Cyprus with Greece in return for compensation to Turks and
the overthrow of the Makarios regime. They believed that Makarios would accept
double enosis if confronted with something worse as an alternative. A consen-
sus was reached among these officials that the Makarios problem must be left to
Greece.'° 78 Some Greek critics accused the United States of taking part in anti-
Makarios activities in Cyprus. 1079 U.S. intelligence services in Cyprus were partic-
ularly condemned because of their alleged role in the assassination attempt against
Makarios in March 1970.1080 It was claimed that American officials at least were
well-informed of anti-Makarjos terrorist activities supported by the Greek junta
but chose to do nothing about it.'° 81 The U.S. ambassador to Cyprus appealed
to the State Department to condemn the assassination attempts against Makarios
1075 Dzileri Bakanhgz Belieteni, April 1967, p.61, Amerika'da Onbir Gun, Ankara: Yarm
Yayuilari, 1967, p.32. During Turkish P.M. Erim's visit to the liSA in March 1972 U.S. authorities
reiterated the same opinion. Resmi Ternaslar, Sayin Babakan ye Bn. Erim 'in
Amerzka'yz Zzyaretz, 18-23 March 1972 (no publisher, place and date), p.63.
1076 Laipson, op.cit., p.66.
1077 Attalides, op.cit., p.103.
1078 Attalides, op.cit., p.l54, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.126.
1079 Attalides, op.cit., pp.155, 156-157, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., pp.128, 144n, P.M. Kitro-
inilides. "From Coexistence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic
Conflict in Cyprus" in Attalides (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed, op.cit., pp.58-59. As early
as March 1965 Greek Cypriot newspaper Agon alleged that U.S. intelligence agents and certain
Greek Cypriots had plotted to overthrow Makarios. Keesing 'S..., vol.15, pp. 20630-20631.
1080 Sarica et aL, Kibris Sorunu, op.cit., pp.165-166.
1081 Attalides, Cyprus, op.cit., p.l33.
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but the appeal was ignored by Secretary of State Kissinger and was opposed by
the American ambassador to Greece.'°82
It should be noted that there was a special relationship between the Greek
junta and the U.S. administration in the 1967-1974 period. While the United
States became the main source of support for the increasingly isolated Greek junta
in the international arena,'° 83 Athens provided important bases and facilities to
the USA.'° 84 Consequently, the Greek regime became more open to pressures from
Americans, who wanted solution of the Cyprus problem without alienating the
Turks.1085
7.6 The Military Coup in Cyprus
7.6.1 The Cypriot Coup and the United States
In 1974 the enmity between the Greek and Greek Cypriot administrations
reached its peak. Makarios began to take actions against terrorist organisations
and Greek elements in Cyprus.'° 86 On 2 July he sent a letter to Greek President
Gizikis, asking for the withdrawal of Greek officers staffing the National Guard in
Cyprus.'° 87 On 15 July the National Guard, led by Greek officers and aided by
EOKA-B units attacked the Cypriot presidential palace. Makarios escaped death
and left the island with British help. 1088 Nikos Sampson, a rightist journalist and
a leading figure in EOKA-B, was declared president.
1082 Ibid., p.131.
1083 Xydis, Op.cit., pp. 195-196, 200, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.52, Attalides, Cyprus, op.cit., p.130,
Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, op.cit., p.294.
1084 J.C. Campbell. "the United States and the Cyprus Question 1974-1975"
in Coufoudakis (ed.), Essays..., op.cit., pp.16-17, Salih, Cyprus, op.cit., p.71, Papandreou,
op.cit., p.295, Xydis, op.cit., p.204, Couloumbis, the United States, Greece and Turkey,
op.cit., p.54.
1085 P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980, London: Duckworth,
1980, p.127, Attalides, Cyprus, op.cit., p.99.
1086 Sarica et aL, Kzbrzs Sorunu, op.cit., pp.178-179.
1087 Quoted in R. Denktash, the Cyprus Triangle, op.cit., pp. 174-179, Keesing's..., vol.20, pp.
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Allegedly the United States had enough information to predict the coup against
the Makarios regime. The American intelligence service, the CIA, had close and
constant contact with the Greek intelligence and therefore had known what was
going on in Athens. Makarios himself and the Cypriot press publicised the fact
that a coup against the Cypriot administration was being prepared. In March
1974 the Cypriot ambassador to the United States, Nikos Dimitriou, informed
State Department officials Rodger Davies and Thomas Boyatt that an assassination
attempt would be made against Makarios.'° 89
 Subsequently, some working level
State Department officials appealed to the higher level officials to express their
opposition to assassination attempts against Makarios. But their appeals were
ignored. 1090
On 20 June General loannides, the head of the Greek junta, informed a CIA
officer in Athens that his administration decided to overthrow the Makarios regime
and asked U.S. opinion about it.'° 9 ' Subsequently, a CIA report mentioning this
serious development was dispatched to Washington. The State Department in-
structed U.S. ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, to convey Washington's oppo-
sition to the use of violence in Cyprus to loannides personally.' 092 Since he did not
regard the situation as critical Tasca chose not to see loannides personally but to
pass the message through government channels. 1093 On 3 July the CIA passed a
message to Washington from a new and untested source that Greek General loan-
nides decided to abandon his coup action against the Cypriot administration.'094
The resignation of Greek Foreign Minister Tetenes on 8 July because of his op-
position to a coup in Cyprus did not attract attention of U.S. officials.'°° 5
 On 14
July, the CIA reported again that loannides had been dissuaded from attempting a
coup in Cyprus. British military intelligence also believed that loannides had been
1089 Stern, the Wrong Horse. op.cit., p.94, Attalides, Cyprus, op.cit., p.166.
1090 Laipson, "Cyprus: a Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy" in Koumoulides
(ed.), op.cit., p.68, Attalides, op.cit., pp.166-167.
1091 Attalides, op.cit., p.163.
1092 Coulounibis, op.cit., p.86, Stern, op.cit., pp.99-100.
1093 Attalides, op.cit., p.167, Coulounibis, op.cit., p.86, Campbell, op.cit., p.18, Bölükbai, Super-
powers..., op.cit., p.l82.
1094 Attalides, op.cit., pp.l67-l68. Stern, op.cit., pp. 101-102.
1095 Bö1ükbai, op.cit., p.183, P.Y. Watanabe, Ethnic Groups, Congress and American For-
eign Policy, London: Greenwood Press, 1984, p.88.
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forced to back off by diplomatic pressures. 1096 Under these circumstances, Bell
rightly suggests that "the CIA was deceived rather than deceiving, and that Joan-
nides believed himself to have enough diplomatic leverage to induce Washington
to restrain the Turks, just as they had done in the crises of 1964 and 1967."°°
Some Greek critics accused American officials of encouraging Joannides in his
coup plot by assuring him that they would not oppose the overthrow of Makarios
and would prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus.' 098 It was argued that the USA
could prevent the Cyprus coup if it took a strong action against the Greek junta
in the early stages when rumours erupted.'° 99 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
was particularly criticised because of his failure to register a strong disapproval of
the Greek junta's actions."°° Allegedly he rejected Senator William Fuibright's
suggestion to prevent the Greek plot. 110 ' Kissinger denied these accusations in
his press conference on 22 July 1974: "The information concerning an impending
coup was not exactly lying around the streets." 1102 The Cyprus Country Director
in the State Department, Thomas Boyatt, said in this subject in a conference on
22 February 1975:
I am prepared to accept that U.S. policy was inadequate.., and that there have
beeii niistakes made... [ButJ I absolutely reject the devil theory, the proposition that this
government, through any of its arms, somehow bluntly and clandestinely developed a
situation with General loannides that he would take an action which in the last analysis
would have the result which is so totally disastrous for the United States.''°3
It seems that U.S. rulers had continued their policy of leaving the Makarios
problem to the Greeks. In spite of enough warnings on the Greek junta's action,
they did not Wal1t to get involved in disagreements between the Greek and the
1096 C. Bell, Diplomacy of Detente, London: Martin Robertson, 1977, pp. 146-147, Stern, op.cit.,
p.102.
1097 Bell, op.cit., pp. 146-147, see also K.H. Karpat, "War on Cyprus: the Tragedy of
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Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.195.
1098 Attalides, op.cit., pp.170-17l, Bö1ükbai, op.cit., p.185.
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1100 Stern, op.cit.. p.101, Attalides, op.cit., p.167, Watanabe, op.cit., p.88.
1101 Bölükbai. op.cit., pp. 183-184.
1102 Watanabe, op.cit., p.87.
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Greek Cypriot administrations by condemning the one side. The Americans would
pay more attention to not alienating the Greek junta because of U.S. interests in
Greece. However, they might have failed to predict the exact time of the Cypriot
coup to take effective action to prevent it.
7.6.2 U.S. Attitude in the Aftermath of the Cyprus Coup
In the first few days of the Cypriot coup, the United States followed a wait-
and-see policy, and avoided showing any reaction to the developments in Cyprus.
She did not condemn the coup and its organisers, did not criticise the Athens junta
for its alleged involvement in the coup, did not call for the withdrawal of Greek
officers from Cyprus and did not make clear her position on wIio represented official
authority in Cyprus.' 104 It seemed that the United States was ready to accept the
new situation in Cyprus. It was reported that U.S. officials felt great relief when
they learned of the removal of Makarios."°5
State Department Spokesman Robert Anderson refused to comment on the
recognition of legal Cypriot regime and avoided criticising any side in the conflict.
His statements were far from making the U.S. position clear." 06 In his meeting
with Turkish P.M. Ecevit on 17 July, U.S. ambassador William B. Macomber had
the same attitude and concentrated mainly on the possibility of a Greco-Turkish
war.' 107 In the United Nations and NATO, U.S. representatives worked rather
for softening criticism against the Greek regime and blocking harsh resolutions
condemning the coup organisers. 1108 On 18 July the U.S. ambassador to Cyprus,
Rodger Davies, received the foreign minister of the new regime, Dimis Dirnitrou,
1104 Campbell. op.cit., p.19. Nikolas A. Stavrou, "Kissinger's Tilt on Cyprus, the New
Style of Crisis Diplomacy" in Couloumbis and Hicks (eds.), op.cit., 1975, p.100, Laip-
son, op.cit., p.69. Polyviou, Cyprus, 1980, op.cit., p.156, Coulouu,bis, 1983, op.cit., p.88, K.C.
Markides, the Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, New Haven, Con,,, and London:
Yale University Press, 1977, p.180.
1105 Watanabe. op.cit., pp.90-91, H. Ulinan, "Geneva Conferences", Foreign Policy, vol.4,
Nos.2-3, February 1975, p.50, Couloumbis, 1983. op.cit., pp.88-89.
1108 C. Hackett, "Ethnic Politics in Congress: the Turkish Embargo Ex-
perience" in A.A. Said (ed.), Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1977, p.21, Stern, op.cit., p.112. Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., p.156, Böliikba,, op.cit., p.186.
1107 Sarica et al., op.cit., p.186.
1108 Attalides, op.cit.. p.171, Stavrou, op.cit., p.101.
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at the latter's request. Thus the United States became the only state which es-
tablished official contact with the short-lived Sampson regime.1109
It seems that the main American concern after the Cyprus coup was to prevent
the outbreak of a war between Turkey and Greece rather than to restore the status
quo in Cyprus . hhl O
 Americans particularly feared that if they took a stance against
the Cyprus coup, the Greek junta regime could be alienated, anti-Western young
Greek officers could be encouraged to overthrow it and that thus U.S. strategic
interests in Greece including bases could be jeopardised."
As Kissinger notes in his memoir, many American officials in the State De-
partment and the Secretary of Defence wanted the United States to adopt a stance
agaiiist the Greek junta and thus accelerate its fall . m2
 But in Kissinger's view,
"Turkey's demands left little doubt that it was planning to intervene.., the Greek
government was unlikely to survive its follies. That made it all the more necessary
that the United States not to be seen in Greece as the agent of its humiliation."1'-'3
Such an Anerjcan action also could be used by Turks to justify their intervention
in Cyprus."- 14 It is difficult to say under these circumstances that U.S. attitude
aimed to encourage a Turkish intervention which could cause the loss of Greece
for America and could bring unpredicted grave dangers for U.S. interests.
Anyway, the U.S. attitude pleased neither Turks nor Greeks. Turks claimed
that if they did not act quickly the United States would recognise the Sampson
regime and the fait accompli in Cyprus would be legalised. 1115 The Greek side was
of the opinion that the U.S. inactivity against the Cyprus coup gave Turkey a good
1109 Stavrou, op.cit., p.101, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.89, Laipson, op.cit., p.69.
1110 Karpat, "WTar on Cyprus...", op.cit., p.197.
1111 J Reyton's article in International Herald Tribune on 18 July 1974 quoted by S. Tahan,
"Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus". Foreign Policy, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February
1975, p.172, Markides, the Rise..., op.cit., p.l8O, P. Oberling, the Road to Bellapazs, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p.161, Stern, op.cit., p.113.
1112 fi. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, London: Weidenfield and Nicolson and Micheal Joseph, 1982,
p.119O
1113 Ibid., pp. 1190-1191.
1114 Oberling, op.cit., p.l62, Stern, op.cit., p.113.
111 Oberlrng, op.cit., p.l62, M.A. Birand, SO Sicak Gun, 4th Edition, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari,
1976, p.30.
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pretext for its invasion of Cyprus.l'io
7.7 The Turkish Military Eritervention in Cyprus
7.7.1 The Sisco Mission
The Turkish government publicly announced and informed the USA that the
Cyprus coup was an intervention by Greece in Cyprus and that Turkey would not
tolerate it." 7 In its meeting on 15 July, the Turkish National Security Council
secretly decided to land armed forces in Cyprus on 20 July." 8 In order to complete
the legal procedure under the Treaty of Guarantee before intervention, Turkish
P.M. Bülent Ecevit went to Britain for consultations and proposed to the British
a joint military intervention in Cyprus." 9 The British were of the opinion that
peaceful alternatives had not yet been exhausted.
On the night of 17 July 1974, when Ecevit and the British authorities were hav-
ing talks, U.S. Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco was dispatched by Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger to defuse the crisis. In Kissinger's words, "Sisco's mission
was to help Britain start a negotiating process that might delay a Turkish invasion
and enable the structure under Sampson in Cyprus to fall of its own weight.""2°
However, this American move was too little and too late to prevent a Turkish in-
tervention in Cyprus. The Turks at that stage were virtually unstoppable." 2 ' The
U.S. decision not to condemn the Greek junta's actions and the Cypriot coup had
robbed Sisco of much needed leverage in dealing with the Turkish leaders."22
During their meeting in London on 18 July 1974 Sisco assured Ecevit that
U.S. military assistance to Turkey, which was reduced during the last weeks as a
"° Stavrou, op.cit., p.101, Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., pp.156-157, Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., p.85, Couloumbis,
1983, op.cit., p.89.
1117 Coulouinbis, 1983, op.cit., p.90, Sarica et aL, op.cit., pp.180-18l.
1118 Bö1iikbai, op.cit., pp.188-190, B. Ecevit's statement to Kurtul Altug's programme, Bunahinh
Yjilar, on Turkish TV, 1993.
1119 Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.90, Bö1ükbai, op.cit., p.l9l, U.H. Bayülken, "The Cyprus
Question and the United Nations", Foreign Policy, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February
1975, pp.119-120, Sarica et al., op.cit., p.186, Keesing 'S..., vol.20, p.26663.
1120 Kissinger, op.cit., p.119l.
1121 Coulouinbis, 1983, op.cit., p.91.
1122 Watanabe, op.cit., p.94.
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result of American displeasure over Turkey's decision to resume poppy cultivation,
would be resumed in full." 23
 But he also warned that a Turkish intervention in
Cyprus might cause a bigger war involving Greece and the Soviet Union and that
consequently Turkish-American relations might be damaged." 24 Ecevit reminded
Sisco that U.S. prevention of Turkish interventions in the past harmed the U.S.
image in Turkey."25
The next day Sisco was in Athens, pressurising the Greek colonels to replace
Sampson with a more moderate Greek Cypriot and to withdraw Greek officers from
Cyprus." 26
 The Greek authorities offered only to replace rather than withdraw
the Greek officers on a phased timetable. 1127 Sisco then flew to Ankara on the same
day to inform Ecevit of the Greek answer. Ecevit was determined to initiate the
military intervention. He rejected Sisco's demand for a forty-eight hour delay in
Turkish operation. Ecevit said: "The United States and Turkey both have made
mistakes - the United States by preventing Turkish military action and Turkey by
accepting. We should not make the same mistakes again." 28 At 3.00 a.m. on
20 July 1974 Ecevit informed Sisco of the Turkish intervention: "We have done it
your way for ten years, and now we are going to do it our way."29
7.7.2 U.s. Ineffectiveness to Prevent the Turkish Intervention
Some critics accused the United States of not being sincere in trying to prevent
the Turkish intervention in Cyprus." 3° They showed statements of Turkish officials
as proofs of their claim." 3 ' In his press conference on 16 August 1974 Turkish P.M.
Ecevit praised the American attitude as being less emotional than Britain's and
refraining from taking sides and putting pressures on the parties to the problem."32
1123 Birand, op.cit., p.48, Stavrou, op.cit., p.102.
1124 Bö1ükbai, op.cit., p.192.
1125 l3irand. op.cit., p.48.
1126 Salih, Cyprus, 1978, op.cit., p.91, H. Sahin, Gece Gelen Mektup, Istanbul: Cep Kitaplari,
1987, pp.57-59.
1127 Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.92, Stern, op.cit., pp. 118-119.
1128 flirand. op.cit., p.64, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.92, Stern, op.cit., p.119.
1129 Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.93, Stern, op.cit., p.12O.
1130 o1yviou, 1975, op.cit., pp.83, 84, 85, Watanabe, op.cit., p.93.
1131 Attalides, 1979, op.cit., p.172.
1132 Watanabe, op.cit., p.119, for another statement of Ecevit see Cumhuriyet, 8.9.1974, p.7.
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Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güne later acknowledged that the United States
resorted to diplomatic methods to persuade Turkish rulers not to intervene but
did not use any threats because she knew that if she acted on this way she would
lose Turkey completely."33
American officials themselves declared that they did not threaten Turkey to
deter her from intervening in Cyprus. In his press conference on 22 July 1974,
Kissinger said:
I made clear on Saturday in San Clemente [at a July 20 news briefing] that no
war would be fought between NATO allies with an open American supply line so this
put a limit to the escalation that could be conducted. As to the other steps that were
taken, there were no specific threats made. It was very clear that we would consider a
continuation of a military confrontation between NATO allies as a very grave matter.
While answering a question he stated that they did not threaten Turkey with
cutting off military aid." 34 On 19 August 1974 Kissinger explained the reasons for
this attitude:
We are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our common interest in
the defence of the eastern Mediterraiiean. Once such a decision is taken, it will have
the most dramatic consequences... It was judged that the United States would be both
ineffective and counterproductive to threaten the cut off aid. Short of this, however, we
iiade the most repeated and urgent representations to Turkey in order to prevent the
military action that happened."35
Allegedly, U.S. officials including Sisco did threaten Turkey with cutting off
aid," 36
 but as some authors rightly put it, this was not a sufficient weapon be-
cause the flow of aid to Turkey had been reduced to the minimum as a result
of budgetary adjustments and Congress's displeasure with the Turkish decision
to resume poppy cultivation. Moreover, the Turks were determined not to listen
the advice of the United States unlike the 1964 and 1967 crises." 37 Preventing a
Cumhuriyet, 25.7.1975. In his interview with the author, former Turkish foreign minister Osman
Olcay made almost the same comment.
A.A. Fatouros, "How to Resolve Problems by Refusing to Acknowledge
They Exist -Some Legal Parameters of Recent U.S. Policy Toward
Greece and Cyprus" in Couloumbis and Hicks (eds.), 1975, op.cit., p.46n, Milliyet,
24.7.1974.
1135 Fatouros, op.cit., pp.34. 35, for State Department spokesman Anderson's statement in the same meaning see Cumhuriyet,
9.9.1974, pJ.
1136 Ulman, op.cit., p.50, Salih, 1978, op.cit., p.92.
1137 Watanabe, op.cit., p.95. Bell, op.cit., p.l49, the author's interview with Osmnan Olcay.
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Turkish intervention with threats oniy would have caused an irreparable damage
to U.S .-Turkish relations.1138
It was reported that U.S. Ambassador in Athens Henry Tasca urged the Pen -
tagon to deploy the Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean to discourage Turkey. Secre-
tary of State Kissinger intercepted the message and cabled Tasca that the idea was
"hysterical." This would have undermined Turkish-American relations and would
have made the United States the supporter of the Sampson regime. 1139 It seems
that Kissinger was sure about a Turkish invasion and therefore believed that any
American pressure which was brought on the Turks would be counter-productive
in terms of wider American strategic interests.' 140 In his own words,
it had become since an article of faith in Turkish politics that this submission to
Anierican I)refeiences [iii 1964 and 1967] had been unwise and would never be repeated.
I thought it was iuost unlikely that Turkey would tolerate the union of Cyprus with
Greee. That Turkey was driving toward a showdown was obvious... We could not
without cost resist a Turkish invasion because that would be considered as objectively
support lug the Greek junta. In any case. only the threat of American military action
could have prevented a Turkish landing on the island; this was an impossibility. My
consultations with Congressional leaders produced the unanimous advice that we should
not get involved at all. We could not avoid diplomatic engagement in a NATO crisis,
but in the last three weeks of Nixon's Presidency we were in no position to make credible
threats or credible promises. 1141
U.S. failure to prevent the Turkish intervention in Cyprus seems to be the
most important example of the United States' inability to influence Turkey to act
in a certain way. The Americans had not opposed secession of a Cypriot terri-
tory (a base) to Turkey and even thought about a controlled invasion of a part
of Cyprus by the Turks. However, they certainly did not want an uncontrolled
Turkish interventioii in Cyprus, which was very likely to lead to a Greco-Turkish
war . Therefore, U.S. rulers applied diplomatic pressures, which were eventually
unsuccessful, to stop the Turks. But, as was apparent from the events, the Amer-
icans were not altogether determined to prevent the Turkish intervention. They
had shown the same attitude toward the Greek coup, which weakens the claim
tl1at the Turks effectively defied the U.S. influence. The U.S. regime at that time
1138 Tuhan. op.rit., p.173. Karpat. "Var on Cyprus...", op.cit., p.198.
1130 Markicics. 1977. op.cit., p.181, Birand. op.cit.. p.58. Karpat, op.cit., pp. 198-199.
1140 l'ulyvioli. 1980. op.cit.. p.156. Stern, op.cit.. p.113.
op.eit.. pp. ii0-119'.
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was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal and impeachment of the president,
so it was not in a powerful position to deter the Turks. Moreover, the Turkish in-
tervention in Cyprus was likely to bring less damage to general U.S. interests than
the Turkish alienation by U.S. intervention provided that the USA could prevent
a Greco-Turkish war whose possibility was reduced by the Greek unpreparedness.
7.7.3 The Turkish Military Intervention In Cyprus
The Turkish naval and aerial landing on Cyprus started at 5.30 a.rn. on 20
July 1974.1142 Turkish authorities announced that they took this action as their
legal right under the Cyprus treaties to restore the independence and constitu-
tional order of Cyprus. 1143
 On the same day, the U.N. Security Council adopted
resolution 353, which demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention
in Cyprus.11
At that stage the danger of a major war between Greece and Turkey was so
acute that American officials concentrated all their efforts on averting this possibil -
ity. Joseph Sisco continued his shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara. He
and Ambassador Tasca took a very strong stance against the Greek junta's decision
to declare war on Turkey . 1145
 Secretary of State Kissinger established continuous
telephone contact with European leaders and Turkish P.M. Ecevit, urging him to
cease fire immediately." 46
 Meanwhile, the Greek army chiefs opposed a war with
Turkey, thinking that it would be against interests of Greece, causing the loss of
the Aegean islands to Turkey. Their initiative caused the replacement of the Greek
junta wilh a civilian government under the premiership of Constantine Cararnanlis
on 22 July. 1147 In the evening the Turkish government announced its decision to
1142 Keesing 'S.... vol.20. pp. 26663-26664.
1143 Staftinetits of Ecevit and tile Turkish government ill Foreign Policy, vol.4, Nos.2-3. February
1975. pp. 224-227. For opinions defending tile Turkish action see also Kaniran Iiian. "Cyprus,
1974 Crisis", Foreign Pohcy, vol.4. op.cit., p.67, Bayülkeu, op.cit.. p.119. Tanikoç, the
Turkish Cypriot Stale. op.cit., pp.99, 105. Denktash. op.Cit.. p.68.
1144 For full text see Foreign Policy. vol.4, op.cit.. pp. 218-219, Keesing's..., vol.20, p.26665.
1145 Salili. 1978. op.Cit.. p.93. Stern. op.cit.. pp.120-122, Couloumbis. 1983, op.cit., p.94, Sarica et al.,
op.Cit.. p.198. Böliikbini, op.Cit., p.198.
1146 Th51iikba.i. Op.cit.. p.199, Campbell, op.cit., p.20.
1147 Coulounihis. 1983. op.cit.. p.94, Campbell, op.cit., pp.2O-2l, Salih, op.cit., p.93, Stern, op.cit.,
p.1 24. Keesing 'S.... vol.20. pp.26666-26668.
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agree to a cease-fire. 1148 Subsequently, the puppet Sampson regime in Cyprus col-
lapsed and Glafkos Clerides, the President of the Cyprus House of Representatives,
assumed the duties of president.' 149 Clerides was viewed by American officials in
Nicosia "as a satisfactory alternative to Makarios, whose political fortunes they
thought and/or hoped were finished."1150
There are different views on why Turkey accepted the cease-fire on 22 July.
Kissinger claimed in his memoirs: "During the night of July 21-22, we forced
a cease-fire by threatening Turkey that we would move nuclear weapons from
forward positions - especially where they might be involved in a war with Greece.
It stopped Turkish military operations while Turkey was occupying only a small
enclave on the island." 51 Bö1ükbai disagrees with this claim by noting that the
Turkish government accepted the cease-fire only after it secured a bridgehead in
Cyprus.' 52 In Birand's opinion, the main reason for the Turkish decision was
the fear that the two superpowers could act together in stopping the Turkish
intervention.' 153 In his press conference on 22 July 1974 Turkish Prime Minister
Ecevit denied that U.S. pressures brought about the cease-fire: "There has been no
pressure from any country. Pressure tactics are and should be out of the question
between friendly countries. I had a friendly conversation with Kissinger, whom
I have known for a long time. We made joint effort for peace and agreed on the
necessity of establishing peace in the region." " It is, however, almost certain that
Turkey stopped its operations before achieving its real aims because of international
opposition, especially U.S. opposition.
7.7.4 U.s. Attitude Toward the Turkish Intervention
As U.S. authorities did not condemn the Cyprus coup not to alienate the
Greek junta, they showed almost the same attitude toward the Turkish intervention
in Cyprus. They did not issue any statement openly denouncing the Turkish
Ecevits statement quoted by Foreign Policy, vol.4, op.cit., pp.228-229.
"° Polyviou. 1975. op.cit.. p.56, Coulouinbis, 1983, op.cit., p.95, Keesing's....vol.2o, p.26666.
1150 Laipson. op.cit.. p.7O.
1 t 1 Kisiiiger. op.cit.. p.1 192.
1152 Bö1iikba.i. op.cit., pp. 199-200.
1153 M.A. Biraiid, Diyet, Istanbul: Agaoglu Yayuevi. 1979, p.28.
1154 Foreign Policy, vol.4. op.cit., p.229, Sarica et al.. op.cit., p.l97.
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intervention and did not press the Turks to reverse their action. 1155
 It was clear
that the Turks would not leave Cyprus under any conditions. Given the alienation
of Greeks from the USA, pressing the Turks would cause only the loss of another
strategic ally in the eastern Mediterranean. The oniy thing which could be done
was to contain the Turkish action within limits acceptable to Greeks.1156
Kissinger was opposed to taking forceful actions against Turkey because the
crisis had been started by Greece, taking a one-sided position would prevent the
USA from easing the conflict between two strategic allies in the eastern Mediter-
ranean and the U.S. government which was on the verge of the collapse was not in
a position to take such actions. "The preoccupation with Watergate had reached
a point where we were losing even the ability to transmit papers bearing on vital
foreign policy matters... between the president and the White House."57
7.8 The Geneva Conferences
The first Geneva conference on the Cyprus crisis was held between 25 and
30 July 1974 and was attended by the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and
Britain; Turan Güne, George Mavros and James Callaghan. The United States
sent to the conference a special representative, Assistant Secretary of State William
Baffum. 1158 The joint declaration issued at the end of the conference, on 30 July
1974,1159 was seen by the Turks as supporting their viewpoint."66
The Second Geneva conference was held between 8 and 14 August and was also
attended by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and Greek Cypriot President
Glafcos Clerides. The Turkish side proposed a federal system based on the geo-
graphical separation of the two ethnic communities in Cyprus." 6 ' When the Greek
1155 Polyviou. 1975, op.cit.. p.86, Wataiiabe, op.cit., p.97.
1156 Oherliuig. op.cit.. pp. 169-170, Uhuan, op.cit., p.50. Kaniran luau (former Turkish MP and
diplomat) and Seyfi Ta1iaii (Turkish academic) told the author that Aiuericas position favoured
tin' Turkish side.
1157 Kissinger. op.cit.. pp. 1191-1192.
1158 For a detailed account of tile conference see Ulinan, op.cit.. pp.52-59.
For the text of the declaration see Foreign Policy, vol.4, op.cit., pp. 230-232, Keesing's....
vol.20. p.26709.
1160 Uhnan. op.cit.. p.47, Böl{ikhai, op.cit., p.201.
5161 Uhiian. op.cit., 1)11.60-61. Former Turkish foreign minister U.H. Bayülken told the author that new
coiiditions ('Ohilpelled Turkey not to bring the fornier regime which was required by the treaties on
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delegation rejected the proposal, Kissinger persuaded Turkish P.M. Ecevit to put
a cantonal system proposal on the table."° 2
 The new Turkish proposal which
suggested establishment of six autonomous Turkish region covering 34 percent of
Cyprus, too, was rejected by Greeks."° 3
 Allegedly, on 13 August, Callaghan in-
formed the Greek delegatiol1 that Kissinger could not exert any further pressure
on Turkey to prevent a further Turkish expansion in Cyprus unless the Greeks
accepted the Turkish proposal as the basis of negotiations. 1164
 Believing that the
Greeks were employing delaying tactics and their position in Cyprus was deterio-
rating, on 13 August, the Turks demanded an immediate yes-or-no answer to their
proposals. With the Turkish rejection of the Greek demand of 36 hours to answer,
the negotiations broke down.1165
Toward the end of the second Geneva conference the American attitude seemed
increasingly favouring the Turkish position. The Turkish cantonal proposal con-
tained heavy inputs from the Americans and apparently gained their support.
The State Department's statement on 13 August also implied the U.S. support for
Turkish position:
U.S. I)ositmn is as follows: we recognise that the position of tile Turkish community
iii Cyprus requires coi,siclerable improvement and protection. We have supported a
greater degree of autonomy for them. The parties are negotiating on one or more
Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted and
therefore the United States would consider a resort to military action unjustified. We
have iiiade this clear to all parties.1166
Turkey's strategic importance for U.S. interests played a crucial role in this
U.S. attitude.'07
In Ecevit's account, the Turkish side made a further interim proposal to prevent
the breakdown of the conference: If the Greeks would agree in principle to the
Turks' basic demand for a cantonal or bizonal system, and to the establishment
Cyprus.
1162 l3ir,uid. Diyet. op.cit., p.27, Ulman, op.cit., p.62.
1103 Ulnian. op.cit.. p.63, Birand. Diyet, op.cit., p.29, Böliikba,, op.cit., p.205.
1104 polyvion. 1980. op.(it., pp. 175-176.
1105 J3ölükbai. op.cit.. pp. 206-207, Ulman, op.cit., pp.59-60, 64, Denktash, op.cit., p.?3, Cottloumbis,
1983, op.cit.. p.97. Keesing's.... vol.20, pp. 26709-26710.
1 1G6	 1983. op.cit., pp.00-O7, Polyviou, 1980. op.cit., p.181.
1167 Caiiipbell. op.cit.. p.22, Stern. op.cit., p.130.
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of a buffer zone around the area held by the Turkish Armed Forces (the area to
include a line from Nicosia to Kyrenia and to the Turkish part of Famagusta), and
to the immediate withdrawal of their forces in 17-18 percent area of the island to
be handed over to Turkish Cypriot administration, Turkey would not place troops
there while negotiations were in progress and she would wait for the boundaries of
other cantons to be fixed. If the Creeks had accepted this proposal and evacuated
their troops from the region Turkish rulers would have been prepared to wait not
36 hours but 36 days before taking further action. Kissinger liked the idea and
tried to sell it to the other side. But Callaghan's negative attitude prevented the
success of the plan.'168
Apart from Callaghan's attitude and the U.S. failure to exert heavy pressure on
the Turks," 6° the incompatibility of Turkish and Greek demands and the Turkish
determination to strengthen their position in Cyprus with further military oper-
ations 117 ° played a role in the breakdown of the Geneva talks. By the end of 13
August, the Turks had realised that the negotiations would bring no favourable
results and that if they did not act swiftly international public opinion would to-
tally turn against them and they would have to be content with the seven percent
of Cyprus.
7.9 The Second Turkish Intervention and U.S. Attitude
Accusing the Greek side of intentionally obstructing a peaceful solution and
violating security of Turkish Cypriot people, the Turkish government resumed its
military operations in Cyprus on 14 August." 7 ' By 16 August, the Turkish forces
had captured 36 percent of the territory of Cyprus, displacing thousands of Cypriot
1	 1172people.
As a reaction to the new development, the United States announced that if
Turkey and Greece fought with each other it would cut off its military aid and arms
11U8 Ecevits kttc.r to Denktasli quoted in Denktash. op.cit., pp. 369-373.
116 Caiiipbell. op.cit., pp.2l-22. Polyviou. 1980, op.cit., p.199.
1170 Cauipbcll. op.cit.. p.2i. Böliikbai. op.cit., p.207.
1171 Sai,ra et a!.. op.cit., pp. 207-208, Erevit's statement in Bayülken, op.cit., p.122. the Turkish
goveriinieiits statemeilt in Foreign Policy. vol.4, op.cit.. pp. 233-234, Reesing's..., vol.20,
p.26710.
BöIiikbai. op.cit., p.211.
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sales to both countries, 117
 but did not explicitly condemn the Turkish action.1174
It seemed to be happy With the geographical separation of Cypriot communities
with the Turkish action. 1 ' Kissinger reportedly stated that the United States
would not resort to forceful actions to intervene in the matter because she was not
the policeman of the world. 1178
 Only Secretary of Defence Schlesinger criticised
the Turks by saying that their action went beyond what any of its friends would
have accepted. He raised the possibility of an aid cut-off and the return of some
of the Cyprus territory which the Turks had captured.1177
It should be noted that at that time American officials were preoccupied with
the resignation of President Nixon and the change of the administration. The
only thing which Kissinger could do was to recommend immediate resumption
of talks between the concerned parties and to offer his services as mediator.1178
U.S. strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean led American officials to try
to remove Cyprus as a source of friction in the region by forcing both sides to
compromise rather than condemning only one side.'79
Meanwhile, the U.S. failure to stop the Turkish intervention alienated the
Greeks greatly.U80 On 14 August 1974 the Greek government withdrew from the
military area of NATO. 1181 In the anti-American demonstration in Nicosia on 19
August, U.S. Ambassador Rodger Davies was killed.' 182 Greek Americans arranged
large demonstrations in front of the White House."83
1173 l3iraiid. Diyet. op.cit., p.39.
1174 Polyvioti. 1980. op.cit., p.201, Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., p.87.
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1176 Curnhtiriyet. 22 Aiigii.st 1974. p.1.
1177 Ibid.. 19 August 1974. T.M. Frai,ck and E. Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress, Oxford:
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7.10 The Arms Embargo and Turkish-American Relations
7.10.1 Imposition of the Arms Embargo
On 15 August 1974, a delegation of Greek-American congressmen led by Repre-
sentative John Brademas visited Secretary of State Kissinger. They blamed him for
the U.S. failure to stop the Turkish intervention and requested that the administra-
tion cut off its military assistance to Turkey until its troops were withdrawn from
Cyprus." s4
 In Kissinger's eyes, the intervention of the Greek-American Congress-
men who were merely instruments of the Greek foreign office in the formulation
of U.S. foreign policy could not be accepted. 1185
 He largely blamed Callaghan for
the failure of the second Geneva conference and claimed that the USA was doing
enough to restrain the Turks.'186
At a news conference on 19 August 1974 Kissinger promised to get expert
opinion about the legality of Turkish use of U.S.-supplied military equipment in
Cyprus." 87
 Although the administration kept the result of a legal team's study
on the matter secret from the public,' 188 it leaked it to Senator Thomas Eagleton
through his aide Brian Adwood. The legal memo concluded that by no stretch
of the statues or the legal imagination of the State Department's attorneys could
military aid to Turkey be continued.' 189 Subsequently, some congressmen decided
to plunge into battle with the administration on the issue of law and order in the
context of the legality of U.S. aid to Turkey.
In spite of Kissinger's warnings that cutting off aid to Turkey could jeopardise
u.s. interests and bases in Turkey,uoo the U.S. Congress passed a series of resolu-
t184 St.rrii. op.cit.. pp.140-l41. Biranci, Diyet, op.cit.. pp.42-43.
185 K.R. Lcgg. "Congress as Trojan Horse, the Turkish Embargo Problem,
1974-1978" in J. Spaiiier and J. Hogee (eds.). Congress, the Presidency and Amer-
ican Foreign Policy, New York: Pergaman Press. 1981. p.117, Biraiid. Diyet, op.cit.. p.41.
1180 Biraud. Diyet. op.cit.. p.42. Stern. op.cit.. p.141.
1187 flack& tt. op.eit.. p.23. Legg. op.cit.. p.117.
1188 E.B. Laipsoii. Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo.
Wasliiiigton: U.S. Government Priiiting Office, June 1981. p.14, Fatouros, op.cit.. p.35.
1180 St.'i'ii, op.cit.. pp. 143-144. Laipson. 1981. op.cit., p.14.
1190 Jis.i1lg(1s inrt'ting with some congressmen on 19 September 1974 in Stern, op.cit.., p.145. I3irand.
Diyet. op.cit.. p.56, Laipson. 1981. op.cit., p.19, Hackett. op.cit.. pp.22-23.
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tions requesting the President to stop arms sales to Turkey." 9 ' Initially President
Ford vetoed such bills but the strong support for the embargo in Congress forced
him to sign a resolution banning U.S. assistance to Turkey from 5 February 1975
if she did not make concessions in the Cyprus issue. Turks seemed to be willing to
soften their attitude in Cyprus. They accepted the U.N. General Assembly reso-
lution on 1 November 1974 and decided to reduce the number of Turkish soldiers
in Cyprus. But the disagreement between the coalition partners on the Cyprus
issue resulted in resignation of the government on 19 September 1974.1192 After
both Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Dernirel had been unable to form a new govern-
ment, President Korutürk asked Sadi Irmak to do so. Irmak's cabinet of mostly
independent senators and technocrats was announced on 17 November but failed
to gain a vote of confidence. Nevertheless, at this difficult time Irmak remained
Prime Minister until 31 March 1975 when he was succeeded by Demirel, who led
a "national front" coalition.
On 5 February 1975 the Congress's embargo action came into effect. Deliveries
for over 200 million dollars in arms purchases and grants which had been scheduled
for transfer to Turkey was frozen.' 193 The ban included 78 million dollars worth of
equipment already paid for." 94 Turks harshly condemned the action and declared
that U.S. pressures would not affect their Cyprus policy.'195
In the aftermath of the embargo resolution, U.S. authorities stated that they
supported political negotiations between the sides of the Cyprus conflict" 96
 and
pressed Turks to make territorial concessions in Cyprus if they wanted to reverse
the enlbargo." 97 When the House of Representatives defeated the partial lifting
of the embargo on 24 July 1975, the Turkish government announced that tile De-
fence Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and all other related agreements between the
1191 For the Congress actions on the Turkish arms embargo see T.A. Couloumbis and S.M. Hicks. "the
Impact of Greek Americans Upon United States Foreign Policy" in
Attalides(ed.). op.cit.. pp. 165-171. Keesing's.... 1975, vol.21, p.26886.
1192 Birand. Diyet. op.cit., pp.79. 81-82, Keesing's..., vol.21, pp. 26885-26886.
1193 Couloumbis. 1983. op.cit.. .lO5.
1194 Lcgg. op.cit., p.I21.
1195 5tatcments of the Turkish Prime Minister and NSC in Polyviou, 1975, op.cit.. pp.210-211, Birand.
Diyet. op.cit., p.lOO.
1196 The State Departniciits statement in Salih, Cyprus, 1978, op.cit., p.186n.
1197 issu1gvrs nieetiiigs with Turkish rulers in the first half of 1975 in Birand, Di yet. op.cit., pp.
118-128.
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United States and Turkey had lost their legal validity. 1198 The Congress decision to
lift the embargo partially in October 19751199 did not impress Turks. They did not
terminate suspension measures in bases until the complete lifting of the embargo
in September 1978.1200
7.10.2 Arguments of the U.S. Congress on the Arms Embargo
In the eyes of U.S. congressmen, the second Turkish military operation in
Cyprus was an unacceptable aggressive act whereas its first action could be justi-
fled as a defensive act aimed at protecting lives of Turkish Cypriots and restoring
tile status quo lfl the island. 120 ' Their main argument for imposing an embargo
on Turkey was that Turkey used in its military operations in Cyprus U.S. arms
and miiitary equipment contrary to the American law and the provisions of the
agreements under which these arms had been granted or sold to it. 1202 They also
reasoned that an arms embargo was necessary to force Turkey to make conces-
sions to tile Greek side and thus to accelerate the process of finding a peaceful
settlement to tile Cyprus question. Failing to do so would mean rewarding the
Turkish aggression and allowing the Turks to dictate their solution of the Cyprus
problen1 by the force of arms.' 203 Even George Ball and Cyrus Vance, the former
American mediators on the Cyprus question, testified in favour of retaining the
linkage between Turkey's security assistance program and demonstrated progress
on Cyprus.' 204 The pro-embargo forces also claimed that failing to impose the
embargo would alienate Greece, a strategically vital ally of the United States.1205
However, the main reasons of congressmen for opposing the American admin-
1198 Ibid.. p.l75, Cotilounihis. 1983. op.cit., p.mi, Gumhuriyet, 26 July 1975, Keesing's.... vol.21,
'° Keesing's..., vol.21, p.27450.
1200 Couloiuiibis. 1983. op.cit., p.106.
1201 Congressman D. Riegl&s statement quoted by Watanabe, op.cit., p.100, see also Hackett. op.cit.,
p.25.
121)2 Couloumbis and Hicks, "the Impact of Greek Americans... ". op.cit., p.146,
Coulounibis. 1983, op.cit., p.104.
121)3 HF. Griniiiiett. Thrkish-U.S. Defense Relationship: the Arms Embargo Issue, the
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. 1978. p.4, Representative B. Roseiitlial's
statenient in Böliikbai, op.cit., pp.216-217.
121)4 Laipsoit. "Cyprus; a Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy", op.cit., p.73.
1205 Hosentlials statement in Bölükbai, op.cit., p.217.
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istration on the embargo issue stemmed from the uneasy relationship between the
legislative and executive branches. The American policies toward Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Chile, the Soviet Union and Pakistan had caused the gradual loss of Con-
gressional confidence in the practices of the administration. As the years passed,
Congress became more and more suspicious of the motives and practices of the
executive branch. Finally the Watergate scandal resulted in an almost complete
breakdown of Congressional trust in the Presidency. In the eyes of congressmen,
the American administration had become a body which did not care about the rule
of law and the power of Congress. Congressmen believed that they had to give a
lesson to the executive branch to break its arrogance. The Cyprus issue simply
provided this opportunity.' 20° The opposition to Kissinger as a former member
of the 110W discredited Nixon administration, too, played an important role in the
Coiigress's insistence on the arms embargo. 1207 The Turkish embargo issue of-
fered an opportunity for Kissinger's congressional critics to question some major
tenets of his domestic and foreign policies, his methods and his style of careful
manipulation of Congress and public opinion.
For many congressmen, to work for imposing an arms embargo on Turkey was
a part of the struggle to have a greater voice and control in foreign affairs. In
reality what Congress challenged was the strong executive dominance over the
foreign policy process.' 208
 For some Congressmen who were highly critical of the
Turkish government's decision to resume poppy cultivation, the arms embargo was
a good opportunity to express their disapproval over the Thrkish decision and
pumsh Turkey.
7.10.3 Arguments of the U.S. Administration on the Embargo
The arguments of anti-embargo forces, the American administration and some
congressmen, could be summarised as follows: 1209 Firstly, putting pressure on only
121)6 R.E. Canipany. Turkey and the United States, New York: Praeger, 1986. p.'78, Laipson.
"Cyprus...", op.cit. p.71, Laipsoii, Congressional-Executive Relations... , op.cit.,
p.30.
1207 Laipson. Congressional-Executive..., op.cit., p.29.
1205 Campany. op.cit.. p.?8.
1209 Statements of President Ford. Secretary of State Kissinger, the Senate majority leader and State
Departiieixt spokesman Aiiderson in Watanabe, op.cit., pp.107, 109. Salihi, 1978, op.cit., pp.100-
101, 18Th. Polyvioti. G'yprus, 1975. op.cit.. p.211, Kissinger, op.cit., p.1192, Stern, the Wrong
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one side in a complicated problem would not help its solution. Imposing an arms
embargo on Turkey would be destructive to U.S. efforts to bring about a peaceful
solution the Cyprus question by rendering the proud and independent-minded
Turks less flexible 011 future Cyprus negotiations.' 21° Secondly, the embargo would
cause alienation of Turkey, whose strategic importance was vital to NATO and
Western security designs. The United States might lose its strategic military and
communication facilities in Turkey and the American position in the strategic
eastern Mediterranean region might weaken.
Thirdly, the arms embargo was an act of Congress which represented an abuse
of congressional authority in foreign policy and violated the principle of separation
of power in the state structure. Foreign policy making and its tactical (day-to-day)
applications were largely the prerogative of the administration. Congress's exces-
sive involvement in the example of tile arms embargo restricted the adrniiiistra-
tion's executive capabilities in protecting U.S. interests. While imposing an arms
embargo against Turkey, congressmen could not take a responsible, statesmanlike
posture in ai important issue because they were influenced and manipulated by
an agitated group of politically active Greek Americans.'21'
Finally, apparently to prompt the opposition of the mighty Israeli lobby, the
American administration claimed that an arms embargo against Turkey could also
hurt Israel. Israel, too, might be caught by a strict interpretation of the non-
defensive use provisions of the law because Israel had used American weapons in
its struggle against tile Arabs. 1212 Moreover, the U.S. bases in Turkey, which were
threatened by the arms embargo, were important for Israel's defence.1213
7.10.4 Role of Greek Americans in the Imposition of the Embargo
The Greek Orthodox Church in North America was very active in communicat-
ing a deep concern over Cyprus to its members and in activating Greek American
Horse. oi).(it., p.l52. Grinimett, op.cit., p.4, Keesing 'S..., vol.21, pp.27035. 27337.
1210 Couloijiubis. 1983. op.cit.. p.105.
1211 Laipsoil, Congressional-Executive Relations..., op.cit.. p.30.
1212 hackett, Op.cit..	 Legg, op.cit.. p.118, Birand, Diyet, op.cit.. p.70.
1213 Hackett, op.cit.. p.26.
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population to force American officials and legislators for anti-Turkish actions.'214
The expected role of the Orthodox Church on the arms embargo was so great that
in October 1974 Ford and Kissinger met with Archbishop lakovos in the Oval Office
in order to persuade him to calm his community. 12h5
 Greek American lobby groups,
too, played a crucial role in activating the Greek-American population and putting
pressure on congressmen and the American administration on the arms embargo
110issue.
It seems that congressmen were influenced by the efforts of Greek Americans
in their votes on the embargo issue because they wanted to secure the support of
Greek Americans in the approaching congressional elections in November 1974.1217
No congressmen would like the agitated Greek-American groups, which constituted
a politically and socially activated segment of the U.S. population, lobbying against
him. Many congressmen would incline toward accommodating such an important
ethnic group in a symbolic vote.' 218
 But it should be noted that in the embargo
issue congressmen were also affected by other factors which were mentioned above
and they used efforts of Greek-Americans for their own political aims.'219
Whatever its reasons were, the arms embargo was the most important action
of the United States after the Johnson letter to force Turkey to act in a certain
way. The Turks felt the negative consequences of the embargo but they did not
change their policies toward Cyprus. The U.S. administration's opposition to the
embargo might have played a role in this Turkish attitude. But it is also a fact
that U.S. officials asked the Turks to make concessions in Cyprus to help the lifting
of the embargo. The Turkish reaction was to suspend U.S. activities in military
bases in Turkey rather than yield to U.S. pressures.
1214 Coulouiiibis and Hicks, "the Impact of Greek Americans Upoii United States
Foreign Policy". op.cit., p.152, Bö1ükbai, op.cit., p.2l4.
1215 Conloiimhis and Hicks. op.cit., p.1&&.
1216 Ibid., PI
.162-' 63 ' BöIilkba.i, op.cit., pp.214-2l5, Legg, op.cit., pp.117, 120, Hackett, op.cit., p.29.
1217 Dö1iikhai. op.cit.., pp. 215-216, Legg. op.cit., p.118.
1218 Hackctt. cp.cit.. p.29.
1219 Cotiloumbis arid Hicks, op.cit., p.174 , Laipson, Congressional-Executive Relations...,
Of).Cit., p.5.
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7.10.5 Arguments of Turkish Rulers Against the Embargo
Firstly, Turkish authorities claimed that their military operations in Cyprus
were just and in conformity with international law and agreements and that there-
fore the arms embargo which aimed at punishing Turkey for its Cyprus action
was unjust. Secondly, Turkish authorities argued that the arms embargo was an
obstacle to the negotiation process on Cyprus in many ways: 1- It encouraged the
uncompronhising attitude of the Greek side. 2- It brought Turkey under psycho-
logical pressure. If she made concessions in this situation she would seem yielding
under U.S. pressure.' 22° 3- The embargo changed the balance between the posi-
tions of the two sides by putting pressure on only one side and thus it undermined
the peace negotiations from the outset 1221
Thirdly, Turkish rulers always stressed that the Cyprus question and the bi-
lateral defence cooperation between Turkey and the United States were separate
issues and could not be linked with each other.' 222 Fourthly, they pointed out
that the supply of American arms to Turkey was not a favour but an essential
obligation under a military defence alliance.' 223 Fifthly, Turkish authorities ar-
gued that the arms embargo would harm the NATO defence system by causing
the destruction of its southeastern flank and the weakening one of its members.1224
Sixthly, they warned that the arms embargo could cause the total breakdown of
U.S.-Turkish relations. Finally, Turkish officials claimed that the arms embargo
was a discriminatory act of the United State toward Turkey because she did not
apply the same U.S. laws against other countries such as Greece and Cyprus, which
used U.S.-supplied military equipment for non-defensive purposes.'225
1220 Speeches of the Turkish foreign niinisters, Turan Güne and Melih Esenbel, in Turkish Parliament
iii Cumhuriyet, 26.10.1974. p.1, 18.12.1974, p.7.
1221 Foreign Minister Melih Eseiibel, IVIillet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (..MMTD), 21.2.1975. term
4. sess.2. vol.9. PP.459-460. the author's interview with Osman Olcay.
1222 Turkish P.M. DeiiiireVs talk to Kissinger in Birand. Di yet. op.cit., p.l24, Grixnniett, op.cit., p.2,
M. Eseiibel. MMTD, 21.2.1975, op.cit., pp.459-460 . Foreign Minister I.S. calayangil, MMTD,
12.6.1975. term 4. sess.2. vol.12, p.579.
1223 Esejibel, IVIIvITD. 21.2.1975, op.cit., p.460, Turkish P.M. Sadi Irmak's statement to journalists in
Cumhuriyet. 4.2.1975. p.7. Turkeys National Security Council's statement in C1umhuriyet,
17.6.197. p.9.
1224 Turkish P.M. DemireFs talk with President Ford in Birand, Diyet, op.cit., p.l26.
1225 Turkish Defence Minister Hasa,, I,k's statement on the Turkish TV in Gumhuriyet. 27.9.1974,
Turkish P.M. Demirel's talk with Kissinger in Birand, Diyet. op.cit.. p.182.
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7.10.6 Turkish Public's Reaction to the Intervention and Embargo
Some Turkish people, especially leftist ones, believed that the Cyprus coup was
a plot organised under the auspices of the United States.' 226 In their opinion, the
United States expected that the Cyprus coup would solve the chronic Cyprus prob-
lem to her advantage by removing anti-American Makarios and unifying Cyprus
with pro-American Greece. They also alleged that the Americans predicted that
Turkish P.M. Bülent Ecevit with anti-American and leftist inclinations would not
be able to resist the Cyprus coup, and thus he would lose his credibility at home
and would be replaced by a more pro-American politician.
The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus received unanimous support from
Turkish public opinion. There was no other issue, domestic or foreign, on which
there was such unanimity in Turkey. All Turkish major parties and the domestic
press supported the Turkish military action. There were no MPs and no editorials
in any major newspapers and magazines criticising the move and calling for the
withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. Turkish public opinion unanimously
condemned the arms embargo as an anti-Turkish move and deplored the use of
arms supplies as a tool to exert influence on Turkish policy. Nobody suggested
withdrawing from Cyprus or making any compromise.' 227 Even the Turkish armed
forces, which were the most affected element of the Turkish political structure
by the arms embargo, did not favour any concessions under the American pres-
sure. Only a small group of leftist radicals, intellectual Marxists, opposed Turkey's
military intervention because they felt that Turkey was acting as an imperialist
1228state.
7.11 Conclusion
The Cyprus question was a test of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in a matter which
did not the concern common security interests that constituted the basis of the
alliance. The problem mainly concerned Turkish national interests and foreign
° Birand. 30 Sicak Gun. op.cit., pp.30, 80. in Cumhuriyet: Oktay Akbal, "Pay1amaya
oru mu?", 20.7.1974, lilian Seicuk, "Pencere", 24.7.1974 p.2, Ali Siriueu "Dhnyada
ugun", 26.7.1974, p.3.
1227	 jscusSioii.S iii Parliament, MMTD, 20.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9. pp.367-372, 21.2.1975. ibid.,
pP444457
1228 Ca11IpL1Y. op.cit., pp.52-53.
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policy. The United States interested in the development of the matter because of
global, strategic interests and policies, stemmed from being a superpower. This
proves that the U.S.-Turkish relationship was a small-big state relationship. Turkey
would not advise or try to influence the United States in its policy toward Vietnam.
The Johnson letter in 1964 had claimed that Turkish rulers had the commit-
ment to consult with the U.S. administration before taking any action in Cyprus. In
fact, Turkish authorities always complied with this advice by informing the Amer-
icans oti their action on Cyprus before initiating them. This situation gives the
impression that the U.S.-Turkish alliance bore some characteristics of the patron-
client relationship. But it is also related to the Turkish perception that close allies
should consult with each other in every matter concerning each state. Another
reason for this attitude might be Turkish rulers' intention to use U.S. opposition
to appease agitated public opinion.
It is not true, as some Turks had claimed, that the United States was par-
ticularly opposed to the Turkish cause on Cyprus and supported the Greek side.
She was mainly concerned with her own interests while reacting to developments
in the Cyprus question. When she thought that pressuring Turkey was necessary
she did not hesitate to act in this way. U.S. pressures on Turkey before 1965
were really heavy and forced the Turks to abandon their proposed intervention
in Cyprus. however, the Americans also had to consider the possibility of losing
Turkey's alliance. Therefore, they did not take direct forceful actions such as the
active involvement of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in stopping Turkish ships. They also
acted more cautiously after 1964 not to alienate the Turks, seeing the severe of-
ficial Turkish response and the anti-Americanism among Turkish people. Turkey
could threaten to leave NATO in the face U.S. pressures, but had to consider the
consequences of her action. She certainly did not wish to be left alone against the
Soviet threat; she needed U.S. and NATO support for her security, and she did
not want to weaken her position on Cyprus by losing all Western sympathy and
understanding.
The U.S. attitude toward the Cyprus problem before 1965 led Turkish rulers
to be more cautious in their relations with the USA, suspecting that their interests
could be adversely affected by U.S. actions. It also inspired the Turks to have
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a more independent and flexible foreign policy by improving relations with the
Eastern bloc, the Third World and neighbouring countries. So both the U.S.-
Turkish alliance and Turkish foreign policy were affected by developments in the
Cyprus question.
The Americans managed to prevent Turkish intervention in Cyprus in Novem-
ber 1967. However, this time they took great care not to antagonise the Turks.
Their influence was not too heavy at that time. But at the end the Americans
achieved their objective of preventing Turkish intervention.
In 1974 the United Stated failed to prevent the Turkish intervention in Cyprus.
Its influence apparently did not work this time. But the Americans were not too de-
termined in this direction. Turkey's strategic importance for U.S. interests played
a role in this attitude. The weakness of the U.S. government because of Watergate
was another factor. The Turks were not entirely free in their actions in Cyprus
because of U.S. pressures and opposition. They stopped their first intervention
before achieving their original aims and after capturing 36 percent of Cyprus faced
the punishment of the U.S. congress (the embargo and later conditioning of U.S.
assistance) whose effects have continued up to now. The embargo did not succeed
in forcing the Turks to change their Cyprus policies radically but affected their fu-
ture defence policies and increased their isolation in the international arena. The
suspension of U.S. activities in Turkish bases was Turkey's proof that she was not
a satellite of the USA.
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Chapter VIII
THE OPIUM ISSUE AND TURKISH-AMERICAN
RELATIONS
The opium controversy between the United States and Turkey broke out as
a result of the American administration's campaign against the drug addiction
problem among American youth. U.S. rulers made great efforts to persuade Turkey
to decrease its opium production and even to ban it completely. Turkey's failure to
fulfil American dernaiids satisfactorily because of domestic reasons made the issue
one of the most important matters of Turkish-American relations at the end of the
1960s and at tl1e beginning of the 1970s. The opium question was a matter outside
the formal defence alliance between the two countries but touched the feelings
of both American and Turkish people. Like the Cyprus question, it would have
been a test of the Turkish-American alliance in a matter which did not concern
common strategic interests. However, the issue was forestalled by the Turkish
intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 and ceased to be an important matter after
the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey because of her actions in
Cyprus and the Turkish government took effective measures preventing Turkish
opium from falling into illicit hands.
8.1 The Opium Issue Before the Nixon Administration
8.1.1 The Period Before 1960
Opium had been grown by Turkish peasants in Anatolia for centuries. Turkey
had long been a major exporter of opium for the licit medicinal market. The
first contact between Turkey and the United States involving opium occurred at
the beginning of the nineteenth century. When the British East India Company
forbade its ships to carry opium to China in 1805, American ships moved into the
opium trade from Turkey to China and held a monopoly of it for fifteen years to
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the extent that One Chinese official in Canton thought that Turkey was a part of
the Uiiited States.'22°
In the early l900s the growing concern for drug addiction at home and the
dislike for the dirty trade abroad led American officials to take up the opium issue
iii the international arena. The United States played a leading role in convening
an international opium commission in Shanghai in 19091230 and in drawing up
The Hague International Opium Convention in 1912.1231 In 1923 the American
Consul General in Istanbul suggested that Turkey could be persuaded to eliminate
opium production if a suitable crop such as silk could be substituted for poppy.'232
The memorandum of the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Joseph C. Grew, on his
farewell conversation with the Turkish foreign minister on 29 February 1932 stated:
"I observed that there was still one unfortunate element which could exact an
adverse effect on relations; namely the continued clandestine traffic in narcotics
from Turkey to the United States."'233
In spite of her dislike for the League of Nations, the United States cooperated
with the League's Advisory Committee on the Traffic of Opium and Other Danger-
ous Drugs and participated actively in preparation of a draft convention focusing
primarily on controlling opium at its source.' 234 The American Congress's Joint
Resolution No. 241 which was approved by the President on 1 July 1944 (Public
Law 400, 78th Congress) urged all poppy-growing nations to enter into an interna-
tional agreement to reduce the production of opium to the medical and scientific
needs of the world.'235
Turkey adhered to the League of Nations convention to control the production
aitci sale of narcotics in 1932 and made the production and marketing of opium a
1229 .J.W. Spain. "the United States, Turkey and the Poppy", Middle East
Journal. Stimitier 1975, vol.29, No.3, p.295.
1230 Ibid.. p.296. H.R. Weilnian, "Drug Abuse: A Challenge to U.S.-Turkish Co-
operation in the Seventies", Department of State Bulletin. vol.64. 1 February
1971. p.142.
1231 Spain. op.Cit.. p.296, Welhuan, op.eit.. p.143.
1232 Spain. op.cit.. Pl• 296-297.
1233 Jbid.. p.297.
1234 Ibid.. p.297.
1235 J.L. Zeiitiier. "The 1972 Turkish Opium Ban: Needle in the Haystack
Diplomacy". World Affairs, vol.136, Suninier 1973, p.3'T•
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state fllOflOI)OIY in 1933.1236 According to the information which was given by a
Turkish official to Harvey R. Welirnan, the Special Assistant for Narcotic Matters
to the U.S. Secretary of State in 1971, Turkish President Kemal Atatürk as early as
1937 advocated the replacement of the cultivation of opium by sugarbeets because
he was concerned that Turkish opium was circulating as a poison in the world.'237
Oh 14 May 1945 the Inönü government explained Turkey's position that opium
production should be restricted to a few countries including Turkey. It also gave
assurances that Turkey would consent to every limitation of production which
niight be contemplated under equal conditions for all producers.'238
After the Second World War the United States played the leading role in
international efforts to control production and marketing of narcotic drugs. In
1953 the Opium Protocol was signed under United Nations auspices, limiting the
authorisation to produce opium for export to seven named producers, including
Turkey.' 23° Both Turkey and the United States signed and ratified the protocol.
In the same year Turkey licensed the opium-growing farmers for the first time and
made the opium production and exportation the responsibility of the Turkish Soil
Products Office.124°
In 1958 42 of Turkey's 67 provinces were growing opium which contained the
highest raw morphine in the world. U.S. Secretary of State Christian B. Herter was
informed at that time that too much Turkish opium was entering the illicit traffic
and that therefore Turkey should begin seriously to control its production.124'
During a CENTO meeting in Washington in 1959, reportedly Herter and CIA
Director Duhles asked Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to prohibit opium
cultivation in Turkey but Menderes strongly rejected their demand and proposed
that Turkey and the USA should establish an opium industry in Turkey together
and build a joint opium factory whose products would be sold to Europe.'242
1236 Ibid.. p.38. G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1972. P191
1231 1Nclliiian. Op.Cit.. p.144.
1238 Harris. op.cit.. p.191.
1239 'Vc11iiiaii. op.eit.. p.l43. Zeiitner, op.cit.. p.37.
1240 Z'ntiir. op.eit... ).38.
1241 Ibid.. p.39.
1242 C. Arcayiin'k. çankaya'ya Giden Yol 1971-1973, Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi. 1985. p.146.
Ozgeii Acar. "Afyon Raporu". Cumhuriyet. 20 July 1970.
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8.1.2 The Opium Issue in the 1960s
In 1961 the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was signed under United Na-
tions auspices. The Convention, which came into force in 1964, aimed at consoli-
dating existing treaties and bringing all narcotic substances under control. Under
the Single Convention, the International Narcotics Control Board was authorised
to administer the system of estimates and statistical control of all transactions
concerning narcotic substances. As for the prevention of the illicit drug traffic,
the Board's authority was limited to surveillance, investigation, publicity and rec-
ominendations. The responsibility for preventing opium from falling into illicit
channels lay mainly with the treaty members. 1243 The United States attributed
great importance to the Single Convention and always drew attention to this treaty
while pressurising Turkey on opium.
In the mid-1960s U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson began to stress the opium
issue in the U.S. relations with Turkey and thus linked the domestic issue of drug
abu'e with the foreign policy objective of controlling opium production in producer
nations. 1244 In Spain's words, Johnson was "hoping to salvage part of his dream of
"the Great Society" from the inroads of the Vietnam War" by achieving success
in the increasing heroin addiction problem.'245
Turkey initially showed no enthusiasm toward American demands. The Inönü
government officially rejected the American demand to prohibit opium cultiva-
tion. 1246 In 1963 the Turkish Parliament passed Law No.245, which reiterated
Turkey's promise to fight against illicit opium traffic and to maintain strict control
on opium. 1247 The Demirel government, which came to power in November 1965,
showed more willingness to cooperate with the United States in fighting against
the illegal opium trade.' 248 The Turkish Parliament ratified the Single Convention
1243 Welhuiaii. op.cit.. p.143.
1244 M.A. Turner. the International Politics of Narcotics, Ph.D. Thesis, Kent State University,
1975. P.106.
124t' Spain. op.cit.. p.297.
1246 Arcayürek. op.cit., p.147.
1241 Turkish Agriculture Minister Illiami Ertem. Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi('MMTD),
24.7.1970. term 3. sess.1, vol.8, p.631.
1248 l-Iarri.s. op.eit., p.l92. Turner. op.cit., pp. 122-123.
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on Narcotics in December 1966 and Turkey formally acceded to this treaty on 22
June 1967.1240
8.2 U.s. Pressures on Turkey on Opium 1969-1971
8.2.1 Views of the Americans on Turkey's Opium Production
The following section is largely based on opinions of American officials and
American public opinion:
Drug addiction was a serious problem in the United States at the end of the
1960s and in the 1970s.' 25° It was threatening the whole of American society
in cities and suburbs. The number of drug addicts was increasing threateningly.
The Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), John E.
Ingersoll, gave some figures in his statement on 26 October 1970: "Ten years ago we
estimated there were 60,000 narcotic addicts in the United States; today we believe
there are two to three times that amount. Ninety-seven percent of the addicts are
addicted to heroin. Our list of addicts is growing by several thousand each year,
and in 1969 the number of new addicts doubled from the previous year." 1251 It
was estimated in 1973 that there were about 600,000 heroin addicts in the United
States and that half of them lived in New York.'252
American law enforcement officials believed that there was a direct link between
heroin addiction and increase of crime.' 253
 They claimed that at least half of all
street crimes and burglaries in New York City were committed by addicts who
stole to maintain their habits.' 254 The BNDD estimated that a typical male addict
needed 50 milligrams of heroin a day to maintain his habit and that this cost him
about 29 dollars a day and 10,556 dollars a year. Thus heroin was a huge industry
pushing people to crime.' 255
 John Ingersoll's figures on crime related to heroin
1249 Harris. Of).Cit.. pp. 192-193.
1250 Welliiiaii. op.cit.. p.l41.
1251 Ibid.. p.141.
1252 The Staff and Editors of Newsday; the Heroin Trail, London: Souvenir Press, 1975, pp.xi, 186,
Ozcaii Köknel, "Hahag Ekimi ye ABD", Milliyet, 4 November 1975, Zentuer, op.cit.,
p.47n.
1253 Tiiriier. op.cit., pp.9, 11-12.
1254 the Heroin Trail. op.cit.. pp.xi-xii.
1255 Ibid.. p.187.
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addiction was as follows: "In 1965 there were less than 50,000 arrests in the United
States for drug-related offences; in 1969 there were 233,690 such arrests. Almost
20 percent of these arrests were in suburban areas, where drug problems had not
existed in previous years. Arrest trends for all drug-law violations increased nearly
500 percent during the last ten years. During the same period the arrest trends
for persons under 18 years of age increased nearly 2500 percent."1256
Deaths caused by heroin addiction also increased in the United States. In New
York City alone three or four persons were dying because of drug-related causes
per day. 1257 According to one estimate, in the whole of America people were dying
of drug addiction at the rate of 8 to 10 per day.1258
The iiumber of families who were affected by drug addiction problems, too, was
increasing greatly. Statistical figures showed that almost one third of American
families complained about heroin addiction of their children.' 259 The rise of heroin
addiction among the sons and daughters of the American elite led the American
administration to attribute the utmost importance to the matter.' 26° Ingersoll
voiced the complaint of American families in his statement:
I speak for over 200 million human beings who are alarmed, distressed, and even
outraged about a calamitous problem they did not create and which they cannot solve
alone. They do imot understand why the nations of tile world cannot bring an end to
the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly opiate addiction, is causing our
people. There is growing unity of opinion among tile various and diverse segments of
our population: Illicit narcotics must go.'26'
The Americans believed that the real cause of their sufferings was the availabil-
ity of heroin which was derived from illegally supplied foreign opium.' 262 Source
countries, and not the United States, were considered the real cause of the Arner-
ican drug disease. Among the producer countries Turkey was the most notorious
for tile Americans. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs alleged that 80
1256 W(hlIllalI up.cit., p.l4l.
1257 liigcrso1ls statenu'mit, ibid., p.141, Spain, op.cit., p.298.
125 Ragip Umier. "Afyon Sorunu ye Amerika", Cumhuriyet, 18 March 1971.
1259 Areayiirek. op.cit.. p.146.
60 C. Harris. "Turkey Between Alliance and Alienation", Foreign Policy, vol.8,
Nos.3-4, 1980. l).121.
I .36 I
	
, 0 p.eit. 1)140.
1252 II)i(l.. p.141.
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percent of heroin illegally consumed in the United States was derived from Turkish
opium) 263 American drug officers claimed that they reached this conclusion be-
cause they could identify Turkish opium with its high perceiitage of morphine.1264
According to American sources, Turkish opium reached the United States in
the following way: Turkish villagers, who had very low incomes, were tempted to
sell opium gum to illegal buyers because, while the government paid about 10 dol-
lars for a kilogram of opium gum, illegal drug smugglers paid three times more for
the same amount.' 265
 Collectors who were usually well known to villagers collected
opium gum and took it to secret depots.' 266
 It was changed to morphine base eas-
ily by a simple chemical process before leaving Turkey.' 267
 Changing 10 kilograms
of opium worth 300 dollars into 1 kilogram of morphine increased its value to
500 dollars. 1268
 Turkish patrons smuggled morphine base abroad through custom
points like Kapikule' 26° and passed it through Bulgaria in return for a price. They
were expected to occasionally reciprocate by providing the smuggling of guns and
ammunition from Bulgaria to Turkish revolutionaries and supplying intelligence
information to the Bulgarian secret police.' 270 After morphine was converted to
heroin in Marseilles laboratories in southern France through a more complicated
chemical process which required sophisticated techniques, modern equipment and
'	 Turner, op.cit.. pp.3, 106, Harris, Troubled Alliance, op.cit., p.192, O.S. Ray, Drugs, So-
ciety and Human Behaviour, Saint Louis: the CV. Mosby Company, 1972, P .193. the
Heroin Trail, op.cit., pp.xiii, 7. ABD Diileri Bakanz William Rogers'in Kon-
gre 'ye Sundugn Rapordan Böliimler, Ankara: Amerikan Basin ye Kültür Merkezi, 1972,
1264 Isinail Ccms interview with former Turkish foreign minister I.S. çalayaiigil in I. Cern, Tarih
Açzsindari 12 Mart, Istanbul: Cern Yaymevi, 1980. pp. 311-312. Later some Turkish newspa-
reported that American officials misled American people on the source of heroin used in the
United States. Reportedly. in 1975 the former chairman of the Congress's commission on dangerous
drugs. Walter Miiiiiick, told congressmen that the U.S. Congress and people had beeii badly misled
by American officials on the source of heroin and claimed that Turkey was chosen as scapegoat
because she could be pressurised easily. All Sirmen "Dunyada Bugun: Afyonlama",
curnhurz yet. 8 March 1975. In another report it was claimed that Johu Ingersoll deliberately
trie(l to present Turkey as the source of American drug addiction problem to divert public anger
from the a(lluinistration. Selahattin Giller, "ABD Kongresini Turkiye'de G orevil
Ajanlar Yaniltti". C'umhuriyet. 24 March 1975.
1265 Roy. op.cit.. p.193. the Heroin Trail. op.cit., p.2. Wellrnan, op.cit., p.44.
1266 the Heroin Trail, op.cit.. p.11.
1267 Il)id.. pp.Xiii. 11. Roy. op.cit.. p.194.
1268 Roy, up.cit.. p.194.
1269 the Heroin Trail. op.cit., pp.20-42.
1270 ii,id.. p.53.
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chemical expertise, the price of a kilogram heroin went up to 4000 to 6000 dol-
lars.127'
Heroin was then smuggled into the United States by a number of routes, es-
pecially through Latin America.' 272
 Professional smugglers easily passed heroin
through the U.S. Bureau of Customs.1273 A large portion of the smuggled heroin
ended up in the New York metropolitan area, where it was either adulterated and
sold wholesale to dealers throughout the eastern United States or was adulterated,
put into bags or packages and sold to the numerous addicts in the area.' 274
 While
one kilogram of heroin was delivered in the United States for 15,000 dollars, it
was then sold to distributors who might pay 30,000 to 40,000 dollars for the same
amount. The dilution was so great that retail price of a kilogram of heroin might
be a quarter of a million dollars at street level.'275
In the light of these facts, American officials were convinced that their fight
against drug addiction at home would not be successful unless the source of heroin,
Turkey, was shut off. In their opinion, Turkey had ratified the Single Convention
and thus undertook the responsibility to implement the most effective measures in
order to eliminate illegal production and sale of opium in Turkey.' 276 They further
argued tl1at Turkey should totally ban opium production' 277
 because a country was
obliged to eradicate its opium cultivation if it could not successfully prevent the
diversion of opiun1 into illegal channels.'278
8.2.2 The Nixon Administration's Fight Against Opium
After becoming president, Richard Nixon immediately launched an all-out war
1271 Jiy. op.cit.. P.104.
1272 the Heroin Trail, op.cit.. p.167.
1273 11)111.. p.156.
1274 Ibid.. p.xii.
1275 flay. op.cit.. p.194, Wellman op.cit., p.144. International Aspects of the Narcotics Prob-
1cm. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress,
1st Session. July 7,8,9, and 30, 1971, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, p.5.
1276 Welluian, op.cit.. pp.143, 145.
1277 Spaiii. op.cit., p.298.
1278 Harris. 1972, op.cit., plO5, Turner, op.cit., p.l28.
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against drug addiction at home' 279
 and opium production abroad. He had come
to office with a strong commitment to ending violence in the street, which was
growing as drug addicts turned to crime to finance their habits. As a part of
this campaign, from 1969 onwards, the American administration pressured Turkey
publicly to close down all of its opium fields,' 28° making the issue a high priority in
relations between the two countries. 128 ' It also made bilateral arrangements with
other states such as France, Mexico and Canada to fight against the illicit drug
traffic. 1282
In his message to Congress on 17 June 1971, President Nixon said:
If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy
us. I ani not prepared to accept this alternative... I am proposing appropriation of
a(l(litioual funds to meet the cost of rehabilitating drug abusers, and I will ask for
additional funds to increase our enforcement efforts to further tighten the noose around
the necks of drug peddlers, and thereby loosen the noose around the necks of drug
users... I am proposing additional steps to strike at the supply side of the drug equation
- to halt the drug traffic by striking at the illegal producers of drugs, the growing of
those plants from which drugs are derived, and trafficking in these drugs beyond our
bordrs.'2M3
In order to coordinate international efforts on illegal opium production and
trafficking President Nixon created the Cabinet Committee on International Nar-
cotics Control in September 1971.1284
8.2.3 U.S. Efforts to Eradicate Turkey's Opium Production
It was reported that several times the United States approached Turkey to
buy its whole opium crop. In mid-1969 President Nixon dispatched D. Patrick
Moynilian to Turkey with a virtual blank cheque to buy the entire 1969 crop but
the Turks rejected the offer flatly.' 285
 Later the American ambassador to Turkey,
William J. Handley, proposed to Foreign Minister caglayangil to pay for the whole
1279 For U.S. domestic measures against drug addiction see Wehiman, op.cit.. pp.141-142, the Heroin
Trail. op.rit.. pp.xii, xiii. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971-1972 vol.18, p.25227.
1280 Harris. Tronbled Alliance, op.cit., p.193.
1281 Spain. op.cit.. pp.298. 303.
1282 Keesing 'S..., vol.18, p.24693, the Heroin Trail, op.cit., p.90, Ragip lJner. op.cit., Welhnan.
Ol ) .C1l. p.142.
j23 J(('eSifl !J 8..., vol.18. pp. 24092-24693.
1284 Turner, op.cit., p.202.
1285 Ttirnr. op.cit.. pp.126. 139-140.
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opium crop. The reply came from P.M. Demirel through ca1ayaigil: Opium had
been grown in Turkey for centuries, there was even a city which was named after
opium. Turkey could not stop opium cultivation but could restrict it. 1286 Handley
was not satisfied with the answer, he wanted to see Demirel personally.' 287 In
their meeting Handley proposed to Demirel: Turkey would announce an end to
opium production and plough up its 1970 crop in exchange for 5 million dollars to
compensate the growers. 1288 Demirel rejected the offer and said that he could not
find any Turk who would drive bulldozers to destroy poppy fields.1289
In April 1970, U.S. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson visited Ankara.
In his press conference at the Esenboa airport on 23 April, Richardson praised the
Turkish government for showing understanding toward the drug addiction problem
of the United States. When a reporter asked whether Turkey would reduce its
opium-growing provinces to seven in return for an additional three million dollars of
U.S. aid, Richardson confirmed that among other things they negotiated measures
which would prevent opium from falling into illicit channels and a further decrease
in Turkey's opium production.'29°
Richardson's visit to Ankara publicised the opium issue in Turkish domestic
politics. The Turkish press reported that Richardson's talks with Turkish officials
were aimed at forcing Turkey to eliminate both legal and illegal opium production.
Fierce criticism of the United States appeared in opinion columns of leftist and
rightist newspapers. Further criticism was heard when a story in the New York
Times triggered the rumour that American narcotics officials advocated withhold-
ing the requested 40 million dollar economic aid to Turkey in order to force a ban
on opium production.129'
Subsequently, U.S.-Turkish discussions on opium continued intensively. Dur-
ing the CENTO meeting in the United States in May 1970 Turkish Foreign Mm-
1286 Deniirels statement to a Turkish TV documentary in M.A. Birand et al., 12 Mart, Ankara: Imge
Kitabevi, 1994. p.169.
1287 j S caglayangil. Anzlarzm, Istanbul: Yihuaz Yayinlari. August 1990, p.324.
1288 Turner. op.rit.. p.l26, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.150, caghtyangil's iiiterview with I. Cern in Cein,
op.cit.. p.312.
1289 Arcayiirek. op.eit., p.lSO.
1290 Di,ilcri Bakan1z'i Belleteni, April 1970, p.133.
129j Flarris. 1972, op.cit., p.194, Turner, op.cit., pp.126-127.
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ister calayangil told Richardson that Turkey could not undertake to ban opium
cultivation. 1202
 In May 1970 high-level BNDD officials, Andrew Tartaglino and
John Cusack, visited Turkey.' 29
 In June 1970 the U.S. President's special envoy
Moynihan told Turkey's NATO representative Muharrem Nun Birgi that Turkey
should ban opium cultivation if she wanted to avoid harming Turkish-American
cooperation in all areas.'204
The most important event which triggered an explosion of widespread Turkish
anger toward the United States was U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell's tes-
timony before the House Ways and Means Committee on 20 July 1970. Iii his
testimony Mitchell gave approval to the concept of economic sanctions in order
to shut off opium traffic from countries including Turkey. During the committee
meeting Congressman Vanik proposed to impose economic and trade sanctions
against the countries who did not cooperate with the United States on preventing
illegal opium trafficking. Mitchell replied that his government, mainly the State
Department, was negotiating with these countries and recently made an initiative
in the framework of NATO and he added that if these initiatives were not success-
ful tile United States should take further measures. When the Director of BNDD,
John Ingersoll, claimed that 80 percent of the opium illegally introduced to the
United States came from Turkey, Vanik stated that economic sanctions might be
the best tool to combat the problem. He suggested to Attorney General Mitchell
that "we ought to set up a system that would provide for an embargo, or suspen-
sion of trade, or even suspension of relationships" until Turkey should "control the
problems" of drug traffic. Thereupon Mitchell said that he quite agreed with tile
concept: "we are all for cutting off the source in any way that is in the best interest
of this country." He mentioned some measures taken by Turkey to cut opium pro-
duction and to prevent illegal trafficking but he said that he did not think these
measures would be successful and that this situation did not prevent him from
taking other forceful measures to stop the flow of opium. Mitchell finally added
that "any legislation or administrative action that can cut down the production
1292 Arcayiirek. op.cit., p.153.
1203 Cumhuriyet. 17 May 1970, p.1.
1294 Arcayiirk. op.cit.. p.153.
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and.., the illicit traffic of opium... be the country Turkey or another, we, at the
Justice Department, would be in favor of it..."1295
Mitchell's threat of economic sanctions was immediately denounced by the
rFurkis l government, On 22 July 1970 the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a state-
ment expressing disappointment over Mitchell's remarks and declaring that those
kinds of irresponsible statements would harm Turkish-American friendship and
cast suspicion on the American attitude. 1296 Turkish P.M. Süleyman Demirel told
reporters that if there was such a statement Turkey would feel sorry about it and
added that statements which were not compatible with the sovereignty of states
could not be tolerated. 1297 In the parliament Turkish Ministers Turhan Bilgin and
lihami Ertem declared that no country could punish Turkey and intervene in her
affairs. They accused people who publicised Mitchell's statement of deliberately
trying to show that Turkey was under tile influence of the United States.' 298 MP
Celal Kargili said that the Turkish nation was in deep sorrow because it was scolded
by the Attorney General of the U.S. government in a manner which was applied
to colonies.1209
Turkish newspaper columnists voiced the following criticism of Mitchell's state-
melt: The statement clearly showed that Turkey was dependent on the United
States and was her satellite. The Americans considered Turkey their colony and
therefore did not hesitate to pressurise Turkish rulers to stop opium cultivation.
The United States herself failed to take drastic measures at and within her bor-
ders to stop heroin smuggling but tried to hide her incompetence by attacking
Turkey. Mitchell's statement showed that the Americans cared only about their
own interests. In this context it was reminiscent of the famous Johnson letter and
demonstrated iiiequality in tile U.S.-Turkish relationship.'30°
1295 HLrris, 1972. op.cit., p.l94n. Jlililliyet, 23 July 1970, Cumhuriyet, 23 July 1970, p.7.
1296 Cumhuriyet. 23 July 1970, p.7.
1297 Ilid.
1298 MMTD. 24.7.1970, term 3. sess.1, vol.8, p.630-632.
1299 Ibid.. pp.026-029.
1300 In curnhuriyet: Oktay Akbal, "Amerikasiz da Yaanir", lihan Selçuk,
24 July 1970. p.2. Cihad Baban, "Demirel Hakli". 28 July 1970, p.2; Abdi Ipekci, 'TtI14(1Ye
Ceza1andiri1acakmi", Milliyet, 22 July 1970, pp.1 nd 9.
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As Harris stated, the Mitchell statement had not caused as sharp a dividing
line in Turkish-American relations as the Johnson letter had. It further strained
relations betweeii the two countries but it did not bring about a dramatic change.
"The opium issue had risen too suddenly to seriously affect Turkish public opinion
and was not in any case the basic national issue that Cyprus had been." Unlike
the reaction to the 1964 Cyprus crisis, Turkish people were no longer shocked by
the realisation that even allies could have fundamental differences. In fact after
Mitchell made his statement the American Department of State promptly denied
any intention of applying economic sanctions against Turkey.'301
At the U.N. Narcotics Committee meeting in Geneva in September 1970 the
Turkish representative explained that regulation, not eradication, of opium pro-
duction was the Turkish government's aim and that Turkey would not accept any
obligation outside the present treaties on opium.' 302 On 8 October 1970 John
Ingersoll brought a personal letter of President Nixon to Turkish P.M. Demirel,
urging the Turkish government to help the United States on the drug abuse prob-
lem. Deinirel's letter to Nixon, which was dated 10 November 1970, stated that
Turkey was aware of the gravity of the problem and would cooperate with the
United States to fight against it. However, the letter did not make ally promise to
ban opium cultivation completely. 1303 In fact, President Nixon had sent another
personal and secret letter to Demirel in January 1969. In this letter Nixon re-
minded Demirel that when the Soviet Union threatened Turkey after the Second
World War, the United States had come to Turkey's rescue. It was now Turkey's
turn to help the Umiited States on the opium issue which posed a similar threat to
Anierican people.'304
Allegedly, the U.S. dislike for the Demirel government on the opium issue
played a role in the Turkish military "coup by memorandum" on 12 March 1971.1305
Turhan Bilgin, who was state minister in the Dernirel government, later claimed
that the CIA had prepared plans in the framework of NATO to topple the Turkish
1301 Harris 1972. op.cit., p.195. Turner. op.cit., pp.141-i42.
1302 Harris. 1972. op.cit.. p.195. Cumhuriyet, 4 October 1970, p.1.
1303 Arcayürk. op.cit.. pp.148-149.
1304 Turha', Bilgiii, "12 Mart", Miiliyet. 24.3.1976 quoted by Cern. op.cit., pp.294-295. Turner,
op.cit.. pp.125-126.
1305 flirau(l et al., op.cit.. p.169.
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government and that one high-level American official had said at that time that
the American drug abuse problem could be solved only through the fall of the
Demirel government.' 306
 According to Ismail Cern, during their talk on 7 February
1974, calayangi1, foreign minister of the Demirel government, made the following
remarks: The United States was not pleased with the Demirel government because
of certain matters such as opium, flights of American U-2 planes and use of Amer-
ican bases in Turkey. The government had been weakened by its internal problems
and was expected to fall in the near future. The United States correctly assessed
the situation and accelerated the process of the Demirel government's fall. When
it fell, Turkey's anti-NATO stance came to an end, leftists and the opposition to
NATO were crushed and opium production was banned, thus the United States
and NATO became happy.'307
It is not likely that the Turkish military would have halted the normal demo-
cratic process only or mainly to prohibit opium cultivation to please the Americans
because it would be difficult to maintain agreement among top Turkish military
officers in such an issue. It is even hard to prove the claim that U.S. displeasure
with the Turkish government was one of reasons for the 12 March move because
documents on both sides are classified. The only thing which could be said is that
the United States had reasons for not being happy with the situation in Turkey at
that time. One can easily see this fact by looking at widespread attacks against
Americans in Turkey.1308
8.2.4 U.s. Pressure upon Turkey on the Opium Issue
The Americans applied pressure tactics, for instance, they used the issue of
economic and military assistance as leverage against Turkey to force her to comply
with American demands on opium. Most authors agree with this conclusion.'309
1306 T. Bilgin, op.cit. quoted by Cern, op.cit., pp.295-296.
1307 Cern, op.cit., pp.299-300, 313-314. Former Thrkish MP and diplomat Karnran Juan told the author
that the USA did not take part in the fail of the Turkish government. In Kurtul Altu's programme
on Turkish TV, Bunalimli Yillar, a high-level RPP member, Besim Ustünel, claimed that in a dinner
in the U.S. embassy in Ankara one week before the 12 March move a high-level U.S. official from
the State Departnient told him that deputy chairman of RPP's parliamentary caucus, Nihat Erim,
promised the Americans to prohibit opium cultivation if the RPP came to power.
1308 Keesing's.... vol.18, pp.24637-24639.
1309 V. Coufoudakis, "Turkey and the United States: the Problems and Prospects
of a Post-War Alliance", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol.9,
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Turkish public opinion was convinced of the existence of U.S. pressure. Members of
the then Turkish government admitted that they were subjected to strong pressures
by the United States on the opium issue.'31°
It seems that the U.S. administration did not openly and officially use threats
against Turkey but advocated indirect pressures through prudent diplomacy. U.S.
public officials, including BNDD members, called on the White House to use its
leverage of military and economic aid on Turkey. They reasoned that the United
States was subsidising its allies at the expense of the moral and physical health of
American citizens.' 311 The Nixon administration, the Departments of State and
Defence were opposed to such pressure diplomacy, claiming that it would harm
the vital U.S.-Turkish alliance, and subsequently U.S. and NATO interests. They
suggested that the United States should be helping the Turkish government rather
than threatening it.' 312 However, in Turner's words,
American diplomats did not block the transmission of threatening messages to the
Turks. Publicly, the administration objected to the holding of congressional hearings
on some sixty bills calling for an end to military and economic aid to Turkey. Yet these
same bills and the remarks of American legislators were indirectly utilised to emphasise
the seriousness of tile situation to the Turks. The Turks knew that the Americans
would take some type of action if the opium crop were not brought under control... The
Turks were aware that general reductions in American aid and personnel could have
direct implications for them at a time of much needed improvement in their military
llardware.'313
The reasons for the U.S. administration's pressure on Turkey might be ex-
plained with the publicity which the opium issue gained in domestic politics. The
American government could not be indifferent to a matter which concerned almost
the whole of American society and which was closely followed by the Congress,
the media and other public opinion groups. Since Turkey was believed to be the
source of the U.S. heroin and since she was a weaker ally of the United States, it
was natural and easy for U.S. rulers to direct their efforts against Turkey.
No.2, Fall 1981, p.187, R. Morris, Uncertain Greatness, London: Quartet Books, 1977, p.272.
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U.S. Congressmen took the lead in calling for measures to force Turkey to aban-
don its opium cultivation. They argued: The United States had given considerable
military and economic aid to Turkey since the Second World War. Turks surely
owed the Americans a favour, therefore, they should be willing to give up the 5
million dollars a year they earned from legal opium production, which constituted
less than one third of one percent of Turkey's total foreign trade.1314 In 1970 and
1971 congressmen continuously threatened to terminate all aid to Turkey if she
did not stop opium production. They argued that this threat would force Turkey
to cooperate with the United States on the matter.' 315 Section 506 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971, passed by Congress, read as follows: "The use of funds
herein appropriated to assist any country shall be suspended by the President in
whole or in part when the President determines that the government of such coun-
try has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs..." 316 It should
be noted that congressmen were mainly trying to placate their home constituencies
by indicating they were indeed doing something about the situation.'317
U.S. newspapers and magazines, too, contributed to the publicity of the opium
issue by giving wide place to the matter in their columns. They featured articles
on the theme, "Let's Halt Heroin at the Source", calling the administration to
shut off the flow of Turkish opium. 1318
 American public; parents, social workers,
doctors, and police, put great pressure on the U.S. administration to deal firmly
with Turkey's opium production. American people had been convinced that the
real cause of the drug abuse problem was Turkish opium and that Turkey was not
doing enough to prevent its opium from poisoning American youth.'31°
Under the constant pressure from all sides President Nixon felt that he had
to do something about the drug problem. At least he had to appear to be doing
1314 Harris, 1972. op.cit., p.196, Spain, op.cit., p.303, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.145, Zentner, op.cit., p.43,
Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations, Hearing Before tile Committee on Foreign Affairs, House
of Representatives, 93rd Coaigress, 2nd Session, July 16, 1974, Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1974, pp.3, 32, 33, 50, 59.
1315 International Aspects..., op.cit., pp.13, 42.
1316 Turner, op.cit., p.130.
1317 Ibid., pp.277-278.
1318 Arcayflrek, op.cit., pp.149-iSO, Acar, op.cit., 19 July 1970.
1319 In Ragip liner's opinion, American public came to this conclusion because of the intensive and
effective propaganda of the Greek and Armenian Americans. R. liner, "Afyon Sorunu",
Cumhurz yet, 18 March 1971.
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something. He was the candidate for the 1972 presidential elections and the most
important and prominent matter for the American people at that time was the
drug problem. If Nixon succeeded in forcing Turkey to stop its opium production,
this would be a great victory for him and would increase his chance of winning the
election.'32°
The Americans were justified in asking the Turks to do more in controlling
their opium production. However, they probably made a mistake by directing all
their efforts to achieving the prohibition of Turkish opium cultivation and seeing
the issue as a means to further their political gains at home. U.S. rulers should
have known that only halting the flow of Turkish opium would not end the drug
addiction problem and that the elected Turkish governments could not ban a tra-
ditional means of earning a living under public pressure of the USA.
8.3 The Opium Issue From Turkey's Point of View
8.3.1 Turkish Actions to Control Opium Production
Turkey's Justice Party government committed itself to reducing poppy acreage
and the number of provinces where poppy cultivation was legal. While the number
of opium-growing provinces was 42 in 1960, this number was reduced in the 1961-62
harvest year to 30, in 1963-64 to 25, in 1966-67 to 21, in 1967-68 to 18, in 1968-69
to 11 and in 1969-70 to 9. The government decree on 30 June 1970 permitted
the cultivation of opium crop in 7 provinces for the 1970-71 year and announced
a further reduction to 4 for 197172.1321 On 20 and 24 July 1970 Turkish Agri-
culture Minister Illiami Ertem told the Turkish Parliament that the government's
aim in reducing the number of poppy-growing provinces was to eliminate opium
cultivation in the exterior, frontier provinces where control was difficult and diver-
sion was easy and to concentrate production in a diminishing number of interior
provinces for more effective supervision. He explained that this did not mean re-
ducing opium production and that the government would continue to permit legal
1320 Cein, op.cit., p.293, Birand et al., op.cit., p.l69, the author's interview with former Turkish foreign
minister Osman Olcay.
1321 Acar, op.cit., 6 July 1970, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.148, Facts on Turkish Poppy, Directorate
General of Press and Information (of Turkey), p.6, cumhurz yet, 1 July 1970, p .1, Welhuan,
op.cit., p.145, Zentuer, op.cit., p.39.
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production under certain conditions which would prevent illegal production and
trafficking.1322
Turkish foreign minister calayangi1 later stated that their ultimate aim was
to permit Opium cultivation only in the province of Afyon which took its name
from opium. 1323
 There was one report in 1967 that Turkish P.M. Demirel had
agreed to end all poppy cultivation by 1971.1324 According to another report, on 1
August 1970 Demirel stated that "Turkey cannot ignore [the fact] that humanity...
is being destroyed by drugs" and that since it was unable to stop the smugglers
it had no option other than replacing the opium poppy with substitute crops in
the long run.' 325 U.S. official Weilman said in his speech to the American Turkish
Society on 14 December 1970 that in Turkey "crop substitution, the development
of alternative and more beneficial uses of land, labor, and capital, is stifi considered
the fundamental solution to the problem of illicit opium production."326
As the number of provinces with legal cultivation was reduced, it was an-
ticipated that the Turkish government would also reduce the total area under
production.' 327
 However, it was claimed that Turkey's opium production was not
being curtailed proportionately because the four grower provinces, Afyon, Burdur,
Isparta and Kütahya, were the most productive provinces where more intensive
cultivation and illegal planting were made.' 328
 According to Newsday reporters,
Turkey produced 60 metric tons of opium crop in the 1969-70 harvest year, 149
metric tons in 1970-71 and 75 tons in 197172.1329 Reportedly even the total area
under production was not reduced considerably. According to the figures given by
Wellman, hectareage of the production area was reduced from 24,000 hectares in
1966 to 20,000 hectares in 1967, and to 13,000 liectares in 1968. The estimated
1322 ft1171/ITD, term 3, sess.1, vol.8, pp.566, 630-632.
1323 Cen, op.cit., p.312.
1324 Harris, "Turkey and the United States" in K.H. Karpat (ed.), Turkey's Foreign
Policy in Transition, Leiden: E.J. Bril, 1975, p.68, Turner, op.cit., p.124.
1325 s. Bölükba.i, Super Powers and the Third World, New York: University Press of America,
1988, p.173.
1326 Wellivau, op.cit., p.144.
1327 Ibid., p.145.
1328 Ray, op.cit., p.193.
1320 The Heroin Trail, op.cit., p.l5.
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land area was 13,000 hectares in 1969 and 15,300 hectares in 1971. The explana-
tion for this apparent increase in land use for the opium poppy was that in the
absence of a licensing and control law, existing controls did not limit land use for
poppy cultivation in the provinces where opium production was legal.'33°
In fact the Turkish government had long been criticised because of its failure
to enact a licensing and control law on the opium production. In a meeting of the
U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs Turkey gave a pledge that it would enact a
strict licensing and control law in accordance with the Single Convention. When
the Demirel government was forced out of office by the Turkish military on 21
March 1971, such a law had been prepared and was before the Grand National
Assembly for approval.133'
Among other measures taken to deal with illegal opium production and traf-
ficking, the Turkish administration increased the government price for legal opium
and expanded the official collection organisation in order to improve control.' 332 It
established heavy punishments for use and smuggling of heroin, reportedly heavier
than U.S. and European punishments for the same crimes. In spite of its limited
equipment and resources the Turkish police showed considerable success in cap-
turing heroin smugglers.' 333 To fight against illicit opium production the Turkish
government stationed over 1,000 Turkish national police and gendarmes in the
opium growing areas from 1967. In 1969 narcotics police sections and bureaus
were organised, trained and equipped.'334
In Spain's words, "the [Turkish] government [also] had from the beginning co-
operated with American narcotics agencies, even subordinating national pride and
permitting the stationing in Turkey of more American Drug Enforcement Agency
personnel than in any other countries except Mexico and Thailand." 335 American
narcotics agents worked closely with the Turkish control authorities to facilitate
1330 Weilman, op.cit., p.145, International Aspects..., op.cit., p.119.
1331 Welhnau, op.cit., p.144, Spain, op.cit., pp.298, 305.
1332 Spain. op.cit., p.305.
1333 Acar, op.cit., 16 July 1970.
1334 Welirnan, op.cit., p.145, R.F. Nyrop (ed.), Turkey; A Country Study, Third Edition, Wash-
jiigton D.C.: American University, 1980, p.285, Zentner, op.cit., p.43, Acar, op.cit., 16 July 1970.
1335 paifl, op.cit., p.305.
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the exchange of information, experience and techniques, and organisational exper-
tise. 1336
 They had joined Turkish police in tracking down opium diverted into illicit
channels as early as the autumn of 1966.1337 In 1968 the United States gave "a 3
million dollar loan to the Turkish government to defray the foreign exchange costs
for research into substitute crops and for vehicles and other equipment needed to
implement the restrictions on the opium trade." 336 In çalayangil's account, the
interior minister was anxious to accept the offer because he saw it as an important
opportunity to make good shortages of Turkish police.'339
In the international arena Turkey signed all the treaties on opium and other
dangerous drugs and joined all organisations established to deal with narcotic
drugs.' 34° She gave support to any proposals by the United States, which would
strengthen the Single Convention and cooperated with her in the U.N. Commission
on Narcotic Drugs 1341
In spite of its willingness to cooperate with the United States on the opium
issue, the Demirel government did not comply with the American demand to ban
poppy cultivation completely for the following reasons: Drug addiction was not a
problem for the Turkish nation. Therefore, there was no domestic pressure at all
on the Turkish government to end poppy production.' 342 Indeed, the situation in
Turkey was quite the reverse: the poppy crop was the primary source of living for
a section of Turkish population. If the Dernirel government had banned opium cul-
tivation, it would have brought adverse social and economic results for traditional
producers.' 343
 At that time the Demirel government had a very thin margin of
support in Parliament because the conservative wing had left the Justice Party'344
and formed the Democratic Party in early 1970. Demirel was understandably re-
luctant to initiate measures totally eliminating opium cultivation, especially as the
1336 Weliman, op.cit., p.145.
1337 Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.193, Turner, op.cit., p.124.
1338 Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.193, Acar, op.cit., 16 July 1970, ABD Dzileri Bakanz..., op.cit., p.4,
International Aspects..., op.cit., p.119.
1339 Ce'ii, op.cit., p.312.
1340 Ozcan Köknel, "Haha Ekimi ye ABD", Milliyet, 4 November 1975.
1341 Weilman, op.cit., pp.145-146.
1342 Øarris, 1972, op.cit., p.192.
1343 Jbid., p.192 . Spain, op.cit., p.298.
1344 Keesing's..., 1969-1970, vol.17, p.23956, ibid., vol.18, p.24640.
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votes of the opium-producing provinces were essential to the survival of his party's
parliamentary majority. 1345 Furthermore, "constant U.S. pressure... made the is-
sue public and therefore increased Demirel's difficulties in handling the question of
concessions." 346 If Demirel had banned opium cultivation he would have seemed
to be yielding to U.S. pressures.
The unwillingness of Turkish rulers to prohibit opium production can be un-
derstood. But it was a fact that their measures were not effective to prevent the
diversion of opium into illicit channels and therefore Turkey's reputation in the
international arena was damaged. They did not appreciate the fact that the con-
tinuity of illicit opium production and trafficking gave the Americans opportunity
to pressurise Turkey.
8.3.2 Turkey's Arguments on the Opium Issue
Turkish officials believed that Turkish opium was not the only or even the
primary cause of the U.S. drug addiction problem. They thought that if the
supply of heroin was the real cause of drug addiction it would be Turkey which
suffered most from this problem. If Turkey banned opium cultivation the drug
abuse problem of the United States would not come to an end. As long as there was
a strong demand for narcotic drugs, they would be supplied somehow.' 347 There
were already other opium producer countries whose opium had reached the United
States: India, Pakistan, China, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Thailand, Laos, etc.
Marseilles was the centre point of the heroin traffic, but the United States did not
press France as much as she did Turkey.' 348 Figures showed that even if all opium
produced in Turkey in a year found its way to the United States it would meet
the needs of American addicts only for a few weeks. 1349 In spite of all these facts,
Turkey would do its best and cooperate with any country in this matter out of its
humanitarian concerns.' 350 However, the United States should stop its pressure
Harris, 1972, op.cit., pp.195-196, Turner, op.cit., pp.143, 204-205, F. Ahmad, the Turkish Ex-
periment in Democracy, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977, p.418.
1346 Ahrnad, op.cit., p.418.
1347 Cern, op.cit., pp.292-293.
1348 ça1ayangils interview with Cern in Cern, op.cit., p.312, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.147, Köknel, op.cit..
1349 Köknel, op.cit., çalayangil's interview in Cern op.cit., p.311.
1350 J. Ertein, MMTD, 20 and 24 July 1970, op.cit., pp.566, 630-632.
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tactics against Turkey, which constituted interference in her internal affairs,'35'
while she herself failed to stop heroin smuggling at home. 1352
 Turkey could hardly
be blamed for drug addiction of U.S. citizens while the same U.S. addicts even
brought their disease to Turkey. In the 1960s and the 1970s a little restaurant near
the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, the Pudding Shop, had become a major stop for U.S.
hippies who consumed cheap opium from the underground world. "U.S. citizens
were on the one hand threatening to cut off the livelihood of Turkish peasants and
on the other pouring into Istanbul to disrupt and corrupt local society."353
One of Turkish officials' arguments for not banning opium cultivation com-
pletely was the importance of opium for Turkey. In 1971 some 100,000 Turkish
farmers in Afyon and the surrounding provinces relied on the poppy crop for their
survival. The poppy was an integral part of the way of life in the area.' 354
 In
Spain's words,
it provided the main cash crop. Opium gum, which lasts almost indefinitely, was
stored from year to year toward a daughter's dowry or other anticipated essential ex-
penditure. Apart from the profits to be had from the narcotic gum, the young leaves
were a favorite salad ingredient. The seeds flavored the local bread. When pressed they
made the oil in which food was cooked. The stalks of the plant provided cattle fodder
and fuel for the household [and the roofing material]. During the brief harvest period
for the gum, otherwise excess skilled labor, much of it female, was utilised profitably
in incising and scrapping the poppy pods. In some remote and impoverished mountain
villages, the poppy was the only crop that made a subsistence existence possible. To
Afyon (the very name meaiis opium in Turkish) and the other hardcore provinces, the
poppy meant at least as much as tobacco to Kentucky.1355
8.3.3 Turkish Public's Reaction to U.S. Pressures on Opium
The United States was subjected to heavy criticism by Turkish public opinion
for pressing Turkey to abandon poppy cultivation. In parliament deputies such as
Süleyman Mutlu and Celal Kargili and senator and former prime minister Suat
Hayri Urgiiplü criticised the United States for its unfair pressure tactics and ac-
cused the Turkish government of yielding to U.S. pressures. Pressure groups such
1351 Turner, op.cit., pp.122, 139.
1352 T. Bilgin, "12 Mart", Milliyet, 24.3.1976, quoted by Cern, op.cit., p.294.
1353 J.W. Spain, American Diplomacy in Turkey, New York: Praeger, 1984, p.136.
1354 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.305, Turner, op.cit., p.32.
1355 pBifl, 1975, op.cit., p.30s, see also Facts on Turkish Poppj, op.cit., p.7.
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as university students,' 5° the leftist Dev-Genc organisation,' 357 the union of agri-
culture engineers,' 358 and the union of agriculture chambers1359 issued statements
condemning the Turkish government's actions to restrict opium production un-
der U.S. influence. Leftist groups and peasants arranged demonstrations' 36° and
newspaper columnists continuously wrote articles for the same purpose.
Some points voiced by Turkish critics were as follows:' 36 ' The United States
was right in wishing to find a solution to the serious drug addiction problem among
its citizens. However, the U.S. pressure tactics aimed at forcing Turkey to ban its
opium cultivation were not the right way to deal with the problem. U.S.-Turkish
cooperation on the opium issue was reminiscent of the organisation of Duyunu
Umumiyye during the Ottoman Empire period, which made Turkish gendarmes
shoot their own people who produced and used tobacco outside the permission of
this organisation. The drug addiction was a disease of the American society which
was caused by sociological and psychological problems of the American people.
It was unfair to impose the price of the American people's disease on Turkish
farmers who had nothing to do with it. The United States herself was subsidising,
advertising and selling harmful goods such as tobacco and destructive war weapons.
Illegal American goods were sold in Turkish markets but nobody was complaining
about it. Automobile accidents were the leading cause of deaths in Turkey and
most automobiles in Turkey were American-made but no Turks were demanding
that the United States shut down its automobile factories. 1362 It was strange that
while demanding an end to opium cultivation in Turkey, American officials and
journalists were constantly pressing for a reduction in the stiff sentences which
were applied to American narcotics offenders convicted in Turkey.
1356 Cumhuriyet, 4 July 1970, p.1.
1357 Ibid., 25 July 1970, p.7.
1358 Ibid., 31 July 1970, p.1.
1359 Acar, op.cit., 20 July 1970.
1360 Cumhuriyet, 11 August 1970, p.7, Turner, op.cit., p.142.
1361 Siileyrnan Mutlu (20.7.1970) and Celal Kargih (24.7.1970), Il'IMTD, term 3, sess.1, vol.8, PP564
565, 626-629; in Cumhurz yet: S.H. Urgüplii's speeches, 3 and 10 July 1970, p.1, 0. Acar,
"Afyon Raporu", 5-20 July 1970, 0. Akbal, "Amerikasiz da Yaanir", 24 July
1970, C. Baban, "Demirel Hakh", 28 July 1970, R. Uner, "Afyon Sorunu ye
Amerika", 18 March 1971; in Milliyet: A. Ipekçi, "Tiirkiye CezaIandiri1acakmi",
22 July 1970,!. Cern "Afyon mu Silah mi?", 23 and 24 July 1970; Spain, op.cit., pp.305-
306.
1362 International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem, op.cit., p.22.
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8.4 The Opium Issue in the 1971-1974 Period
8.4.1 Erim Government Decision to Ban Opium Cultivation
After the Demirel government was forced out of office by the Turkish military
on 12 March 1971, a non-party government under Nihat Erim's premiership came
to power. The new government made the opium issue one of its first priorities.'363
A licensing decree which was prepared by the Demirel government on the basis of
existing legislation was issued on 19 March 1971.1364 However, the long-awaited bill
providing strict licensing procedures with severe penalties for those who violated
the terms of act was passed by Turkish parliament as late as 18 August 1971.1365
In his statement on the government's program before Turkish Parliament, Nihat
Erim declared: "Believing that contraband trade in opium - which has assumed the
aspect of an overwhelming blight for the youth of the whole world - is offensive on
humanitarian grounds in the first place, the government will pay serious attention
to this problem. Turkish opium growers will be shown a way to earn a better-
living." 1366
Immediately after the Erim government won the vote of confidence in Par-
liament, U.S. officials started an intensive campaign to achieve the prohibition of
Turkish opium cultivation. In Spain's words, "every American official in Turkey
became a walking encyclopaedia on the subject and both socially and profession-
ally their Turkish contacts heard about little else." 1367 After U.S. Secretary of State
William P. Rogers visited Ankara in April 1971 to discuss the opium question, U.S.
and Turkish officials began discussions on the technical aspects of the problem.1368
In May 1971 the Erim government announced that it was going to move against
the illicit opium production by purchasing the entire 1971 crop, licensing poppy
growers, and encouraging the cultivatioii of other crops by poppy farmers. 1369 On
1363 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.298.
1364 Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.196.
1365 Ibid., p.197, for detailed iiiforniation see Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., pp.13-14.
1366 Ahinad, op.cit., p.4l7.
1367 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299.
1368 Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.196, Turner, op.cit., p.135, Arcayiirek, op.cit., pp.153154
1369 ftay, op.cit., p. 193.
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16 May the government's purchasing price of opium was raised by two-thirds in
order to increase sales to the authorities.'370
In their meeting on 17 May U.S. Ambassador Handley presented to Erim a
document stating the U.S. aid to the Turkish government and poppy farmers in
the case of the prohibition of opium cultivation.' 37 ' On 11 June Handley informed
Erim that President Nixon was waiting for the Turkish government's reply to the
American proposals. Erim said to Handley that his government could ban opium
cultivation in the three provinces immediately instead of the next year.'372
On 14 June 1971 President Nixon summoned the American ambassadors in
France, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam and the United Nations to a White
House conference. Reportedly Nixon told the ambassadors that "the interdiction of
narcotics was to be a first order priority of U.S. foreign policy" and he instructed
them "to make clear to their host governments that their actions to suppress
narcotics trafficking would have a definite bearing on U.S. economic and military
support."373 In the meeting, William Handley explained the peculiar nature of
the Turkish opium problem and came away with a Presidential commitment to
provide assistance in establishing alternative sources of income if the Turks would
stop opium cultivation immediately. He was given a maximum of 35 million dollars
to offer the Turks for their cooperation.'374
Eventually, the Turkish government's opium decree on 30 June 1971 announced
that the planting and production of poppies within the borders of Turkey was
forbidden beginning from the autumn of 1972.' On the same day Erim and U.S.
President Nixon explained the Turkish government's decision to their people.'376
Some points mentioned by Erim in his speech are as follows:
1370 Cumhuriyet, 17 May 1971, p.1.
1371 Arcayürek, op.cit., p.154.
1372 Ibid., p.154.
1373 Turner, op.cit., p.131.
1374 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299.
1375 Cumhuriyet, 30 June 1971, p.1, Zentner, op.cit., p.39, Keesing's..., vol.18, p.24717.
1370 For the statements of the two premiers in Turkish see Dzileri Bakanlzz Belle teni, June
1971, pp.137-142.
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Smuggling from our country in recent years has become very distressing for us...
Now planting has been decreased to four provinces. In this way it was hoped to prevent
smuggling. However, unfortunately, this system did not give results... It is certain
that a smugglers' gang organised on an international scale, constitutes an economic and
political problem for Turkey... In countries where health is endangered through this
opium, because smuggling cannot be prevented in Turkey, anti-Turkish opinions are
created. The measures to be applied to control smuggling are extremely expensive...
Our nation, which is known for its honesty and integrity, is now under grave accusation.
The time when we must end the placing of blame for deaths in other countries on
Turkey is so long overdue. We cannot allow Turkey's supreme interests and the prestige
of our nation to he further shaken... Our government forbids completely the planting
of poppies... The agreement ratified in 1966 [the Single Convention] also stipulates this
arrangement.. In order to make up for the income farmers who are planting in seven
provinces at present will lose, they will be given compensation beginning from the
coming year... In the long term investments will be made in the region to compensate
the lost income of farmers through other ways and to provide new income sources for
them..
President Nixon's speech contained the following points:
Today, Erim declared that the Republic of Turkey, our friend and staunch
ally within NATO, would abandon a traditional agricultural practice in order to make a
significant contribution to the well-being of the world... This farsighted step will provide
an example which we trust will soon be followed by other nations... We know well the
importance of the agricultural sector of Turkey's economy and we are prepared to put
at the disposal of the Turkish government our best technical brains to assist Turkey's
program to bring about a better life for the Turkish farmer. We are proud to assist in
a program from which we will all benefit... We in the United States are obligated to a
friend and ally whose firm military and political commitment to the welfare and defense
of the Atlantic Community is well known... I pledge continued cooperation with Turkey
in its efforts to increase the well-being of its people and to maintain its independence
and security.'378
On the same day President Nixon also joined a press conference together with
the U.S. Secretary of State and the Turkish Ambassador to Washington. He told
journalists that the Turkish government's decision was the most important initia-
tive in the struggle to eradicate the source of heroin. Nixon explained that the
Turkish decision was a result of negotiations between U.S. and Turkish officials.'379
1377 Turner, op.cit:, p.3ii-3i5. For Erim's ideas on the opium ban see also Resrni Ternaslar, Sayzn Babakari
ye Bn. Erzm. zn Bzrletk Amerzka 'yz Zzyaretz, 18-23 March 1972, no date, publisher and place, pp.37,
50-51, 63. Erim stated that he was happy for doing something for the USA in return for U.S. economic and military
aid to Turkey.
''	 Turner, op.cit., pp.316-317.
1379 Dzileri Bakan1gz Belleteni, June 1971, pp.141-142.
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8.4.2 Motivations of the Turkish Government in Banning Opium
Turkish officials always claimed that they decided to stop poppy cultivation
for two reasons: (a) to serve humanity and (b) to save the prestige of Turkey in
the eyes of international community.' 38° In their opinion, Turkey, as a country
which wanted to be a part of the Western civilisation, could not be indifferent
to a matter threatening the Western societies and other nations. Turkey also
could not afford being seen as a country which poisoned other nations with its
opium. According to Haluk Bayülken, who served as foreign minister for some
time during the military-supported governments, the elected governments before
12 March 1971 were responsible for Turkey's bad reputation on the opium issue
because they ignored the criticism by other countries and did not take effective
measures because of electoral concerns.'38'
It seems that the most important reason which pushed the Erim government to
ban poppy cultivation was the desire of Turkish rulers to strengthen relations with
the United States.' 382 The U.S. was really taking the opium issue very seriously.
The Erim regime, which did not enjoy parliamentary and popular support at home,
did not want to lose the American support as well. Turkish authorities and "their
bosses", Turkish generals, were determined to prevent deterioration of U.S.-Turkish
relations because they needed U.S. economic and military aid and political support.
In Mango's opinion the total ban on opium cultivation "symbolised the desire of
Turkish generals and their proteges to do business with the United States."1383
Mango also claims: "With a Marxist insurgency on their hands, the authorities
took care not to antagonise the United States. The cultivation of opium was thus
banned; and in economic policy, military-backed governments became noticeably
more accommodating after the resignation of eleven radical ministers."1384
It is clear that constant U.S. pressures played a role in the Turkish decision.
1380 See Nihat Erim's speech, Turner, op.cit., p.311-315.
1381 Bayülken told the author that these governments either should have proved that Turkey was not
the source of the world's narcotic problem or should have taken really effective n,easures.
1382 Osinan Olcay, who served as foreign minister for some time during the Eriin government, told
the author that Turkish authorities had to consider the fact that the United States was the main
military and economic aid supplier of Turkey.
1383 A. Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976, p.37.
1384 Ibid., p.42.
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The presentation of the decision to American public by U.S. rulers as their suc-
cess strengthens this point. However, U.S. officials publicly claimed that it was
persuasion and not coercion which brought about the Turkish opium ban and
that if they had threatened to cut off aid Turkey would not have complied with
their demand.' 385 On the other hand, many congressmen were of the opinion that
Congress's threats to cut off aid played a role in the Turkish decision and that if
the United Stated had pressurised Turkey previously, the opium ban would have
been achieved much earlier.'386
Another reason for Turkish poppy prohibition was to prevent leftist radicals
from getting weapons from abroad.' 387 Turkish political and military authorities
believed that leftist terrorists were obtaining large amounts of weapons illegally
from opium smugglers. When opium production was halted, drug traffickers would
not be able to smuggle weapons into the country.
8.4.3 The Implementation of the Opium Prohibition
In return for the prohibition of opium cultivation the United States undertook
to provide Turkey with 35 million dollars in loans over a three-year period. Of this
amount, 20 million dollars would be devoted to development programs and projects
which could provide alternative sources of income and employment opportunities
for poppy farmers. 15 million dollars would be for compensation to the Turkish
governn1ent for its loss of foreign exchange earnings from legal export of opium and
would be used to compensate the losses of opium growers.' 388 The United States
also promised to provide 300,000 dollars for controlling the 1972 crop and 400,000
dollars for covering miscellaneous expenses.'389
Arrangements to determine a U.S. loan to Turkey on the opium issue were
made secretly between Turkish and U.S. officials. As Spain stated, "due to Turk-
ish political sensitivities, these arrangements were never welded into a single formal
1385 International Aspects..., op.cit., pp.17, 22, 28, 75, 76, 163, 164.
1386 Ibid., pp.21, 48.
1387 Turner. op.cit., pp.152, 156, 159-160, 278.
1388 Zentner, op.cit., :40' Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299, Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.l97, Nihat Erim's state-
ments, C'urnhurzyet, 25 February 1972, 23 Marcl, 1972.
1389 Turner, op.cit., pp.149-150.
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document but were incorporated into various exchanges of 1390 Later Prime
Minister Erim and other Turkish officials claimed that they banned opium culti-
vation unilaterally for humanitarian concerns without an agreement between the
United States and Turkey on the matter. If the Turkish government felt that the
ban was harming interests of poppy farmers, then it could resume poppy produc-
tion. In their opinion, after Turkey took the decision, the United States offered aid
to help them. 1391 However, American officials expressed the view that the Turk-
ish action was primarily the result of an agreement between the two countries.
They pointed out that the 35 million-dollar U.S. loan was an integral part of the
negotiations and the agreement between U.S. and Turkish officials.'392
The United States transferred 20 million dollars of 35 millions by July 1974.'
In mid-1972 the United States gave 300,000 dollars to the Turkish Soil Products
Office to assist its campaign to control and collect the opium harvest during the
final growing season.'3"
Turkish officials and public opinion argued that the U.S. aid was not enough to
compensate losses of Turkish farmers and Turkey generally.' 395 They maintained
that the amount envisaged would cover only one-twelfth of the total loss which was
estimated as more than 6 billion Turkish liras or 400 million U.S. dollars.' 396 The
Turkish government had declared that it would pay compensation to farmers who
chose not to grow the poppy in 1971-1972 and to all who had formerly grown it
in the four provinces but were forbidden to do so in 1972-1973 and the succeeding
years. The basis for payment under the government's formula would be the value
on the international market of the whole produce, such as opium, seeds and stems
'°Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299.
1391 Erinfs statements, Cumhuriyet, 25 February 1972, 21 March 1972, Resmi Ternaslar, op.cit.,
p.5O.
1392 Turner, op.cit., pp.146-147, 148, 150, 217. Kaniran Juan told the author that opium cultivation
was banned as a result of U.S. request and compensation. U.S. Congressman Lester L. Wolff told a
House committee that he had "a statement from the U.S. State Department, which puts on paper
the exact agreement that was made with" Turkey. Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations,
op.cit., p.2.
1393 Turner, op.cit., pp.215-216, 241.
1394 Zentner, op.cit., p.41.
1395 Aytunc Altindal, "Haha Politikasi", Curnhuriyet, 11 September 1973, K. Cemal
Giiven, "Haha Sorunu", Cumhuriyet, 23 March 1974.
1396 G. Lewis, Modern Turkey, New York: Praeger, 1974, p.218, Zentner, op.cit., p.47n, the
Heroin Trail, op.cit., p.3.
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that the growers would sell to the Soil Products Office in 1972."° But the com-
pensation envisaged did not include all losses of growers.' 398 For example, for the
relatively high illegal revenue the farmers were earning before there would be no
compensation. 1399 The individual farmer also had other indirect benefits that were
harder to compensate.' 40° Moreover, former poppy farmers and small businessmen
involved indirectly with opium production were kept outside the compensation.'401
Allegedly, the Turkish government transferred only 2 million dollars of the 10 mil-
lion dollars which it received from the U.S. to Turkish farmers. The rest of it went
either into planning at the top levels of the government or was reserved for other
purposes.'402
When Turkey announced the prohibition of poppy cultivation, U.S. President
Nixon had promised to send American technical experts to Turkey to assist the
Turkish government's projects of helping poppy farmers to survive in the face of
economic hardship.' 403 As a part of this promise, the U.S. Secretary of Agricul-
ture, Clifford Hardin, and a team of American agricultural experts visited Turkey
in November 19u1.'° The Turks generally thought that Hardin had brought offers
of substantial aid. During his visit, the Turkish press carried estimates evaluating
Turkey's real losses caused by the poppy prohibition. At one point Turkish Agricul-
ture Minister Orhan Dikmen found it necessary to issue a formal statement denying
a widely circulated report that the Turkish government would resume opium pro-
duction if the United States failed to provide sufficient compensation.' 405 In fact,
Hardin had come to Turkey to explore with Turkish experts agricultural plans
for substitute crops and sources of income and to provide technical advice on the
1307 Agriculture Minister Orhan Dikmen, JvIMTD, 24 February 1972, term 3, sess.3, vol.22, p.137.
1398 See the report of some U.S. congressmen, expressing doubts about the compensation formula, in
Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations, op.cit., p.67.
1399 the Heroin Trail, op.cit., p.4.
1400 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.305, Zentner, op.cit., p.41.
140k Turner, op.cit., p.217.
1402 Ibid., pp.217, 220. See also statements of U.S. congressmen in Turkish Opium Ban..., op.cit.,
pp2- 3 , 18, 55, 61, 62.
1403 See also U.S.-Turkish joint statement at the end of Erim's visit to the USA, Resmi Temaslar,
op.cit., p.63.
1404 Cumhuriyet, 3,7 November 1971, pp. 1 and 7.
1405 flarris, 1972, op.cit., p.198.
297
transition from poppy cultivation.'40°
As a result of the Hardin mission, a task force was established "to study the
agricultural situation in the seven-province region, to assess the potential for im-
proved agricultural output and associated agri-industries and to provide specific
programs and policy recommendations for consideration by the Turkish govern-
ment." In February 1972, the task force issued a report which was called "Improv-
ing Farm Income in the Poppy Region -A Program for Action, Recommendations of
tl1e Joint Turkish-American Agricultural Team." 407 The U.S.-Turkish joint decla-
ration on 15 February 1972 stated that research and experiments would be started
to find substitute crops for opium and specified the actions which would be imple-
mented immediately: irrigation; animal feeding; cultivation of sunflower, various
fruits, and wheat; marketing; and the establishment of a sugar factory.'408
Turkish officials continuously reiterated their commitment to developing the
poppy region and explained that they took necessary measures, and prepared plans
and projects for this purpose.'409
 On 29 February 1972 the Turkish government
issued a decree stating long-term projects for the economic and social development
of the poppy region.' 41° In March the Poppy Region Development Organisation
was established.'41'
In spite of all these initiatives, the program of crop substitution never brought
any positive results. It was realised that there was simply no single substitute
crop which could replace poppy and yield as high a return per unit of land as
does opium. 1412 The poppy was the only autumn-sown crop. It was not easily
replaceable by spring crops such as cotton, maize, sugar beets or tobacco. It
was harvested before the grain and thereby provided expense money for the main
1400 Ibid., p.198 , Spain, 1975, op.cit., pp.299-300.
1407 Zentner, op.cit., pp.40, 47n.
1408 Cumhuriyet, 16 February 1972.
14O Agriculture Minister Orhan Dikmen, IvIMTD, 24 February 1972, term 3 sess.3, vol.22, p.137,
P.M. Nihat Erim's statements, Cumhuriyet, 25 February and 23 March 1972, P.M. Ferit Melen's
statement, Cumhurz yet, 18 September 1972.
1410 Melen's statement, op.cit.
1411 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.300.
1412 Turner, op.cit., p.237, Ahmet Kerse, "Afyon Savai", Curnhuriyet, 5 January 1972, Spain,
1975, op.cit., p.300. See also the report of U.S. congressmen in Turkish Opitim Ban..., op.cit.,
pp.62, 67.
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harvest. Some of the areas where opium had been grown had extremely limited
soil and water resources, and therefore were not suitable for a viable alternative
agriculture.''
Meanwhile, the United States decided that it did not want to get deeply and
directly involved in the development program for the poppy region.' 414
 It "made
it clear to Turkey that it expected the Turks themselves to devise and implement
it with only limited numbers of U.S. Department of Agriculture personnel being
available under contract to advise." 415 Both the Turkish and the American sides
grew pessimistic. The Turkish press was criticising the opium ban and interviewing
discontented farmers and pointing to mistakes. Villagers did not see substantial
progress in their situation and were becoming impatient to resume poppy grow-
ing.' 416 Seeing development projects as unbearable burdens Turkish officials were
thinking that U.S. funds would not be sufficient to carry them out.' 417 American
journalists who visited Turkey were emphasising the tremendous financial losses to
those in the illegal trade and warning that total suppression would not work un-
der any circumstances. U.S. diplomats and officials who played a part in bringing
about the ban had the feeling that the 1971 arrangement could not last forever.'418
During the poppy prohibition period Turkish narcotics officers were trained and
helped by U.S. narcotic agents in capturing illegal opium and smugglers.' 419 Turk-
ish authorities established a Central Police Drugs Bureau to direct and coordinate
the activities of thirty-three provincial narcotics offices. The Turks also arranged
commissions to conduct regular inspection missions in the provinces where poppy
cultivation was forbidden.'42°
'' Zentner, op.cit., p.41, The Heroin Trail, op.cit., pp.16-17.
1414 During a committee discussion, some U.S. congressmen admitted that the USA did not do enough
to help the Turks in the development program. Turkish Opium Ban..., op.cit., pp.33, 39, 40.
1415 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.301.
1416 the Heroin Trail, op.cit., pp.7, 17.
1417 Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., p.7.
1418 Spain, 1975, op.cit., pp.30l, 303.
1419 Ibid., p.300.
1420 Zeutner, op.cit., p.42.
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8.4.4 Turkish Public's Reaction to the Opium Ban
The opium prohibition really hurt the pride and honour of the Turkish na-
tion. In their eyes, the interests of Turkish people had been bargained with a
foreign country. The government had accepted that Turkish farmers had been poi-
soning the American people.' 42 ' The opium prohibition also symbolised Turkish
subservience to U.S. interests and showed the humiliating dependence of Turkey
on the United States.
However, the opium prohibition did not attract public criticism at that time be-
cause the military-backed regime did not allow free expression of ideas. Only some
MPs dared to express opposition to the ban' 422
 and in December 1971 21 deputies
and in September 1972 111 deputies introduced bills to authorise resumption of
opium production under strict control.1423
8.4.5 U.s. Attitude Toward the Opium Ban
The Americans praised the Turkish decision to prohibit opium cultivation as
a major step in fighting against the drug abuse problem of the USA.'424 However,
some Americans expressed the following doubts: It was highly likely that the
Turkish ban would increase the cost of heroin in the American street market by
causing a temporary shortage. This would result in more crime being committed
and would only make the social consequences of addiction even greater.' 425 Even
the stoppage of Turkish opium was not certain. The Turkish police and gendarmes
were vulnerable to corruption and bribery by heroin smugglers because they had
very low salaries. The Turks also lacked the logistical equipment and sophisticated
enforcement capability that was necessary to enforce the opium ban adequately.'42°
As a tradition Turkish farmers would hide and had already hidden the opium crop
1421 Arcayürek, op.cit., pp.139, 144, 149, Ozer Olçmen and Suleyman Mutlu, MMTD, 24.2.1972, term
3, sess.3, vol.22, pp.133-135.
1422 See speeches of 0. Olçmen and S. Mutlu, op.cit..
1423 Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.l98, Cumhuriyet, 18.9.1972, p.1, Keesing 'S..., 1974, vol.20, p.26722.
1424 President Nixon's statements, Diileri Bakanligi Belleteni, June 1971, pp.140-142, the
State Department's statement quoted by Turner, op.cit., p.148, Congressman Benjamin S. Rosen-
t,lial's statement to Turkish journalists, Curnhuri yet, 14 January 1972, p.7, Secretary of State
Roger's report to Congress mentioned by Cumhurz yet, 21 April 1973, p.3.
1425 Ray, op.cit., p 194, Zentuer, op.cit., p.44.
1426 Zentner, op.cit., p.i13, Turkish Opium Ban..., op.cit., pp.66, 67.
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from the past harvest, which would continue to reach the American market for
several years.'427
American critics also pointed out that when the Turkish opium ceased to be a
supply source drug traffickers would shift their operations to somewhere else.' 428 It
was estimated at that time that Turkey produced only 5 to 8 percent of the illicit
opium available throughout the world.'429 Some countries were already replacing
Turkey as supply source. According to one estimate, in 1972 Mexico supplied 15
percent of American heroin. 1430 Burma, Thailand and Laos, which were called
the Golden Triangle countries, produced more than half of the world's opium sup-
ply. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, illegal opium production was increasing
rapidly.' 43 ' It was stated in the House Select Committee of the U.S. Congress on
2 January 1971: "Our hope for international control and, or eradication of the
opium poppy becomes increasingly more difficult when we are dealing with opium-
producing countries that do not have control over the areas within their borders
where substantial quantities of opium poppies are cultivated and ultimately pro-
cessed into morphine base. Several Southeast Asian countries fall clearly within
this category." 1432
 Allegedly the United States did not press high-level officials
in some Southeast Asian countries, who directed opium smuggling, because they
protected U.S. interests in the region.'433
Zentner reached the following conclusion, which was written in italics, in his
article in 1973: "It seems probable that attempts to control or abolish opium pro-
duction in Turkey will have little long-range effect on the American opiate problem
as illicit marketeers turn to new and readily available sources of supply. This is the
key element in understanding the futility of the present Turkish endeavour."1434
1427 Zentner, op.cit., p.4A, the Heroin Trail, op.cit., pp.8-9, Turkish Opium Ban..., op.cit.,
pp.66, 67.
1428 See comments of U.S. congressmen in International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem,
op.cit., pp.3, 25, 34, 49, 54, 61, 148, 149.
1429 Zentner, op.cit., p.45, Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., p.21.
1430 Ray, op.cit., p.194, International Aspects..., op.cit., p.25.
1431 Ray, op.cit., pp.194, 196, Zentner, op.cit., pp.45-46.
1432 Zentner, op.cit., p.47n. See also International Aspects..., op.cit., pp.54, 119, 148.
"Afyon, CIA ye Tiirkiye", Le Monde's article translated by Cumhuriyet, 26 Au-
gust 1972.
1434 Zentner, op.cit., p.46.
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On 27 June 1972 the U.S. Undersecretary of the Treasury Department, Eugene
T. Rossides, went so far to say: "Stopping the source, the idea of putting in the
amount of money that would be required for crop substitution is ludicrous. It was
a misguided thought in the past and has led us to most of the problems we have
today because less than 2 percent of the total production of opium would easily
supply all the U.S. markets."435
Unfortunately, after achieving the Turkish opium ban U.S. authorities ignored
internal aspects of the drug trafficking and paid little attention to the availability
of other sources. They did not even show enough determination to ensure the
success of the Turkish ban. They failed to give enough help to the Turks and while
high-level U.S. officials visited the neighbouring Arab countries for other reasons
they did not stop in Turkey to talk to Turkish authorities on the opium problem.
8.4.6 The Effect of the Opium Ban
American officials generally claimed that the prohibition of poppy cultivation
in Turkey had the desired effect in the United States. According to them, the
international illegal drug network was disrupted. Big drug traffickers needed new
sources and when they got to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, they found Amer-
ican agents and local enforcement officials already organised to make life difficult
for them. In the United States the rate of new drug addiction decreased and more
and more addicts turned themselves in for treatment since they could not find the
drug and could not afford to buy it.'436
According to the investigation of Newsday reporters, law enforcement officials
first reported a heroin shortage in New York during the presidential campaign
in August 1972. However, in the following years the availability of drugs was a
disputed issue between U.S. officials. Some claimed that the shortage continued,
others argued that the supply was still as plentiful as ever, although perhaps more
adulterated than in the past. The survey which was released by the federal gov-
ernment's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in the summer
Ibid., p.47n.
1436 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.304, Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations, op.cit., pp.10, 20, 31, 49, 59,
62, 71, 76, 77.
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of 1972 acknowledged increased seizures of illegal heroin but it said that "the ris-
ing level of seizures still represents only a small fraction of the illicit flow... The
international heroin market almost certainly continues to have adequate supplies
to meet the demand in the consuming countries."437
During the meeting of the U.N. narcotics and dangerous drugs committee in
1974, U.S. official Robert Dupent said that for the first time deaths and crimes
in the U.S., which were caused by drug addiction, decreased. He stated that the
amount and quality of U.S. heroin decreased whereas its price increased and that
the number of U.S. drug addicts reduced from 700,000 to 200,000. Another high
level U.S. official, John R. Bartels, pointed that the heroin trafficking in North and
South America fell considerably because of the Turkish opium prohibition. The
chief of the French narcotics police, Francois Le Moel, claimed that the Turkish
ban caused shortage of morphine base in Europe and this cut the amount of heroin
smuggled into the U.S.'438
The Turks generally believed that the American drug addiction problem did
not ease because of their opium ban. In their opinion, the apparent shortage of
heroin and the increase in heroin prices was a result of the intensive U.S. and
French police campaign against drug traffickers. 1439 In fact, it seems that both
the ban and the increased police activities contributed to the heroin shortage and
hence to the increased heroin prices, but the Turkish ban on its own proved an
inadequate solution to the American drug abuse problem.
8.5 The Turkish Decision to Resume Opium Cultivation
8.5.1 The Period Before the Decision
When normal party politics returned in Turkey with the 1973 elections, the
opium issue became one of the most important subjects of the election campaign.
Since the people of the poppy region strongly demanded restoration of opium
cultivation, almost all the parties competed with each other in trying to increase
their votes by condemning the 1971 poppy ban and promising to resume opium
1437 the Heroin Trail, op.cit., p.xiii.
1438 Milli yet, 14 March 1974.
1439 0. Kökael, "Haha Ekimi ye ABD", Milliyet, 4 November 1975.
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production under strict controls if they came to power. The election manifestos of
all parties made the withdrawal of the ban a primary target.'44°
During the elections and after Biilent Ecevit assumed the premiership in Jan-
uary 1974 by establishing a coalition with the National Salvation Party, Turkish
public opinion, especially the press, continuously encouraged the authorities to
fulfil their promises by legalising opium production.' 44 ' The resumption of poppy
cultivation had become a matter of national honour and prestige. The Turks urged
their prime minister to resist all kinds of U.S. pressures and to restore their honour
sullied by the Erim regime. In their opinion, objective facts supported the Turkish
government's stance for resumption of opium production. Turkey had been the
world's largest legal exporter of opium and its opium had been the most valuable
of all from a medicinal standpoint. Now, since Turkey stopped its production, a
world shortage of medicinal opium was developing rapidly. Turkey itself was find-
ing it increasingly difficult and expensive to acquire its own requirements of opium
for medicinal use.' 442 International and American pharmaceutical companies were
complaining of opium shortages and were pressurising Congress and the admin-
istration to meet their demands.'443 The United States itself announced plans
to go into poppy cultivation in the areas selected in the Far West, Walla Walla
and Phoenix.' 444
 She was also allowing the production of synthetic drugs which
were available to drug addicts. Moreover, the United States encouraged India to
increase its opium production and decided to meet needs of the medicinal sector
from strategic stockpiles.'445
1440 N. Eren, Turkey, NATO and Europe, Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs,
1977, p.24, Turner, op.cit., p.251, Ahmad, op.cit., pp.419, 42911, Spain, 1975, op.cit., pp.301-302,
Cumhuriyet, 9.10.1973.
14 In Curnhuriyet: Aytunc Altmdal, "Haha Politikasi", 11.9.1973, Uhan Selcuk, "Haha",
21.2.1974, Hasan Sever, "Haha Sorunu ye çozumu", 15.3.1974, Oktay Akbal,
"Afyon Savai", 16.3.1974, I. Selçuk, "Onurumuzu Koruyalim", 16.3.1974, I.
Selcuk, "Afyonu Afyon Söker", 17.3.1974, K. Cema.l Güven, "Haha Sorunu",
23.3.1974.
1442 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.307.
'443 Cumhuriyet, 14.6.1973, the article of New England Journal of Medicine quoted by Curnhuriyet,
27.1.1975, Turner, op.cit., pp.203-204, 229, Cunzhuriyet, 14.3.1974, Facts on Turkish Poppy,
op.cit., pp.7-8, 11.
1444 Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.307, Eren, op.cit., p.24.
'' Cumhuriyet, 14 and 20 March 1974, Spain, op.cit., p.307, Turner, op.cit., p.228.
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8.5.2 The Ecevit Government's Actions on Opium
The Ecevit government had come to office by promising dynamic policies in
every area, which would protect Turkish interests more effectively. Its program
proclaimed the independence of Turkey as the aim of foreign policy.' 446
 It soon
became clear that Ecevit and his ministers had every intention of cancelling the
opium ban and were not after more money from the United States as compensa-
tion. They continuously made public statements for this end.' 447
 In March the
Turkish government officially informed Washington that it would resume poppy
production soon and asked U.S. authorities to join in re-examination of the opium
In the same month the Ecevit regime allowed opium production in state
farms and agricultural institutions to protect the opium crop's genetic value' 449
 and
the Ministry of Agriculture started work on cultivation plans for 1974-75. Farm-
ers were authorised to germinate poppy seeds in state farms for the next year's
cultivation.' 450 Meanwhile, repeated strong approaches by U.S. Ambassador Ma-
comber and other American officials received a negative response from Turkish
authorities. Visiting U.S. congressmen and journalists were told that the opium
ban would come to an end soon.'45'
Eventually on 1 July 1974 the Turkish government announced that poppy cul-
tivation would resume in the autumn of 1974 in seven provinces; Afyon, Burdur,
Denizli, Isparta, Kütahya, Uak and four towns of Konya. P.M. Bülent Ecevit ex-
plained the government's decision in his speech to the Turkish National Assembly
on 2 July 1974:452 The prohibition of poppy cultivation by an unelected govern-
ment had been a mistake because it created an unfillable gap in the poppy farmers'
life in the absence of a viable alternative. The previous governments took sonie
measures to compensate the losses of growers but these measures were insufficient
and met with the understandable resistance of people. The eradication of Turkish
1448 Mango, op.cit., pp.42-43.
'447 Cumhuriyet, 16,17 February 1974, 14, 16, 17, 20 March 1974.
1448 Turner, op.cit., pp.252-253, Keesing 'S..., vol.20, p.26722.
1449 Ecevit's statement, Cumhuriyet, 17.3.1974, B. Ecevit, IVIII/ITD, 2.7.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.6,
p .347 Keesing 'S.... vol.20, p.26722.
1450 Spain, op.cit, p.302, Turner, op.cit., p.252.
451 Spain, op.cit., p.302.
M7vITD, term 4, sess.1, vol.6, pp.347-349. For reasons for the decision from Turkish point of view
ee also Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., pp.8lO.
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opium production caused a serious opium shortage in the world pharmaceutical
industry and did not help the drug abuse problem in other countries. In the light
of these facts the Turkish government decided to resume limited poppy cultivation
under strict state control. It would take every kind of measure to prevent Turkish
opium from harming other nations and would be willing to listen to the advice of
any interested international organisations and friendly countries for this purpose.
If the envisaged measures proved ineffective, the government would seek author-
ity from parliament to implement more forceful methods. It would also continue
to explore substitute crops and new sources of income in the poppy region. The
Turkish government believed that it followed the will of the people by allowing
opium cultivation. No democratic regime could tell its people to change their way
of life and to give up a traditional way of earning which had been practised for
centuries.
As elected rulers, the Ecevit government could justify resumption of opium
cultivation in response to the will of people. But publicization of the matter, its
presentation as an act of independence against the USA and ignoring protests of
the Americans were mistakes made by Turkish authorities. U.S. rulers, too, failed
in the matter by not responding to Turkish suggestions to review the opium ban.
8.5.3 Turkish Public's Reaction to the Lifting of the Opium Ban
The Ecevit government's decision to resume poppy cultivation received popular
and political support at home.' 453 Some saw it as restoring Turkey's dignity and
independence and some supported it in principle but expressed doubts about its
long-term consequences. In his speech to the Turkish Parliament on 3 July 1974,
Reliance Party leader Turhan Feyziolu expressed support for the decision as an act
fulfilling people's demands but warned that the opium issue should not be exploited
by the government for political purposes in a manner which would harm Turkey's
alliance relations with the U.S. and the West. 1454
 Justice Party leader Demirel
saw the lifting of the opium ban as an act of an independent country but stated
1453 j Terciirnan: A. Kabakh, "Haha Mutlulugu", 6.7.1974, H. Erkmen, "Ambargo
ye Otesi", 1.8.1975; in Ctzrnhurijet: A. Sirmen, "Amerikan Bombalari", 11.7.1974,
A. Sirmen, "Alavere Dalavere ',15.7.1974; "Durum: Haha Karari ye Amerika",
Milliyet, 3.7.1974.
1454 MMTD, term 4, sess.1, vol.6, p.398.
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that the government should consider advantages and disadvantages of its decision
carefully.'455 Nationalist Movement Party leader Alparsian Türke later claimed
that the Ecevit government acted on the matter in pursuit of political gains rather
than interests of poppy farmers and thus caused the isolation of Turkey in the
Western camp and damaged its interests in the Cyprus question.' 456 Faruk Sükan,
the secretary general of the Democrat Party, argued that the government's opium
policy harmed Turkey's friendly relations with the United States and Europe.'457
The opinions expressed by Ismet Giritli and Metin Toker constitute good ex-
amples of the criticism directed against the resumption of poppy cultivation:'458
The lifting of the opium ban was not related to Turkey's interests, pride and inde-
pendence. The Ecevit government made a grave mistake by not demanding funds
from the United States but allowing opium production without consulting with
Americans. As a response to Turkey's hostile decision, the United States would
not care any more about Turkey's security and economic interests. Turkey would
face the danger of being isolated against its enemies such as Greece and the Soviet
Union. The decision would please only three groups: anti-Americans, opium and
arms smugglers. The best solution might be the implementation of the develop-
ment projects which were considered by the previous governments with the help
of the Americans.
8.6 U.s. Reaction to Resumption of Turkish Opium Production
8.6.1 Reaction of the Congress
When the Ecevit government made clear its intention to resume poppy produc-
tion, U.S. congressmen threatened Turkey with cutting off aid. During their visit
to Turkey on 15 and 16 March U.S. congressmen Wolff and Rangel warned Turkish
officials and journalists that the cancellation of the opium ban would cause a severe
'	 Cumhuriyet, 19.3.1974, p.7, A. Oymen, "Ecevit Babakan1ik Dönemini An-
latiyor", op.cit..
1456 Oymeu, op.cit. Turkish academic Seyfi Tahau agreed with Türke's point.
'	 Cumhuriyet, 14 July 1974, p.1.
1458 j • Giritli, "Haha ye Tiirk-Amerikan I1iki1eri", Tercüman, 15.7.1975; M.
Toker, "Haha Otesi ye Berisi", 24.3.1974, "Hahain Sonrasi", 14.7.1974,
Milliyet.
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reaction among American congressmen and people.'459
 As reported by Turner, in
the wake of the Turkish decision on 1 July 1974, more than 250 bills suggesting
cutting off aid to Turkey were pending in Congress.' 46° On 12 July the Senate
passed a resolution by 81 to 8, which required stopping economic and military aid
to Turkey if she did not take effective measures on the opium issue.'46'
Discussions of U.S. congressmen during a committee meeting on 16 July 1974
give their ideas on the Turkish decision to resume poppy production:' 462 The Turk-
ish decision was taken because of political concerns rather than economic ones.
The Turkish government failed to use the U.S.-supplied funds to ease difficulties of
poppy farmers. Poppy production contributed very little to the Turkish economy
and provided income for a very small percentage of the Turkish population. The
Turkish opium ban between 1971 and 1974 did not cause great economic and social
hardship in Turkey. Ignoring economic aspects of the problem, some "demagogic"
Turkish politicians used the issue as a symbol of Turkish nationalism to gain po-
litical support. Organised crime in Turkey, too, inspired the opium campaign.
Turkish authorities decided to resume poppy cultivation unilaterally without con-
sulting with U.S. officials in spite of the existence of an agreement on the matter
between the two countries. As the past experiences had shown, Turkey could not
prevent the diversion of opium into illicit channels because of ineffectiveness of its
bureaucracy. The Turkish government recently released from jail charged narcotic
traffickers who would go back to business.
U.S. congressmen further argued: The Turkish opium ban had substantially
contributed to the reduction of the number of heroin addicts and heroin-related
problems in the USA. With the new Turkish decision, there would be a big increase
in heroin supply in America and all the success achieved in the drug abuse problem
would be reversed. Therefore, this decision constituted a direct attack upon the
people of the USA. As Washington Post's article stated, "if the Turkish government
had announced that it intended to land secret agents at night on American shores
to poison and kill thousands of Americans, and to subvert the foundations of
'	 Cumhuriyet, 16 and 17 March 1974.
1460 Turner, op.cit., p.201.
1461 Cumhuriyet, 13 July 1974, pp.', 7, Keesing's..., vol.20, p.26722.
1462 Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations, op.cit., pp.1-77.
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American society - which is, of course, exactly what heroin does - then that would
be regarded as an act of war and handled accordingly." The threat of Turkish
opium to U.S. people was much greater than the Turkish contribution to NATO.
In fact, U.S. facilities in Turkey and Turkey's cooperation in the defence field was
no longer important for the USA. In any case, congressmen had the commitment
to their constituents rather than to Turkey. The Congress should authorise the
President to cut off aid to Turkey, showing its seriousness on the matter. This
could exert pressure upon Turkey and change its decision.
There were also some congressmen who claimed that such a decision would not
force the Turks to change their policies. They also argued: As other states could
do, Turkey, too, could develop a strict control program on opium production. It
was a fact that the U.S. administration, too, failed in this matter. It did not give
enough help to the Turks in their development projects in the poppy region and
did not take action to persuade Turkish rulers to change their decision after they
expressed their intention. The United States itself should take effective measures
at home rather than expecting the others to solve its problem.
At the end of July the Congress forbade the Export-Import Bank to grant
further credit to Turkey because of its resumed poppy cultivation.' 463 On 6 Au-
gust 1974 House Concurrent Resolution 507, sponsored by 239 Congressmen, was
passed by the House. The resolution urged the president to "1- immediately ini-
tiate negotiations at the highest level of the Turkish government to prevent the
resumption of opium production; and 2- if such negotiations prove unfruitful, ex-
ercise the authority provided by the Congress under the Foreign Assistance Act
[of 1971], to terminate all assistance to the Government of Turkey." 464 The Sen-
ate passed an amendment to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of
1970, which required the president to terminate all aid by 1 January 1975 to any
government that failed to ban opium production.' 465
 After the second Turkish
military intervention in Cyprus on 14 August 1974, an initiative was launched by
1403 Turner, op.cit., p.261, Cumhuriyet, 2 August 1974, p.1.
1464 Turkish Opium Ban..., op.cit., p.1, BöIükbai, op.cit., pp.l80-l8l, Cumhuriyet, 7.8.1974,
p.l, K.R. Legg, "Congress as Trojan Horse?" in J. Spanier and J. Nogee (eds.),
Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy, New York: Pergamon Press,
1981, pp.118-119, Turner, op.cit.. p.257.
1465 Turner, op.cit., p.258.
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the U.S. Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey because of its actions in
Cyprus. Thus opium became a secondary issue. Opponents of the Turkish opium
cultivation supported the arms embargo and supporters of the embargo exploited
the opium issue for their purposes.'46°
8.6.2 The U.S. Administration's Reaction
The U.S. administration was not happy with the Ecevit government's intention
to resume poppy production. In their opinion, the ban should not be lifted because
it had proved a success. On 6 May 1974 U.S. officials privately warned that U.S.-
Turkish relations would worsen if poppy cultivation was resumed.' 467
 On 8 May
1974 U.S. narcotics official Sheldon B. Vance told the Senate that 20 million dollars
of aid intended for Turkey had been held because Turkey's decision on the opium
issue was not clear yet.'468
When Turkey decided to resume opium production, the U.S. administration
attacked the Turkish action as a breach of an agreement.' 469
 The State Department
commented that "we deeply regret the decision of the Turkish government... It
was taken without any official Turkish notification to U.S. Ambassador William B.
Macomber." 47° State Department spokesman John King expressed the American
worry about the Turkish action but he said that economic and military aid to
Turkey would not be stopped though the 20 million dollar promised loan would
not be paid. 147 ' As a means of displaying its displeasure, on 7 July 1974 the U.S.
administration recalled its ambassador to Turkey for consultations and to review
the situation arising from the Turkish government's decision.1472
In the aftermath of the Turkish decision, U.S. officials reportedly opposed the
actions of Congress to cut off aid to Turkey because they believed that these kinds
1466 Bülent Ecevit claimed in Kurtul Altug's programme on Turkish TV, Bunalimh Ytilar, 1993, that
contrary to the general belief the arnis embargo was imposed on Turkey because of its decision to
lift the opium ban, not its intervention in Cyprus.
1467 R.C. Campany, Turkey and the United States, New York: Praeger, 1986, p.26.
1468 Cumhuriyet, 9 May 1974, p.1.
1469 Keesing 'S..., vol.20, p.26722.
1470 Turner, op.cit., p.256.
,ri Cumhuriyet, 4 July 1974, p.1.
1472 Ibid., 6 July 1974, p.1, Campany, op.cit., p.26, Bölükba1, op.cit., p.lo, Turner, op.cit., p.256.
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of threats would not reverse the Turkish action but would harm strategic interests
of the United States.' 473 Before the Cyprus issue overtook the opium question, the
administration managed to fight off a flat cut-off of aid and to introduce consider-
ation of control into the handling of the matter.'474
American public opinion showed great anger toward the Turkish decision to
resume poppy cultivation. Parents, doctors, law enforcement officials believed
that Turkish opium would resume poisoning the youth of American at a high rate.
American newspapers carried articles severely criticising the Turkish decision. The
most extreme of these was Pete Hamill's article in New York Post on 8 July 1974,
"Act of War" 1475 Seeing the Turkish action as an act of war against American
people, Harnill suggested the bombing of Turkish poppy fields by the U.S. Air
Force.
8.7 The Aftermath of the Opium Issue
While allowing the opium production in seven provinces under state licensing,
the Ecevit government took the strictest measures to prevent illicit drug traffic.'476
The most important of them was the introduction of a new method of harvesting
poppies, the "poppy straw process". Formerly, raw opium had been scraped by
poppy farmers from the incised poppy pod, and therefore, given high prices for
illicit sales, it had been impossible to control opium supply in thousands of hands.
The straw process method completely bypassed the production of gum opium by
farmers through incision. The government forbade farmers to incise poppy pods.
The entire plant would be cut in the field and taken to a government factory
employing the straw process, which would use a sophisticated technique to extract
maximum narcotic from the plant. Thus the government monopoly would purchase
the whole product and process it into morphine, which would be marketed to meet
legitimate world medicinal needs for codeine and other opium derivates. For a few
" Cumhuriyet, 13 July 1974, p.7.
Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.304.
'' Quoted by Turkish Opium. Ban..., op.cit., pp.73-75. See also Spain, op.cit., p.302, Böliikbai,
op.cit., p.181; in Cumhuriyet, 0. Akbai, "Haha Soguk Savai", 15.7.1974, A. Sirmen,
"Amerikan Bombalari", 11.7.1974.
1476 For detailed information see Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., pp.12-13.
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years, until Turkey built such an opium factory, the harvested, unincised poppies
would be exported to Western Europe.'477
These Turkish actions were generally praised by the international community.
On 19 September 1974 the United Nations issued an official statement welcoming
Turkey's decision to implement a new method as an act of strict compliance with
international obligations.' 478 In another statement on 16 October, the United
Nations presented the Turkish action to other states as an example to be carried
out in opium production and stated that the new method would prevent illegal
opium traffic and increase earnings of poppy farmers.' 479 A U.N. narcotics mission
that visited Turkey in July 1975 reported that it was greatly impressed by the
success of the Turkish control system.' 48 ° The investigation of the International
Narcotics Control Board and the U.N. Secretariat, which was completed on 13 July
1976, indicated that Turkish controls were fully effective and that there had not
been any diversion or leakage to the illicit market.' 48 ' After receiving complaints
of illegal opium trafficking another U.N. mission went to Turkey in early 1977 but
found "no evidence that there have been any leaks since poppy cultivation was
resumed in 1975.1482
The United States, too, praised the Turkish actions as effective ways of pre-
venting opium smuggling. On 20 September 1974 the State Department expressed
the American pleasure with the Turkish decision to apply the straw process.'483
In a message to Congress President Ford praised the effectiveness of the Turkish
controls. 1484 In fact, the U.S. government financed the straw process plant built
by Turkey.'485
Spain. 1975, op.cit., p.308, Spain. Arnericart Diplomacy in Turkey, op.cit., p.83, Harris,
"Turkey and the United States" in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., p.70, Turner, op.cit., p.253,
Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., pp.15,17.
1478 U. Gürtuna, "Diplomaside Kulis", C'u'mhuriyet, 23 September 1974, Oymen, "Ece-
vit Babakan1ik Dönemini Anlatiyor", op.cit..
1479 Oyinen, op.cit..
1480 Eren, op.cit., p.25, Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., pp.15-16.
1481 S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,
srol.II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.432.
1482 Eren, op.cit., p.25.
1483 Oymen, op.cit..
1484 Eren, op.cit., p.25, Facts on Turkish Poppy, op.cit., p.l8.
1485 5pam, American Diplomacy in Turkey, op.cit., p.83.
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In the mid and late 1970s the most important problem for Turkey on the opium
issue was narcotics originating outside the country and passing through it on the
way to Western Europe. 1486
 Developments concerning opium in the 1980s were
mentioned by former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, James W. Spain, in his book:
At the beginning of the 1980s, "there was an enormous stock [in Turkey] from the
poppy fields waiting for completion of the straw process plant so that processing
could be taken. The key to the success of the whole venture was the U.S. medi-
cal market for which the major pharmaceutical companies made large purchases.
In July 1981 a team of company representatives and officials from the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration arrived in Turkey to try to put the whole operation
together." After the plant started working in good condition, another question
emerged: whether the United States would buy the Turkish opium. "The General
Services Administration, which is responsible for maintaining U.S. strategic stock-
piles, was contemplating a large replenishment of its holdings, which could sop up
all the backlog of the Turkish plant. However, no one was eager to assign Turkey a
specific quota - which would limit freedom in the market. After much haggling it
was agreed not to set individual country quotas, but to allocate 80 percent of the
market to Turkey and India together and 20 percent to all other producers."487
Another problem that concerned the U.S. and Turkey on opium was a number
of U.S. travellers serving long-term sentences in Turkish prisons for narcotic of-
fences. There was an antipathy among the American people toward Turkey on this
issue, which stemmed from a famous film, "Midnight Express". U.S. ambassadors
"Spiers and Macomber had negotiated a U.S.-Turkey treaty on the Enforcement
of Judicial Judgements, which provided the long-term prisoners in each country
of the opposite nationality could opt to serve their remaining sentences in their
country." When Ambassador Spain left Turkey in August 1981, "the prisoners had
gone home, and they were released soon on parole since the parole system is pro-
vided for in the U.S. legal structure and not in the Turkish. At my departure, we
did not have a single U.S. long-term prisoner in Turkey."488
1486 R.F. Nyrop (ed.), Turkey:, op.cit., p.295.
1487 Spain, American Diplomacy in Turkey, op.cit., pp.83-84.
1488 Ibid., pp.137-138.
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8.8 Conclusion
Up to 1971 U.S. pressures led Turkish rulers to take some measures to control
illegal opium production and trafficking but failed to force Turkish authorities
to ban opium cultivation completely. Internal concerns prevented the Turkish
government from falling under the influence of the USA in this regard. The non-
party Erim government, not bound by electoral considerations, easily gave in to
U.S. pressures but also maintained that the ban was in Turkey's interests too. The
Ecevit government in 1974 resumed poppy cultivation as proof of its independence
from the USA but faced threats from Congress. It would have certainly been
subjected to heavy U.S. pressures if the Cyprus crisis had not forestalled the issue.
Like the Cyprus question, the opium issue was a matter which did not con-
cern the basis of the Turkish-American alliance, i.e. maintaining security in the
context of the East-West confrontation. Although it was not originally serious
or fundamental enough to strain relations between the two countries, the opium
question would have shaken the alliance dramatically if the Cyprus issue had not
emerged. If the two governments tried, they could have found a mutually satisfac-
tory solution because the essence of the problem was not the production of opium
but the leaking of the product into illicit channels. Other producer countries had
been able to establish effective controls, and Turkey could have easily followed
their example. However, the two states mainly tried to appeal to their domestic
opinion with their policies. By propagating that halting the flow of Turkish opium
at the source would ease the drug abuse problem, the Americans disregarded the
importance of relations with Turkey, misjudged the true nature of Turkey's domes-
tic politics, and ignored the realities of heroin supply and demand. While using
forceful tactics against Turkey with heavy Congressional and press involvement,
they neglected the possible damage to the reputation of the Turkish government in
the eyes of international community and Turkish people. Turkish authorities first
did not take effective measures to prevent illegal production and selling of opium
and allowed their country to gain a bad reputation on the matter. Then they saw
the resumption of poppy cultivation as a gesture against the United States and
more specifically as a challenge to the U.S. Congress. Presenting the action as an
act of independence, they aimed to increase their popular support but ignored the
possible alienation of the American people from the presentation of the decision.
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Chapter IX
CONCLUSION
9.1 General Evaluation of U.S.-Turkish Relations
The oniy shadow over close relations between Turkey and the United States
in the 1950s had been U.S. unwillingness to supply a stabilisation fund to Turkey
to help its balance of payments problems. After a four-year debate, the Turkish
government had to accept strict U.S. conditions in 1958 to be able to obtain the
fund. 148° After the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact as a result of a mili-
tary coup, the United States assured Turkish rulers of U.S. commitment to Turkish
security by signing a bilateral agreement in 1959. In the eyes of opposition Repub-
lican People's Party's members this American act was aimed at saving the rightist
Democrat Party government. While RPP leaders warmly welcomed the overthrow
of the DP regime by the military coup of 27 May 1960, which could be seen by
them as an anti-American act in those circumstances, DP supporters believed that
the Americans abandoned them and cite as proof growing U.S. displeasure with
their government toward the end of the 1950s.
Hence both the U.S. attitude toward the coup and the military junta's actions
in Turkey's alliance relations with the United States and NATO became particu -
larly sensitive matters. In fact, in their first public announcement, Turkish officers
expressed their loyalty to their existing alliances and NATO, showing their in-
tention not to make any changes in the traditional direction of Turkish foreign
policy. The quick recognition of the new regime and the promise of economic and
military aid to it by the United States proved that there would be no changes
in U.S.-Turkish relations. In fact, the Turkish military junta soon became more
dependent on the USA because of its need for U.S. financial assistance to achieve
economic development and to improve the welfare of Turkish military officers.
Therefore, it did not hesitate to sign bilateral agreements with the United States,
1480 G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.74-75,
T.A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.19.
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to station the U.S.-supplied Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory and even to fa-
cilitate the legislation of bilateral agreements with the USA by introducing a new
constitutional procedure. Military rulers wanted to make some changes in rules
applied to U.S. personnel in Turkey but when the Americans seemed unwilling to
give up their existing privileges, they did not pursue the matter.
When the Cuban missile crisis broke in October 1962, the Turks still had warm
feelings toward the United States. Turkish rulers and MPs proudly supported the
U.S. stance to expel the Soviet missiles from the Caribbean. There was no criticism
in the Turkish press directed toward the firm U.S. stance against the Soviet Union,
which could cause a global nuclear war. When the possibility of trading Soviet
missiles in Cuba with the Jupiters in Turkey was discussed in Western states and
when it was proposed by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, the Turks did not make any
comment about it and sincerely believed that their close ally America would not
bargain the interests of a NATO member with the enemy camp.
Meanwhile, the pluralist 1960 constitution began to have its effects in Turkish
politics. Using means provided by the constitution, marginal groups were able to
voice their opinions and criticise basic tenets of the regime, including the traditional
foreign policy line which was considered a taboo. Newspaper columns became the
main platform of such discussions and criticism. As a start, the withdrawal of the
Jupiter missiles were criticised on the ground that it decreased Turkey's strategic
importance for the West and created a security gap for Turkish defence. During
parliamentary discussions in 1963 the inadequacy of U.S. military aid was subjected
to criticism.
The most important thing which triggered the widespread anti-Americanism in
Turkey was the Turkish belief that the United States did not work enough to stop
atrocities against Turkish Cypriots, which began at the end of December 1963,
but continuously prevented the Turkish government from intervening in Cyprus
to protect lives and rights of Turkish people on the island. President Johnson's
letter to Turkish P.M. Inönii in June 1964 further fuelled the anti-Americanism
among Turkish people and brought radical changes in the thinking of Turkish
rulers. Johnson had threatened that NATO might not come to Turkey's help if
the Soviet Union attacked Turkey because of her intervention in Cyprus and he had
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reminded the Turks that they could not use U.S.-supplied weapons in their actions
in Cyprus. While mainly leftist groups and university students arranged mass
demonstrations against the USA and attacked American buildings in major Turkish
cities, Turkish authorities showed their disappointment over the U.S. attitude with
their statements. In one point Turkish P.M. Inönü hinted that Turkey could leave
the Western camp. Nevertheless, frictions between the USA and Turkey on the
official level did not last long. To change the unpleasant image of the United
States among Turkish people, U.S. leaders reiterated their commitment to Turkish
security, offered more financial assistance and voted against the U.N. decision in
December 1965, which supported the Greek cause. Turkish rulers announced that
it was not their intention to change their foreign policy line and leave the Western
camp.
After the rightist Justice Party came to power at the end of 1965, Turkish
leftist groups increased their attacks against the United States and Turkey's al-
liance with this state and NATO. Columnists of Turkish newspapers except rightist
ones joined leftists in criticising all aspects of Turkish-American relations, espe-
cially military contacts. Under public pressure and to prove their independence
Turkish rulers took the following major actions which could be interpreted as anti-
American: the withdrawal from the Multilateral Force, banning U-2 flights using
Turkish territory, changing the duty status formula applied to U.S. personnel, not
allowing the use of the Incirlik base for non-NATO purposes, reviewing all bilat-
eral military agreements with the USA and forcing this state to sign a new general
military agreement. Turkish leaders also tried to improve relations with Eastern
bloc countries through intensive state visits and economic agreements and to gain
the sympathy of Third World and Arab countries by supporting their causes in
the United Nations.
The Americans were not happy about the Turkish actions but they did not
show resentment because these actions did not harm their fundamental interests
which were fulfilled by the strong Turkish commitment to NATO and the U.S.
use of military facilities and bases on Turkish territory. The apparent pro-Turkish
attitude of the United States during the November 1967 Cyprus crisis also ensured
the closeness of U.S.-Turkish relations on the official level until 1969.
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After 1969 Turkish rulers were subjected to U.S. pressure on their opium pro-
duction. The Americans had believed that Turkish opium provided 80 percent
of heroin at U.S. streets and thus made great contribution to the harrowing drug
addiction problem among the youth of the USA. Turkish authorities did not fulfil
the U.S. demand to prohibit opium cultivation because they did not want to lose
the votes of poppy growers. Meanwhile, increasing terrorist actions against U.S.
personnel by Turkish leftists, who lost representation in the parliament to voice
their opinion, posed another problem for the Americans.
The removal of the Turkish government from power by the military on 12 March
1971 and the subsequent rule by non-party, technocrat governments served mostly
U.S. interests. Under the martial law, extreme leftist groups were suppressed and
thus anti-American criticism in newspaper columns and terrorist acts against U.S.
personnel stopped. More importantly, opium cultivation in Turkey was completely
prohibited. However, the return of normal party politics at the end of 1973 brought
problems for U.S.-Turkish relations again. After an election period in which heavy
criticism was directed against the opium ban, the coalition government of leftist
Republicans and Islamist Salvationists decided to resume poppy production in
June 1974 as an act of independence in spite of American protests. While the
U.S. Congress was busy with trying to cut off economic and military assistance to
Turkey because of the new Turkish decision, the military coup in Cyprus and the
subsequent Turkish intervention in Cyprus forestalled them.
The Turkish government was not unhappy with the U.S. attitude toward its
action, which resulted in capturing 36 percent of Cyprus, because the United States
had not taken direct action to prevent or later to reverse the Turkish action. In
fact, Turkish rulers were of the opinion that they had proved that their government
was not under the U.S. influence and was able to pursue Turkey's national interests
effectively. However, the U.S. Congress's action to impose an arms embargo on
Turkey because of its intervention in Cyprus, starting from 5 February 1975, caused
a new wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Turkish authorities were angry because
they believed that the Congress action unilaterally violated principles of the U.S.-
Turkish alliance and undermined its basis. As a response, in July 1975 the coalition
government of rightist parties, "the nationalist front", announced invalidity of U.S.-
Turkish bilateral agreements and closed down U.S. facilities and bases in Turkey.
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Thus, relations between Turkey and the United States hit their lowest level though
the alliance of the two states continued within the NATO framework.
9.2 Evaluation of Validity of Theories
Alliance theories studied in Chapter II proved to be a great help to explain
Turkish-American relations between 1960 and 1975. It became clear in the course
of the study that reasons adumbrated in those theories for alliance formation and
continuation were also valid for the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Although they had
serious disputes with the USA on some matters, the Turks remained very keen to
continue their alliance with America because they saw it as a warranty of Turkish
security against the Soviet threat and other possible threats, as a source of consid-
erable military and economic assistance and as a guarantee for westernising Turkey
and making her a part of the Western world. Turkey's strategic importance for
U.S. interests, which were explained in Chapter IV, and the desire to keep Turkey
within the Western camp so as not to lose prestige vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc were
the main reasons for the USA continuing the alliance with Turkey.
Both sides clearly believed that the alliance brought far more benefits than
costs for their national interests. 1490 However, the implications of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis and the Johnson letter caused doubts in the Turkish side on the security
provided by the alliance and thus decreased the value of the alliance for Turkey.
Technological developments in intelligence collecting and nuclear missiles, with-
drawal of the Jupiters from Turkey and unavailability of Turkish bases for opera-
tions in the Middle East led American leaders to attribute less importance to their
alliance with Turkey.
In the 1960s and the 1970s, the goals and expectations of Turkey and the
United States from their alliance were not so similar as they had been during the
1950s. Turkey wanted the alliance help its Cyprus cause whereas the United States
expected that the close alliance relationship would induce the Turks to do a favour
for America by prohibiting opium cultivation. This situation caused problems in
the two states' relations.
1490 Turkish rulers' opinions in this regard were mentioned in the section of NATO discussion in Chapter
IV and U.S. officials' opinions in the section of Turkey's strategic importance in the same chapter
and in the section of the arms embargo in Chapter VIII.
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In the 1960-1975 period, the U.S.-Turkish alliance was considerably affected
by developments in the international arena. The decrease of tension and conflict
between the Eastern and Western blocs (detente) allowed both states to act more
independently from restrictions of their alliance. The apparent decrease in the
Soviet threat particularly let Turkish rulers improve their relations with Eastern
bloc and Third World countries and give more emphasis to their national causes,
especially the Cyprus problem. The Americans became less anxious about pro-
viding military and economic assistance to Turkey and went so far as to threaten
Turkey with not protecting her against the Soviet camp.
The thesis has showed that U.S.-Turkish contacts between 1960 and 1975 did
not amount to a patron-client relationship though some individual events implied
the opposite result. Generally, until 1964 Turkey acted as if it was under close and
strong American influence. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 supported
this conclusion. Turkish rulers proudly announced their support for the U.S. stance
during the crisis without thinking that Turkey's interests and even its survival could
be put under threat because of their attitude and they expected only U.S. praise
in return, nothing else. On the other side, the Americans bargained the Jupiter
missiles belonging to Turkey with the Soviet Union without informing the Turks
and they did not tell the Turks how Turkey's survival was under threat. Before
1964, Turkey's voting patterns in the United Nations very largely coincided with
those of the United States.
In 1964, heavy U.S. pressures on Turkish rulers prevented them from taking
a major action in Cyprus, including military intervention. The Johnson letter
in June 1964 in particular resembled an ultimatum sent by a colonial power to
its vassal. However, the severe reaction of Turkish rulers and people induced the
Americans to be more careful in their dealings with the Turks and avoid alienating
them because they certainly did not want to lose benefits of their alliance with
Turkey. Turkish actions after 1964 implied more independence from U.S. influ-
ence. Turkey improved relations with states outside the Western camp, took some
actions in military relations with the USA and supported causes of Arab and Third
World countries in U.N. votings. However, she also remained strictly loyal to her
commitment toward NATO, allowed the use of military bases on her territory by
the United States and followed the U.S. lead in U.N. votings on cold-war matters.
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Before 1971 Turkish rulers complied with most of the U.S. demands on the
opium question and showed sincere efforts to help the United States in this issue.
However, in order not to lose electoral support and not to be seen as acting under
the U.S. influence, they did not fulfil the main American demand, prohibiting
opium cultivation completely. The military-backed governments after March 1971
proved to be more receptive to U.S. influences. They banned opium cultivation to
prevent deterioration of relations with the United States.
The Ecevit government of 1974 was seen by many as the most independent of
Turkish governments, pursuing Turkish interests without staying under U.S. influ-
ence. In fact, it resumed poppy production and intervened in Cyprus militarily in
spite of U.S. opposition. But at the same time it was anxious not to destroy the
alliance with the USA nor to allow a serious deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations.
Therefore, the Ecevit government was very careful in taking these decisions not
to alienate the Americans. Moreover, the U.S. administration was not altogether
determined to prevent the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and on the opium ques-
tion the Congress was doing enough to punish Turkey. The U.S. arms embargo
in February 1975 and the closure of bases by Turkey in July 1975 clearly showed
that the Turkish-American alliance was not a patron-client relationship. However,
Turkey's economic and military dependence on the USA was always a continuing
fact in relations.
9.3 Other Results of the Study
It will now be appropriate to answer the questions which are set forth in the
Introduction though they are dealt with partially in different parts of the thesis.
It has become clear from the study that a superpower inevitably gets involved in a
matter which mainly concerns its small ally if this issue seems to have the potential
to affect the alliance established by the superpower and the balance of power in a
strategic region. As the leader of the Western camp, which had global interests,
the United States got involved in the Cyprus question, which mainly concerned
Turkey and Greece, and tried to influence its development to prevent any possible
damage to NATO and her interests in the eastern Mediterranean.
Superpowers certainly have the potential to influence decisions and actions of
their small allies and even to force them to act in a certain way through threats of
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punishment. But they are restricted by certain factors such as their own interests
while acting in this way. While they tried to prevent a proposed Turkish inter-
vention in Cyprus, the Americans did not want to alienate the Turks totally and
lose their alliance which brought considerable benefits for U.S. interests. Moreover,
Turkey was an independent state which could resist American demands especially
on her vital national causes. Turkey's membership of NATO also diminished the
possibility of any U.S. armed action against Turkey such as had been applied to
many Central American countries.
Open threats generally fail to force a small state to act in a certain way because
they arouse public emotions. Public consensus on a matter which touches national
feelings plays a great role in the determination of the small state's government
in not yielding to pressures of its big ally. Turkey's adamant position on the
Cyprus question and its military intervention in Cyprus could be explained by the
tremendous support given by all segments of the Turkish population including the
military.
Pressures from a superpower may lead its small ally to seek alternative sources
of support for her security and national interests but the decision of this small
ally to change sides or to opt for neutrality depends on her military and economic
capabilities and the character of the international system. The small state may
improve her relations with members of other blocs with the help of detente but
she does not enter into defence contacts with these states if she does not want to
lose her existing alliance. Turkish authorities had economic and cultural contacts
with the Eastern bloc and the Third World and supported some of their causes
in international forms but they did not buy a single weapon from these states in
order not to loosen their defence cooperation with the West. In their eyes, the
Western alliance provided the vital guarantee for Turkey's security.
Having alliance relations with a superpower may always bring difficulties for a
small state. It may attract the threat of another superpower and may cause the
involvement of the small state in superpower conflicts. The big ally's interference
in internal affairs and its influence on domestic and foreign policy decisions are also
possibilities. If the small power's elites are not careful in their dealings with the
superpower and follow its lead with full trust, dangers for the small state increase.
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The Cuban crisis demonstrated all these dangers for Turkey, as was explained
in Chapter V. Turkey had to stop its opium production because of its alliance
relationship with the USA. This incident also proved that military regimes which
are militarily dependent on a superpower are more responsive to demands of the
superpower.
One important conclusion of the thesis is that internal conditions and public
opinion on both sides played an important role in relations between the United
States and Turkey. Turkish policies on the opium and Cyprus questions and the
U.S. attitude on the opium and arms embargo issues were strongly influenced by
internal public opinion. The sensitiveness of Turkish rulers to foreign influence
and intervention, their long-pursued aim of integrating Turkey into the Western
world, their evaluation of Turkey's strategic importance, their seeing the Cyprus
issue as a vital national cause and the continuity of Turkey's traditional foreign
policy line, too, had effects on U.S.-Turkish relations. On the American side,
anti-communism, the world leadership concept, realism during the Nixon admin-
istration, the Vietnam issue, the president's wide powers in formulating foreign
policy, and the Congress's actions to curb the presidential power and to have a
voice in foreign policy decisions were general elements of U.S. foreign policy which
also had repercussions on the U.S.-Turkish alliance.
Chapter IV showed that the following factors played role in Turkish actions
in the military field, which appeared as anti-American: intensive public criticism
of Turkey's military relations with the USA, misconduct in signing of bilateral
military agreements, untidiness of these agreements, U.S. personnel's actions an-
tagonising the Turkish public, and the humiliation of Turkey by U-2 flights which
took place without her knowledge. The Turks succeeded in banning U-2 flights,
rearranging bilateral agreements under a new general treaty, in changing the duty
status formula and in not allowing the use of the Incirlik base by the Americans for
their operations in the Middle East. However, other facts show that these Turkish
actions were not so successful as they appeared. Turkish withdrawal from the MLF
would not achieve a radical result because most NATO members were opposed to
it. The use of the Incirlik base for Middle East operations was not required by the
NATO alliance. In the duty status issue the Americans kept their right to have
the last word. Turkey had to accept NATO's flexible response strategy though
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she did not like it entirely. Her efforts to gain a voice in the control of nuclear
weapons on her territory did not bring any positive result. Bilateral agreements
with the USA remained secret and the public did not know their contents. The
amount and allocation of U.S. military aid, too, did not make the Turks happy.
Chapter IV also showed that considerable U.S. economic and military assistance to
Turkey and Turkey's importance for U.S. strategic interests constituted the most
important factor in the continuity of the two states' alliance.
Chapter V demonstrated that the stationing of the Jupiter missiles on Turkish
territory inspired the Soviet decision to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba and made
Turkey a part of the Cuban crisis. The chapter also showed that a trade off between
Turkish and Cuban missiles was considered by U.S. officials and that the Americans
at the end made a secret deal with the Russians in this direction. Another result
was that because of its alliance relations with America Turkey came close to being
one of first targets of a nuclear war which could have broken out between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
Some conclusions of the chapters on the Cyprus question may be summarised
as follows: the United States reluctantly became involved in the matter and re-
luctantly supported the scheme to station NATO soldiers in Cyprus. U.S. officials
believed that unification of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) or enosis with some con-
cessions to Turkey would be the best solution of the Cyprus problem and worked
for such schemes. While threatening to intervene in Cyprus militarily, Turkish
rulers, especially P.M. Inönii, were not altogether determined to initiate such an
action because of unpreparedness of the Turkish army. In any case, in 1964 Amer-
ican authorities were determined to stop a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. In the
same period, Turkish authorities' hints on making changes in Turkey's traditional
Western-oriented foreign policy were not genuine but were aimed at showing their
disappointment over the Western attitude toward the Cyprus question. During
the Cyprus crisis of November 1967, U.S. rulers did not show the same harsh at-
titude toward Turkish intervention threats but seemed to give more support to
the Turkish position by working for the acceptance of Turkish demands. U.S. of-
ficials ignored assassination and coup attempts against Greek Cypriot President
Makarios between 1967 and 1974 but failed to predict the Cyprus coup on 15 July
1974. The U.S. attitude after the coup showed that it was willing to accept the
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new situation and this forced and also gave a green light to Turks to intervene in
Cyprus. U.S. efforts to stop the Turkish action were not adequate and effective but
also the Turks were unstoppable at that stage. The U.S. attitude after the Turkish
intervention tended to accept the new situation. The U.S. arms embargo against
Turkey in 1975 was mainly as a result of power competition between the Congress
and the administration. But efforts of Greek-American lobbies and Congress dis-
like for the Turkish decision to resume poppy production also played a role in the
embargo.
Chapter VIII showed that U.S. officials and especially the U.S. Congress used
pressure tactics against Turkey on the opium issue and that they were considerably
influenced in their efforts by the desire to placate American voters. Before 1971
Turkish rulers were willing to comply with U.S. demands on the matter but did not
prohibit opium production in order not to lose their thin majority in parliament.
The chapter also proved that the Turkish government's opium ban decision, which
was reached as a result of negotiations with the Americans to please them, was not
an adequate arrangement to provide a permanent solution to the problem and that
both the United States and Turkey made mistakes in its implementation. It further
became clear from the chapter that public emotions considerably motivated the
Turkish decision to resume poppy production and the reaction of the U.S. Congress
to it. Finally, the chapter showed that, contrary to U.S. predictions, the Turkish
control over opium production proved a success.
9.4 Areas for Further Study
As was noted earlier, the material available for this research was limited be-
cause some of the primary documents are still classified and some of the individuals
involved in the events concerned have not yet been able or willing to disclose all
they know. If and when those limitations are removed, the important topics for
further study and possible reassessment include:
the U.S. role in Turkish politics, e.g. in the overthrow of the Menderes
government on 27 May 1960, in the fall of the Inönü government after
losing a vote of confidence in February 1965, in the Justice Party's
1965 election victory, in the military "coup by memorandum" on 12
March 1971, in the July 1971 ban on opium production and in the
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decision to recognise the People's Republic of China in August 1971.
(Related to these topics, the relationship between the United States
and Justice Party between 1965 and 1971 - especially the latter part
of this period - deserves particular attention to discover whether or
not the U.S. authorities held hostile views towards Justice Party rulers,
especially with regard to their foreign policies.)
the U.S. role in Cyprus, especially with regard to assassination and coup
attempts against Greek Cypriot President Makarios, the July 1974
Sampson-led Cyprus coup, and the subsequent Turkish intervention.
the U.S.-Soviet deal on Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Soviet missiles in
Cuba and the significance of Turkey as a factor in the negotiations that
led to this settlement of the Cuban missiles crisis.
the power competition in the United States between Congress and the ad-
ministration in the foreign policy arena from 1969 onwards.
the real intentions of Turkish rulers when they threatened to intervene in
Cyprus in 1964 and whether they would have had the military capacity
to implement their threats.
Naturally, the research should also be carried forward into the more recent past
to examine developments since 1975. In particular U.S.-Turkish military relations
as well as the influence of the Cyprus question on U.S.-Turkish relations would
provide rewarding topics.
Although this list of subjects for further research points to inevitable short-
comings in the present work, it is hoped that this thesis nevertheless provides a
sound foundation upon which future scholars can continue to build.
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APPENDIX A
AID TO TURKEY AGREEMENT
Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey (signed
at Ankara July 12, 1947; entered into force July 12, 1947)1491
The Government of Turkey having requested the Government of the United
States for assistance which will enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces
which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence and
at the same time to continue to maintain the stability of her economy; and
The Congress of the United States, in the Act approved May 22, 1947, having
authorized the President of the United States to furnish such assistance to Turkey,
on terms consonant with the sovereign independence and security of the two
countries; and
The Government of the United States and the Government of Turkey believ-
ing that the furnishing of such assistance will help to achieve the basic objectives
of the Charter of the United Nations and by inaugurating an auspicious chap-
ter in their relations will further strengthen the ties of friendship between the
American and Turkish peoples;
The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments for
that purpose, have agreed as follows:
1491 G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington: American Enterprise Iiistitute, 1972, pp.213-
215, R.C. Campany, Turkey and the United States, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp.96-99.
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Article I
The Government of the United States will furnish the Government of Turkey
such assistance as the President of the United States may authorize to be provided
in accordance with the Act of Congress approved May 22, 1947, and any acts
amendatory or supplementary thereto. The Government of Turkey will make
effective use of any such assistance in accordance with the provisions of this
agreement.
Article II
The Chief of Mission to Turkey designated by the President of the United
States for the purpose will represent the Government of the United States on
matters relating to the assistance furnished under this agreement. The Chief of
Mission will determine, in consultation with representatives of the Government of
Turkey, the terms and conditions upon which specified assistance shall from time
to time be furnished under this agreement, except that the financial terms upon
which specified assistance shall be furnished shall be determined from time to
time in advance by agreement of the two governments. The Chief of Mission will
furnish the Government of Turkey such information and technical assistance as
may be appropriate to help in achieving the objectives of the assistance furnished
under this agreement.
The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the
purposes for which it has been accorded. In order to permit the Chief of Mission
to fulfil freely his functions in the exercise of his responsibilities, it will furnish
him as well as his representatives every facility and every assistance which he
may request in the way of reports, information and observation concerning the
utilization and progress of assistance furnished.
Article III
The Government of Turkey and the Government of the United States will
cooperate in assuring the peoples of the United States and Turkey full information
concerning the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement. To this end, in
so far as may be consistent with the security of the two countries:
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1. Representatives of the Press and Radio of the United States will be per-
mitted to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilisation of such
assistance; and
2. The Government of Turkey will give full and continuous publicity within
Turkey as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of such
assistance.
Article IV
Determined and equally interested to assure the security of any article, ser-
vice, or information received by the Government of Turkey pursuant to this agree-
ment, the Governments of the United States and Turkey will respectively take
after consultation, such measures as the other government may judge necessary
for this purpose. The Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the con-
sent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such
article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such arti-
cle or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer,
employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than
that for which the article or information is furnished.
Article V
The Government of Turkey will not use any part of the proceeds of any loan,
credit, grant, or other form of aid rendered pursuant to this agreement for the
making of any payment on account of the principal or interest on any loan made
to it by any other foreign government.
Article VI
Any or all assistance authorised to be provided pursuant to this agreement
will be withdrawn:
1. If requested by the Government of Turkey;
2. If the Security Council of the United Nations finds (with respect to which
finding the United States waives the exercise of any veto) or the General Assembly
of the United Nations finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United
Nations makes the continuance of assistance by the Government of the United
States pursuant to this agreement unnecessary or undesirable; and
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3. Under any of the other circumstances specified in section 5 of the aforesaid
Act of Congress or if the President of the United States determines that such
withdrawal is in the interest of the United States.
Article VII
This agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in
force until a date to be agreed upon by the two governments.
Article VIII
This agreement shall be registered with the United Nations.
Done in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, at Ankara, this 12th
day of July, 1947.
Edwin C. Wilson for the Government of the United States
Hasan Saka for the Government of the Republic of Turkey
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APPENDIX B
AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING NATO STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT
Agreement, with Minutes of Understanding, between the United
States of America and Turkey Implementing Status of Forces Agree-
ment of June 19, 1951, between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty (signed at Ankara June 23, 1954; entered into force June 23, 1954)1492
For the implementation of the "Agreement Between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Status of their Forces," dated June 19, 1951, the
two Governments have agreed as follows:
1. All persons who are relatives of, and in accordance with United States
laws or regulations, depending for support upon and actually residing with any
member of a United States force or the civilian component, except those who are
not United States citizens, shall also be considered dependants and will be treated
in all respects as those persons defined in Article I, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph
c, of the aforesaid NATO Agreement.
2. For the purpose of the application of the aforesaid NATO Agreement and of
the provisions of this Agreement, persons "who are in the employ of' the United
States armed services, within the meaning of Article I-i (b) of the aforesaid NATO
Agreement, and without prejudice to the other requirements of that Article, shall
include employees of United States military organizations, employees of United
States Government departments, Post Exchanges, and recreational organizations
for military personnel, Red Cross and United Services Organization personnel,
and technical representatives of contractors with the United States forces who
are assigned to United States military organizations in Turkey. All of these
persons are subject to United States military law. Should any other specific
categories become involved, the United States Government would wish to discuss
their inclusion in this paragraph with the authorities of the Turkish Government.
1492 G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.217-
220, R.C. Cainpany, Turkey and the United States, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp.100-102.
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3. Residence documents to the members of the civilian component and the
dependants described in paragraph 1 of this Agreement, as well as the dependants
described in Article I, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c, of the Agreement regarding
the Status of NATO Forces, will be issued without fees, except for administrative
expenses incurred in issuing the documents.
4. It is the agreed understanding of the Parties that reasonable quantities
of provisions, supplies and other goods imported for the exclusive use of United
States personnel, directly by special military agencies of the United States, such
as post exchanges, commissaries, and officers' clubs, shall be accorded duty-free
entry under the terms of Article XI, paragraph 4, of the aforesaid NATO Agree-
ment in accordance with arrangements to be agreed with the appropriate Turkish
authorities. It is understood that such provisions, supplies and other goods will
be subject to agreed certification by an authorized United States official, and
to inspection by Turkish customs for conformance with the certificates which
shall be drawn up in accordance with the agreed arrangements mentioned above.
It is further agreed that such special military agencies as post exchanges, com-
missaries, and officers' clubs will be permitted to operate at agreed locations
without licenses, inspections or taxes and other charges. Categories of articles to
be agreed between appropriate United States and Turkish authorities may be sold
by these official United States military agencies only to authorized United States
personnel. Administrative measures shall be taken by United States military
authorities, in cooperation with the appropriate Turkish authorities, to prevent
the resale or transfer in any way of merchandise sold under the provisions of
this paragraph to persons not entitled to purchase items from such agencies, and
generally to prevent the abuse of the facilities provided for in this paragraph.
5. In the implementation of Article XI of the aforesaid NATO Agreement,
with respect to the duty-free entry of personal and household effects, it is under-
stood that the free importation of such effects will be permitted from two months
prior to six months after the arrival of the individual concerned or of any of his
dependencies.
6. It is understood that sales of personal and household effects and auto-
mobiles, taking place between individuals entitled to customs-free entry, are not
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subject to Turkish taxes.
7. It is understood that in the case of any damages in Turkey, caused by
persons referred to in paragraph 2 above who are not paid from appropriations
made to the United States Department of Defense, which require, under the
provisions of Article VIII of the aforesaid NATO Agreement, the payment of
an amount in order to satisfy the claimant with respect to such damages, the
Turkish Government shall pay such amount. Procedures with respect to the
reimbursement to the Turkish Government of such amounts shall be the subject
of special arrangements agreed between the two Governments.
In witness whereof the respective representatives, duly authorised for the
purpose, have signed the present Agreement.
Done at Ankara, Turkey, in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages,
each of which shall be of equal authenticity, this twenty-third day of June, 1954.
For the Government of the United States of America: Avra M. Warren
For the Government of the Republic of Turkey: Fuat Köprülü
Minute of Understanding with Respect to Paragraph Four of the
"Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic
of Turkey Relative to the Implementation of the 'Agreement between
the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Status of Their
Forces"
It is not the intention of the Turkish Government to prohibit the sale of
articles normally sold through United States special military agencies. A.M.W.
and F.K.
Minute of Understanding Regarding Paragraph Seven of the Agree-
ment between the Republic of Turkey and the United States of America
Relative to the Implementation of the "Agreement between the Parties
to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces"
It is understood that the United States Government is able to accept re-
sponsibility for repayment only with respect to claims arising from the acts of
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employees paid from appropriated funds of the Department of Defense. With
respect to claims arising from the acts of all other members of the civilian com-
ponent it is understood that the United States will exercise its good offices to
make satisfactory arrangements with the responsible entities for reimbursing the
Turkish Government. However, the United States Government under existing
laws can accept no financial liability with respect to the latter category of claims.
A.M.W. and F.K.
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APPENDIX C
AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION, MARCH 5, 1959
Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey
(signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959)'3
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Turkey,
Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves
at London on July 28, 1958;
Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed
at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, the parties signatory thereto agreed to coop-
erate for their security and defence, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-
mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the
interest of world peace, agreed to cooperate with the Governments making that
Declaration for their security and defence;
Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact
of Mutual Cooperation making that Declaration affirmed their determination to
maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect;
Considering further that the Government of the United States of America is
associated with the work of the major committees of the Pact of Mutual Coop-
eration signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955;
Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations;
Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as
'	 G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.221-
223.
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vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the indepen-
dence and integrity of Turkey;
Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance granted to
the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United
States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the
Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East; and
Considering that similar agreements are being entered into by the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Governments of Iran and Pakistan,
respectively,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Government of Turkey is determined to resist aggression. In case of
aggression against Turkey, the Government of the United States of America, in
accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such
appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed
upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability
in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Turkey at its request.
Article II
The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the
Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws of the United States
of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Turkey, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Turkey
such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey,
in order to assist the Government of Turkey in the preservation of its national
independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic devel-
opment.
Article III
The Government of Turkey undertakes to utilise such military and economic
assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America
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in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments
associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the
purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Turkey and of
preserving its national independence and integrity.
Article IV
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Turkey will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration
signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such
defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the
other applicable provisions of this agreement.
Article V
The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the cooperation be-
tween the two Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or
arrangements.
Article VI
This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall
continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written
notice of the intention of the other Government to terminate the agreement.
Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.
For the Government of the United States of America: Fletcher Warren
For the Government of the Republic of Turkey: Fatin Riitü Zorlu
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APPENDIX D
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN U.S. PRESIDENT JOHNSON
AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTER INONU
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO TURKISH PRIME
MINISTER INONU JUNE 5, 1964'°
Dear Mr. Prime Minister,
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Am-
bassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government
is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of
Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not
consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far reaching
consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your government to consult
fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you postponed
your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally
whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your government, in effect,
to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support
over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge
you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States
before any such action is taken.
It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is
permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call
your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by
Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the Island, a
solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that
treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the
United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been
exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to
take unilateral action is not yet applicable.
1494 the Middle East Journal, vol.20, Summer 1966, pp.3&5-388, M. Stearns, Entangled Al-
lies, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, pp.156-159.
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I must call to your attention also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of
NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in
Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces.
Secretary of State Rusk declared at a recent meeting of the ministerial council of
NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered
as "literally unthinkable." Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that
NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have
buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less
can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in
Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope
you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider
whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if
Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent
and understanding of its NATO allies.
Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey
as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on
the island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past
several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents
of violence on that island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed
his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations
would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would
defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United
Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this
difficult problem.
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agree-
ment between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance.
Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government
is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for
purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Govern-
ment has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully
understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States
cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a
Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.
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Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel
obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that
such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish
Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash
the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be
sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you
are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent
such a catastrophe.
You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we
are disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to
assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly
and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final
solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most
directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States
has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our
policy has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens (where demonstrations have
been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United
States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our
conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey.
We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests.
Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people
and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we
have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution.
This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means
a great deal to your government and to your people. We have no intention
of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish
Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this
is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure
you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the
Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.
Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, I must tell you that you have posed the gravest
issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral
relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly
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involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because
of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could
produce. You have your responsibilities as chief of the government of Turkey; I
also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you
in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will
not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept
your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for
emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security
Council.
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation.
Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional
position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a
full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy
responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful
resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions
which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the
fullest and frankest consultation.
Sincerely,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
341
PRIME MINISTER INONU'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHN-
SON, JUNE 13, 1964.1495
Dear Mr. President,
I have received your message of June 5, 1964 through Ambassador Hare. We
have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral
action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee. With due regard
to the spirit of candour and friendship in which your message is meant to be
written, I will, in my reply, try also explain to you in full frankness my views
about the situation.
Mr. President,
Your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an
ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its
relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substan-
tial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these
relations.
It is my sincere hope that both these divergences and the general tone of your
message are due to the haste in which a representation made in good-will was,
under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected.
In the first place, it is being emphasized in your message that we have failed
to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was
deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a
military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days
of 1963. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United
States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25,
1963, we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the
other guaranteeing powers only to be answered that the United States was not a
party to this issue. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for
intervention and, as you know, a tri-partite military administration under British
command was set-up on December 26, 1963. Upon the failure of the London
'	 The Middle East Journal, vol.20, Summer 1966, pp.388-393.
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conference and of the joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of
Makarios and in the face of continuing assaults in the island against the Turkish
Cypriots, we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage
of the visit of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we informed again the United States
of the gravity of the situation. We tried to explain to you that the necessity
of intervention to restore order in the island might arise in view of the vacuum
caused by the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals and we informed you
that we might have to intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees
from you on specific issues and your answers were in the affirmative. However,
you asked us not to intervene and assured us that Makarios would get at the
United Nations a severe lesson while all the Turkish rights and interests would
be preserved.
We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured
at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations force, decided
upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for intervention
was felt for the third time to protect Turkish community against the assaults
of the terrorists in Cyprus who were encouraged by the doubts as to whether
the United Nations forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the
Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964. But assuring us that the force
would be set up very shortly, you insisted again that we refrain from interven-
ing. Thereupon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United
Nations forces to assume their duty.
Dear Mr. President,
The era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character which rendered inef-
fective all measures taken so far. From the very outset, the negotiations held
to restore security and the temporary set-ups have all helped only to increase
the aggressiveness and the destructiveness of the Makarios administration. The
Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly and considered the
United Nations as an additional instrument to back up their ruthless and un-
constitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United Nations have
neither the authority nor the intent to intervene for the restoration of constitu-
tional order and to put an end to aggression. You are well aware of the instigative
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attitude of the Greek Government towards the Greek Cypriots. During the talks
held in your office, in the United States, we informed you that under the circum-
stances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order to put an end to
the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your Secretary of State at The Hague
whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality and we re-
ceived no answer. I think, I have thus reminded you how many times and under
what circumstances we informed you of the necessity for intervention in Cyprus.
I do remember having emphasised to your high level officials our due apprecia-
tion of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States within the
alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to enable her
to maintain solidarity within the alliance. As you see, we never had the intention
to confront you with a unilateral decision on our part. Our grievance stems from
our inability to explain to you a problem which caused us for months utmost
distress and from your refusal to take a frank and firm stand on the issue as to
which party is on the right side in the dispute between two allies, namely, Turkey
and Greece.
Mr. President,
In your message you further emphasize the obligation of Turkey, under the
provisions of the Treaty, to consult with the other two guaranteeing powers, before
taking any unilateral action. Turkey is fully aware of this obligation. For the past
six months we have indeed complied with the requirements of this obligation. But
Greece has, not only thwarted all the attempts made by Turkey to seek jointly the
ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from repudiating international treaties,
but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman acts and has even encouraged
them.
The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the
international agreements it signed with us were no longer in force. Various ex-
amples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in detail, orally and in
writing, to your State Department.
We have likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the
Government of the United Kingdom, the other guaranteeing power.
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In several instances we have, jointly with the Government of the United
Kingdom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring
constitutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail
due to the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities.
As you see, Turkey has earnestly explored every avenue of consulting contin-
uously and acting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers. This being
the fact, it can not be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligation
of consulting with the other two guaranteeing powers before taking unilateral
action.
I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the United States Government which
has felt the need to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consultation,
yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, should not have reminded
Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by
the precept "pacta sunt servanda" which is the fundamental rule of international
law. This precept which, only a fortnight ago, was most eloquently characterised
as "the basis of survival" by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at the
"American Law Institute," is now being completely and contemptuously ignored
by Greece, our NATO ally and by the Greek Cypriots.
Dear Mr. President,
As implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions of Article 4 of the
Treaty of Guarantee, the three guaranteeing powers have, in the event of a breach
of the provisions of that Treaty, the right to take concerted action and, if that
proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of
affairs created by the said Treaty. The Treaty of Guarantee was signed with this
understanding being shared by all parties thereto. The "Gentleman's Agreement"
signed on February 19, 1959 by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, is
an evidence of that common understanding.
On the other hand, at the time of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to
the United Nations, the members of the organisation were fully acquainted with
all the international commitments and obligations of the said Republic and no
objections were raised in this respect.
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Furthermore, in the course of the discussions on Cyprus leading to the reso-
lution adopted on March 4, 1964 by the Security Council, the United States Del-
egate, among others, explicitly declared that the United Nations had no power
to annul or amend international treaties.
The understanding expressed in your message that the intervention by Turkey
in Cyprus would be for the purposes of effecting the partition of the island has
caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact
that the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote
from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that
our ally, the Government of the United States, could think that Turkey might lay
aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute
loyalty to international law, commitments and obligations, as factually evidenced
in many circumstances well known to the United States.
I would like to assure you most categorically and most sincerely that if ever
Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will be done in
full conformity with the provisions and aims of international agreements.
In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President, that the postponement
of our decision does naturally, in no way affect the rights conferred to Turkey by
Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.
Mr. President,
Referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that the very
essence of NATO requires that allies should not wage war on each other and that
a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between
Turkish and Greek forces.
I am in full agreement with the first part of your statement, but the obliga-
tion for the NATO allies to respect international agreements concluded among
themselves as well as their mutual treaty rights and commitments is an equally
vital requisite of the alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their mutual
contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable.
As to the concern you expressed over the outbreak of a Turco-Greek war
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in case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in conformity with her rights and
obligations stipulated in international agreements, I would like to stress that
Turkey would undertake a "military operation" in Cyprus exclusively under the
conditions and for the purpose set forth in the agreements. Therefore, a Turco-
Greek war so properly described as "literally unthinkable" by the Honorable Dean
Rusk could only occur in case of Greece's aggression against Turkey. Our view,
in case of such an intervention, is to invite to an effective collaboration, with the
aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greece and the United
Kingdom in their capacity as guaranteeing powers. If despite this invitation and
its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we could in no way be
held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I would like to hope that
you have already seriously drawn the Greek Government's attention on these
matters.
The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO
allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as
a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are
as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of
the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of
great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will
naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO's structure
is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means that
this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the
North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come
forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only
point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of
this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong
of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether
this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an
obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a
discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose
its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come
into being immediately upon the observance of aggression. That is why Article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member
states as an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the
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party so attacked by taking forthwith such action as they deem necessary. In this
connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have
met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, as early as the stage of the
United Nations debate on the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the
Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December
1963.
As you will recall, at the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council held
three weeks ago at The Hague, it was acknowledged that the treaties continued
to be the basis for legality as regards the situation in the island and the status
of Cyprus. The fact that these agreements have been violated as a result of
the flagrantly unlawful acts of one of the parties on the island should in no way
mean that the said agreements are no longer in force and that the rights and
obligations of Turkey by virtue of those agreements should be ignored. Such an
understanding would mean that as long as no difficulties arise, the agreements
are considered as valid and they are no longer in force when difficulties occur.
I am sure you will agree with me that such an understanding of law cannot be
accepted. I am equally convinced that there could be no shadow of doubt about
the obligation to protect Turkey within the NATO Alliance in a situation that
can, by no means, be attributed to an arbitrary act of Turkey. An opposite way
of thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial of the concept of law and of
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
In your message, concern has been expressed about the commitments of
Turkey as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President you will
agree with me if I say that such a concern, which I do not share, is groundless
especially for the following reasons: Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the
most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turk-
ish people has spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations
Charter, and has even sacrificed her sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed
in supporting this organisation and, in order to secure its proper functioning,
has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing
financial difficulties. Despite the explicit rights conferred to Turkey by the Treaty
of Guarantee, my Government's respect for and adherence to the United Nations
have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security
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Council resolution of March 4, 1964 as well as by the priority it has given to the
said resolution.
Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out
their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave
concern for both you and I, would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United
Nations operations in the island have proved unable to put an end to the oppres-
sion.
The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the island for the past
few weeks marks the beginning of preparations of the Greek Cypriots for further
tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations forces, assuaging
Turkish Cypriots, enable the Greeks to gather their crops; but they do not try
to stop the Greeks when the crops of Turks are at stake and they act as mere
spectators to Greek assaults. These vitally important details may not well reach
you, whereas we live in the atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic
events.
The report of the Secretary-General will be submitted to the United Nations
on June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat
similar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4th had
further convinced Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him
and thereupon he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations forces
under his control and direction. From then on the assassination of hostages and
the besieging of villages have considerably increased.
Dear Mr. President,
Our allies who are in a position to arbiter in the Cyprus issue and to orient
it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle the problem from
a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered by the deliberate
policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the treaties and abrogat-
ing the constitution. Security can be established in the island only through the
proper functioning of an authority above the Government of Cyprus. Yet only
the measures acceptable to the Cypriot Government are being sought to restore
security in Cyprus. The British administration set up following the December
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events, the Anglo-American proposals and finally the United Nations command
have all been founded on this unsound basis and consequently every measure ac-
ceptable to Makarios has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged oppression
and aggression.
Dear Mr. President,
You put forward in your message the resentment caused in Greece by the
policy pursued by your Government. Within the content of the Cyprus issues,
the nature of the Greek policy and the course of action undertaken by Greece
indicate that she is apt to resort to every means within her power to secure
the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains to make our
allies understand the sufferings we bear in our rightful cause and the irretrievable
plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand, it is not the
character of our nation to exploit demonstrations of resentment. I assure you that
our distress is deeply rooted since we can not make you understand our rightful
position and convince you of the necessity of spending every effort and making
use of all your authority to avert the perils inherent in the Cyprus problem by
attaching to it the importance it well deserves.
That France and Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good ex -
ample. However, our nation had already given such an example forty years ago
by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the ruthless devastation
of the whole Anatolia by the armies of that country.
Dear Mr. President,
As a member of the Alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and
rights. We do not pursue any aim other than the settlement of the Cyprus prob-
lem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement
is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme
authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation.
Mr. President,
I thank you for your statement emphasising the value attached by the United
States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your kind words about the
350
Turkish nation. I shall be happy to come to the United States to talk the Cyprus
problem with you. The United Nations Security Council will meet on June the
17th. In the meantime, Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO, will have
paid a visit to Turkey. Furthermore, the United Nations mediator Mr. Tuomioja
will have submitted his report to the Secretary-General. These developments
may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It will be possible for me to go
abroad to join you, at a date convenient for you, immediately after June 20th.
It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined views
and designs you may have on the Cyprus question so that I may be able to study
them thoroughly before my departure for Washington.
Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the frank, fruitful and
promising talks we had with Mr. G. Ball in Ankara just before forwarding this
message to you.
Sincerely,
ISMET INONU,
Prime Minister of Turkey.
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APPENDIX E
DUTY STATUS AGREEMENT
Duty Status Agreement (entered into force September 24, 1968)1496
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note No: 6302/5399, Ankara,
September 24, 1968
Excellency:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Note of September 24,
1968 which reads as follows:
"Excellency:
I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of our two
Governments concerning duty certificates in implementation of Article VII, para-
graph 3 (a) (ii) of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces and have the honour to propose the
following:
Article I
In case of offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of
official duty, the duty certificates will, in conformity with the spirit and the letter
of the Agreement between the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding
the Status of Their Forces and according to the practices in the other NATO
countries, be issued by the authorities of the Sending State and will be put into
effect by the authorities of the Government of Turkey in conformity with the
spirit and the letter of the Agreement between the Parties of the North Atlantic
Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces, and according to the practices in
the other NATO countries.
Article II
In implementation of Article I, the following procedures shall apply:
1496 G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.225-
228.
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A. Upon being informed that the accused is entitled to benefit from the
provisions of the aforesaid Agreement, the Public Prosecutor of the locality where
the offense has been committed shall inquire of the Turkish General Staff, through
the Ministry of Justice, whether the offense arose out of any act or omission done
in the performance of official duty. The Turkish General Staff shall then inquire of
the concerned authorities of the Sending State about this matter. (If the Sending
State is the United States, the concerned authority will be the highest ranking
commanding officer of the United States Forces in Turkey.)
B. If after investigation, the concerned authorities of the Sending State deem
that a certificate, attesting that the alleged offense arose out of any act or omission
done in the performance of official duty, should be issued in conformity with the
provisions of Article I above, one copy of that certificate shall be forwarded
immediately to the Turkish General Staff and another to the commander of the
unit to which the accused is assigned or attached.
C. If accepted by the TGS the duty certificate will be sent through the Min-
istry of Justice, to the Public Prosecutor of the locality where the offense has
been committed. Upon receipt of the duty certificate from the Ministry of Jus-
tice, the action against the accused shall be suspended by the competent judicial
authorities, and the file of the accused shall be sent to the TGS. The TGS will
then, except in cases covered by paragraphs (D) and (E) below, forward the file to
the concerned authorities of the Sending State. The case against the accused will
then be dismissed. The concerned authorities of the Sending State will officially
inform the TGS of the outcome of the case.
D. If not found acceptable by the TGS and withdrawn by the concerned au-
thorities of the Sending State, the TGS will, through [the] Ministry of Justice,
so notify the Public Prosecutor of the locality where the offense has been com-
mitted. The Public Prosecutor of the said locality will, through the Ministry of
Justice, inform the Turkish General Staff of the outcome of the case. The latter
will in turn transmit this information to the concerned authorities of the Sending
State.
E. If the duty certificate is not found acceptable by the TGS and not with-
drawn by the concerned authorities of the Sending State, the Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs will be informed with a view to reaching an agreement through negotia-
tions with the diplomatic representative of the Sending State with the participa-
tion of TGS and a military representative of the Sending State and in consultation
with other concerned Turkish authorities. In the meantime the duty certificate,
as well as the legal action against the accused, will be suspended without affecting
the availability of the accused for trial by Turkish courts if the duty certificate is
not found acceptable. The outcome of these negotiations such as the acceptance
of the duty certificate or its withdrawal by the concerned military authorities of
the Sending State will be communicated to the Public Prosecutor of the local-
ity where the offense has been committed, in the same manner as foreseen in
paragraphs (C) and (D) above, for appropriate action."
I have the honor to propose that, if the foregoing is acceptable to the Govern-
ment of Turkey, this note and Your Excellency's reply concurring therein shall
constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into
force on the date of Your Excellency's reply. It is the understanding of my Gov-
ernment that the agreement concerning duty certificates contained in the aides-
memoire which were exchanged on July 28, 1956, will be considered terminated
on that same date.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
His Excellency Ihsan Sabri çalayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Turkey, Ankara
His Excellency Parker Thompson Hart, Ambassador of the United States of
America
Minute of Understanding
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note No: 6302/5400, Ankara,
September 24, 1968
Excellency:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Note of September 24,
1968, which reads as follows:
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"Excellency:
I have the honour to refer to my note to you of this date, referring to discussion
between representatives of our two Governments, concerning duty certificates in
implementation of Article VII, paragraph 3 (a) (ii) of the Agreement between the
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces and
wish to propose the following agreed minute:
The United States negotiators have indicated that the practices in other
NATO countries are to accept the U.S.-issued duty certificate with provision
for discussion of exceptional cases.
The Turkish negotiators have indicated that the phrase 'put into effect' cor-
responds to 'ilem görecektir' in Turkish.
In the interest of fulfilling the provisions of the NATO SOFA, which require
than an accused person of the Sending State shall receive prompt and speedy
trial, and in the interest of the proper and effective administration of justice, the
Government of Turkey will permit the Sending State to take appropriate action
under its own laws in the case at hand when negotiations have not resulted in an
agreement within two months. The TGS will forward the duty certificate through
the Ministry of Justice to the Public Prosecutor concerned. The case against the
accused will then be dismissed. The file of the accused will be forwarded to
the concerned authorities of this Sending State. The Government of Turkey will
take the necessary steps with the appropriate authorities to give effect to this
provision. The issues upon which agreement had not been reached shall continue
to be the subject of discussion with a view to achieving a resolution to be applied
in future cases involving similar issues.
I would appreciate being informed of the concurrence of Your Excellency's
Government in the foregoing agreed minute.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."
In reply, I have the honor to inform You that my Government is in concurrence
with the foregoing agreed minute.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
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His Excellency Parker Thompson Hart, Ambassador of the United States of
America, Ankara
His Excellency Ihsan Sabri ca1ayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs
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APPENDIX F
TURKISH GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE July 3, 19691497
Upon proposal by The Government of the Republic of Turkey to the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America on April 7, 1966, to the effect that ne-
gotiations be started with a view to amending the military facilities Agreement
entered into between the two Governments on June 23, 1954 and acceptance by
the Government of the United States of America of this proposal on April 18,
1966, both Governments have initiated preparatory work on this subject at the
level of national authorities.
Following careful studies carried out by the national authorities, the represen-
tatives of the two Governments officially started negotiations to this effect. After
two years and four months of extensive and detailed negotiations which took place
in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cordial relationship that has al-
ways characterised the bonds of friendship between Turkey and the United States
of America, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of
the United States of America have today concluded an Agreement relating to
the collective security measures to be taken by the two Governments pursuant to
Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Agreement signed today within the framework of the North Atlantic
Treaty, designed to lay down the basic principles of the defence cooperation be-
tween the two Governments, as well as to codify and clarify current arrangements
in accordance with these basic principles and to determine the conditions of the
United States participation in the Turkish defence measures under the North At-
lantic Treaty constitutes a milestone in the history of close bonds of friendship
and alliance between the two countries.
The North Atlantic Treaty in its Article III provides that "the parties, sepa-
rately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,
will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed
attack." It is under this Article of the North Atlantic Treaty that the United
1497 the Middle East Journal, vol.24, Winter 1970, pp.72-73.
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States has participated in Turkey's defence measures, since her entry into NATO
in 1952 in pursuit of this objective.
As was made public by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of
budget debates early this year at the Grand National Assembly, the principles laid
down and mutually agreed upon in the Agreement signed today are universally
recognized as governing the relations between sovereign and equal partners.
This Agreement, further sustained by the inherent rights for individual and
collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, reflects
the earnest intention of both Governments, while they continue in the search for
peace, to maintain each nation's respective obligations with regard to the security
and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. As it is conceived within NATO,
this Agreement does not provide for additional commitments.
The mutual cooperation between the two parties envisaged in this Agreement
is based on reciprocal respect for each other's equal rights and sovereignty.
Any measures for the common defense in which the Government of the United
States of America may participate in Turkey may be initiated after the complete
and detailed approval of the Government of Turkey.
The Government of the Republic of Turkey retains the ownership of the land
areas made available to common defence installations as well as all non-removable
property, including property incorporated in the soil, constructed or installed
on the land areas allocated by the Government of the Republic of Turkey for
the purposes of this Agreement. No rent is envisaged in the Agreement for the
allocation of such land areas for common defence installations.
Turkey also retains the right to assign a suitable number of Turkish military
and civilian personnel to all facilities.
The nature, purpose and duration of each common defence installation must
be approved by the Government of the Republic of Turkey.
Turkey has the right of inspection of all facilities to verify that the nature and
purpose of the common defence effort under this Agreement conforms to mutual
goals of both nations as specified in implementing Agreements.
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Within the terms of this Agreement, it is clear that the Government of the
United States of America holds no secrets from the Government of the Republic
of Turkey.
Both Governments are bound to the terms of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement signed on June 19, 1951 and approved by the Grand National Assem-
bly under Law No. 6375, which delineates the treatment to be accorded to the
personnel sent by one NATO state to serve in the territory of another. Admin-
istrative matters covering the sending of such personnel are covered in full detail
in this Agreement.
The Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United
States of America have agreed that the principle of joint operation and use should
be applied to all common defence installations permitted to function by the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Turkey for the realisation of the purposes of this
Agreement.
This Agreement also provides for certain measures from which the Turk-
ish economy will benefit. For instance, local civilian labor will be used in the
construction, operation and maintenance of common defence installations, and
materials, equipment and supplies required by the United States for the purposes
of this Agreement will be procured in Turkey to the maximum practicable extent.
American military personnel and civilian employees of the military personnel
and their dependents assigned to common defence installations in Turkey are
bound to respect the legislation of the Republic of Turkey.
There will be a special regulation for display of national flags respecting the
legislation of the Republic of Turkey.
The Agreement states that the Government of the United States of America
will provide support to the Turkish defence effort at a level to be determined
through mutual consultations, subject to congressional action.
The Government of the Republic of Turkey has the right in cases of national
emergency to take the required restrictive measures for the safeguarding of na-
tional existence all through the emergency period.
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The provisions of the Montreux Convention are reserved.
Both nations are dedicated to common goals, and in the spirit of partners
everywhere, are prepared to consult jointly to give effect to this Agreement and
to overcome any differences which may arise.
Under this Agreement, which shall remain valid as long as the parties are
members of, and bound by, the North Atlantic Treaty, either party may, when
necessary, ask that negotiations be entered into to amend or end the Agreement.
Both Governments believe that the Agreement, the basic features of which
are given above, will regularise the defence cooperation between the two countries
and prevent misunderstandings and criticisms.
The two Governments look forward to the continued close cooperation and
harmony that has marked relations between the two countries for many years.
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APPENDIX G
REPORT OF TURKISH PRIME MINISTER SULEYMAN DEMIREL'S
PRESS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 7, 1970
Prime Minister Explains Bilateral Treaties and NATO'498
ANKARA- On Saturday at his 17th press conference the Prime Minister
explained the bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the U.S.A. under
article 3 of the NATO Pact and the new NATO strategy. He said that over the
25 years of the alliance, 91 bilateral agreements had been signed and 54 of them
had been in force when the JP had come to power in October 1965. Of these
agreements 13 had been signed under the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement and
were the most important.
"Above all I should like to point out that no bilateral agreement against the
national interests has been signed in the JP period. On the contrary, intelligence
flights, which were conducted on the basis of an agreement signed previously,
were stopped on 28 December 1965, shortly after the JP came to office when an
American intelligence aircraft was lost in the Black Sea. This incident was made
the excuse to revise the agreements concerning bilateral defence setups.
"It is observed that while criticisms are made about bilateral agreements,
points concerning multilateral setups are confused with bilateral agreements.
"At the talks we conducted with the U.S.A. we did not discuss the subjects
concerning multilateral cooperation. As is known, multilateral defence setups
in NATO are infrastructural, atomic support and communication arrangements.
Under the infrastructural arrangements installations totalling TL 4,000 m., such
as airfields, communication installations, war headquarters, fuel pipelines, early
detection radar systems, have all been turned over to the Turkish Armed Forces.
"The subject to which our Government has given priority has been the Mili-
tary Facilities Agreement signed on 23 June 1954 and the agreements concluded
in connection with it."
1498 Pulse (Ankara), No.1661, February 9, 1970 quoted by G.S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Wash-
ington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.229-238.
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Explaining the nature of the 13 agreements signed under the 1954 Military
Facilities Agreement, Demirel said, "Some of these agreements concern the radar
installations needed both for the defence of our country and that of our NATO
allies. Because some of these have been taken over by the Turkish Armed Forces,
at present only the Karamürsel, Sinop and Diyarbakir bases have a joint defence
installation nature. Other of the agreements concern the cooperation between the
Turkish and American Ground, Naval and Air Forces. The rest concern airfields.
Of these only the Incirlik airfield in Adana is now in existence as a joint defence
force.
"The aircraft in incirlik which are located there in accordance with the NATO
joint defence plans constitute part of NATO's general deterrent force. They come
under the Supreme Allied Command for Europe (SACEUR) and this Command is
attached to the NATO Council. As is known, Turkey is represented in the NATO
Council. The NATO Council cannot take a decision without the participation
of Turkey. And without the decision of the Council SACEUR cannot order the
NATO-assigned aircraft in Incirlik to take action. It is out of the question for
these aircraft to be used for any purpose other than NATO defence. For these
reasons, it is impossible for these aircraft to drag Turkey into a war against her
will, without any reason.
"The radar stations are passive defence installations. They are needed for
both Turkey's and other NATO members' defence. They help to detect dangers
against Turkey and NATO members. It is the most natural sovereignty right
for every country to take measures concerning its defence. As is seen, there is
nothing against sovereignty or provocative in these agreements.
"The NATO Armies, the Turkish Armed Forces among them, are equipped
with nuclear arms in accordance with NATO resolutions. These arms menace no
one. They are entirely defensive and short-range. They make deterrence more
effective. They can be used in no way without Turkey's consent. They constitute
no added menace or threat for Turkey. On the contrary, they gain for her an
additional defence power."
Passing on to a comparison of what the situation was when the Justice Party
came to power and what it was when it signed the Joint Defence Cooperation
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Agreement on 3 July 1969, Demirel said, "I have explained above the nature and
content of the 13 agreements. What did we do with the Joint Defence Cooperation
Agreement of 3 July 1969?
"First we abrogated the Military Facilities Agreement of 23 June 1954. Sec-
ondly under the light of the past practice we introduced a discipline with a series
of principles. We made a model covering all the agreements. This model will
be applied to all 13 agreements and the adjustments that will be needed will be
made....
"At the end of 1965 there were airfields and installations, electronic intelli-
gence centres, communications posts and support installations active in Turkey
under the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement and other bilateral agreements
signed within it. In these installations they used to run flight, periodic train-
ing, electronic intelligence, communications and scientific activities. In an area
of 35,000 dönüms (one 'dönüm'= 1,000 sq. meters) in more than ten places in
our country, there were about 23,000 military and civilian Americans with their
relatives.
"This was the actual situation when we took up office at the end of 1965. As
for the legal situation: In the over ten years preceding 1965 there were scattered
agreements concluded by several authorities not based on any principles. Besides,
we were up against a practice whose legal grounds and content was not known
and which led to great difficulty and complaints.
"What have we done in the question of the bilateral agreements? We stopped
such flights: as from 28 December 1965 after an American reconnaissance aircraft
was lost in the Black Sea. We have not allowed these flights since.
"After long and meticulous preparations and two years, four months of ne-
gotiations we signed the 3 July 1969 agreement and abrogated the 1954 Military
Facilities Agreement.
"The agreements based on the Military Facilities Agreement will also be
reviewed quickly and those which do not conform to the principles of the 3 July
1969 agreement will also be abrogated. The talks on this topic are continuing
between the military authorities of the two countries."
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Demirel then said that the JP Government had signed 15 bilateral agreements
with the U.S.A. since it had taken over on 27 October 1965. All these agreements
concerned military aid to Turkey under which Turkey received over 600 million-
dollar aid in five years. None of the agreements concerned the foundation of a
new installation or the expansion of the activities in any existing one. And none
contained any provision that would drag Turkey into a war against her will.
"Since 1965, among the installations set up under the Military Facilities
Agreement, the joint defence installations in Anadolukavai and in Gö1bai near
Ankara have been completely turned over to our Armed Forces. Agreement has
been reached for the total delivery to the Turkish Armed Forces of the Izmir
(cili) airfield and the Trabzon and Samsun radar installations. The actual units
have now left çili and only maintenance personnel and the persons in charge
of delivery remain. By 30 June 1970 the base will be totally taken over by the
Turkish Armed Forces and their resources and ability will thus be increased by
approximately 40-45 million dollars.
"At present there are joint defence installations run under the 3 July 1969
agreement in five places in our country. These are the radar installations in
Kocaeli (Karamürsel), Diyarbakir (Pirinclik) and Sinop, the airfield in Adana
(Incirlik) and the headquarters and logistics installations in Ankara (Balgat).
The total area they cover is 19,500 'döniim's. On 1 January 1970 the Ameri-
can military and civilian personnel, including the platoon-company size units in
the transport terminals in Istanbul, Izmir and Iskenderun, totalled about 7,000.
When the Samsun, Trabzon and cigli installations are completely taken over by
our Armed Forces by 1 July 1970 the number will be reduced to about 6,000."
The Prime Minister also explained the principles which the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the General Staff had established for the 3 July 1969 agreement.
They had been approved by the National Security Council. The following were
the highlights of the agreement which had been read in Parliament:
"1. All activities run in Turkey under joint defence cooperation will be based
on the mutual cooperation foreseen in article 3 of the NATO Pact and will never
exceed the limits of NATO commitments.
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"2. The commitments in question will conform to the scope and principles of
the U.N. Charter.
"3. The agreements and application of them will be run under the principles
of mutual sovereignty and equality.
"4. No action can be taken for the foundation of a joint defence installation
or its activities without Turkey's consent.
"5. The property rights of the areas where joint defence installations are set
up belong to the Turkish Republic. The installations to be set up on them will
also be the Turkish Republic's property. They are not even leased.
"6. The control of the Turkish Government over the joint defence installations
and the activities from them will be full and absolute. Turkey will inspect all these
installations as she finds it necessary to ensure that they are used in accordance
with the agreements.
"7. Turkey will locate as many military and civilian personnel in these in-
stallations as she wishes.
"8. The foreign personnel in these installations will be subject to the NATO
Forces' Status Convention signed on 19 June 1951 and the agreement signed on
23 June 1954.
"9. The Turkish Government will allow the U.S. Government to engage in
any of the joint defence activities in Turkey only after it has full and detailed
knowledge of them.
"10. The nature, scope and period of each of the joint defence installations
have to be approved by the Turkish Government.
"11. The amount, arms and equipment and suppiy provisions of the American
personnel to take up duty in the installations under the NATO Forces' Status
Convention will be subject to the provisions which will enable the control of the
Turkish Government.
"12. The Turkish Government will be able to take every restrictive measure
for the maintenance of the national interests, throughout national emergency
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cases.
"13 . The provisions of the Montreux Convention have been reserved.
"14. Joint defence installations are based on the principle of joint utilization.
"15. The principle in the construction, operation and maintenance of joint
defence installations is to use a Turkish labour force.
"16. The material, equipment and supply goods to be required by the U.S. for
the purposes of the agreement will be procured from Turkey, as much as possible.
"17. Foreign employees and their relatives to be employed by American
personnel assigned to the joint defence installations will have to observe the
legislation of the Turkish Republic.
"18. A special regulation conforming to the Turkish legislation will be in force
in joint defence installations in connection with the hoisting of national flags.
"19. Disagreements concerning the application of the agreement will be solved
through mutual negotiation and the Council of Ministers will be able to stop the
practice pending the solution of the disagreement.
"20. Even though the agreement will be in force as long as the parties con-
cerned are attached to the NATO Pact, each one of the parties will be able to
ask for negotiations for the amendment or denunciation of the agreement.
"The U.S.A. has also pledged with the agreement to extend aid for Turkey's
defence efforts, in accordance with her constitution."
Demirel also explained that the rules since 1956 about the trial of Americans
committing crimes in Turkey had been changed and they now conformed to the
rules of other NATO countries and further than this, still it was agreed through
exchange of Notes on 24 September 1968 that the Turkish General Staff would
have the last word on deciding whether or not the American concerned was on
duty when the crime was committed.
"There is no provocative installation in Turkey that would attract lightning to
Turkey. All joint defence installations are legitimate defence arrangements. They
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have no provocative or aggressive characteristic. To oppose such arrangements
is tantamount to wanting Turkey to be blind and deaf. For the maintenance of
the deterrence power of the Alliance certain intelligence information is needed.
There are no strategic missiles in Turkey. The installations in Turkey are passive
installations. The squadron allotted to NATO in Incirlik cannot be used outside
NATO plans which are totally defensive. Turkey has a say in the preparation of
NATO plans. It is natural that the procedure foreseen in our Constitution will
be observed in taking these decisions."
Answering criticisms about the period of the 3 July 1969 agreement and the
procedure concerning its denunciation, the Prime Minister said that it was normal
and logical for the agreement to remain in force as long as the NATO Pact was in
force. Yet Turkey had the possibility of denouncing the agreement even if NATO
membership continued. "Also it was foreseen in the agreement that joint defence
activities and installations have certain periods. These periods will be established
by the application agreements concerned. The Government has the right to put
an end to them before the periods stipulated in the application agreements, when
necessary.
"The claim that putting an end to the 3 July 1969 agreement and other ap-
plication agreements dealing with joint defence will take four and a half years is
not true. It is understood that this conclusion is derived from adding together
the maximum periods for the procedure involved in denunciation. When denun-
ciation is found necessary first a six-month consultation period is accepted. If
the situation necessitating the denunciation is not eliminated in this period, with
a notification the denunciation will be made and then the liquidation period will
begin. The durations of these periods will change in every special situation and
will not in any case exceed two years. Under this the agreement will disappear in
two years at the most, following the six-month consultation period. This is the
maximum period and the term 'within' enables its realization before. Even under
the maximum periods the denunciation is materialized in two and a half years,
after which period all activities foreseen in the agreement stop. The liquidation
period involves only activities about the liquidation."
The Prime Minister then said that ratification of the 3 July 1969 agreement
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by the Government was in conformity with article 65 of the constitution and Law
244.
Answering criticisms about NATO and the flexible response strategy, Demirel
said that when a nuclear balance was struck between East and West the massive
nuclear retaliation policy had necessarily been changed by the flexible response.
"An aggression against Turkey will be of a nature to change the strategic bal-
ance of Europe. The geo-strategic characteristics of Turkey does not allow an
aggression against our country to remain in a narrow area. Because an aggres-
sion against Turkey would change the strategic balance of Europe, the potential
aggressor cannot risk an operation against her unless it risks engaging in a very
extensive operation. When this is the case, aggressions against Turkey neces-
sarily involve the general nuclear guarantee secured for Europe. Consequently it
is impossible to envisage a local conventional or nuclear war against Turkey by
any rational aggressor. There is no sign in the NATO strategy to indicate that
Turkey or any other European country is considered a dispensable area."
Demirel then said that there was only one strategy in NATO and that there
was no centre/wing differentiation in the new NATO strategy. The only difference
being the existence of allied forces in the centre, in Germany and not in the wings.
NATO had offered Turkey the same thing, by placing an allied division on the
Soviet frontier but it had been rejected by Turkey.
He noted that Turkish forces had fought in Austria, Bulgaria and Rumania
in 1916 in Ottoman times. "Under the NATO defence arrangements the Turkish
forces are responsible exclusively for their own territory. It is out of the question
for any of our units to take up duty outside Anatolia or Thrace.
"For the fulfillment of mutual aid commitments in the NATO alliance and for
the execution of joint defence plans, infrastructural installations such as airfields,
submarine shelters, oil pipelines and depots, early detection and warning systems,
a joint communications network have been built in our country with NATO aid.
Also passive land intelligence systems and logistics organizations are met with
bilateral arrangements with the U.S.A. within the NATO Pact. Without such
arrangements joint defence plans cannot possibly be executed effectively. There-
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fore the claims that Turkey undertook unnecessary commitments which do not
come under NATO are untrue."
Turkey had been equipped with tactical nuclear arms according to NATO
resolutions. "At present there are in Turkey ground launching devices and nuclear
arms with limited ranges directed at the target from air and also the NIKE system
against an air raid. All are to be used for tactical defence purposes...
"In accordance with the established rules of NATO, tactical nuclear arms in
Turkey are subject to the double key system and it is impossible to use them
without Turkey's consent. The launching devices of tactical nuclear arms in
Turkey are in the hands of the personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces and no
other personnel has the right or possibility to use these arms. After NATO's
decision to use these tactical weapons, taking over the warheads; placing them in
devices and aircraft; directing and firing them at the target or flying the aircraft
are entirely in the authority of the Turkish personnel and pilots."
Demirel said that in emergencies, NATO countries could use nuclear arms
against a nuclear aggression without a decision of the NATO Council. The NATO
Nuclear Planning Council had discussed the matter at its November 1969 meeting
in Washington and taken very delicate and secret resolutions. NATO established
the necessary procedure and certain criteria for the timely utilization of tactical
nuclear arms by the members. "NATO countries are determined to further de-
velop these procedures and criteria. It is our conviction that this stage attained
in the alliance in this field is truly satisfactory under international realities today
and they reinforce NATO's deterrence."
Answering the criticism that the U.S. could bomb Soviet targets from Incirlik
and thus expose Turkey to a nuclear counter-blow, the Prime Minister noted that
both the Soviet Union and the U.S. knew that even a limited nuclear aggression
would soon lead to total nuclear retaliation by the other party, considering the
importance of even seconds in such an eventuality. "When this is the case, the
American desire to put Turkey in trouble would be tantamount to putting herself
in trouble and it is inconceivable."
About the criticisms that NATO commitments and aid were not automatic
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under article 5 of the Pact, Demirel said that it was indeed so under article 5 but
a necessary shortcoming. "In a collective security system formed by independent
and sovereign States the agreement could not have been expected to have been
otherwise. Like Turkey, other NATO countries are also tied by the provisions of
their constitutions and the will of their parliaments." If it had been otherwise it
would have been against article 110 of the Turkish constitution. However, there
were certain measures to counter this shortcoming in NATO. These joint measures
were: the NATO early detection and warning system; the communications and
intelligence network; the joint defence plans; the Mobile Force of the European
Allied Command.
He explained that under the Mobile Force arrangement light infantry battal-
ions composed of German, U.S., Benelux, British, Italian and Canadian forces
and NATO air support forces would come to the political tension area in NATO
even before the outbreak of war. Thus the aggressor would find itself facing the
forces of eight NATO countries in addition to the national forces of that country.
This force was not very big, but it was a "live guarantee and assurance" that the
countries concerned and NATO as a whole would be beside the member subjected
to aggression.
Dernirel said that the same was the case with the NATO naval "on-call force"
which would be composed of U.S., British and Italian warships and would also
be participated in by Turkey and Greece. The criticism that this would enlarge
Turkey's responsibility area was not valid because Turkey was totally free about
complying with each "call." Also, the mission of the Turkish participant would
be established by Turkey herself. Therefore, there was no reason for anxiety. The
matter was still under study, he added.
In conclusion, Demirel said, "Had Turkey felt secure enough outside NATO
she would not have undertaken any commitment. It is also obvious that remaining
outside NATO makes Turkey a more comfortable target for those who cherish
aggressive ambitions. These calculations have been made today, as was done
before, the answers have been given and the decision taken accordingly... The
claims that Turkey will be subjected to an aggression if she remains neutral
should be taken as considerations with ulterior motives rather than valid ones."
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Answers to questions: Jupiter missiles had come to Turkey with the 30 June
1960 agreement and had been removed because they had become obsolete ac-
cording to one rumour and because of the Soviet-American bargaining during
the Cuban crisis, according to another. The news reports were wrong that the
American aircraft in Libya had been brought to Incirlik. The number of aircraft
in the Incirlik base depended on the table of organization established, he said.
The Prime Minister ruled out the possibility that tactical nuclear arms would
mean the destruction of Turkey. "Even if this consideration had been the case,
still we could not have given up tactical arms," he pointed out.
Turkey had taken no initiative about concluding a non-aggression pact with
anyone.
On being told that a Mr. Max Stuart had said that Turkey would be ex-
hausted within four or five days in the event of an aggression, Demirel said that
Turkey was no easy mouthful to swallow, as everyone had admitted. "We cannot
accept such a fate of four or five days. Turkey's defence strategy is based on the
defence of Turkey house by house, tree by tree, hill by hill, town by town, village
by village, inch by inch," he said.
Milliyet reported from Berlin on Saturday that the renowned Dr. Mansholt of
the EEC had said that he saw in Turkey's entry into the Common Market a "black
end and bankruptcy" for her. He had said that Turkey could sell the Community
no agricultural goods, nor was it anything but a dream to imagine that Turkey
could sell cars to the EEC. Asked to comment on these words, Demirel said, "It
is not right to seek abroad the authorities who think of Turkey better than us.
Let everyone deal with his own affairs. Why should Turkey enter into a setup
which would make her go bankrupt? Have we lost all wisdom?"
He wound up by saying that Turkey could use NATO arms herself and had
done so in Cyprus.
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APPENDIX H
U.S.-TURKEY DEFENCE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AGREEMENT, March 29, 198O'
Agreement for cooperation on defence and economy between the governments
of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey in accordance with
Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of
Turkey,
Reaffirming their devotion to the aims and principles of the United Nations
Charter,
Recognizing that the relationship and cooperation between them rest on the
principles of democracy, human rights, justice and social progress,
Expressing their desire to maintain the security and independence of their
respective countries and to increase the standard of living of their peoples,
Recognizing that cooperation in the fields of economy and defence, as in all
other fields, is based on full respect for the sovereignty of the Parties,
Expressing their willingness to continue their economic and related scientific
and technological cooperation both bilaterally and as members of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization and to enhance their defence cooperation as partners
within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty,
Reaffirming their determination to contribute to the strengthening of world
peace,
Taking into account the principle that the maintenance of an adequate defence
posture is an important element for the preservation of world peace and stability,
Expressing their faith in the acceleration of disarmament efforts and their
n1utual desire to contribute to this process,
1499 R.C. Cainpany, Turkey and the United States, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp.103-107.
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Acting on the basis of their continuing friendship and in recognition of their
obligations to the security and defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area and
pursuant to Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty,
Have entered into the following Agreement:
ARTICLE I
On the basis of sovereign equality and mutual interest, the Parties shall main-
tam cooperation so as to foster their economic and social development.
For this purpose, the Parties shall maintain and develop close cooperation
between the comprising economic, defence and related scientific and technical
fields.
The Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey
shall continuously review their cooperation in all these fields and identify and
implement appropriate measures for developing it.
For these purposes consultations shall be held, the level and date of which
shall be as mutually agreed between the two Governments.
ARTICLE II
Recognizing the interrelationship of economic and defence matters and the
fact that a sound defence rests on a sound economy and in order to assist each
other to fulfil their mutual responsibilities as members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Parties, as envisaged in Article II of the North Atlantic
Treaty, will exert maximum efforts to develop economic cooperation, including
commercial, economic, industrial, scientific and technological relations, between
the two Countries.
For this purpose, the Government of the United States will exert its best
efforts to provide mutually agreed financial and technical assistance to Turkey's
development efforts.
ARTICLE III
For the purpose of strengthening the mutual security cooperation between
the two Governments within the framework of Article III of the North Atlantic
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Treaty, the Government of the United States shall use its best efforts to pro-
vide the Government of the Republic of Turkey with defence equipment, services
and training in accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon. The
cooperation in this field shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary
Agreement Number 1 on Defense Support.
ARTICLE IV
In the furtherance of the spirit of Article II of this Agreement and in recog-
nition of the mutual benefits to be achieved by both Parties, the Governments of
the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey shall seek opportunities
to cooperate in the production and purchasing of appropriate defence material.
Both Parties will undertake to encourage joint investment in the above areas of
economic and defence cooperation.
For this purpose, the Government of the United States shall assist the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Turkey in mutually agreed efforts aimed at enhancing
the production, maintenance, repair and modernisation of defence material and
equipment in Turkey and will encourage new defence production projects and
two-way trade in defence material.
This cooperation shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary
Agreement Number 2 on Defense Industrial Cooperation.
ARTICLE V
1. The Government of the Republic of Turkey authorises the Government of
the United States to participate in joint defence measures at specified Turkish
Armed Forces installations.
2. The activities and technical operations of the installations shall be con-
ducted in accordance with mutually agreed purposes and programs.
3. The "Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Re-
garding the Status of Their Forces" dated June 19, 1951, shall apply to the force
and civilian component of the United States of America and their dependents
assigned or stationed in the territory of the Republic of Turkey for the purposes
of this Agreement.
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4. The extent of the defence cooperation envisaged in this Agreement shall
be limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty.
5. This cooperation shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary
Agreement Number 3 on Installations.
ARTICLE VI
Taking into consideration the sovereign equality of the Parties and for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Agreement and its Supplementary
Agreements on the basis of reciprocity, the Parties agree that:
A. The Government of the Republic of Turkey may maintain a military li-
aison office within its Embassy in the United States to carry out liaison with
appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States on questions re-
garding the exchange of information, cooperation and other defence matters of
mutual concern, including security assistance and other related subjects.
B. Likewise, the Government of the United States may maintain its organi-
zation in Turkey to carry out similar functions with appropriate authorities of
the Government of the Republic of Turkey.
ARTICLE VII
1. This Agreement and the Supplementary Agreements annexed to it shall be
valid for a period of 5 years. Unless one of the Parties notifies the other Party of
the termination of this Agreement 3 months in advance of the end of this initial
5-year period, it will continue to be in effect from year to year until terminated
by agreement of the Parties or by either Party upon 3 months notice prior to the
end of each subsequent year.
2. Should disagreement arise from the interpretation or implementation of
this Agreement or of the Supplementary Agreements, the Parties shall begin
consultations immediately in order to resolve the matter.
3. Either Party may propose, should it find necessary, in writing, the amend-
ment or revision of this Agreement or any of the Supplementary Agreements.
In this case, consultations shall begin immediately. If no result is reached in
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three months, either Party may terminate the Agreement or the Supplementary
Agreement in question upon notice in writing of 30 days.
4. In the event that one of the Parties concludes that the other Party is
not complying or is unable to comply with the provisions of this Agreement or
its Supplementary Agreements, it may propose, in writing, consultations, which
will begin immediately. If no result is reached within 30 days, either Party may
terminate upon notice in writing of 30 days this Agreement or any of the Sup-
plementary Agreements without prejudicing the validity of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This Agreement and the Supplementary Agreements annexed to it shall come
into effect on the date of exchange of notes in accordance with respective legal
procedures.
ARTICLE IX
Done at Ankara in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of
which shall be equally authentic, on this 29th day of March, 1980.
JAMES W. SPAIN, Ambassador of the United States of America, for the
Government of The United States of America
HAYRETTIN ERKMEN, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the Government of
The Republic of Turkey
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APPENDIX I
U.S.-TURKISH TRADE RELATIONS
Between 1960 and 1975 Turkey was trying to develop its economy through
rapid industrialization under the five-year development plans which were prepared
by the State Planning Organization. Therefore, Turkey's industry was heavily
dependent on imports of machinery, spare parts and fuel. The first five-year
plan (1963-1967) predicted that the export of traditional agricultural products
would increase and that investment projects would cause an increase in the im-
port, of machinery and other investment products.' 50° Even the third five-year
plan (1973-1977), which aimed at a considerable increase in the export of manu-
factured goods and in their share of the total exports, predicted that Turkey still
would import manufactured and investment goods in large amounts. 1501 These
predictions proved correct: major Turkish imports in 1960-75 comprised the fol-
lowing items: 1- Non-electric machinery. 2- Iron and steel products. 3- Means
of transport (including motor vehicles). 4- Crude oil and petroleum products.
4- Electrical machinery. 5- Rubber and plastics products. 6- Agriculture-based
processed products. 7- Cereal (including wheat). 8- Textiles. Turkey's exports
were: 1- Cotton. 2- Tobacco. 3- Hazelnuts. 4- Raisins. 5- Minerals (including
chromium). 6- Textiles. 7- Food beverages. 8- Industrial products.'502
In the period of our study, as an industrialized, developed country, the United
States was one of the leading powers in the export of manufactured goods though
manufactures also occupied the most important place in her imports. Major U.S.
exports were: 1- Machinery. 2- Automobiles and parts. 3- Aircraft and parts. 4-
Iron and steel products. 5- Chemicals. 6- Electrical, construction and agricultural
machinery. 7- Fuels. 8- Wheat. Major U.S. imports were: 1- Machinery. 2-
Transport equipment. 3- Petroleum products. 4- Forest products. 5- Iron and
steel products. 6- Chemicals. 7- Coffee. The percentages of categories in U.S.
1500 Kalkinma Plani; Birinci Be Yzi 1963-1967, T.C. Babakanhk Deviet Planlama
Teki1ati, Ankara: Babakanhk Matbaasi, January 1963, p.509.
'5°' Yeni Strateji ye Kalkznrna Plani; Uçiincü Be Yil, T.C. Babakan1ik Deviet Planlama
Teki1ati, Ankara, 1973, pp.187, 189-190.
1502 Z.Y. Hershiag, Turkey: the Challenge of Growth, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968, pp.370-371,
Z. Hatibo1u, An Unconventional Analszs of Turkish Economy, Istaibul: Aktif
Büro Basnn Organizasyon, 1978, pp.109-112, lurkey: Prospects and 1-'roblems of an
Expanding Economy, Washington: the World Bank, 1975, pp.346-348.
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exports and imports respectively were the following: 1- Finished manufactures:
60.2 and 44.6. 2- Semi-manufactures: 15.1 and 22.1. 3- Crude materials: 10.7
and 16.0. 4- Crude foodstuffs: 8.6 and 8.8. 5- Manufactured foodstuffs: 5.5 and
971503
Trade relations between the USA and Turkey in the 1960-1975 period fit
trade patterns of both countries, which are mentioned above, and demonstrate
that the U.S.-Turkish trade was complementary rather than competitive. Tables
4 and 5 show items of the U.S.-Turkish trade. In 1960-75, while Turkey exported
to the United States agricultural products (mainly tobacco and various fruits,
vegetables and nuts), some raw minerals and metals, animal products, textile and
cereals, U.S. exports to Turkey included mainly manufactured goods: machinery
(including electrical machinery), road vehicles and other transport equipment,
cereals (mainly wheat), chemicals, petroleum and products, metal manufactures,
iron and steel, textiles and rubber manufactures. The two countries had no
competition in any trade products. Although Turkey was an agriculture country,
its cereal (especially wheat) export was not considerable in 1960-75 and she had to
import wheat in bad harvest seasons. As a wheat exporter, the United States met
Turkey's this need under a special arrangement' 504 rather than being a competitor
of Turkey in this field. Turkey's textile exports, too, were not great enough in
this period to cause problems between the two countries.
1503 R.K. Vedder, the American Economy in Historical Perspective, Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Co. Inc., 1976, p.404, W. Woodruff, America's Impact on the World, Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1975, pp.265-266, W.H. Branson, Trends in United States Inter-
national Trade and Investment Since World War II in M. Feldstein (ed.),
The Amercan Economy in Transition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1980, pp.196, 200-201, 222-225.
1504 See p.137 of this thesis.
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Table 4: TURKISH EXPORTS TO THE USA (monthly averages,
000 dollars)
	Item	 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Tobacco and manufactures 4,284 4,295 3,791 3,838 3,670 4,686 4,964 3,888
Fruits, vegetables, nuts	 889 679 648 614 572 628 429 347
Metalliferous ores, scrap 	 286 262 378 137 174 261 102 234
Base metals, mainly copper 100
	 12	 -	 -	 -	 523 218 136
Wool and other animal haii 216 137 83 143 105 29
	 34	 12
Animal and veg. oils, fats 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 31	 75	 10	 60
Textile manufactures	 10	 8	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Cereals and products 	 -	 -	 -	 2	 1	 -	 -	 9
	
Total	 6,284 5j19 5,8685,2155,0386,8226,8756,553
	
Item	 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Tobacco and manufactures 6,35E 3,815 3,56 2,846 6,71 5,993 6,701 7,896
Fruits, vegetables, nuts 	 844 702 643 708 1,449 1,488 1,097 1,221
Metalliferous ores, scrap 	 258 289 615 874 243 431	 448	 905
Base metals, mainly copper 66 103 22
	 34 240	 56	 69	 175
	Wool and other animal haij 11
	 3	 2	 -	 37	 3	 1	 -
Animal and veg. oils, fats 	 4	 3	 -	 1	 -	 35	 144	 2
Textile manufactures 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 85	 123	 123	 253
Cereals and products 	 18	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
	
Total	 8,283 5,631 5,091 7,551 8,836 10,767 11,766 12,06
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Table 5: TURKISH IMPORTS FROM USA (monthly averages,
000 dollars)	 _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ ____ _____
Item	 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Machinery, non-electric	 3,334 1,896 3,134 5,265 2,649 2,985 4,16 3,345
Electric machinery	 471	 475	 672 1,764 604 1,199 1,288 988
Road vehicles	 2,783 884 1,213 1,165 900 1,473 2,02r 2.071
Other transport equipment	 -	 -	 18	 72	 489	 723	 60	 137
Cereals and products 	 3,980 4,534 5,012 2,824 768 1,680 2,92	 103
Chemicals	 371	 447	 982	 796	 971	 943 918 801
Petroleum and products 	 489	 580	 672	 657	 747	 737 615 865
Metal manufactures	 156	 209	 612	 569	 179	 272 212 173
Iron and steel	 264	 257	 572	 775 1,139 659 505 147
Textiles	 10	 10	 369	 206	 727	 521 298 241
Rubber manufactures	 374	 283	 350	 260	 165	 93	 90	 120
Total	 13,72' 10,604 16,132 17,982 13,389 13,360 	 -	 -
Item	 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Machinery, non-electric	 3,104 2,541 2,677 2,980 4,165 4,386 6,81( 16,250
Electric machinery	 999 1,288 1,676 1,180 1,478 1,479 1,90k 2,810
Road vehicles	 1,910 1,786 1,332 639 1,890 2,448 2,81 6,845
Other transport equipment 893 1,053 1,119 1,519 2,267 2,457 4,438 1,585
Cereals and products 	 148 2,141 2,938 2,598 264 3,089 7,78 5,139
Chemicals	 967	 789	 691	 695	 631 1,235 1,450 3,195
Petroleum and products 	 704	 510	 700	 466	 549	 249 380 523
Metal manufactures	 166	 186	 438	 401	 211	 204 236 924
Iron and steel	 172	 322	 751	 843	 106	 292 860 704
Textiles	 105	 16	 68	 38	 27	 29	 31	 84
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Item	 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Rubber manufactures 117	 66	 36	 65	 53	 90	 157	 368
Total	 25,058 24,861 23,228 22,378 25,021 28,920 38,54' 50,61
Source: Quarterly Economic Review, Turkey, November 1961, No.40, p.15,
June 1964, No.50, p.15, June 1966, No.2, p.18, June 1968, No.2, p.12, June 1970,
No.2, p.17, June 1972, No.2, p.13, September 1972, No.3, p.12, June 1974, No.2,
p.11, September 1976, No.3, p.16.
The total value of the U.S.-Turkish trade in U.S. dollars can be seen in Tables
4 and 5. Table 6 shows the value of this trade in Turkish liras. The trade with the
USA held a considerable place in Turkey's total exports and imports. Although
the USA's share in Turkey's exports and imports fell constantly in the 1960s and
the 1970s (see Table 7), she, as a single trade partner, maintained her importance
for Turkey's trade. On the other hand, Turkey was not a significant trade partner
of the United States. In 1970 her share was 0.7 percent in U.S. export and 0.1
in U.S. import. (This figures became 0.2 and 0.1 in 1978).'° There was no
significant disagreement in the economic field between the United States and
Turkey in 1960-75 because there was no fierce competition between them in the
trade of any products and Turkey's share in the U.S. was not important. Only the
amount of U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey and the use of economic aid
by U.S. authorities as a leverage against Turkey brought problems as explained
in different parts of the thesis.
'° J. Agnew. the United States in the World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987, p.144.
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Table 6: TURKEY'S TRADE WITH USA (000 TL)
-	 1960	 1961	 1962	 1963	 1964	 1965	 1966	 1967
Import 546342 1260835 163113 1904630 1403371 1458606 156718 111440C
Export 292556 586841 674069 448049 656885 740965 722156 836390
-	 1968	 1969	 1970	 1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975
Import 1095208 1152964	 -	 1951630 2494341 2545112 481347 598094
Export 652798 538962	 -	 914646 1374859 1797120 1997626 2104976
Source: Dz Ticaret Yillzk Istatistik, T.C. Babakanhk Deviet Istatistik En-
stitiisü, 1961-1962, p.xxv, 1963-1964, p.xxi, 1965-1966, p.xxiii, 1967-1968, p.xxiii,
1969, p.xxv, 1975-1976, p.xxv.
Table 7: US SHARE IN TURKISH TRADE (percent of total value)
-	 1960 1961 1962 19& 1964 1965 1966 196
Export 17.2 18.8 19.6 13.5 17.8 18 	 16	 18
Import 25.8 27.5 29.1 30.6 28.7 28 	 24 26
-	 1968 196 197( 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Export 15 12 12 10 12 10	 9	 10
Import 16 20 19 14 12 11	 7	 9
Source: Quarterly Economic Review Annual Supplement, Turkey, June 1961,
p.9, June 1963, p.11, June 1965, p.15, 1967, p.16, 1969, p.19, 1971, p.23, 1973,
p.23, 1975, p.24, 1976, p.24.
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